Search

This paper considers whether the child's early vocabulary shows signs of being organized into word categories. Two main kinds of evidence are looked for: 1. differential production of fillers (referred to here more neutrally as Prefixed Additional Elements); ii. relevant phonomoprhological variation for verb-words, and only in them. Results of analyses of natural speech production provided by the longitudinal studies of two French acquiring children followed between the ages of 1;3 and 2;3, show that there is a first period in which words seem to constitute one, formally undifferentiated, set. Differentiation between noun-words and verb-words appears progressively, as evidenced by the differential occurrence of PAEs in prenominal and in preverbal positions, and in the appearance of phonomorphologically relevant variations only in words that are verbs in the language. Looking at connected aspects of language, other péhenomena are observed to occur at the same time, in particular, a significant increase in the production of multiword speech, that becomes the dominant way of expression.

We can do little but to share Miller’s view [1] that cognitive psychology was born in the 1950s. However, his article distorts the role of psychology in the birth of cognitive science. On two occasions, Miller proposes that psychology could not play a role in the cognitive revolution because of its narrow focus on behaviorism.

The interests of mother and infants do not exactly coincide. Further, infants are not merely objects of attempted control by mothers, but the sources of attempts to control what mothers do. Taking account of the ways in which this is so suggest an enriched perspective on mother-infant interaction, and on the beginnings of conventionalized signaling.

Working with multi-species allometric relations and drawing on mammalian theorist Denenberg’s works, I provide an explanatory theory of the mammalian dual-brain as no prior account has.

This paper defends two initial claims. First, it argues that essentially the same cognitive resources are shared by adult creative thinking and problem-solving, on the one hand, and by childhood pretend play, on the other¾namely, capacities to generate and to reason with suppositions (or imagined possibilities). Second, it argues that the evolutionary function of childhood pretence is to practice and enhance adult forms of creativity. The paper goes on to show how these proposals can provide a smooth and evolutionarily-plausible explanation of the gap between the first appearance of our species in Southern Africa some 100,000 years ago, and the 'creative explosion' of cultural, technological and artistic change which took place within dispersed human populations some 60,000 years later. The intention of the paper is to sketch a proposal which might serve as a guide for future interdisciplinary research.

Background: The goal of this study was to investigate the automaticity/cerebellar theory of dyslexia. We tested phonological skills and cerebellar function in a group of dyslexic 8-12 year old children and their matched controls. Tests administered included the Phonological Assessment Battery, postural stability, bead threading, finger to thumb and time estimation. Results: Dyslexic children were found to be significantly poorer than the controls at all tasks but time estimation. About 75% of dyslexics were more than one standard deviation below controls in phonological ability, and 50% were similarly impaired in motor skills. However, at least part of the discrepancy in motor skills was due to dyslexic individuals who had additional disorders (ADHD and/or DCD). The absence of evidence for a time estimation deficit also casts doubt on the cerebellar origin of the motor deficiency. About half the dyslexic children didn't have any motor problem, and there was no evidence for a causal relationship between motor skills on the one hand and phonological and reading skills on the other. Conclusion: This study provides partial support for the presence of motor problems in dyslexic children, but does not support the hypothesis that a cerebellar dysfunction is the cause of their phonological and reading impairment.

Speech rhythm has long been claimed to be a useful bootstrapping cue in the very first steps of language acquisition. Previous studies have suggested that newborn infants do categorize varieties of speech rhythm, as demonstrated by their ability to discriminate between certain languages. However, the existing evidence is not unequivocal: in previous studies, stimuli discriminated by newborns always contained additional speech cues on top of rhythm. Here, we conducted a series of experiments assessing discrimination between Dutch and Japanese by newborn infants, using a speech resynthesis technique to progressively degrade non-rhythmical properties of the sentences. When the stimuli are resynthesized using identical phonemes and artificial intonation contours for the two languages, thereby preserving only their rhythmic and broad phonotactic structure, newborns still seem to be able to discriminate between the two languages, but the effect is weaker than when intonation is present. This leaves open the possibility that the temporal correlation between intonational and rhythmic cues might actually facilitate the processing of speech rhythm.

