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The paper deals with the problem of E. Voegelin’s notion of experience: the positive meaning of this concept is not specified in any of the author’s works. Based on W. James’s ‘‘Essay on Radical Empiricism” and Voegelin’s late works, it is shown that Voegelin’s theory of consciousness is rooted in James‘s concept of “pure experience”, which essentially sought to close the epistemological chasm between subject and object, phenomena and noumena. According to this notion, mental and physical, subjective and objective realities are merely derivative aspects of a certain primordial pure experience, which is more elementary and fundamental than the two former aspects of reality. Finally, the article exposes other implications of this connection with James’s philosophy for E. Voegelin’s theory of consciousness.

The article offers information related to "Old friends and partners: Allan Bowe as an associate of Carl Faberge" by Boris Gorelik, which appeared in the periodical "Jewellery Studies" on 2021, is presented. Topic includes on the history of the House of Faberge has been thoroughly researched, and many lavishly illustrated volumes of a popular or academic nature have been dedicated to the emergence, development and phenomenal success of that company, some aspects require further exploration.

Conceptual constructive models are a type of scientific model that can be used to construct or reshape the target phenomenon conceptually. Though it has received scant attention from the philosophers, it raises an intriguing issue of how a conceptual constructive model can construct the target phenomenon in a conceptual way. Proponents of the conception of conceptual constructive models are not being explicit about the application of the constructive force of a model in the target construction. It is far from clear that how a conceptual constructive model exerts its constructive force on the constructed phenomenon of interest. Consequently, the function and the epistemic status of a conceptual constructive model are dubious at best. Making use of the conception of abstraction-as-aggregation, I argue that a conceptual constructive model can be used to construct the phenomenon of interest conceptually via a two-step process of abstraction: (1) abstracting away the lower-level details; and (2) aggregating the relevant information into a higher-level composite element. I contend that this process of abstraction, which is not playing the representational role as in a typical representational model, confers the constructive force on a model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper distinguishes in Maxwell's thought between "atomic molecules" and "ultimate atoms," and arrives at a set of properties that characterize each type of atom. It concludes that Maxwell is a mathematical atomist, an approach that entails the notion that although it is impossible to observe the ultimate atoms as free particles, we can nevertheless study them as mathematical observables, on the caveat that mathematical formalism remains tied to phenomenalism and to theoretical interpretations of such phenomena as, for example, mass and force variations, gravitational pull, gas diffusion and viscosity, and heat conduction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to phenomenal transparency, phenomenal concepts are transparent where a transparent concept is one that reveals the nature of that to which it refers. What is the connection between phenomenal transparency and our concept of a subject of experience? This paper focuses on a recent argument, due to Philip Goff, for thinking that phenomenal transparency entails transparency about subjecthood. The argument is premissed on the idea that subjecthood is related to specific phenomenal properties as a determinable of more specific determinates. I argue that the argument fails, which opens the door for one to endorse phenomenal transparency while denying transparency about the concept of a subject of experience. I draw out the consequences of this for certain versions of the combination problem for panpsychist metaphysics and moreover argue that rejecting the transparency of subjecthood does not undermine anti-physicalist arguments premissed on considerations relating to phenomenal transparency . [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on standard phenomenal conservatism (SPC), a theory in epistemology that seeks, to ground justified beliefs in the way things "seem" to subject who holds a belief. Topics include Roger White's argument related to prominent Bayesian line of attack against Pryor's dogmatism, which is a version of SPC restricted to perceptual seemings; role of Probabilism as a tool for modeling the justification; and Michael Huemer's formulation of the phenomenal conservatism.

Copyright of Revue Académique des Études Sociales et Humaines is the property of Hassif Benbouali University of Chlef and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Philosophy & Canon Law is the property of Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Slaskiego and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Problems / Problemos is the property of Vilnius University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Theologies of divine action in nature have sought to maximize traction with the sciences to secure their credibility. While varying in significant ways, all extant proposals share a commitment to physical realism, the claim that (at least some) physical entities and facts are both mind‐independent and ontologically basic within creation. However, I will argue that this metaphysical commitment undermines the body of scientific knowledge to which theologians wish to be responsive. Is there an alternative? Building on the work of Howard Robinson, I will show that there is a coherent account of mind's place in nature that denies physical realism. Such an account would enable a theological description of God's sustaining and governing action in nature through the ontological mediation of minds and laws causally constraining their sensations. Furthermore, this proposal yields a positive research program that makes essential use of the contributions of the natural sciences to understand the nature of embodiment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The shift from a cinematic to a post-cinematic media regime has occasioned a great deal of anxiety for theorists and spectators alike, and the horror genre has been adept at channeling this unease for its own purposes, as is evidenced in movies that revolve around the proliferation of digital devices and networks as new media for ghosts, demons, and other forms of evil. This article argues that the fears elicited in post-cinematic horror are more deeply rooted in the "discorrelation" of phenomenal experience and computational microtemporality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Obnovljeni zivot is the property of University of Zagreb, Society of Jesus and Faculty of Philosophy & Religious Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

