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259 results on '"Talgam-Cohen, Inbal"'

101. Why Prices Need Algorithms.

Author

ROUGHGARDEN, TIM and TALGAM-COHEN, INBAL

Subjects
ALGORITHMS, PRICES, GAME theory
Abstract

Understanding when equilibria are guaranteed to exist is a central theme in economic theory, seemingly unrelated to computation. This paper shows that the existence of pricing equilibria is inextricably connected to the computational complexity of related optimization problems: demand oracles, revenue-maximization, and welfare-maximization. This relationship implies, under suitable complexity assumptions, a host of impossibility results. We also suggest a complexity-theoretic explanation for the lack of useful extensions of the Walrasian equilibrium concept: such extensions seem to require the invention of novel polynomial-time algorithms for welfare-maximization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Published
2015
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106. Modularity and Greed in Double Auctions.

Author

DÜTTING, PAUL, ROUGHGARDEN, TIM, and TALGAM-COHEN, INBAL

Subjects
AUCTIONS, LABOR incentives, STOCK purchase agreements (Close corporations), APPROXIMATION theory, SUPPLY & demand
Abstract

Designing double auctions is a complex problem, especially when there are restrictions on the sets of buyers and sellers that may trade with one another. The goal of this paper is to develop “black-box reductions” from double-auction design to the exhaustively-studied problem of designing single-sided mechanisms. We consider several desirable properties of a double auction: feasibility, dominant-strategy incentivecompability, the still stronger incentive constraints offered by a deferred-acceptance implementation, exact and approximate welfare maximization, and budget-balance. For each of these properties, we identify sufficient conditions on the two one-sided mechanisms — one for the buyers, one for the sellers — and on the method of composition, that guarantee the desired property of the double auction. Our framework also offers new insights into classic double-auction designs, such as the VCG and McAfee auctions with unit-demand buyers and unit-supply sellers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Published
2014
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112. Optimal and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values.

Author

ROUGHGARDEN, TIM and TALGAM-COHEN, INBAL

Subjects
OPTIMAL designs (Statistics), AUCTION theory, LABOR incentives, GAME theory, BIDDERS, MATHEMATICAL models
Abstract

The article presents a study which investigates the use of optimal and near-optimal mechanism design in generalizing the standard setting of interdependent and private values. Topics discussed include application of Myerson's optimal auction theory in evaluating many interdependent settings, the characterization of ex post incentive compatible (IC) and individually rational (IR) mechanisms, and the use of mechanism design theory in defining the rules of the game being played by bidders.

Published
2013

113. Supply-Limiting Mechanisms.

Author

Roughgarden, Tim, Talgam-Cohen, Inbal, and Qiqi Yan

Subjects
INTERNET auctions, BUSINESS revenue, BID price, VALUATION, BAYESIAN analysis
Abstract

Most results in revenue-maximizing auction design hinge on "getting the price right" - offering goods to bidders at a price low enough to encourage a sale, but high enough to garner non-trivial revenue. Getting the price right can be hard work, especially when the seller has little or no a priori information about bidders' valuations. A simple alternative approach is to "let the market do the work", and have prices emerge from competition for scarce goods. The simplest-imaginable implementation of this idea is the following: first, if necessary, impose an artificial limit on the number of goods that can be sold; second, run the welfare-maximizing VCG mechanism subject to this limit. We prove that such "supply-limiting mechanisms" achieve near-optimal expected revenue in a range of single- and multi-parameter Bayesian settings. Indeed, despite their simplicity, we prove that they essen- tially match the state-of-the-art in prior-independent mechanism design. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Published
2012

114. Ad auctions with data.

Author

Hu Fu, Jordan, Patrick, Mahdian, Mohammad, Nadav, Uri, Talgam-Cohen, Inbal, and Vassilvitskii, Sergei