A set of iterative mechanisms, the Three-Step Algorithm, is proposed to account for the burst in the syntactic capacities of children over age two. These mechanisms are based on the children’s perception, memory, elementary rule-like behavior and cognitive capacities, and do not require any specific innate grammatical capacities. The relevance of the Three-Step Algorithm is tested, using the large Manchester corpus in the CHILDES database. The results show that 80% of the utterances can be exactly reconstructed and that, when incomplete reconstructions are taken into account, 94% of all utterances are reconstructed. The Three-Step Algorithm should be followed by the progressive acquisition of syntactic categories and use of slot-and-frame structures which lead to a greater and more complex linguistic mastery.

Regardless of how intelligent they are, people with developmental dyslexia have difficulties in learning to read, a characteristic first described over a century ago. Dyslexia is now known to be a hereditary neurological disorder that affects a huge number of people — about 5% of the global population — but its underlying basis is still hotly debated. At two recent meetings, however, the reasons for the disagreement became clearer.

In the following pages we propose a theory on cognitive systems and the common strategies of perception, which are at the basis of their function. We demonstrate that these strategies are easily seen to be in place in known cognitive systems such as vision and language. Furthermore we show that taking these strategies into consideration implies a new outlook on immune function calling for a new appraisal of the immune system as a cognitive system.

Various deficits in the cognitive functioning of people with autism have been documented in recent years but these provide only partial explanations for the condition. We focus instead on an imitative disturbance involving difficulties both in copying actions and in inhibiting more stereotyped mimicking, such as echolalia. A candidate for the neural basis of this disturbance may be found in a recently discovered class of neurons in frontal cortex, 'mirror neurons' (MNs). These neurons show activity in relation both to specific actions performed by self and matching actions performed by others, providing a potential bridge between minds. MN systems exist in primates without imitative and ‘theory of mind’ abilities and we suggest that in order for them to have become utilized to perform social cognitive functions, sophisticated cortical neuronal systems have evolved in which MNs function as key elements. Early developmental failures of MN systems are likely to result in a consequent cascade of developmental impairments characterised by the clinical syndrome of autism.

Geometric features of surfaces and local information are constitutive elements of spatial representations. A number of studies in animals (rats) and human children (24 months old) have shown that in a rectangular environment with a reward hidden in one of the corners, geometric properties predominate over local cues for search strategies. In contrast, monkeys and human adults are able to take into account both types of information (geometric and local) to reorient. So far, all of the experiments have been conducted in the locomotor space involving a navigational task. In the present study, we examined whether similar search patterns are found using a tabletop model of a rectangular room. Three groups of children (3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds) and one group of adults were tested. Results show that geometric encoding appears only at 4 years of age, that is later than in the locomotor space. The joint use of geometry and local cues emerges at 5 years of age. These data show that similar types of processing are implemented in both manipulatory and locomotor space but not at the same time. The difference between locomotor and manipulatory tasks suggests that being immersed in the environment makes this separated processing easier than being confronted by a task for which the object is exterior to the participant

It is widely accepted that developmental dyslexia results from some sort of phonological deficit. Yet, it can be argued that phonological representations and their processing have been insufficiently tested in dyslexia research. Firstly, claims about how tasks tap into certain kinds of representations or processes are best appreciated in the light of an explicit information-processing model. Here, a cognitive model of lexical access is described, incorporating speech perception, reading and object recognition. The model emphasises that phonological forms of lexical items are distinct from non-lexical phonological representations Secondly, phonology, as a linguistic discipline, teaches us that there is much more to it than phonemic categorisation and awareness. The phonological level of representation also embodies phonotactic regularities, patterns of phoneme assimilation and alternation, as well as supra-segmental knowledge pertaining to syllable structure, stress, intonation and rhythm. All these aspects are in part language-dependent, and therefore must be learnt by children in order to become proficient native speakers and listeners. If phonological representations were affected in dyslexia, dyslexic children would presumably have difficulties acquiring these aspects of their language. This prediction is as yet untested. A possible research agenda is outlined, aiming to provide a more comprehensive assessment of the phonological theory of dyslexia.