According to the Phenomenal Unity Thesis ("PUT") – most prominently defended by Tim Bayne and David Chalmers – necessarily, any set of phenomenal states of a subject at a time is phenomenally unified. The standard formulation of this thesis is unacceptably vague because it does not specify what it is to be a subject. In this paper, I first consider possible meanings for 'subject' as used in PUT and argue that every plausible candidate definition renders the thesis trivially true. I consider and reject Tim Bayne's proposal that 'subject' means 'human being'. Then I argue, contra Bayne and Chalmers, that PUT is not incompatible with any major theory of consciousness, and contra Michael Tye, that split-brain patients do not provide evidence against PUT. I close by considering some nontrivial alternatives to PUT. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cognition is not, and could not possibly be, entirely representational in character. There is also a phenomenal form of cognitive expression that registers the intrinsic properties of mental states themselves. Arguments against the reality of this intrinsic phenomenal dimension to mental experience have focused either on its supposed impossibility (since the brain possesses no such properties), or secondly, the non-appearance of any such qualities to introspection. This paper argues to the contrary, that the registration of cognitive state properties does take place independently of representational content; and necessarily so, since it supports an independent function—self-management. Given the fact that unlike a computer, the brain must, of necessity, operate itself, it needs to be in touch with itself to do so. Intrinsic phenomenal forms of cognitive expression allow the brain to do just that by registering characteristics of the cognitive states themselves. Self-management might well prove to constitute the prime reason for the emergence of subjectivity itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Beytulhikme: An International Journal of Philosophy is the property of Beytulhikme: An International Journal of Philosophy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Recent empirical studies raise significant methodological concerns about the use of intuitions in philosophy. According to one prominent line of reply, these concerns are unwarranted since the empirical studies motivating them do not control for the putatively characteristic phenomenology of intuitions. This paper makes use of research on metacognitive states that share the phenomenology of intuitions to argue that this reply fails. Furthermore, it shows how empirical findings about these metacognitive states can help philosophers make better informed assessments of their warrant for relying on intuitions in inquiry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article we analyze the basic theoretical assumptions of participants in the Methodenstreit dispute. The opposing views of positivists and historists have been analyzed according to the key positivist rules set out by Kolakowski (1972): phenomenalism, nominalism, status of value judgements and unity of science. In particular, the main consequences of different understandings of the relationship between the methods of the natural and social sciences were discussed: a) understanding of the goal of the social sciences: comprehension and explanation, b) the possibility of discovering universal laws as opposed to contextual analysis of unique phenomena; c) the place of social sciences in the system of sciences. We point to the efforts of the representatives of both directions to affirm the knowledge possibilities of the social sciences, but with different perceptions of the direction of the development of the social sciences - towards conquering the external or internal world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of the article is to reconstruct some important themes and conceptual motives that mark the continuity between Kant's transcendental philosophy and Husserl's phenomenology. They are divided into dozen headings in order to support more analytical approach. These include: the difference between phenomenology and phenomenalism, the status of the thing in itself and the transcendental object, the faculty of intuition, Kant's refutation of idealism in relation to Husserl's lifeworld, the role of imagination, the time-consciousness and others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of NaUKMA Research Papers in Philosophy & Religious Studies is the property of National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, Faculty of Humanities and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

While physicalist interpretations of human consciousness have been the major focus in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science during the last decades, many existing proposals expressly link phenomenal consciousness with human linguistic ability and build on the idea that we acquire cognitive access to consciousness through “higher-order” verbal thinking. Accepting this premise and the epistemological consequences of Jackson’s Knowledge Argument, this paper argues that the study of phenomenal knowledge as the one mediated by language might grow into a novel and promising research agenda for cognitive linguistics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Praxis Filosófica is the property of Universidad del Valle and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

