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The availability of practical mechanisms for comparing domestic efforts aimed at mitigating global climate change are important for the stability, equity, and efficiency of international climate agreements. We examine a variety of metrics that could be used to compare countries’ climate change mitigation efforts and illustrate their potential application to large developed and developing countries. Because there is no single comprehensive, measurable metric that could be applied to all countries, we suggest using a set of indicators to characterize and compare mitigation effort, akin to using a set of economic statistics to indicate the health of the macroeconomy. Given the iterative pledge and review approach that is emerging in the current climate change negotiations, participation, commitment, and compliance could be enhanced if this set of indicators is able to show that all parties are doing their “fair share,†both prospectively and retrospectively. The latter, in particular, highlights the need for a well-functioning policy surveillance regime.

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In September 2011, the US Environmental Protection Agency asked 12 economists how the benefits and costs of regulations should be discounted for projects that affect future generations. This paper summarizes the views of the panel on three topics -- the use of the Ramsey formula as an organizing principle for determining discount rates over long horizons, whether the discount rate should decline over time, and how intra- and intergenerational discounting practices can be made compatible. The panel members agree that the Ramsey formula provides a useful framework for thinking about intergenerational discounting. We also agree that theory provides compelling arguments for a declining certainty-equivalent discount rate. In the Ramsey formula, uncertainty about the future rate of growth in per capita consumption can lead to a declining consumption rate of discount, assuming that shocks to consumption are positively correlated. This uncertainty in future consumption growth rates may be estimated econometrically based on historic observations, or it can be derived from subjective uncertainty about the mean rate of growth in mean consumption or its volatility. Determining the remaining parameters of the Ramsey formula is, however, challenging.

In recent years, public sector funding, in general, and for the support of activities in developing countries, in particular, has become more and more ‘results’ and ‘performance’ oriented. The Governing Instrument of the recently established Green Climate Fund (GCF), for example, tasks the GCF Board with establishing ‘a framework for the monitoring and evaluation of performance … of activities supported by the Fund’ and approving a ‘results measurement framework with guidelines and appropriate performance indicators’. There are different methods by which performance can be ‘indicated’ (or even ‘measured’) in this context. The World Bank, for example, uses Country Performance Ratings which are based on its Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) and country implementation performance indices based on its Annual Report on Portfolio Performance. In the CPIA, countries are assessed with respect to 16 different criteria in terms of a largely qualitative 6-level ranking. The focus of this brief, however, is on activities that are associated with quantitative performance indicators, i.e. performance assessed in terms of measured quantities − such as tonnes (of carbon), kWh, or hectares − as carried out by the private sector.

The pollution haven hypothesis suggests that unilateral domestic emission mitigation policies could cause adverse “competitiveness†impacts on domestic manufacturers as they lose market share to foreign competitors and relocate production activity – and emissions – to unregulated economies. We construct a precise definition of competitiveness impacts appropriate for climate change regulation that can be estimated exclusively with domestic production and net import data. We use this definition and a 20+ year panel of 400+ U.S. manufacturing industries to estimate the effects of energy prices, which is in turn used to simulate the impacts of carbon pricing policy. We find that a U.S.-only $15 per ton CO2 price will cause competitiveness effects on the order of a 1.0 to 1.3 percent decline in production among the most energy-intensive manufacturing industries. This amounts to roughly one-third of the total impact of a carbon pricing policy on these firms’ economic output.

Given that technologies to significantly reduce fossil fuel emissions are currently unavailable or only available at high cost, technological change will be a key component of any long-term strategy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In light of this, the amount of research on the pace, direction, and benefits of environmentally-friendly technological change has grown dramatically in recent years. This research includes empirical work estimating the magnitude of these effects, and modeling exercises designed to simulate the importance of endogenous technological change in response to climate policy. Unfortunately, few attempts have been made to connect these two streams of research. This paper attempts to bridge that gap. We review both the empirical and modeling literature on technological change. Our focus includes the research and development process, learning by doing, the role of public versus private research, and technology diffusion. Our goal is to provide an agenda for how both empirical and modeling research in these areas can move forward in a complementary fashion. In doing so, we discuss both how models used for policy evaluation can better capture empirical phenomena, and how empirical research can better address the needs of models used for policy evaluation.