Abstract

The holy grail of online advertising is to target users with ads matched to their needs with such precision that the users respond to the ads, thereby increasing both advertisers' and users' value. The current approach to this challenge utilizes information about the users: their gender, their location, the websites they have visited before, and so on. Incorporating this data in ad auctions poses an economic challenge: can this be done in a way that the auctioneer's revenue does not decrease (at least on average)? This is the problem we study in this paper. Our main result is that in Myerson's optimal mechanism, additional data leads to additional revenue. However in simpler auctions, namely the second price auction with reserve prices, there are instances in which additional data decreases the revenue, albeit by only a small constant factor. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Published
2012
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115. Simple versus optimal contracts

Author

Dütting, Paul, Roughgarden, Tim, Talgam-Cohen, Inbal, Dütting, Paul, Roughgarden, Tim, and Talgam-Cohen, Inbal

Abstract

We consider the classic principal-agent model of contract theory, in which a principal designs an outcomedependent compensation scheme to incentivize an agent to take a costly and unobservable action. When all of the model parameters-including the full distribution over principal rewards resulting from each agent action-are known to the designer, an optimal contract can in principle be computed by linear programming. In addition to their demanding informational requirements, however, such optimal contracts are often complex and unintuitive, and do not resemble contracts used in practice. This paper examines contract theory through the theoretical computer science lens, with the goal of developing novel theory to explain and justify the prevalence of relatively simple contracts, such as linear (pure commission) contracts. First, we consider the case where the principal knows only the first moment of each action's reward distribution, and we prove that linear contracts are guaranteed to be worst-case optimal, ranging over all reward distributions consistent with the given moments. Second, we study linear contracts from a worst-case approximation perspective, and prove several tight parameterized approximation bounds.

116. Modularity and greed in double auctions

Author

Dütting, Paul, Talgam-Cohen, Inbal, Roughgarden, Tim, Dütting, Paul, Talgam-Cohen, Inbal, and Roughgarden, Tim

Abstract

Designing double auctions is a complex problem, especially when there are restrictions on the sets of buyers and sellers that may trade with one another. The goal of this paper is to develop a modular approach to the design of double auctions, by relating it to the exhaustively-studied problem of designing one-sided mechanisms with a single seller (or, alternatively, a single buyer). We consider several desirable properties of a double auction: feasibility, dominant-strategy incentive compatibility, the still stronger incentive constraints offered by a deferred-acceptance implementation, exact and approximate welfare maximization, and budget balance. For each of these properties, we identify sufficient conditions on two one-sided algorithms—one for ranking the buyers, one for ranking the sellers—and on a method for their composition into trading pairs, which guarantee the desired property of the double auction. Our framework also offers new insights into classic double auction designs, such as the VCG and McAfee auctions with unit-demand buyers and unit-supply sellers.

117. Gross Substitutes.

Author

Paes Leme, Renato and Talgam-Cohen, Inbal

Subjects
ELECTRONIC commerce, PROBLEM solving
Published
2018

119. Envy-free Division of Multi-layered Cakes

Author

Igarashi, Ayumi, Meunier, Frédéric, Goos, Gerhard, Founding Editor, Hartmanis, Juris, Founding Editor, Bertino, Elisa, Editorial Board Member, Gao, Wen, Editorial Board Member, Steffen, Bernhard, Editorial Board Member, Woeginger, Gerhard, Editorial Board Member, Yung, Moti, Editorial Board Member, Feldman, Michal, editor, Fu, Hu, editor, and Talgam-Cohen, Inbal, editor

Published
2022
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120. Computing Envy-Freeable Allocations with Limited Subsidies

Author

Caragiannis, Ioannis, Ioannidis, Stavros D., Goos, Gerhard, Founding Editor, Hartmanis, Juris, Founding Editor, Bertino, Elisa, Editorial Board Member, Gao, Wen, Editorial Board Member, Steffen, Bernhard, Editorial Board Member, Woeginger, Gerhard, Editorial Board Member, Yung, Moti, Editorial Board Member, Feldman, Michal, editor, Fu, Hu, editor, and Talgam-Cohen, Inbal, editor

Published
2022
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121. The Distortion of Distributed Metric Social Choice