The biological concomitants of childhood conduct disorder (CD) have seldom been considered separate from those of hyperkinesis with which CD is often comorbid. CD predicts an increased likelihood of developing a personality disorder and is often associated with an antisocial outcome. Childhood CD may originate in a stressful upbringing in a dysfunctional family environment, and has been reported to be associated with unusual physical or sexual development and thyroid dysfunction. Methods: We therefore explored circulating levels of hormones from adrenal, gonadal and growth-hormone axes associated with stress, aggression and development in 28 CD patients and 13 age-matched healthy children (10-18 years old). Results: 1/ The CD group had higher levels of dehydroepiandrosterone sulphate (DHEA-S) and corticotropin (ACTH) and for those under 14 years of age there was more free triiodothyronine (fT3) in the circulation. 2/ There were no differences for gonadal hormones, and neither the levels of steroid hormones nor the ratings of maturity (early/late) were associated with aggression, as has been reported elsewhere. 3/ Smaller physical measures in CD children correlated with DHEA-S and growth factors (e.g. IGF-I): 4/ increased ACTH and fT3 correlated with restless-impulsive ratings, and DHEA-S with 'disruptive behaviour'. Conclusions: Imbalances in the adrenal and growth axes may indeed have neurotrophic repercussions in growth and development.

Humans are able to construct mental representations and models of possible interactions with their environment. They can use these mental models to identify actions that will enable them to achieve their adaptive goals. But humans do not use this capacity to identify and implement the actions that would contribute most to the evolutionary success of humanity. In general, humans do not find motivation or satisfaction in doing so, no matter how effective such actions might be in evolutionary terms. From an evolutionary perspective, this is a significant limitation in the psychological adaptability of humans. This paper sets out to identify the new psychological capacity that would be needed to overcome this limitation and how the new capacity might be acquired. Humans that develop this capacity will become self-evolving organisms - organisms that are able to adapt in whatever ways are necessary for future evolutionary success, largely unfettered by their biological and social past.

This essay examines the proposal that psychological essentialism results from a history of natural selection acting on human representation and inference systems. It has been argued that the features that distinguish essentialist representational systems are especially well suited for representing natural kinds. If the evolved function of essentialism is to exploit the rich inductive potential of such kinds, then it must be subserved by cognitive mechanisms that carry out at least three distinct functions: identifying these kinds in the environment, constructing essentialized representations of them, and constraining inductive inferences about kinds. Moreover, there are different kinds of kinds, ranging from nonliving substances to biological taxa to within-species kinds such as sex, and the causal processes that render these categories coherent for the purposes of inductive generalization vary. If the evolved function of essentialism is to support inductive generalization under ignorance of true causes, and if kinds of kinds vary in the implicit assumptions that support valid inductive inferences about them, then we expect different, functionally incompatible modes of essentialist thinking for different kinds. In particular, there should be differences in how biological and nonbiological substances, biological taxa, and biological and social role kinds are essentialized. The functional differences between these kinds of essentialism are discussed.

What unites the many selves that constitute the human mind? How is the self-binding problem solved? I argue that separate selves come to belong together as one Self as a result of their dynamic participation in creating a single life, rather as the members of an orchestra come to belong together as a result of their jointly creating a single work of music.

Most studies of early lexical development are focused on the acquisition of the noun or verb categories. Only studies targeting the very beginning of word production describe the rich pattern of reference and expressive words produced by very young children. Still, during their second year, children’s production in tokens contains as many words that are not nouns and verbs than words that are. The importance of categories such as communicators, adverbs, pointers and adjectives never decreases, neither in English nor in French children between the age of 1;6 to 2;6. A cross-linguistic comparison shows that the same type of words is the most frequent in English and French children, while a comparison with adult production shows that, in neither language, do the words produced by children match exactly the words they hear most frequently. The difference in the syntactic structure of English and French argues strongly for a cognitive origin to this close match of the children’s words. These words other than nouns and verbs are more complex than they appear, because they cover a whole range of reference principles – direct reference, indirect reference, shared reference, generic reference, multiple reference, ambiguity, similarity, repetition, absence of –, as well as a wide range of expressive meanings. This type of words appears and grows throughout the children’s second year and provides the basic stones for further lexicon and syntax development.

The aim of the present study is to provide evidence for the role of action used mainly by children with cerebral palsy to get over difficulties in some mental rotation tasks. 25 children with cerebral palsy and 25 able children were given a task inspired from the Tétris video game consisting in fitting together geometrical figures. Results show that children with cerebral palsy are able to anticipate mentally the motion of the object, but they can not mentally break down the motion. This may be explained by the use of an object manipulation strategy necessary to actualize the properties of the object motions. These findings have implications in the understanding of the role of action in the development of mental imagery.