This paper argues against the common-sense conclusion that climate change demands a global market-based solution, such as international emissions trading. First, current experience suggests global cooperation is not necessary for initial mandatory actions. Second, when domestic targets vary across nations, there are a variety of reasons why international emissions trading, even though it creates aggregate economic gains for all nations, may not be desirable. These reasons include concerns over legitimizing target variations for future negotiations, real and perceived consequences of capital flows across nations, and distributional impacts within nations. Finally, the underlying need for global technology solutions suggests domestic mitigation policies that balance clear emissions price signals, incentives for technology development and deployment, and mechanisms to finance deployment to developing countries. International efforts, in turn, might focus on encouraging these domestic actions, facilitating the developing country investment mechanisms, and providing credible reviews of national action.

Resources for the Future and the Institute for Global Environmental Strategies convened a one and one-half day workshop on domestic and international climate policy May 11–12, 2005, in Tokyo, Japan. The first day included 49 participants hearing presentations from 13 speakers and discussing domestic activities, economics, and politics. The second day included a smaller group of participants listening to a panel of four experts and discussing opportunities for future international climate regimes. Participants included government officials from the Japanese Ministry of the Environment; the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry; the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency; the U.S. Department of State; and the Massachussetts Department of Commonwealth Development; representatives from business and environmental groups; and academic experts. Over the course of both days, it was clear that great opportunities exist for regularly informing experts from both countries on recent policy developments, economic analyses, and political nuances in the other country. For example, U.S. participants had an opportunity to learn the process through which Japanese technology standards are set and implemented, the subtle evolution of mandatory policy discussions, and details of current policies on voluntary trading and an emission registry. Japanese participants benefited from a frank discussion with U.S. experts of how and why it would be difficult to link different domestic emissions trading markets, the current process to establish a regional emissions trading program, and the evolving dynamics in the U.S. Senate. Looking forward, important lessons may be taken from past negotiating experiences. A small group of national leaders, including large emitters of greenhouse gases and major economies, addressing not only climate change but also developmental issues, could be a useful vehicle for meaningful international efforts. Such a small-group process should be carried out in parallel with the multilateral United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change process. In addition, policies in both the United States and Japan reflect a strong emphasis on technology development and commercialization; this may be an area where bilateral cooperation could be particularly beneficial.

We estimate a carbon mitigation cost curve for the U.S. commercial sector based on econometric estimation of the responsiveness of fuel demand and equipment choices to energy price changes. The model econometrically estimates fuel demand conditional on fuel choice, which is characterized by a multinomial logit model. Separate estimation of end uses (e.g., heating, cooking) using the 1995 Commercial Buildings Energy Consumption Survey allows for exceptionally detailed estimation of price responsiveness disaggregated by end use and fuel type. We then construct aggregate long-run elasticities, by fuel type, through a series of simulations; own-price elasticities range from –0.9 for district heat services to –2.9 for fuel oil. The simulations form the basis of a marginal cost curve for carbon mitigation, which suggests that a price of $20 per ton of carbon would result in an 8% reduction in commercial carbon emissions, and a price of $100 per ton would result in a 28% reduction.

Economic analyses of climate change policies frequently focus on reductions of energy-related carbon dioxide emissions via market-based, economywide policies. The current course of environment and energy policy debate in the United States, however, suggests an alternative outcome: inefficiently designed and/or sector-based policies. This paper uses a collection of specialized, sector-based models in conjunction with a computable general equilibrium model of the economy to examine and compare these policies at an aggregate level. We examine the relative cost of different policies designed to achieve the same quantity of emissions reductions. We find that excluding a limited number of sectors from an economywide policy does not significantly raise costs. Focusing policy solely on the electricity and transportation sectors doubles costs, however, and using nonmarket policies can raise costs by a factor of 10. These results are driven in part by, and are sensitive to, our modeling of preexisting tax distortions.

