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Discusses the need to evaluate the effectiveness of games and simulations that are used for training and educational purposes. Evaluation criteria are described, including validity, reliability, and utility; methods of measuring training device effectiveness are explained; and problems encountered with evaluations are discussed. (30 references) (LRW)

Abstract Mining activities in Australia tend to be cyclical, with boom and bust times impacting upon associated communities. However, little information exists to classify key impacts or to identify how [...]

To authenticate to the full-text of this article, please visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1744-7976.2009.01152.x Byline: John Rolfe (1), Jill Windle (2), Juliana McCosker (3) Abstract: Conservation auctions are typically framed as closed, discriminatory, single round, first-price auctions, and are based on the assumption that landholders will offer bids determined by their 'independent private values.' Where landholders are unfamiliar with conservation tender processes and the supply of environmental services, they may find it very difficult to construct bids in this way. Bid values may be influenced by other factors, such as concerns about 'winner's curse,' a desire to capture economic rent, and premiums for risk and uncertainty factors. Sealed, single round auctions may exacerbate information gaps and uncertainty factors because of the limited information flows compared to traditional market exchanges and open, ascending auctions. In this paper, the cost efficiencies of a multiple bidding round auction for landholder management actions are explored with the use of field experiments and a conservation auction. The case study application is improved grazing management in a rangeland area of Australia, where landholders are unfamiliar with supplying environmental services or conservation auctions. Results suggest that multiple round auctions may be associated with efficiency gains, particularly in initial rounds. Les encheres pour la conservation sont generalement des encheres au premier prix, a un tour, discriminatoires et par offre ecrite. Elles reposent sur l'hypotheque que les offres des proprietaires fonciers refleteront leur ≪valeur privee≫. Lorsque les proprietaires fonciers ne sont pas familiers avec les processus d'encheres pour la conservation et la prestation de services environnementaux, ils peuvent eprouver de la difficultea attribuer une valeur a leur offre. Cette valeur peut-etre influencee par d'autres facteurs, tels que la crainte de la ≪malediction du vainqueur ≫, le desir de realiser une rente economique, les primes de risque et les facteurs d'incertitude. Les encheres scellees a un tour peuvent aggraver le manque d'information et les facteurs d'incertitude etant donne que les encherisseurs disposent de peu d'information comparativement aux encheres ascendantes ouvertes traditionnelles. Dans le present article, nous avons examine, a l'aide d'experiences sur le terrain et d'encheres pour la conservation, l'efficacite-cout d'une enchere a tours multiples pour des mesures de gestion de la part de proprietaires fonciers. L'exercice visait a ameliorer la gestion des paturages d'un parcours naturel en Australie, ou les proprietaires fonciers ne sont pas familiers avec la prestation de services environnementaux ni avec les encheres pour la conservation. Les resultats autorisent a penser que les encheres a tours multiples pourraient offrir des gains d'efficience, particulierement durant les premiers tours. Author Affiliation: (1)Faculty of Business and Informatics, CQUniversity Australia, Bruce Highway, Rockhampton, Queensland 4702, Australia (corresponding author: phone: +61-(0)7-4923-2132; fax: +61-(0)7-4930-9700; e-mail:j.rolfe@cqu.edu.au). (2)Centre for Environmental Management, CQUniversity Australia, Bruce Highway, Rockhampton, Queensland 4702, Australia (phone: +61-(0)7-4930-9089; fax: +61-(0)7-4930-9156; e-mail:j.windle@cqu.edu.au). (3)Queensland Environmental Protection Agency, PO Box 906, Emerald, Queensland 4720, Australia (phone: +61-(0)7-4982-4555; fax: +61-(0)7-4982-2568; e-mail:juliana.mccosker@epa.qld.gov.au).

Incentive payments to landholders have become increasingly popular as mechanisms to achieve conservation goals. Within these mechanisms economists commonly recommend competitive tenders over fixed rate payment schemes because (a) specialist knowledge of landholders about their own enterprises and costs can be utilized, (b) auction prices are more likely to reflect the marginal value of the resources being used to produce the environmental outcome, and (c) the scope for rent seeking is reduced by competition between landholders. Yet there is very little uptake of conservation tenders as agrienvironmental schemes, potentially because of the difficulties in generating sufficient levels of landholder participation to make tenders effective. In this paper we summarize the efficiency benefits of using competitive tenders, analyze reasons why participation rates may be so low, and suggest potential mechanisms to address this. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, a stated value experiment is reported that assesses values held for protecting Aboriginal cultural heritage sites in central Queensland. Choice Modelling, a stated preference non-market valuation technique, was used to estimate non-use values for protecting cultural heritage sites in the context of further water resource allocation and irrigation development. Three population groups were sampled, being an indigenous population, and regional centre and capital city populations. Results show that there are significant differences in values between indigenous and general population groups. The general population groups had negative values for high levels of cultural heritage site protection, but did have positive values for small increases in protection above current levels.