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1. Mylohyoid eminentiae form on the lingual flange of a denture impression when a gap exists in the mylohyoid muscle. The gap, when void of resistant structures, allows the overlying mucous membrane to sag into the aperture under pressure from impression material. 2. The eminentiae may be considered clinically unimportant, because they can be altered if necessary without affecting the serviceability of the denture.

When, on 24 June 1950, the forces of North Korea invaded the Republic of Korea 1 by crossing the 38th parallel, the United Nations was faced with what was to be its major experience in utilising its collective security system — a system which, as Quincy Wright categorically urged, “must be thought of as a stage in the evolution of international relations half-way between unorganized diplomacy ... and world government.”2

Clyde Eagleton, in his Hague Academy lectures on international responsibility stated the basis of the traditional law as follows:1 The responsibility of a State in international law rests largely upon a terri-. torial basis, but behind this territorial basis lies the broader concept of control.... The control which a state exercises within its own territory is exceptional and exclusive; and since it is exclusive, international law imposes upon the state a, larger degree of responsibility for occurrence within that area. If no other state can be allowed to protect its interests therein, the territorial State must be held responsible for the protection of those interests. Whenever such control is exercised, in or out of the territorial area, responsibility is measured by the actual degree of control, and in general legal capacity, varies with every state, with every legal person. A state, or other international legal person, may be held responsible only to the extent that it has rights and duties which it is free to exercise; and some have more than others.

It is axiomatic that contemporary international law and the Charter of the United Nations are based on the sovereign equality of States.1 “Between independent states,” said the International Court of Justice, “respect for territorial sovereignty is an essential foundation of international relations.” 2 Previously, the Permanent Court had declared in more general terms that “the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a state is that, failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary, it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another state.” 3 And one leading writer has also defined “the sovereignty of a state” as meaning “the residuum of power which it possesses within the confines laid down by international law.” 4

The question of the compatibility of action taken by ONUC under the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly in fact became so complex that the specific functions assigned to the Force must be examined before any kind of general conclusion is attempted.

The threat of the Congo to international peace in 1960 cannot be analysed solely in terms of recent events. The roots of the tragedy that gripped the new Republic at the very dawn of its independence go deep; they belong, perhaps, more to the past than to the present.

Since the ONUC operations were never conceived as “enforcement action” against the Congo, but were based upon the consent of the Congolese Government, relations between the UN and the host State necessarily had a “consensual” basis.

The United Nations is an attempt to organize international society, seeking, as set forth in Article I, paragraph Z, of the Charter, “To maintain international peace and security and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace....”

The complexity of this question arises from the facts that the resolutions emanated from two different organs, the Security Council and the General Assembly and that none of those resolutions expressly stated its legal basis in terms of the Charter. Besides, the resolutions were, in their various operative paragraphs, addressed to the Secretary-General, to States as well as non-State entities.

Technical assistance was required by the Congo from the very day it became independent, in view of the “sudden mass withdrawal of European personnel from the executive, administrative and technical posts... without any adequate anticipation or training for their replacement by Congolese nationals.” 1

The significance, purpose and indeed the constitutional basis of the resolutions passed by both the Security Council and the General Assembly can scarcely be appreciated except within the factual context of the events in the Congo which gave rise to them. The purpose of the present chapter is, therefore, to outline briefly the developments which occurred and to indicate what resolutions were passed and at what stage. This brief outline, however unsatisfactory to a historian, is clearly necessary before the legal problems raised in subsequent chapters can be rendered meaningful.

Although the United Force in the Congo was established under the Security Council resolution of 14 July, neither that resolution nor any subsequent resolution of the Council expressly provided for an international force or even authorised the Secretary-General in explicit terms to establish such a force.