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Since the introduction of Meltdown and Spectre, the research community has been tirelessly working on speculative side-channel attacks and on how to shield computer systems from them. To ensure that a system is protected not only from all the currently known attacks but also from future, yet to be discovered, attacks, the solutions developed need to be general in nature, covering a wide array of system components, while at the same time keeping the performance, energy, area, and implementation complexity costs at a minimum. One such solution is our own delay-on-miss, which efficiently protects the memory hierarchy by i) selectively delaying speculative load instructions and ii) utilizing value prediction as an invisible form of speculation. In this article we dive deeper into delay-on-miss, offering insights into why and how it affects the performance of the system. We also reevaluate value prediction as an invisible form of speculation. Specifically, we focus on the implications that delaying memory loads has in the memory level parallelism of the system and how this affects the value predictor and the overall performance of the system. We present new, updated results but more importantly, we also offer deeper insight into why delay-on-miss works so well and what this means for the future of secure speculative execution. © 2020 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works.

Over the past three decades, the parallel applications of the Splash-2 benchmark suite have been instrumental in advancing multiprocessor research. Recently, the Splash-3 benchmarks eliminated performance bugs, data races, and improper synchronization that plagued Splash-2 benchmarks after the definition of the C memory model. In this work, we revisit the Splash-3 benchmarks and adapt them for contemporary architectures with atomic operations and lock-free constructs. With our changes, we improve the scalability of most benchmarks for up to 32 and 64 cores, showing an improvement of up to 9x in actual machines, and up to 5x in simulation, over the unmodified Splash-3 benchmarks. To denote the substantive nature of the improvements in the Splash-3 benchmarks and to re-introduce them in contemporary research, we refer to the new collection as Splash_4.11GitHub repository: https://github.com/OdnetninI/Splash-4

Speculative side-channel attacks consist of two parts: The speculative instructions that abuse speculative execution to gain illegal access to sensitive data and the side-channel instructions that leak the sensitive data. Typically, the side-channel instructions are assumed to follow the speculative instructions and be dependent on them. Speculative side-channel defenses have taken advantage of these facts to construct solutions where speculative execution is limited only under the presence of these conditions, in an effort to limit the performance overheads introduced by the defense mechanisms.Unfortunately, it turns out that only focusing on dependent instructions enables a new set of attacks, referred to as “speculative interference attacks”. These are a new variant of speculative side-channel attacks, where the side-channel instructions are placed before the point of misspeculation and hence before any illegal speculative instructions. As this breaks the previous assumptions on how speculative side-channel attacks work, this new attack variant can be used to bypass many of the existing defenses.We argue that the root cause of speculative interference is a priority inversion between the scheduling of older, bound to be committed, and younger, bound to be squashed instructions, which affects the execution order of the former. This priority inversion can be caused by affecting either the readiness of a not-yet-ready older instruction or the issuing priority of an older instruction after it becomes ready. We disrupt the opportunity for speculative interference by ensuring that current defenses adequately prevent the interference of younger instructions with the availability of operands to older instructions and by proposing an instruction scheduling policy to preserve the priority of ready instructions. As a proof of concept, we also demonstrate how the prevention of scheduling-priority inversion can safeguard a specific defense, Delay-on-Miss, from the possibility of speculative interference attacks. We first discuss why it is susceptible to interference attacks and how this can be corrected without introducing any additional performance costs or hardware complexity, with simple instruction scheduling rules.

Achieving low load-to-use latency with low energy and storage overheads is critical for performance. Existing techniques either prefetch into the pipeline (via address prediction and validation) or provide data reuse in the pipeline (via register sharing or L0 caches). These techniques provide a range of tradeoffs between latency, reuse, and overhead. In this work, we present a pipeline prefetching technique that achieves state-of-the-art performance and data reuse without additional data storage, data movement, or validation overheads by adding address tags to the register file. Our addition of register file tags allows us to forward (reuse) load data from the register file with no additional data movement, keep the data alive in the register file beyond the instruction’s lifetime to increase temporal reuse, and coalesce prefetch requests to achieve spatial reuse. Further, we show that we can use the existing memory order violation detection hardware to validate prefetches and data forwards without additional overhead. Our design achieves the performance of existing pipeline prefetching while also forwarding 32% of the loads from the register file (compared to 15% in state-of-the-art register sharing), delivering a 16% reduction in L1 dynamic energy (1.6% total processor energy), with an area overhead of less than 0.5%.