W. V. Quine's first philosophical monograph, Word and Object (1960), is widely recognized as one of the most influential books of twentieth century philosophy. Notes, letters, and draft manuscripts at the Quine Archives, however, reveal that Quine was already working on a philosophical book in the early 1940s; a project entitled Sign and Object. In this paper, I examine these and other unpublished documents and show that Sign and Object sheds new light on the evolution of Quine's ideas. Where "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" is usually considered to be a turning point in Quine's development, this paper redefines the place of 'Two Dogmas' in his oeuvre. Not only does Quine's book project reveal that his views were already fairly naturalistic in the early 1940s (Sects. 3–5); Sign and Object also unearths the steps Quine had to take in maturing his perspective; steps that will be traced in the second half of this paper (Sects. 6–9). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International Journal of Philosophy, Human & Social Sciences, Nr. 2, 2017: A partire da Kant: interpretazioni e metamorfosi del trascendentale / Starting from Kant: interpretations and metamorphosis of the transcendental. 288 Jacobs, Nathan A.: Can the New Wave of Kant Scholarship Baptize Kant's Deism? [Japanische Kant-Studien 18, 2017]: Symposium: Die "Publizität" nach 3.11 und Kant: Kant in Fukushima. 498 Pichler, Axel: "Kant: or can't as intelligible character": Meaning and Function of the Type "Kant" and his Philosophy in Twilight of the Idols. 553 Sánchez Madrid, Nuria - Marey, Macarena: Kant et le droit en 1784: la formation de l'obligation juridique dans le cours «Naturrecht Feyerabend». [Extracted from the article]

A generalized analytical formulation for analyzing the Goos-Hänchen (GH) lateral shift direction is provided, from which we show that the phenomenon of both positive and negative GH shifts at different incident angles can be observed with left-handed material (LHM) slabs. The formulation also reveals that this unique phenomenon is related to the relative amplitudes of the growing and decaying evanescent waves inside the LHM slabs. The energy flux patterns with LHM slabs are further studied to show the influence of the evanescent waves on the GH shift direction change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents literary criticism which claims that Henry James Sr.'s "Society the Redeemed Form of Man" contains passages that have striking pertinence for the psychological drama of Peyton Farquhar in Ambrose Bierce's "An Occurrence at Owl Creek Bridge." Perception of James on the state of real creation; Concerns that relate to the linguistic phenomenalism surrounding the occurrence at Owl Creek Bridge; Distinction between post-mortem consciousness and moment-of-death consciousness.

Kant has often been accused of being a phenomenalist, i.e., of reducing spatial objects to representations that exist only in our minds. I argue against this reading. Given Kant’s claim that appearances are mere representations, the only way to avoid the accusation of phenomenalism is to provide an alternative conception of “representation” according to which the claim that something is a mere representation does not entail that it is a mere mental item (or an organized collection of mental items). I offer evidence that Kant does not conceive of representations as mental items and outline an alternative conception of representations.