Humans, but no other animal, make meaningful use of spoken language. What is unclear, however, is whether this capacity depends on a unique constellation of perceptual and neurobiological mechanisms, or whether a subset of such mechanisms are shared with other organisms. To explore this problem, we conducted parallel experiments on human newborns and cotton-top tamarin monkeys to assess their ability to discriminate unfamiliar languages. Using a habituation-dishabituation procedure, we show that human newborns and tamarins can discriminate sentences from Dutch and Japanese, but not if the sentences are played backwards. Moreover, the cues for discrimination are not present in backward speech. This suggests that the human newborns' tuning to certain properties of speech relies on general processes of the primate auditory system.

The main goal of this work is to determine the difficulties involved in the recomposition of argumentative text by eleven years old children. The role of text length was examined in Experiment 2. The effect of the comprehension level in reading was evaluated in Experiment 3 and the mastery of prototypical schema was tested in Experiment 4. Experiment 1 was realised to collect the pro and contra arguments used in Experiments 2 to 4. The textual (text length) and individual characteristics (comprehension in reading and mastery of prototypical schema) seem to explain the difficulties faced by the eleven years old children when reorganising an argumentative text.

The originality of Langer's approach to cognitive development (Langer, 1980, 1986) lies in the study of the pragmatic components (actions, object manipulations) of protologicomathematical and protophysical cognition before the age of 2. This perspective falls in line with Piaget's constructive psychology.

Spoken languages have been classified by linguists according to their rhythmic properties, and psycholinguists have relied on this classification to account for infants’ capacity to discriminate languages. Although researchers have measured many speech signal properties, they have failed to identify reliable acoustic characteristics for language classes. This paper presents instrumental measurements based on a consonant/vowel segmentation for eight languages. The measurements suggest that intuitive rhythm types reflect specific phonological properties, which in turn are signaled by the acoustic/phonetic properties of speech. The data support the notion of rhythm classes and also allow the simulation of infant language discrimination, consistent with the hypothesis that newborns rely on a coarse segmentation of speech. A hypothesis is proposed regarding the role of rhythm perception in language acquisition.

In order to become aware of inconsistencies, one must first construe of the world in a way that reflects its consistencies. This paper begins with a tentative model for how a set of discrete memories transforms into an interconnected worldview wherein relationships between memories are forged by way of abstractions. Inconsistencies prompt the invention of new abstractions. In regions of the conceptual network where inconsistencies abound, a cognitive analog of simulated annealing is in order; there is a willingness to question previous assumptions—to ‘loosen’ conceptual relationships—so as to let new concepts thoroughly percolate through the worldview and exert the needed revolutionary effect. In so doing there is a risk of assimilating dangerous concepts. Repression arrests the process by which dangerous thoughts infiltrate the conceptual network, and deception blocks thoughts that have already been assimilated. These forms of self-initiated worldview inconsistency may evoke feelings of fragmentation at the level of the individual or the society.

Background: Previous findings in adults revealed significant hemispheric asymmetry in size of neuronal somata in hippocampal subfield CA2 (the “resistant sector”) with no age-related changes. Paucity of quantitative data on the developmental status of these “protected” neurons has led to the investigation of their morphology in comparison to neurons in adjacent subfield CA3, bilaterally. Methods: Bilateral coronal sections from postmortem hippocampus, 24 and 76 weeks postmenstrual age (gestational age plus postnatal age) were studied. The neurons were digitized and measured on a computer. Results: Soma size correlated positively and significantly with age in CA2 and CA3, bilaterally. CA2 somata were significantly larger (left 34%, right 32%) than adjacent CA3 somata. Variability in soma form or size increased appreciably with age, in both subfields, bilaterally, while variability in soma orientation was weakly correlated with brain growth. Conclusions: The results suggest that in early development there are similarities in hemispheric growth patterns in CA2 and CA3. Large CA2 soma size implies axonal connectivity to distantly located targets very early in development. The results have functional implications, including memory, to brain development

This article is about nooplasis. That is, the article outlines a general model about the dynamic organization and development of mind and it draws the implications of this model for learning and instructions. This is done in terms of 10 postulates concerned with the architecture of mind, its development and dynamics, and the nature of learning, and a general postulate concerned with the dynamic relations between the various systems of mind and also mind and education. Specifically, the model postulates that the mind involves systems oriented to the understanding of the environment and of itself, in addition to general processing functions. It is also postulated that the development of each of the systems is partially autonomous and partially constrained by the development of the other systems, and that it involves both system-specific and system-wide mechanisms of development and learning. Finally, it is argued that these postulates suggest a model of constrained constructivism which leads to a conception of learning in schools which differs considerably from what is suggested by the Piagetian or the Vygotskian conception of constructivism.