Author

Anshelevich, Elliot, Filos-Ratsikas, Aris, Voudouris, Alexandros A., Goos, Gerhard, Founding Editor, Hartmanis, Juris, Founding Editor, Bertino, Elisa, Editorial Board Member, Gao, Wen, Editorial Board Member, Steffen, Bernhard, Editorial Board Member, Woeginger, Gerhard, Editorial Board Member, Yung, Moti, Editorial Board Member, Feldman, Michal, editor, Fu, Hu, editor, and Talgam-Cohen, Inbal, editor

Published
2022
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122. Eliciting Social Knowledge for Creditworthiness Assessment

Author

York, Mark, Dahleh, Munther, Parkes, David C., Goos, Gerhard, Founding Editor, Hartmanis, Juris, Founding Editor, Bertino, Elisa, Editorial Board Member, Gao, Wen, Editorial Board Member, Steffen, Bernhard, Editorial Board Member, Woeginger, Gerhard, Editorial Board Member, Yung, Moti, Editorial Board Member, Feldman, Michal, editor, Fu, Hu, editor, and Talgam-Cohen, Inbal, editor

Published
2022
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123. Maximal Information Propagation via Lotteries

Author

Chen, Jing, Li, Bo, Goos, Gerhard, Founding Editor, Hartmanis, Juris, Founding Editor, Bertino, Elisa, Editorial Board Member, Gao, Wen, Editorial Board Member, Steffen, Bernhard, Editorial Board Member, Woeginger, Gerhard, Editorial Board Member, Yung, Moti, Editorial Board Member, Feldman, Michal, editor, Fu, Hu, editor, and Talgam-Cohen, Inbal, editor

Published
2022
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124. Decentralized Asset Custody Scheme with Security Against Rational Adversary

Author

Chen, Zhaohua, Yang, Guang, Goos, Gerhard, Founding Editor, Hartmanis, Juris, Founding Editor, Bertino, Elisa, Editorial Board Member, Gao, Wen, Editorial Board Member, Steffen, Bernhard, Editorial Board Member, Woeginger, Gerhard, Editorial Board Member, Yung, Moti, Editorial Board Member, Feldman, Michal, editor, Fu, Hu, editor, and Talgam-Cohen, Inbal, editor

Published
2022
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125. The Platform Design Problem

Author

Papadimitriou, Christos, Vodrahalli, Kiran, Yannakakis, Mihalis, Goos, Gerhard, Founding Editor, Hartmanis, Juris, Founding Editor, Bertino, Elisa, Editorial Board Member, Gao, Wen, Editorial Board Member, Steffen, Bernhard, Editorial Board Member, Woeginger, Gerhard, Editorial Board Member, Yung, Moti, Editorial Board Member, Feldman, Michal, editor, Fu, Hu, editor, and Talgam-Cohen, Inbal, editor

Published
2022
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126. Improved Analysis of RANKING for Online Vertex-Weighted Bipartite Matching in the Random Order Model

Author

Jin, Billy, Williamson, David P., Goos, Gerhard, Founding Editor, Hartmanis, Juris, Founding Editor, Bertino, Elisa, Editorial Board Member, Gao, Wen, Editorial Board Member, Steffen, Bernhard, Editorial Board Member, Woeginger, Gerhard, Editorial Board Member, Yung, Moti, Editorial Board Member, Feldman, Michal, editor, Fu, Hu, editor, and Talgam-Cohen, Inbal, editor

Published
2022
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127. Default Ambiguity: Finding the Best Solution to the Clearing Problem

Author

Papp, Pál András, Wattenhofer, Roger, Goos, Gerhard, Founding Editor, Hartmanis, Juris, Founding Editor, Bertino, Elisa, Editorial Board Member, Gao, Wen, Editorial Board Member, Steffen, Bernhard, Editorial Board Member, Woeginger, Gerhard, Editorial Board Member, Yung, Moti, Editorial Board Member, Feldman, Michal, editor, Fu, Hu, editor, and Talgam-Cohen, Inbal, editor

Published
2022
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128. Planning on an Empty Stomach: On Agents with Projection Bias