B. F. Skinner and W. V. Quine, arguably the two most influential proponents of behaviorism in mid-twentieth century psychology and philosophy, are often considered brothers in arms. They were close friends, they had remarkably parallel careers, and they both identified as behaviorists. Yet, surprisingly little is known about the relation between the two. How did Skinner and Quine develop their varieties of behaviorism? In what ways did they affect each other? And how similar are their behaviorisms to begin with? In this paper, I shed new light on the relation between Skinner and Quine by infusing the debate with a wide range of new and previously unexamined evidence from the personal and academic archives of Skinner and Quine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main goal of this paper is to present a theory of the most salient aspect of the phenomenal character of pain – namely, the painfulness of pain or its negative affective quality. This task involves developing an account of the evaluative structure of pain, according to which painfulness is constituted by a (subjectively) frustrated (first‐order) conative attitude that is directed towards the bodily condition the obtaining of which the pain represents. The argument for the proposed Attitudinal‐Representational Theory of Pain proceeds by presenting an explanatory challenge that concerns crucial aspects of the reason‐giving force of pain, and showing that, unlike extant theories of pain, it successfully accounts for them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As detailed examination of the experience of the individual, the Self or the I is overtaken in the intellectual climate of qualitative research by an aim to understand human experience on a collective or transferable level, the claim made by qualitative researchers to providing genuine understanding of the "what is it like" characteristics of being human arguably becomes shaky. If the wellspring from which we draw our understanding is limited to understandings that researchers recognize as general, then the unique and deeper characteristics of individual experience may be buried within the aggregate. We contend that any such restricted approach cannot begin by itself to cogently inform a theory of or a theory for examining human experience that is sufficiently sophisticated for qualitative research practice. Consequently, we propose a recovery and inclusion, into qualitative research frameworks, of a strongly idiographic consideration of the "what is it like" characteristics of phenomena, as experienced by the individual person. Recommending thereby a recovery of hermeneutic and phenomenological modes of thought, in this article, we suggest that the central ideas of KELLY's personal construct psychology involve fertile ground for guiding such a shift in qualitative research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We have taken a look at the rules of games in order to acquire some knowledge concerning constitutive rules and, probably, institutional phenomena in general. In this paper we tried to elaborate a system account of constitutive rules. We claim that all accounts that put emphasis on the form of rules are vulnerable. It appears that constitutive rules are interconnected and always form a system that can be internally differentiated. Thanks to adopting certain qualitative criterion we were able to distinguish central and peripheral constitutive rules. Moreover, that very account makes it possible to distinguish between different types (rigid and flexible) of practices that are determined by types of systems of rules. Secondly, it appears there are three "layers" of games that should not be confused: deep conventions, constitutive rules that establish the game and determine games' identities, and "rules of efficiency" that are some sort of recommendations as to how to play well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the relationship between phenomenal properties and intentional properties. In recent years a number of philosophers have argued that intentional properties are sometimes necessitated by phenomenal properties, but have not explained why or how. Exceptions can be found in the work of Katalin Farkas and Farid Masrour, who develop versions of reductionism regarding phenomenally-necessitated intentionality (or 'phenomenal intentionality'). I raise two objections to reductive theories of the sort they develop. Then I propose a version of primitivism regarding phenomenal intentionality. I argue that primitivism avoids the pitfalls of reductionism while promising broad explanatory payoffs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to phenomenalism, physical things are a certain kind of possibility for experience. This paper clarifies the phenomenalist position and addresses some main objections to it, with the aim of showing that phenomenalism is a live option that merits a place alongside dualism and materialism in contemporary metaphysical debate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article forms part of a series of reflections rooted in the experience of movement in the practice of dance. The proposal is to think of the body as a place of expression using key concepts of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological philosophy to discuss the expressive body from the perspective of its gesturality and its relationship with the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his brief treatment of memory, Hume characterizes memory using two kinds of criteria: ideas' phenomenal character and their correspondence to the past experiences from which they derived. These criteria have seemed so perplexing to interpreters, both individually and jointly, that Hume's account of memory is commonly considered one of the weakest parts of his philosophical system. This paper defends Hume's criteria by showing that they achieve two theoretical aims: a scientific classification of ideas and a definition of 'memory.' In particular, I argue that Hume's definition of 'memory' is cogent in light of Putnamian considerations about definitions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A fundamental feature of addiction is continued use despite high-cost losses. One possible driver of this feature is a dissociation between reward pursuit and reward valuation. To test for this dissociation, we employed a foraging paradigm with real-time delays and video rewards. Subjects made stay/skip choices on risky and non-risky offers; risky losses were operationalized as receipt of the longer delay after accepting a risky deal. We found that reward likability following risky losses predicted reward pursuit (i.e., subsequent choices), while there was no effect on reward valuation or reward pursuit in the absence of such losses. Individuals with high trait externalizing, who may be vulnerable to addiction, showed a dissociation between these phenomena: they liked videos more after risky losses but showed no decrease in choosing to stay on subsequent risky offers. This suggests that the inability to learn from mistakes is a potential component of risk for addiction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article evaluates the pluralist approach of Annalisa Coliva in her book "The Varieties of Self-Knowledge". Topics discussed include phenomena of different kinds of mental states in different ways, apply pluralist conclusion on self-knowledge that work for either beliefs or phenomenal states such as pain and struggle, and her beliefs that depend on a judgment based evidence and can be self-known.

The author discusses the responses to the comments and questions on his book "Phenomenology and Intercultural Understanding: Toward a New Cultural Flesh". The author's philosophical apprenticeship was bilingual and pluricultural and learned the Chinese philosophy. The author also discusses the concept mutual identity and the issue of personal identity.

Abstract Science is a discipline of academic study that orients us strongly to field; to knowledge of how phenomena are classified and composed, and how activities implicate other activities. A strong focus on knowledge building can obscure the fact that the learning of science is also about understanding the values that associate with that knowledge. To date the teaching and learning of values in science remains relatively under-explored, particularly from a linguistic perspective, and in the context of spoken pedagogic discourse. The research reported here constitutes a case study of a live undergraduate lecture in health science on the topic of urine formation. It draws on systemic functional linguistic (SFL) theory, with the aim to model tools for analysis and an exploratory process for identifying the nature and expression of scientific values in the lecturer's discourse. Importantly we consider expression in relation to the semiotic systems of language and body language, and are able to show how their inter-semiotic relations function to reinforce a recurring set of values in ways that make them more noticeable to students, with greater potential for recognition and affiliation. Highlights • The cultivation of science values is integral to the teaching and learning of scientific content. • Distinctive values of specific fields of science are identifiable in the spoken discourse of live lectures. • Body language that couples convergently with spoken language enhances the salience of expressed values. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]