Resources for the Future and the Institute for Global Environmental Strategies convened a one and one-half day workshop on domestic and international climate policy May 11-12, 2005, in Tokyo, Japan. The first day included 49 participants hearing presentations from 13 speakers and discussing domestic activities, economics, and politics. The second day included a smaller group of participants listening to a panel of four experts and discussing opportunities for future international climate regimes. Participants included government officials from the Japanese Ministry of the Environment; the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry; the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency; the U.S. Department of State; and the Massachusetts Department of Commonwealth Development; representatives from business and environmental groups; and academic experts. Over the course of both days, it was clear that great opportunities exist for regularly informing experts from both countries on recent policy developments, economic analyses, and political nuances in the other country. For example, U.S. participants had an opportunity to learn the process through which Japanese technology standards are set and implemented, the subtle evolution of mandatory policy discussions, and details of current policies on voluntary trading and an emission registry. Japanese participants benefited from a frank discussion with U.S. experts of how and why it would be difficult to link different domestic emissions trading markets, the current process to establish a regional emissions trading program, and the evolving dynamics in the U.S. Senate. Looking forward, important lessons may be taken from past negotiating experiences. A small group of national leaders, including large emitters of greenhouse gases and major economies, addressing not only climate change but also developmental issues, could be a useful vehicle for meaningful international efforts. Such a small-group process should be carried out in parallel with the multilateral United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change process. In addition, policies in both the United States and Japan reflect a strong emphasis on technology development and commercialization; this may be an area where bilateral cooperation could be particularly beneficial.

While the rest of the world has pursued absolute emissions limits for greenhouse gases, the Bush administration has proposed an alternative policy formulation based, among other things, on reducing emissions intensity-that is, emissions per dollar of real gross domestic product. Critics of this formulation have denounced the general idea of an intensity-based emissions target, along with its voluntary nature and weak targets. This raises the question of whether intensity-based emissions limits, distinct from the other features of the Bush initiative, offer a useful alternative to absolute emissions limits. This paper makes the case that they do, based on how emissions targets are framed. The argument draws on four key observations: greenhouse gas emissions will continue to rise over the near term, absolute targets emphasize zero or declining emissions growth while intensity targets do not, developing countries' economic development is integrally tied to emissions growth for the foreseeable future, and intensity targets need not be any more complicated to administer than absolute targets.

The uncertainty surrounding both costs and benefits associated with global climate change mitigation creates enormous hurdles for scientists, stakeholders, and decision-makers. A key issue is how policy choices balance uncertainty about costs and benefits. This balance arises in terms of the time path of mitigation efforts as well as whether those efforts, by design, focus on effort or outcome. This paper considers two choices-price versus quantity controls and absolute versus relative/intensity emissions limits-demonstrating that price controls and intensity emissions limits favor certainty about cost over climate benefits and future emissions reductions. The paper then argues that in the near term, this favoritism is desired.

We estimate a carbon mitigation cost curve for the U.S. commercial sector based on econometric estimation of the responsiveness of fuel demand and equipment choices to energy price changes. The model econometrically estimates fuel demand conditional on fuel choice, which is characterized by a multinomial logit model. Separate estimation of end uses (e.g., heating, cooking) using the 1995 Commercial Buildings Energy Consumption Survey allows for exceptionally detailed estimation of price responsiveness disaggregated by end use and fuel type. We then construct aggregate long-run elasticities, by fuel type, through a series of simulations; own-price elasticities range from -0.9 for district heat services to -2.9 for fuel oil. The simulations form the basis of a marginal cost curve for carbon mitigation, which suggests that a price of $20 per ton of carbon would result in an 8% reduction in commercial carbon emissions, and a price of $100 per ton would result in a 28% reduction.

Economic analyses of climate change policies frequently focus on reductions of energy-related carbon dioxide emissions via market-based, economywide policies. The current course of environment and energy policy debate in the United States, however, suggests an alternative outcome: inefficiently designed and/or sector-based policies. This paper uses a collection of specialized, sector-based models in conjunction with a computable general equilibrium model of the economy to examine and compare these policies at an aggregate level. We examine the relative cost of different policies designed to achieve the same quantity of emissions reductions. We find that excluding a limited number of sectors from an economywide policy does not significantly raise costs. Focusing policy solely on the electricity and transportation sectors doubles costs, however, and using nonmarket policies can raise costs by a factor of 10. These results are driven in part by, and are sensitive to, our modeling of preexisting tax distortions.