Speculative side-channel attacks access sensitive data and use transmitters to leak the data during wrong-path execution. Various defenses have been proposed to prevent such information leakage. However, not all speculatively executed instructions are unsafe: Recent work demonstrates that speculation invariant instructions are independent of speculative control-flow paths and are guaranteed to eventually commit, regardless of the speculation outcome. Compile-time information coupled with run-time mechanisms can then selectively lift defenses for speculation invariant instructions, reclaiming some of the lost performance. Unfortunately, speculation invariant instructions can easily be manipulated by a form of speculative interference to leak information via a new side-channel that we introduce in this paper. We show that forward speculative interference where older speculative instructions interfere with younger speculation invariant instructions effectively turns them into transmitters for secret data accessed during speculation. We demonstrate forward speculative interference on actual hardware, by selectively filling the reorder buffer (ROB) with instructions, pushing speculative invariant instructions in-or-out of the ROB on demand , based on a speculatively accessed secret. This reveals the speculatively accessed secret, as the occupancy of the ROB itself becomes a new speculative side-channel.

Recent architectural approaches that address speculative side-channel attacks aim to prevent software from exposing the microarchitectural state changes of transient execution. The Delay-on-Miss technique is one such approach, which simply delays loads that miss in the L1 cache until they become non-speculative, resulting in no transient changes in the memory hierarchy. However, this costs performance, prompting the use of value prediction (VP) to regain some of the delay.However, the problem cannot be solved by simply introducing a new kind of speculation (value prediction). Value-predicted loads have to be validated, which cannot be commenced until the load becomes non-speculative. Thus, value-predicted loads occupy the same amount of precious core resources (e.g., reorder buffer entries) as Delay-on-Miss. The end result is that VP only yields marginal benefits over Delay-on-Miss.In this paper, our insight is that we can achieve the same goal as VP (increasing performance by providing the value of loads that miss) without incurring its negative side-effect (delaying the release of precious resources), if we can safely, non-speculatively, recompute a value in isolation (without being seen from the outside), so that we do not expose any information by transferring such a value via the memory hierarchy. Value Recomputation, which trades computation for data transfer was previously proposed in an entirely different context: to reduce energy-expensive data transfers in the memory hierarchy. In this paper, we demonstrate the potential of value recomputation in relation to the Delay-on-Miss approach of hiding speculation, discuss the trade-offs, and show that we can achieve the same level of security, reaching 93% of the unsecured baseline performance (5% higher than Delay-on-miss), and exceeding (by 3%) what even an oracular (100% accuracy and coverage) value predictor could do.

We propose a novel approach for hardware-based strict TSO persistency, called TSOPER. We allow a TSO persistency model to freely coalesce values in the caches, by forming atomic groups of cachelines to be persisted. A group persist is initiated for an atomic group if any of its newly written values are exposed to the outside world. A key difference with prior work is that our architecture is based on the concept of a TSO persist buffer, that sits in parallel to the shared LLC, and persists atomic groups directly from private caches to NVM, bypassing the coherence serialization of the LLC. To impose dependencies among atomic groups that are persisted from the private caches to the TSO persist buffer, we introduce a sharing-list coherence protocol that naturally captures the order of coherence operations in its sharing lists, and thus can reconstruct the dependencies among different atomic groups entirely at the private cache level without involving the shared LLC. The combination of the sharing-list coherence and the TSO persist buffer allows persist operations and writes to non-volatile memory to happen in the background and trail the coherence operations. Coherence runs ahead at full speed; persistency follows belatedly. Our evaluation shows that TSOPER provides the same level of reordering as a program-driven relaxed model, hence, approximately the same level of performance, albeit without needing the programmer or compiler to be concerned about false sharing, data-race-free semantics, etc., and guaranteeing all software that can run on top of TSO, automatically persists in TSO.

Increasing demands for energy efficiency constrain emerging hardware. These new hardware trends challenge the established assumptions in code generation and force us to rethink existing software optimization techniques. We propose a cross-layer redesign of the way compilers and the underlying microarchitecture are built and interact, to achieve both performance and high energy efficiency. In this paper, we address one of the main performance bottlenecks—level cache misses—through a software- hardware co-design. Our approach is able to hide memory latency and attain increased memory and instruction level parallelism by orchestrating a non-speculative, execute-ahead paradigm in software (SWOOP). While out-of-order (OoO) architectures attempt to hide memory latency by dynamically reordering instructions, they do so through expensive, power-hungry, speculative mechanisms. We aim to shift this complexity into software, and we build upon compilation techniques inherited from VLIW, software pipelining, mod- ulo scheduling, decoupled access-execution, and software prefetching. In contrast to previous approaches we do not rely on either software or hardware speculation that can be detrimental to efficiency. Our SWOOP compiler is enhanced with lightweight architectural support, thus being able to transform applications that include highly complex control-low and indirect memory accesses. © ACM, 2018. This is the author's version of the work. It is posted here by permission of ACM for your personal use. Not for redistribution. The definitive version was published in ACM Transactions of Computing Education, https://doi.org/10.1145/3296979.3192393

