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This handbook is a reference guide to rules and other important information that inmates need to know. However, it must be kept in mind that all information in this handbook is subject to change. Division of Correction Information Bulletins (DCIBs) will be published to inform inmates about changes, and these bulletins may be found in the prison's library. This handbook should be used with other handbooks and orientation information an inmate will receive at his/her holding institution. If there are questions about any subject in this handbook, it is suggested that an inmate read the Division of Correction Directive (DCD) on that subject or ask his/her assigned case management specialist for more information.

Military Intelligence leadership training: Setting a stage for failure? The recommendations and lessons learned following detainee operations such as those mentioned in the investigations of Abu Ghraib detainee abuses; note a need for specialists in detention and interrogation operations. This paper describes the historical basis for our detainee doctrine, reviews investigation findings, details the current conflicting policies, and analyzes the need for specialization of military intelligence officers and recommends improvements to ensure these types of issues are avoided in the future.

Following reports of detainee abuse coming out of Iraq and Afghanistan, some U.S. military members have been tried and convicted under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) for their involvement. Despite the international and war-related character of these offenses, so far the allegations have been charged as common crimes under Title 10 (aggravated assault, dereliction of duty, maltreatment of detainees, murder) even though conduct of members of the U.S. armed forces that constitutes a "grave breach" of the Geneva Conventions can be prosecuted in U.S. civilian courts under Title 18. The War Crimes Act 4 of 1996 sought to implement the Geneva Conventions by criminalizing grave breaches of the Conventions and violations other laws of war and bringing these crimes into the federal criminal code. This Act expanded federal criminal jurisdiction over U.S. military members by providing the United States jurisdiction to try War Crimes Act violations in federal district court. As part of federal statutory law, the War Crimes Act may be incorporated and charged under the UCMJ. Article 134 of the UCMJ, the "general article," allows the military to import non-capital federal criminal statutes and charge them in a military court-martial. This broadens the subject matter of criminal offenses available to a court-martial. Not only are the punitive articles of the UCMJ6 available to the military prosecutor, any federal criminal statute that applies where the crime was committed could also be charged under the general article. This provision would generally allow military authorities to incorporate the War Crimes Act into military prosecutions and charge U.S. service members with certain war crimes.

The Navy Marine Corps Combat Trauma Registry (CTR) is a data repository and warehouse summarizing information from data sets describing events that occurred and treatments administered to casualties from the point of injury to rehabilitation. Among the medical facilities contributing data to the CTR during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) were the Marine Corps forward surgical companies. Surgical companies offer resuscitative surgery, medical treatment and temporary holding facilities, in addition to preparing patients for evacuation. This paper reviews the types of patients admitted to and treatments received at the surgical companies during the major combat period of OIF. The surgical companies saw an average of 15 to 17 patients a day during this period. Fewer than 20% of the U.S. casualties were wounded in action. In contrast, over 75% of the enemy prisoner of war presentations were for battle injuries. Fewer than 15% of the patients were held at the facilities for more than 24 hours., The original document contains color images.

This investigation was ordered initially by LTG Ricardo S. Sanchez, Commander, Combined Joint Task Force Seven (CJTF-7). LTG Sanchez appointed MG George R. Fay as investigating officer under the provisions of Army Regulation 381-10, Procedure 15. MG Fay was appointed to investigate allegations that members of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade (205 MI BDE) were involved in detainee abuse at the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility. MG Fay was to determine whether 205 MI BDE personnel requested, encouraged, condoned, or solicited Military Police personnel to abuse detainees and whether MI personnel complied with established interrogation procedures and applicable laws and regulations. On 16 June 2004, Acting Secretary of the Army R. L. Brownlee appointed General Paul J. Kern, Commander, U.S. Army Materiel Command, as the new Procedure 15 appointing authority. On 25 June 2004, GEN Kern appointed LTG Anthony R. Jones, Deputy Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, as an additional Procedure 15 investigating officer. MG Fay was retained as an investigating officer. Without reinvestigating areas reviewed by MG Fay, LTG Jones was specifically directed to focus on whether organizations or personnel higher than the 205th MI BDE chain of command, or events and circumstances outside of the 205th MI Brigade, were involved, directly or indirectly, in the questionable activities regarding alleged detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib prison. The investigative teams conducted a comprehensive review of all available background documents and statements pertaining to Abu Ghraib from a wide variety of sources. This report documents the operational environment at Abu Ghraib, the abuse that occurred there, discipline and leadership, other contributing factors. This document contains two reports: "Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Prison and 205th Military Intelligence Brigade" and "Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th Military Intelligence Brigade." 7, The original document contains color images.