Great apes show behavioural evidence for secondary representation similar to that of children of about two years of age. However, there is no convincing evidence for metarepresentation in apes. A good evolutionary interpretation should be parsimonious and must bring developmental and comparative data in accord. I propose a model based on the work of Perner (1991) and close by pointing out a logical flaw in Heyes’ second proposed experiment.

Children's ability to modify their drawing procedures changes in their first decade. Young children make size/shape changes and end-of-sequence insertions/deletions of drawing elements. Older children also make middle-of-sequence insertions/deletions and position/orientation changes in drawing elements. Why do modifications occur in this order? We argue that older children's modifications require processing ternary relations, which according to a relational complexity theory, is beyond the working memory capacity of young children.

Great apes show behavioural evidence for secondary representation similar to that of children of about two years of age. However, there is no convincing evidence for metarepresentation in apes. A good evolutionary interpretation should be parsimonious and must bring developmental and comparative data in accord. I propose a model based on the work of Perner (1991) and close by pointing out a logical flaw in Heyes’ second proposed experiment

Talents that selectively facilitate the acquisition of high levels of skill are said to be present in some children but not others. The evidence for this includes biological correlates of specific abilities, certain rare abilities in autistic savants, and the seemingly spontaneous emergence of exceptional abilities in young children, but there is also contrary evidence indicating an absence of early precursors for high skill levels in young people. An analysis of positive and negative evidence and arguments suggests that differences in early experiences, preferences, opportunities, habits, training and practice are the real determinants of excellence.

Most workshops convened by the National Institute's of Health are devoted to the puzzle-solving activities of normal science, where the puzzles themselves and the strategies available for solving them are determined largely in advance by the shared paradigmatic assumptions, frameworks, and priorities of the scientific community's research paradigm. They are designed to facilitate what Thomas Kuhn referred to as elucidating topological detail within a map whose main outlines are available in advance. And apparently for good reason. Historical studies by Kuhn and others reveal that science moves fastest and penetrates most deeply when its practitioners work within well-defined and deeply ingrained traditions and employ the concepts, theories, methods, and tools of a shared paradigm. No paradigm is perfect and none is capable of identifying, let alone solving, all of the problems relevant to a given domain of inquiry. Thus, the essential day-to-day business of normal science is not to question the limits or adequacy of a given paradigm, but rather to exploit the presumed virtues for which it was adopted. As Kuhn cautioned in his discussion of paradigms, re-tooling, in science as in manufacture, as an extravagance to be reserved for the occasion that demands it. Well, as the marketing people say --- this is not your father's Oldsmobile. We are breaking with tradition today by stepping outside the map to initiate and pursue a long-overdue dialogue about paradigm reform and scientific retooling. Our warrant for prosecuting this agenda is a Kuhnian occasion that demands it--- is a protracted paradigm crisis, the neglect of which has hurt us terribly and the resolution of which will determine the viability and fate of the social and behavioral sciences in the 21st century. Since the details of the crisis are well know within and outside our ranks, a brief sketch of its main outlines will suffice as a framework for our dialogue today. They include, (a) widespread dissatisfaction with the meager theoretical progress and practical yield of more than a century of social and behavioral sciences research in many substantive domains, (b) long-neglected yet widely recognized deficiencies in the epistemological assumptions, discovery practices and justification standards of the dominant paradigm on which the social and behavioral sciences have relied --- and rely--- to conceptualize, interpret, and guide their empirical research, (c) a broadly based consensus among leading scholars and scientists about the need for fundamental paradigm reforms, and (d) institutional incentive structures that not only encourage and reinforce the status quo but discourage constructive reform efforts. Our objective for the next eight hours is to formulate strategies and recommendations for leveraging the resources and influence of the National Institute of Mental Health to foster a climate of constructive reforms where they are needed by freeing investigators in from the oppressive constraints of existing paradigms and facilitating, encouraging, and funding their retooling their efforts