Data-race-free (DRF) parallel programming becomes a standard as newly adopted memory models of mainstream programming languages such as C++ or Java impose data-race-freedom as a requirement. We propose compiler techniques that automatically delineate extended data-race-free (xDRF) regions, namely regions of code that provide the same guarantees as the synchronization-free regions (in the context of DRF codes). xDRF regions stretch across synchronization boundaries, function calls and loop back-edges and preserve the data-race-free semantics, thus increasing the optimization opportunities exposed to the compiler and to the underlying architecture. We further enlarge xDRF regions with a conflict isolation (CI) technique, delineating what we call xDRF-CI regions while preserving the same properties as xDRF regions. Our compiler (1) precisely analyzes the threads’ memory accessing behavior and data sharing in shared-memory, general-purpose parallel applications, (2) isolates data-sharing and (3) marks the limits of xDRF-CI code regions. The contribution of this work consists in a simple but effective method to alleviate the drawbacks of the compiler’s conservative nature in order to be competitive with (and even surpass) an expert in delineating xDRF regions manually. We evaluate the potential of our technique by employing xDRF and xDRF-CI region classification in a state-of-the-art, dual-mode cache coherence protocol. We show that xDRF regions reduce the coherence bookkeeping and enable optimizations for performance (6.4 percent) and energy efficiency (12.2 percent) compared to a standard directory-based coherence protocol. Enhancing the xDRF analysis with the conflict isolation technique improves performance by 7.1 percent and energy efficiency by 15.9 percent.

Building high-performance, next-generation processors require novel techniques to enable improved performance given today's power- and energy-efficiency requirements. Additionally, a widening gap between processor and memory performance makes it even more difficult to improve efficiency with conventional techniques. While out-of-order architectures attempt to hide this memory latency with dynamically reordered instructions, they lack the energy efficiency seen in in-order processors. Thus, our goal is to reorder the instruction stream to avoid stalls and improve utilization for energy efficiency and performance. To accomplish this goal, we propose an enhanced stall-on-use in-order core that improves energy efficiency (and therefore performance in these power-limited designes) through out-of-program-order execution. During long latency loads, the Software Out-of-Order Processing (SWOOP) core exposes additional memory- and instruction-level parallelism to perform useful, non-speculative work. The resulting instruction lookahead of the SWOOP core reaches beyond the conventional fixed-sized processor structures with the help of transparent hardware register contexts. Our results show that SWOOP demonstrates a 34 percent performance improvement on average compared with an in-order, stall-on-use core, with an energy reduction of 23 percent.

In Total Store Order memory consistency (TSO), loads can be speculatively reordered to improve performance. If a load-load reordering is seen by other cores, speculative loads must be squashed and re-executed. In architectures with an unordered interconnection network and directory coherence, this has been the established view for decades. We show, for the first time, that it is not necessary to squash and re-execute speculatively reordered loads in TSO when their reordering is seen. Instead, the reordering can be hidden form other cores by the coherence protocol. The implication is that we can irrevocably bind speculative loads. This allows us to commit reordered loads out-of-order without having to wait (for the loads to become non-speculative) or without having to checkpoint committed state (and rollback if needed), just to ensure correctness in the rare case of some core seeing the reordering. We show that by exposing a reordering to the coherence layer and by appropriately modifying a typical directory protocol we can successfully hide load-load reordering without perceptible performance cost and without deadlock. Our solution is cost-effective and increases the performance of out-of-order commit by a sizable margin, compared to the base case where memory operations are not allowed to commit if the consistency model could be violated.