Author

Oren, Sigal, Sklar, Nadav, Goos, Gerhard, Founding Editor, Hartmanis, Juris, Founding Editor, Bertino, Elisa, Editorial Board Member, Gao, Wen, Editorial Board Member, Steffen, Bernhard, Editorial Board Member, Woeginger, Gerhard, Editorial Board Member, Yung, Moti, Editorial Board Member, Feldman, Michal, editor, Fu, Hu, editor, and Talgam-Cohen, Inbal, editor

Published
2022
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129. A Tight Negative Example for MMS Fair Allocations

Author

Feige, Uriel, Sapir, Ariel, Tauber, Laliv, Goos, Gerhard, Founding Editor, Hartmanis, Juris, Founding Editor, Bertino, Elisa, Editorial Board Member, Gao, Wen, Editorial Board Member, Steffen, Bernhard, Editorial Board Member, Woeginger, Gerhard, Editorial Board Member, Yung, Moti, Editorial Board Member, Feldman, Michal, editor, Fu, Hu, editor, and Talgam-Cohen, Inbal, editor

Published
2022
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130. Approximating Nash Social Welfare Under Binary XOS and Binary Subadditive Valuations

Author

Barman, Siddharth, Verma, Paritosh, Goos, Gerhard, Founding Editor, Hartmanis, Juris, Founding Editor, Bertino, Elisa, Editorial Board Member, Gao, Wen, Editorial Board Member, Steffen, Bernhard, Editorial Board Member, Woeginger, Gerhard, Editorial Board Member, Yung, Moti, Editorial Board Member, Feldman, Michal, editor, Fu, Hu, editor, and Talgam-Cohen, Inbal, editor

Published
2022
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131. A Consumer-Theoretic Characterization of Fisher Market Equilibria

Author

Goktas, Denizalp, Viqueira, Enrique Areyan, Greenwald, Amy, Goos, Gerhard, Founding Editor, Hartmanis, Juris, Founding Editor, Bertino, Elisa, Editorial Board Member, Gao, Wen, Editorial Board Member, Steffen, Bernhard, Editorial Board Member, Woeginger, Gerhard, Editorial Board Member, Yung, Moti, Editorial Board Member, Feldman, Michal, editor, Fu, Hu, editor, and Talgam-Cohen, Inbal, editor

Published
2022
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132. Mechanisms for Trading Durable Goods

Author

Oren, Sigal, Roth, Oren, Goos, Gerhard, Founding Editor, Hartmanis, Juris, Founding Editor, Bertino, Elisa, Editorial Board Member, Gao, Wen, Editorial Board Member, Steffen, Bernhard, Editorial Board Member, Woeginger, Gerhard, Editorial Board Member, Yung, Moti, Editorial Board Member, Feldman, Michal, editor, Fu, Hu, editor, and Talgam-Cohen, Inbal, editor

Published
2022
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133. Threshold Tests as Quality Signals: Optimal Strategies, Equilibria, and Price of Anarchy

Author

Banerjee, Siddhartha, Kempe, David, Kleinberg, Robert, Goos, Gerhard, Founding Editor, Hartmanis, Juris, Founding Editor, Bertino, Elisa, Editorial Board Member, Gao, Wen, Editorial Board Member, Steffen, Bernhard, Editorial Board Member, Woeginger, Gerhard, Editorial Board Member, Yung, Moti, Editorial Board Member, Feldman, Michal, editor, Fu, Hu, editor, and Talgam-Cohen, Inbal, editor

Published
2022
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134. Formal Barriers to Simple Algorithms for the Matroid Secretary Problem

Author

Bahrani, Maryam, Beyhaghi, Hedyeh, Singla, Sahil, Weinberg, S. Matthew, Goos, Gerhard, Founding Editor, Hartmanis, Juris, Founding Editor, Bertino, Elisa, Editorial Board Member, Gao, Wen, Editorial Board Member, Steffen, Bernhard, Editorial Board Member, Woeginger, Gerhard, Editorial Board Member, Yung, Moti, Editorial Board Member, Feldman, Michal, editor, Fu, Hu, editor, and Talgam-Cohen, Inbal, editor

Published
2022
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135. The Core of Housing Markets from an Agent’s Perspective: Is It Worth Sprucing Up Your Home?