Event-related potentials (ERPs) from 50 children (6 to 11 years) and ten adults were elicited by auditory passive, and by rare target and frequent nontarget stimuli, and analyzed in the time and frequency domains. The latency of the maximal theta response (or the theta frequency component of the ERP) was evaluated with respect to age and scalp topography effects. The major findings were: (1) The latency of the maximal theta response decreased with increasing age in children, although for each stimulus type and location adults had shorter latencies than the children. (2) The developmental time course of latency reduction depended on the electrode location, with the most prominent reduction occurring at 8 years at Cz, and no differences between children groups obtained for the frontal site. (3) Maximal theta response latency was strongly associated with the latency of the late parietal P400-700 (P3b) component in children. The results suggest that the developmental latency decrease in P300 processes originate from a decrease in the preceding theta-related processes and may reflect a speeding of cognitive stimulus evaluation.

Like the information patterns that evolve through biological processes, mental representations, or memes, evolve through adaptive exploration and transformation of an information space through variation, selection, and transmission. Since unlike genes, memes do not come packaged with instructions for their replication, our brains do it for them, strategically, guided by a fitness landscape that reflects both internal drives and a worldview that is continually updated through meme assimilation. This paper presents a model for how an individual becomes a meme-evolving agent via the emergence of an autocatalytic network of sparse, distributed memories, and discusses implications for complex, creative thought processes and why they are unique to humans. Memetics can do more than account for the spread of catchy tunes; it can pave the way for the kind of overarching framework for the humanities that the first form of evolution has provided for the biological sciences.

This article contains the argument that the human ability to travel mentally in time constitutes a discontinuity between ourselves and other animals. Mental time travel comprises the mental reconstruction of personal events from the past (episodic memory) and the mental construction of possible events in the future. It is not an isolated module, but depends on the sophistication of other cognitive capacities, including self-awareness, meta-representation, mental attribution, understanding the perception- knowledge relationship, and dissociation of imagined mental states from one's present mental state. These capacities are also important aspects of so-called "theory of mind", and they appear to mature in children at around age four. Furthermore, mental time travel is generative, involving the combination and recombination of familiar elements, and in this respect may have been a precursor to language. Current evidence, although indirect or based on anecdote rather than on systematic study, suggests that nonhuman animals, including the great apes, are confined to a "present" that is limited by their current drive states. In contrast, mental time travel by humans is relatively unconstrained, and allows a more rapid and flexible adaptation to complex, changing environments than is afforded by instincts or conventional learning. Past and future events loom large in much of human thinking, giving rise to cultural, religious, and scientific concepts about origins, destiny, and time itself.

Applications of nonlinear dynamical systems theory to psychology have led to recent advances in understanding neuromotor development and advances in theories of cognitive development. This article reviews published findings associated with a specific coherent and influential application from which a theory of adaptive, self-organized cognition has been derived and related to a theory of developmental dynamics of the neuromotor system. The review focuses on implications of two theories for quantifying developmental phenomena, and suggests a method for quantifying the cognitive theory.

How do ERPs reflecting auditory information processing develop across adolescence? This development is described for the amplitude and latency of five ERP components and four difference-waves in four groups of 11 healthy subjects with mean ages of 10, 14, 17 & 21 years. Methods: Vector normalised data were recorded from 19 sites during diffuse and focused attention in a three-tone oddball. (i.e. in passive, diffuse-attention and active, focussed-attention, discrimination conditions) to see how ERP loci varied with age for tone-type, attention-condition and for four types of difference-wave reflecting nontarget and target comparisons: (mismatch negativity, MMN, an auditory working memory trace; Negative difference, Nd, an attentional trace, but also Processing Negativity, PN and the Goodin-waveform). Results: Age interacted with site for most components. P1 loci sensitive to rare tones moved posteriorly and N1 loci lost their right bias at early puberty. But P2 loci did not move anterior to Cz until adulthood. N2 amplitude, sensitive to attention condition, developed a mature frontal focus by 17 years. Right-biased P3 loci move to the midline with focused attention in young and old alike. Difference-waves reflected three developmental stages (figure 2): In 10 year-olds early deflections (<150 ms) were diffusely distributed; in mid-adolescence the main frontal negative component (150-300 ms) became well-formed and lost an earlier right bias; over 17 years the late positive complex developed a right bias in target-derived waves. Latency decreases for early frontal components were marked in 10-14y olds and for later posterior components in 14-17y olds. MMN topography matured (from a right lateral to bilateral distribution) between 10 and 14 y, while Nd topography matured and became bilateral between 14 and 17y. Conclusions: Major developments of brain function appear at the onset of adolescence (<14y) in early stimulus-selection processes and during adolescence in the differential use of this information (N2- and P3-like latencies.