The European Union is on the verge of establishing an emissions trading program ten times the size of the Acid Rain trading program in the United States. Its design takes advantage of many lessons from existing experience with trading programs, as well as economic theory, and innovates in important ways. While we view this as an impressive development, concerns about equity, enforcement, and efficiency remain. Specifically, a lack of data and weaker environmental institutions in some EU Member States raises questions about both allowance allocations and compliance and enforcement. Although much attention has focused on whether prices will be “too low” in the first phase of the program, a greater risk is that uncertainty about program elements, technology and behavioral response, and external events could create volatile markets and costly compliance in the second phase. Regardless of outcome, the EU trading system will be influential in future international efforts to reduce greenhouse gases.

Resources for the Future and the Institute for Global Environmental Strategies (Japan) convened a one-and-one-half day workshop on domestic and international climate policy on February 12–13, 2004 in Washington, D.C. On the first day, 55 participants heard presentations from 14 speakers and discussed domestic activities, economics, and politics. The second day featured a smaller group of 27 participants hearing six informal sets of comments and discussing opportunities for international collaboration. Participants included government officials from the Japanese Ministry of the Environment, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and other U.S. administration and congressional staff; representatives from business and environmental groups; and academic experts. Over the course of both days, it was clear that great opportunities exist for informing participants from both countries on recent developments, economic analyses, and political nuances in the other country. For example, American participants were unaware of the Keidanren’s success at exceeding required efficiency standards. Japanese participants were unaware of U.S. treaty tradition, by which ratification cannot occur until implementing legislation is in place—a fact that makes the Kyoto Protocol virtually unratifiable. Participants on both sides benefited from a frank discussion of how and why it may be unwise for the international community to attempt to re-engage the United States in international climate policy until the United States settles on its own course of meaningful domestic action. Looking forward, an important lesson may be taken from U.S. experience with early environmental regulation, where state action provided experience and impetus for federal action. As an alternative to the Kyoto model, distinct national actions may provide experience and impetus for international action. In addition, policies in both the United States and Japan reflect a strong emphasis on technology development and commercialization; this may be an area where bilateral cooperation could be particularly beneficial.

In this study we use datasets from the 1995 and 2000 Community Water Supply surveys to examine the production costs of water supply systems. We first estimate the economies of scale in water supply by estimating the total unit cost as well as individual component cost elasticities. For total unit cost elasticity, we find that a 1% increase in production reduces unit costs by a statistically significant 0.16%. For individual component cost elasticities, we find that higher economies of scale exist in capital costs, outside costs, other costs, and materials costs; labor costs and energy costs exhibit lower but still positive economies of scale. These economies of scale may reflect production economies or suggest that larger systems are better than smaller systems at bargaining and can obtain inputs at a lower unit cost. Importantly, bargaining gains and some production economies do not necessarily depend on water systems’ becoming physically interconnected.

In this study we use datasets from the 1995 and 2000 Community Water Supply surveys to examine the production costs of water supply systems. We first estimate the economies of scale in water supply by estimating the total unit cost as well as individual component cost elasticities. For total unit cost elasticity, we find that a 1% increase in production reduces unit costs by a statistically significant 0.16%. For individual component cost elasticities, we find that higher economies of scale exist in capital costs, outside costs, other costs, and materials costs; labor costs and energy costs exhibit lower but still positive economies of scale. These economies of scale may reflect production economies or suggest that larger systems are better than smaller systems at bargaining and can obtain inputs at a lower unit cost. Importantly, bargaining gains and some production economies do not necessarily depend on water systems' becoming physically interconnected.