Author

Schlotter, Ildikó, Biró, Péter, Fleiner, Tamás, Goos, Gerhard, Founding Editor, Hartmanis, Juris, Founding Editor, Bertino, Elisa, Editorial Board Member, Gao, Wen, Editorial Board Member, Steffen, Bernhard, Editorial Board Member, Woeginger, Gerhard, Editorial Board Member, Yung, Moti, Editorial Board Member, Feldman, Michal, editor, Fu, Hu, editor, and Talgam-Cohen, Inbal, editor

Published
2022
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136. Beyond Pigouvian Taxes: A Worst Case Analysis

Author

Babaioff, Moshe, Mundel, Ruty, Nisan, Noam, Goos, Gerhard, Founding Editor, Hartmanis, Juris, Founding Editor, Bertino, Elisa, Editorial Board Member, Gao, Wen, Editorial Board Member, Steffen, Bernhard, Editorial Board Member, Woeginger, Gerhard, Editorial Board Member, Yung, Moti, Editorial Board Member, Feldman, Michal, editor, Fu, Hu, editor, and Talgam-Cohen, Inbal, editor

Published
2022
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137. Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents: Pure Nash Equilibria and Fairness

Author

Amanatidis, Georgios, Birmpas, Georgios, Fusco, Federico, Lazos, Philip, Leonardi, Stefano, Reiffenhäuser, Rebecca, Goos, Gerhard, Founding Editor, Hartmanis, Juris, Founding Editor, Bertino, Elisa, Editorial Board Member, Gao, Wen, Editorial Board Member, Steffen, Bernhard, Editorial Board Member, Woeginger, Gerhard, Editorial Board Member, Yung, Moti, Editorial Board Member, Feldman, Michal, editor, Fu, Hu, editor, and Talgam-Cohen, Inbal, editor

Published
2022
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138. Contract Design for Afforestation Programs

Author

Dai Li, Wanyi, Immorlica, Nicole, Lucier, Brendan, Goos, Gerhard, Founding Editor, Hartmanis, Juris, Founding Editor, Bertino, Elisa, Editorial Board Member, Gao, Wen, Editorial Board Member, Steffen, Bernhard, Editorial Board Member, Woeginger, Gerhard, Editorial Board Member, Yung, Moti, Editorial Board Member, Feldman, Michal, editor, Fu, Hu, editor, and Talgam-Cohen, Inbal, editor

Published
2022
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139. On Symmetries in Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design

Author

Essaidi, Meryem, Weinberg, S. Matthew, Goos, Gerhard, Founding Editor, Hartmanis, Juris, Founding Editor, Bertino, Elisa, Editorial Board Member, Gao, Wen, Editorial Board Member, Steffen, Bernhard, Editorial Board Member, Woeginger, Gerhard, Editorial Board Member, Yung, Moti, Editorial Board Member, Feldman, Michal, editor, Fu, Hu, editor, and Talgam-Cohen, Inbal, editor

Published
2022
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140. Welfare-Preserving -BIC to BIC Transformation with Negligible Revenue Loss

Author

Conitzer, Vincent, Feng, Zhe, Parkes, David C., Sodomka, Eric, Goos, Gerhard, Founding Editor, Hartmanis, Juris, Founding Editor, Bertino, Elisa, Editorial Board Member, Gao, Wen, Editorial Board Member, Steffen, Bernhard, Editorial Board Member, Woeginger, Gerhard, Editorial Board Member, Yung, Moti, Editorial Board Member, Feldman, Michal, editor, Fu, Hu, editor, and Talgam-Cohen, Inbal, editor

Published
2022
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141. Bayesian Persuasion in Sequential Trials