Developmental psychopathology stands poised at the close of the 20th century on the horns of a major scientific dilemma. The essence of this dilemma lies in the contrast between its heuristically rich open system concepts on the one hand, and the closed system paradigm it adopted from mainstream psychology for investigating those models on the other. Many of the research methods, assessment strategies, and data analytic models of psychology’s paradigm are predicated on closed system assumptions and explanatory models. Thus, they are fundamentally inadequate forstudying humans, who are unparalleled among open systems in their wide ranging capacities for equifinal and multifinal functioning. Developmental psychopathology faces two challenges in successfully negotiating the developmentalist’s dilemma. The first lies in recognizing how the current paradigm encourages research practices that are antithetical to developmental principles, yet continue to flourish. I argue that the developmentalist’s dilemma is sustained by long standing, mutually enabling weaknesses in the paradigm’s discovery methods and scientific standards. These interdependent weaknesses function like a distorted lens on the research process by variously sustaining the illusion of theoretical progress, obscuring the need for fundamental reforms, and both constraining and misguiding reform efforts. An understanding of how these influences arise and take their toll provides a foundation and rationale for engaging the second challenge. The essence of this challenge will be finding ways to resolve the developmentalist’s dilemma outside the constraints of the existing paradigm by developing indigenous research strategies, methods, and standards with fidelity to the complexity of developmental phenomena.

A response to three critical essays concerning The Antisocial Personalities (1995) and a further analysis of the causes of the epidemic of crime and violence that began in the United States in the 1960s and will continue into the next millenium.

A relation-based theory of cognition proposes that cognitive capacity is limited, in part, by the maximum arity of a relation that can be processed in working memory (Halford, 1993; Halford, Wilson, & Phillips, submitted). Children below age five are limited to binary relations, hence have great difficulty on transitive inference tasks, which require integration of two binary relations into a ternary relation. This theory attempts to integrate cognitive and developmental data on the basic of a single metric - relational arity (number of related arguments). However, the lack of formal analysis into relational information involved in cognitive tasks threatens to undermine its utility. I propose using Natural language Information Analysis Method from relational database theory to analyze relational information in cognitive tasks. To demonstrate the utility of this method, I analyze two tasks: (1) simple oddity; and (2) dimension abstracted oddity. The analysis identifies the peak arity of simple oddity as binary and dimension abstracted oddity (like transitive inference) as ternary. Therefore, the relational theory predicts that dimension abstracted oddity cannot be performed until the median age of five years, while simple oddity can be performed earlier. The analysis also suggests variations on these tasks, and the peak arity for each variation is examined.

The development of a `theory of mind' may not only be important for understanding the minds of others but also for using one's own mind. To investigate this supposition, forty children between the ages of three and four were given false-belief and creativity tasks. The numbers of appropriate and of original responses in the creativity test were found to correlate positively with performance on false-belief tasks. This association was robust, as it continued to be strong and significant even when age and verbal intelligence were partialled out. The results support the hypothesis that the metarepresentational skills involved in theory of mind also affect the way children can access and scan their own mental repertoire beyond the areas of currently activated content (i.e. divergent thinking). With the advent of theory of mind a basic cognitive shift takes place in human development, and possibly took place in cognitive evolution.

Evoked and event-related brain potentials (ERPs) may be regarded as originating from the reorganization of the spontaneous EEG rhythms. The main objective of the present research was to study the alpha responses in 6-11 year-old children to determine whether the ability to reorganize alpha activity after external stimulation demonstrates developmental changes that could reflect variations in information processing with increased age. A total of 50 children aged 6-11 years, divided into 5 age groups, and 10 young adults were assessed in a passive and an oddball condition. Alpha responses in the passive and non-target ERPs at Fz, Cz and Pz were analyzed to assess quantitatively the repeatability (phase-locking) of the evoked alpha oscillations. The alpha responses in 6-11 year-old children were different from those in adults: (1) Adults had significantly lower amplitude and stronger phase-locking than children; (2) Adults had maximal alpha amplitudes and phase-locking over the vertex, whereas children displayed maximal responses over the parietal site; (3) The phase-locking of eldest (10-11 year-old) children was as strong as in adults. These findings indicate that the alpha response system is functionally involved in 6-11 year-old children, though its development is not complete at the age of 11, and the magnitude and the phase-locking parameters may relate to different functional aspects of the alpha response system. Thus, younger children do produce alpha responses during information processing, but are not able to engage this system as strongly as older children and adults.