Resources for the Future and the Institute for Global Environmental Strategies (Japan) convened a one-and-one-half day workshop on domestic and international climate policy on February 12-13, 2004 in Washington, D.C. On the first day, 55 participants heard presentations from 14 speakers and discussed domestic activities, economics, and politics. The second day featured a smaller group of 27 participants hearing six informal sets of comments and discussing opportunities for international collaboration. Participants included government officials from the Japanese Ministry of the Environment, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and other U.S. administration and congressional staff; representatives from business and environmental groups; and academic experts. Over the course of both days, it was clear that great opportunities exist for informing participants from both countries on recent developments, economic analyses, and political nuances in the other country. For example, American participants were unaware of the Keidanren's success at exceeding required efficiency standards. Japanese participants were unaware of U.S. treaty tradition, by which ratification cannot occur until implementing legislation is in place-a fact that makes the Kyoto Protocol virtually unratifiable. Participants on both sides benefited from a frank discussion of how and why it may be unwise for the international community to attempt to re-engage the United States in international climate policy until the United States settles on its own course of meaningful domestic action. Looking forward, an important lesson may be taken from U.S. experience with early environmental regulation, where state action provided experience and impetus for federal action. As an alternative to the Kyoto model, distinct national actions may provide experience and impetus for international action. In addition, policies in both the United States and Japan reflect a strong emphasis on technology development and commercialization; this may be an area where bilateral cooperation could be particularly beneficial.

Most studies that compare price and quantity controls for greenhouse gas emissions under uncertainty find that price mechanisms perform substantially better. In these studies, the benefits from reducing emissions are proportional to the level of reductions, and such linear benefits strongly favor price policies (Weitzman 1974). Catastrophic damages, however, challenge that intuition as consequences become highly nonlinear. Catastrophe avoidance offers huge benefits, and incremental adjustments on either side of the associated threshold are relatively unimportant, suggesting a strong preference for quantity controls. This paper shows that with catastrophic damages, both price and quantity mechanisms offer large gains over the business-as-usual alternative, and the difference between policies is never more than 10%. Catastrophe avoidance is much more important than efficient catastrophe avoidance. Although previous studies favoring price policies in the presence of uncertainty have worried that catastrophes would reverse their results, this analysis indicates that such concerns are not borne out.

Decisions concerning environmental protection hinge on estimates of economic burden. Over the past 30 years, economists have developed and applied various tools to measure this burden. In this paper, developed as a chapter for the Handbook of Environmental Economics, we present a taxonomy of costs along with methods for measuring those costs. At the broadest level, we distinguish between partial and general equilibrium costs. Partial equilibrium costs represent the burden directly borne by the regulated entity (firms, households, government), including both pecuniary and nonpecuniary expenses, when prices are held constant. General equilibrium costs reflect the net burden once all good and factor markets have equilibrated. In addition to partial equilibrium costs, these general equilibrium costs include welfare losses or gains in markets with preexisting distortions, welfare losses or gains from rebalancing the government's budget constraint, and welfare gains from the added flexibility of meeting pollution constraints through reductions in the use of higher-priced, pollution-intensive products. In addition to both partial and general equilibrium costs, we also consider the distribution of costs across households, countries, sectors, subnational regions, and generations. Despite improvements in our understanding of cost measurement, we find considerable opportunity for further work and, especially, better application of existing methods.

The political economy of environmental policy favors the use of quantity-based instruments over price-based instruments (e.g., tradable permits over green taxes), at least in the United States. With cost uncertainty, however, there are clear efficiency advantages to prices in many cases, especially for stock pollutants such as greenhouse gases. The question arises, therefore, of whether one can design flexible quantity policies that mimic the behavior of price policies, namely stable permit prices and abatement costs. We explore a number of "quantity-plus" policies that replicate the behavior of a price policy through rules that adjust the effective permit cap for unexpectedly low or high costs. They do so without necessitating any monetary exchanges between the government and the regulated firms, which can be a significant political barrier to the use of price instruments.

Most studies that compare price and quantity controls for greenhouse gas emissions under uncertainty find that price mechanisms perform substantially better. In these studies, the benefits from reducing emissions are proportional to the level of reductions, and such linear benefits strongly favor price policies (Weitzman 1974). Catastrophic damages, however, challenge that intuition as consequences become highly nonlinear. Catastrophe avoidance offers huge benefits, and incremental adjustments on either side of the associated threshold are relatively unimportant, suggesting a strong preference for quantity controls. This paper shows that with catastrophic damages, both price and quantity mechanisms offer large gains over the business-as-usual alternative, and the difference between policies is never more than 10%. Catastrophe avoidance is much more important than efficient catastrophe avoidance. Although previous studies favoring price policies in the presence of uncertainty have worried that catastrophes would reverse their results, this analysis indicates that such concerns are not borne out.