Out-of-order processors heavily rely on speculation to achieve high performance, allowing instructions to bypass other slower instructions in order to fully utilize the processor's resources. Speculatively executed instructions do not affect the correctness of the application, as they never change the architectural state, but they do affect the micro-architectural behavior of the system. Until recently, these changes were considered to be safe but with the discovery of new security attacks that misuse speculative execution to leak secrete information through observable micro-architectural changes (so called side-channels), this is no longer the case. To solve this issue, a wave of software and hardware mitigations have been proposed, the majority of which delay and/or hide speculative execution until it is deemed to be safe, trading performance for security. These newly enforced restrictions change how speculation is applied and where the performance bottlenecks appear, forcing us to rethink how we design and optimize both the hardware and the software. We observe that many of the state-of-the-art hardware solutions targeting memory systems operate on a common scheme: the visible execution of loads or their dependents is blocked until they become safe to execute. In this work we propose a generally applicable hardware-software extension that focuses on removing the causes of loads' unsafety, generally caused by control and memory dependence speculation. As a result, we manage to make more loads safe to execute at an early stage, which enables us to schedule more loads at a time to overlap their delays and improve performance. We apply our techniques on the state-of-the-art Delay-on-Miss hardware defense and show that we reduce the performance gap to the unsafe baseline by 53% (on average). © ACM, 2020. This is the author's version of the work. It is posted here by permission of ACM for your personal use. Not for redistribution. The definitive version was published here https://doi.org/10.1145/3410463.3414640

Flexible instruction scheduling is essential for performance in out-of-order processors. This is typically achieved by using CAM-based Instruction Queues (IQs) that provide complete flexibility in choosing ready instructions for execution, but at the cost of significant scheduling energy. In this work we seek to reduce the instruction scheduling energy by reducing the depth and width of the IQ. We do so by classifying instructions based on their readiness and criticality, and using this information to bypass the IQ for instructions that will not benefit from its expensive scheduling structures and delay instructions that will not harm performance. Combined, these approaches allow us to offload a significant portion of the instructions from the IQ to much cheaper FIFO-based scheduling structures without hurting performance. As a result we can reduce the IQ depth and width by half, thereby saving energy. Our design, Delay and Bypass (DNB), is the first design to explicitly address both readiness and criticality to reduce scheduling energy. By handling both classes we are able to achieve 95% of the baseline out-of-order performance while only using 33% of the scheduling energy. This represents a significant improvement over previous designs which addressed only criticality or readiness (91%/89% performance at 74%/53% energy). © 2020 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works.

The number of instructions a processor's instruction queue can examine (depth) and the number it can issue together (width) determine its ability to take advantage of the ILP in an application. Unfortunately, increasing either the width or depth of the instruction queue is very costly due to the content-addressable logic needed to wakeup and select instructions out-of-order. This work makes the observation that a large number of instructions have both operands ready at dispatch, and therefore do not benefit from out-of-order scheduling. We leverage this to place such ready-at-dispatch instructions in separate, simpler, in-order FIFO queues for scheduling. With such additional queues, we can reduce the size and width of the expensive out-of-order instruction queue, without reducing the processor's overall issue width and depth. Our design, FIFOrder, is able to steer more than 60% of instructions to the cheaper FIFO queues, providing a 50% energy savings over a traditional out-of-order instruction queue design, while delivering 8% higher performance. FIFOrder MicroArchitecture: Ready-Aware Instruction Scheduling for OoO Processors © 2019 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works.

Speculative execution is necessary for achieving high performance on modern general-purpose CPUs but, starting with Spectre and Meltdown, it has also been proven to cause severe security flaws. In case of a misspeculation, the architectural state is restored to assure functional correctness but a multitude of microarchitectural changes (e.g., cache updates), caused by the speculatively executed instructions, are commonly left in the system. These changes can be used to leak sensitive information, which has led to a frantic search for solutions that can eliminate such security flaws. The contribution of this work is an evaluation of the cost of hiding speculative side-effects in the cache hierarchy, making them visible only after the speculation has been resolved. For this, we compare (for the first time) two broad approaches: i) waiting for loads to become non-speculative before issuing them to the memory system, and ii) eliminating the side-effects of speculation, a solution consisting of invisible loads (Ghost loads) and performance optimizations (Ghost Buffer and Materialization). While previous work, InvisiSpec, has proposed a similar solution to our latter approach, it has done so with only a minimal evaluation and at a significant performance cost. The detailed evaluation of our solutions shows that: i) waiting for loads to become non-speculative is no more costly than the previously proposed InvisiSpec solution, albeit much simpler, non-invasive in the memory system, and stronger security-wise; ii) hiding speculation with Ghost loads (in the context of a relaxed memory model) can be achieved at the cost of 12% performance degradation and 9% energy increase, which is significantly better that the previous state-of-the-art solution. © ACM, 2019. This is the author's version of the work. It is posted here by permission of ACM for your personal use. Not for redistribution. The definitive version was published here, https://doi.org/10.1145/3310273.3321558