Search

Computational psychiatry has suggested that humans within the autism spectrum disorder (ASD) inflexibly update their expectations (i.e., Bayesian priors). Here, we leveraged high-yield rodent psychophysics (n = 75 mice), extensive behavioral modeling (including principled and heuristics), and (near) brain-wide single cell extracellular recordings (over 53k units in 150 brain areas) to ask (1) whether mice with different genetic perturbations associated with ASD show this same computational anomaly, and if so, (2) what neurophysiological features are shared across genotypes in subserving this deficit. We demonstrate that mice harboring mutations in Fmr1 , Cntnap2 , and Shank3B show a blunted update of priors during decision-making. Neurally, the differentiating factor between animals flexibly and inflexibly updating their priors was a shift in the weighting of prior encoding from sensory to frontal cortices. Further, in mouse models of ASD frontal areas showed a preponderance of units coding for deviations from the animals' long-run prior, and sensory responses did not differentiate between expected and unexpected observations. These findings demonstrate that distinct genetic instantiations of ASD may yield common neurophysiological and behavioral phenotypes.

Contemporary pose estimation methods enable precise measurements of behavior via supervised deep learning with hand-labeled video frames. Although effective in many cases, the supervised approach requires extensive labeling and often produces outputs that are unreliable for downstream analyses. Here, we introduce "Lightning Pose," an efficient pose estimation package with three algorithmic contributions. First, in addition to training on a few labeled video frames, we use many unlabeled videos and penalize the network whenever its predictions violate motion continuity, multiple-view geometry, and posture plausibility (semi-supervised learning). Second, we introduce a network architecture that resolves occlusions by predicting pose on any given frame using surrounding unlabeled frames. Third, we refine the pose predictions post-hoc by combining ensembling and Kalman smoothing. Together, these components render pose trajectories more accurate and scientifically usable. We release a cloud application that allows users to label data, train networks, and predict new videos directly from the browser., Competing Interests: Competing Interests Statement Robert S. Lee assisted in the initial development of the cloud application as a solution architect at Lightning AI in Spring-Summer 2022. He left the company in August 2022 and continues to hold shares. The remaining authors declare no competing interests.

Natural behaviors occur in closed action-perception loops and are supported by dynamic and flexible beliefs abstracted away from our immediate sensory milieu. How this real-world flexibility is instantiated in neural circuits remains unknown. Here we have macaques navigate in a virtual environment by primarily leveraging sensory (optic flow) signals, or by more heavily relying on acquired internal models. We record single-unit spiking activity simultaneously from the dorsomedial superior temporal area (MSTd), parietal area 7a, and the dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC). Results show that while animals were able to maintain adaptive task-relevant beliefs regardless of sensory context, the fine-grain statistical dependencies between neurons, particularly in 7a and dlPFC, dynamically remapped with the changing computational demands. In dlPFC, but not 7a, destroying these statistical dependencies abolished the area's ability for cross-context decoding. Lastly, correlation analyses suggested that the more unit-to-unit couplings remapped in dlPFC, and the less they did so in MSTd, the less were population codes and behavior impacted by the loss of sensory evidence. We conclude that dynamic functional connectivity between prefrontal cortex neurons maintains a stable population code and context-invariant beliefs during naturalistic behavior with closed action-perception loops., Competing Interests: Competing Interests Statement No author had any competing interests of any kind.

Self-initiated behavior is accompanied by the experience of willing our actions. Here, we leverage the unique opportunity to examine the full intentional chain - from will (W) to action (A) to environmental effects (E) - in a tetraplegic person fitted with a primary motor cortex (M1) brain machine interface (BMI) generating hand movements via neuromuscular electrical stimulation (NMES). This combined BMI-NMES approach allowed us to selectively manipulate each element of the intentional chain (W, A, and E) while performing extra-cellular recordings and probing subjective experience. Our results reveal single-cell, multi-unit, and population-level dynamics in human M1 that encode W and may predict its subjective onset. Further, we show that the proficiency of a neural decoder in M1 reflects the degree of W-A binding, tracking the participant's subjective experience of intention in (near) real time. These results point to M1 as a critical node in forming the subjective experience of intention and demonstrate the relevance of intention-related signals for translational neuroprosthetics., Competing Interests: Competing Interest Declaration The authors declare no competing interests.

A key computation in building adaptive internal models of the external world is to ascribe sensory signals to their likely cause(s), a process of Bayesian Causal Inference (CI). CI is well studied within the framework of two-alternative forced-choice tasks, but less well understood within the cadre of naturalistic action-perception loops. Here, we examine the process of disambiguating retinal motion caused by self- and/or object-motion during closed-loop navigation. First, we derive a normative account specifying how observers ought to intercept hidden and moving targets given their belief over (i) whether retinal motion was caused by the target moving, and (ii) if so, with what velocity. Next, in line with the modeling results, we show that humans report targets as stationary and steer toward their initial rather than final position more often when they are themselves moving, suggesting a misattribution of object-motion to the self. Further, we predict that observers should misattribute retinal motion more often: (i) during passive rather than active self-motion (given the lack of an efference copy informing self-motion estimates in the former), and (ii) when targets are presented eccentrically rather than centrally (given that lateral self-motion flow vectors are larger at eccentric locations during forward self-motion). Results confirm both of these predictions. Lastly, analysis of eye-movements show that, while initial saccades toward targets are largely accurate regardless of the self-motion condition, subsequent gaze pursuit was modulated by target velocity during object-only motion, but not during concurrent object- and self-motion. These results demonstrate CI within action-perception loops, and suggest a protracted temporal unfolding of the computations characterizing CI.