Happiness, or subjective well-being, was measured on a brith-record-based sample of several thousand middle-aged twins using the Well-Being (WB)scale of the Multidimensional Personality Questionnare. Neither socioeconomic status, educational attainment, family income, marital status, nor an indicant of religious commitment could acciunt for more than about 3% of the variance in WB. From 44% to 52% of the variance in WB, however, is associated with genetic variation. Based on the retest os smaller samples of twins after intervals of 4.5 and 10 years, we estimate that the heritability of the stable component of subjective well-being approaches 80%.

Richters, J. E. (1996). Disordered views of antisocial children: A late 20th century perspective. In C. F. Ferris & T. Grisso (Eds.), Understanding aggressive behavior in children. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences (pp. 208-223). New York: New York Academy of Sciences.

Conditioned blocking (CB) is the undermining of conditioning to a stimulus by conjoint exposure to a stimulus already associated with the unconditioned stimulus. CB is one of several tests of "learned inattention" in which performance has been found to depend on certain features of personality and on monoamine activity recorded in animals performing CB. Methods: In part 1, the performance of 25 healthy young adults (mean age 21.6 years) on a new test form for demonstrating CB is described ("mouse-in-house"). The personality inventories used included the Hamburger neuroticism/extroversion scale (HANES) and the short version of the Minnesota multiphasic personality inventory (MMPI). From 24h urine samples collected at the time of testing the levels of four monoamine and three of their metabolites were measured as an indicator of the overall level of neurotransmitter activity. In part 2, the development of CB was studied across children and adolescents clustered into 4 age groups (means 10, 14, 17 and 22 years of age). Results: Part 1 demonstrated CB in normal healthy young adults and the expression of CB correlated with extroversion and increased catecholamine utilisation (turnover). Part 2 showed CB was least marked prepubertally, but developed across adolescence independent of IQ. Although performance did not correlate with developing personality features, like the adults, CB was positively correlated with dopamine activity. Unlike adults CB was inversely correlated with noradrenaline activity. We show the development of increasing CB across the 4 age-groups and correlations with monoamine activity: also we illustrate how the measures of the 3 monoamines, their metabolites and their activity (turnover) develops across age-groups, with a separate pattern for each transmitter. Conclusions: The maturation of attention related information processing was discussed in terms of the development and maturation of structures in the limbic part of the central nervous system and, in particular, the separate function of dopamine in switching between and noradrenaline in tuning in/out stimulus features during selection processes.

he design-based approach is a methodology for investigating mechanisms capable of generating mental phenomena, whether introspectively or externally observed, and whether they occur in humans, other animals or robots. The study of designs satisfying requirements for autonomous agency can provide new deep theoretical insights at the information processing level of description of mental mechanisms. Designs for working systems (whether on paper or implemented on computers) can systematically explicate old explanatory concepts and generate new concepts that allow new and richer interpretations of human phenomena. To illustrate this, some aspects of human grief are analysed in terms of a particular information processing architecture being explored in our research group. We do not claim that this architecture is part of the causal structure of the human mind; rather, it represents an early stage in the iterative search for a deeper and more general architecture, capable of explaining more phenomena. However even the current early design provides an interpretative ground for some familiar phenomena, including characteristic features of certain emotional episodes, particularly the phenomenon of perturbance (a partial or total loss of control of attention). The paper attempts to expound and illustrate the design-based approach to cognitive science and philosophy, to demonstrate the potential effectiveness of the approach in generating interpretative possibilities, and to provide first steps towards an information processing account of `perturbant', emotional episodes.

Conceptual coordination is a learning process that relates multiple perceptual-motor modalities (verbal, visual, gestural, etc.) in time. Lower-order categorizations are thus related by sequence and simultaneity, as shown by neurological dysfunctions. Heretofore, many theories of abstraction have only considered verbal behavior and assumed that the neural mechanism itself consists of manipulation of descriptions (linguistic models of the world and behavior). This broader view better relates physical and intellectual skills.