Human intelligence (HUMINT), which is the oldest of the intelligence disciplines, has through the course of the 20th century been less emphasized by the U.S. Army relative to the technical disciplines of signals intelligence and imagery intelligence. HUMINT should remain a key component of an intelligence system, as it can cue and be cued by the other disciplines and combine with them to be more effective than any of them would be by itself. Also, the Army is involved in low- and mid-intensity campaigns around the world and Army doctrine for these types of operations identifies the importance of HUMINT in their conduct. Army leadership has expressed dissatisfaction with the current state of Army HUMINT and stated that it needs improvement. To make such an improvement, principles of HUMINT are necessary so that the HUMINT system and its components, including the individual HUMINT collectors, may be properly designed or trained. Such principles may be derived from writings of theorists and practitioners of HUMINT. All of the civilizations of the ancient world practiced HUMINT in one form or another, and many of them left behind extensive writings on the theory and practice of HUMINT. This was particularly true of the ancient Chinese and Indians, for whom HUMINT in its various forms was integral to their statecraft. The civilizations of the ancient Near East and classical period in the Mediterranean also engaged in HUMINT and left behind a record of it. Governments and militaries also employed HUMINT throughout the 20th century, and there is an extensive body of both history and theory from 20th century practitioners and theorists. Other organizations can serve as models for improvement of Army HUMINT, particularly the British Army, the U.S. Marine Corps, and the U.S. Army Foreign Area Officer Program. All of these in one way or another ensure that their HUMINT collectors have the appropriate personal qualities and the leadership they need to succeed.

After 44 years, Fidel Castro continues to defiantly run his Socialist-Marxist government under the nose of the world's hegemon. He does so in spite of powerful economic and political pressures that have severely impacted his nation's way of life and political status. From Eisenhower to the current Bush Administration, American Presidents have seemingly failed to successfully employ the four instruments of power to effect a regime change; at the same time, the Cuban dictator adroitly thwarted American gestures with his own set of military and diplomatic countermeasures. The Bush Administration maintains its staunch position that positive relations will not occur until Castro frees his political prisoners, holds democratic, free elections, and allows free speech. Inversely, the administration, at the behest of new actors in the Cuban policy arena, allowed increased cash trade and remittances that help Castro feed his nation and limit domestic pressures. Typically, United States foreign policy can be viewed as objective-based and developed to further national interests. During the Cold War, the policy and objectives were clear: defeat Soviet-led Communist aggression. Since the Cold War ended years ago, the question must now be asked: Does the United States' current Cuban picture truly strive for re-emergent relations? As important, does it offer the right carrots to entice Castro's assent while at the same time developing the right strategy to deal with his successors? Presuming it does, will Castro or his successors finally see the light or will they just find another way to stymie American advances? This paper will assess United States- Cuba policy to determine its congruency with national strategy. Based on that foundation, this paper will also examine Cuba's strategic value and discuss challenges that strategists face as they push for positive relations and plan for government

With the decision to transfer Al Qaeda and Taliban captives to detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba, the Pentagon headed into legally uncharted territory. The United States has neither recognized the detainees as prisoners of war, nor have they been charged with any crime. Consequently, unanswered questions regarding their legal status and continued incarceration have drawn heated criticism from human rights organizations world-wide. Although senior defense officials are working to develop an appropriate long-term plan, they will likely confront further legal challenges involving military tribunals and the eventual reclassification of some detainees as bona fide prisoners of war. The one certainty is that the military has undertaken an unprecedented prisoner operation with an undetermined end-state.

By the time Germany surrendered in May 1945, detailed Allied planning for the post-conflict phase of operations in that nation had been ongoing for 2 years. In contrast, LTG John Yeosock, commander of Third Army in Operation DESERT STORM, could get no useful staff support to assess and plan for post-conflict issues like hospital beds, prisoners, and refugees, complaint later that he was handed a "dripping bag of manure" that no one else wanted to deal with. Neither the Army nor Department of Defense had an adequate plan for postwar operations to rebuild Kuwait, and civilian agencies were even more unprepared. The situation was only salvaged by the adept improvisations of Army engineers and civil affairs personnel, and the dedicated efforts of Kuwaiti volunteers and the Saudi Arabian government. Some of the deficiencies in postwar planning for DESERT STORM can be attributed to the fact that Third Army was the first American field army in combat since the Korean War. Post-conflict planning historically has been a function of headquarters at echelons above corps, and continuing problems with more recent operations are at least partly attributable to the generally small scale of American interventions. Also, U.S. Army leaders and planners tend to focus on winning wars and not on the peacekeeping or nation-building that comes afterwards. But national objectives often can only be accomplished after the fighting has ceased, and it is possible to win a war and lose the peace. With the winds of war swirling around Iraq, it is time to plan for its post-conflict reconstruction. To assist such planning, this study proposes a construct for identifying the postwar missions to be accomplished following a victory over the Hussein regime and suggests the time phasing for the accomplishment of specific tasks.

On July 20, 2001, we testified at an oversight hearing-which focused on prisoner releases and reintegration programs-held by the Subcommittee on the District of Columbia, House Committee on Government Reform. Among other matters, we testified that the District, a wholly urban jurisdiction, was perhaps facing greater challenges than most jurisdictions. We noted, for instance, that Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) data as of December 31,1999, indicated that the District of Columbia's incarceration rate was higher than the rate for either Louisiana or Texas, the jurisdictions with the next highest rates. Also, we noted that a National Institute of Justice (NIJ) report on arrests in urban areas indicated that a high percentage of adult males arrested in the District in 1999 tested positive for at least one type of drug.