Author

Su, Shih-Tang, Subramanian, Vijay G., Schoenebeck, Grant, Goos, Gerhard, Founding Editor, Hartmanis, Juris, Founding Editor, Bertino, Elisa, Editorial Board Member, Gao, Wen, Editorial Board Member, Steffen, Bernhard, Editorial Board Member, Woeginger, Gerhard, Editorial Board Member, Yung, Moti, Editorial Board Member, Feldman, Michal, editor, Fu, Hu, editor, and Talgam-Cohen, Inbal, editor

Published
2022
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142. Strategyproof Facility Location in Perturbation Stable Instances

Author

Fotakis, Dimitris, Patsilinakos, Panagiotis, Goos, Gerhard, Founding Editor, Hartmanis, Juris, Founding Editor, Bertino, Elisa, Editorial Board Member, Gao, Wen, Editorial Board Member, Steffen, Bernhard, Editorial Board Member, Woeginger, Gerhard, Editorial Board Member, Yung, Moti, Editorial Board Member, Feldman, Michal, editor, Fu, Hu, editor, and Talgam-Cohen, Inbal, editor

Published
2022
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143. Relaxing the Independence Assumption in Sequential Posted Pricing, Prophet Inequality, and Random Bipartite Matching

Author

Caragiannis, Ioannis, Gravin, Nick, Lu, Pinyan, Wang, Zihe, Goos, Gerhard, Founding Editor, Hartmanis, Juris, Founding Editor, Bertino, Elisa, Editorial Board Member, Gao, Wen, Editorial Board Member, Steffen, Bernhard, Editorial Board Member, Woeginger, Gerhard, Editorial Board Member, Yung, Moti, Editorial Board Member, Feldman, Michal, editor, Fu, Hu, editor, and Talgam-Cohen, Inbal, editor

Published
2022
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144. The Optimality of Upgrade Pricing

Author

Bergemann, Dirk, Bonatti, Alessandro, Haupt, Andreas, Smolin, Alex, Goos, Gerhard, Founding Editor, Hartmanis, Juris, Founding Editor, Bertino, Elisa, Editorial Board Member, Gao, Wen, Editorial Board Member, Steffen, Bernhard, Editorial Board Member, Woeginger, Gerhard, Editorial Board Member, Yung, Moti, Editorial Board Member, Feldman, Michal, editor, Fu, Hu, editor, and Talgam-Cohen, Inbal, editor

Published
2022
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145. Two-Way Greedy: Algorithms for Imperfect Rationality

Author

Ferraioli, Diodato, Penna, Paolo, Ventre, Carmine, Goos, Gerhard, Founding Editor, Hartmanis, Juris, Founding Editor, Bertino, Elisa, Editorial Board Member, Gao, Wen, Editorial Board Member, Steffen, Bernhard, Editorial Board Member, Woeginger, Gerhard, Editorial Board Member, Yung, Moti, Editorial Board Member, Feldman, Michal, editor, Fu, Hu, editor, and Talgam-Cohen, Inbal, editor

Published
2022
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146. On the Benefits of Being Constrained When Receiving Signals

Author

Su, Shih-Tang, Kempe, David, Subramanian, Vijay G., Goos, Gerhard, Founding Editor, Hartmanis, Juris, Founding Editor, Bertino, Elisa, Editorial Board Member, Gao, Wen, Editorial Board Member, Steffen, Bernhard, Editorial Board Member, Woeginger, Gerhard, Editorial Board Member, Yung, Moti, Editorial Board Member, Feldman, Michal, editor, Fu, Hu, editor, and Talgam-Cohen, Inbal, editor

Published
2022
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147. Towards a Characterization of Worst Case Equilibria in the Discriminatory Price Auction

Author

Markakis, Evangelos, Sgouritsa, Alkmini, Tsikiridis, Artem, Goos, Gerhard, Founding Editor, Hartmanis, Juris, Founding Editor, Bertino, Elisa, Editorial Board Member, Gao, Wen, Editorial Board Member, Steffen, Bernhard, Editorial Board Member, Woeginger, Gerhard, Editorial Board Member, Yung, Moti, Editorial Board Member, Feldman, Michal, editor, Fu, Hu, editor, and Talgam-Cohen, Inbal, editor

Published
2022
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