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There is a large scientific interest in human moral judgments. However, little is known about the developmental origins and the specific role of the primary caregivers in the early development of inter-individual differences in human morality. Here, we assess the moral intuitions of 3- to 6-year-old children and their mothers (N = 56), using child-friendly versions of five trolley dilemmas and two control scenarios. We found that children responded to moral dilemmas similar to their mothers, revealed by correlations between the responses of mothers and their children in all five moral dilemmas and a highly similar overall response pattern between mother and child across all judgments. This was revealed by a high agreement in the response pattern of children and their mothers. Furthermore, children’s overall response tendencies were similar to the response tendencies of adults. Thus, similar moral principles (e.g., the Doctrine of the Double Effect) which have been identified in adults, and describes as a universal moral grammar, may guide the moral intuitions in early childhood already. Taken together, the present findings provide the first evidence that children’s moral intuitions are closely associated with the moral intuitions of their mother.

The study of moral cognition is marked by two traditions: one centered on the study of how information regarding causality and intentionality is processed, and the other, derived from socio-cognitive potions, privileging moral agency and behavior regulation beyond processing. Thus, there seems to be a gap between the study of reasoning and the study of conduct, when speaking of morals. The article proposes an interaction between a path model of blame, centered on the processing of information, and moral disengagement (md) as a set of justifications of immoral conduct. While the integration is not complete, it does contribute a view of moral cognition focused on social regulation and the interactions between the judgments and responses evident in social interactions. Additionally, as a product of that interaction, the study provides a methodological proposal to inquire into the origin of md in development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: People with schizophrenia are ten times more likely to commit homicide than a member of the general population. The relationship between symptoms of schizophrenia and acts of violence is unclear. There has also been limited research on what determines the seriousness and form of violence, such as reactive or instrumental violence. Moral cognition may play a paradoxical role in acts of violence for people with schizophrenia. Thoughts which have moral content arising from psychotic symptoms may be a cause of serious violence. Method: We investigated if psychotic symptoms and moral cognitions at the time of a violent act were associated with acts of violence using a cross-sectional national forensic cohort (n = 55). We examined whether moral cognitions were associated with violence when controlling for neurocognition and violence proneness. We explored the association between all psychotic symptoms present at the time of the violent act, psychotic symptoms judged relevant to the violent act and moral cognitions present at that time. Using mediation analysis, we examined whether moral cognitions were the missing link between symptoms and the relevance of symptoms for violence. We also investigated if specific moral cognitions mediated the relationship between specific psychotic symptoms, the seriousness of violence (including homicide), and the form of violence. Results: Psychotic symptoms generally were not associated with the seriousness or form of violence. However, specific moral cognitions were associated with the seriousness and form of violence even when controlling for neurocognition and violence proneness. Specific moral cognitions were associated with specific psychotic symptoms present and relevant to violence. Moral cognitions mediated the relationship between the presence of specific psychotic symptoms and their relevance for violence, homicide, seriousness of violence, and the form of violence. Conclusions: Moral cognitions including the need to reduce suffering, responding to an act of injustice or betrayal, the desire to comply with authority, or the wish to punish impure or disgusting behaviour, may be a key mediator explaining the relationship between psychotic symptoms and acts of violence. Our findings may have important implications for risk assessment, treatment and violence prevention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a large scientific interest in human moral judgments. However, little is known about the developmental origins and the specific role of the primary caregivers in the early development of inter-individual differences in human morality. Here, we assess the moral intuitions of 3- to 6-year-old children and their mothers (N = 56), using child-friendly versions of five trolley dilemmas and two control scenarios. We found that children responded to moral dilemmas similar to their mothers, revealed by correlations between the responses of mothers and their children in all five moral dilemmas and a highly similar overall response pattern between mother and child across all judgments. This was revealed by a high agreement in the response pattern of children and their mothers. Furthermore, children's overall response tendencies were similar to the response tendencies of adults. Thus, similar moral principles (e.g., the Doctrine of the Double Effect) which have been identified in adults, and describes as a universal moral grammar, may guide the moral intuitions in early childhood already. Taken together, the present findings provide the first evidence that children's moral intuitions are closely associated with the moral intuitions of their mother. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Building on the old adage that the deliberate mind corrects the emotional heart, the influential dual process model of moral cognition has posited that utilitarian responding to moral dilemmas (i.e., choosing the greater good) requires deliberate correction of an intuitive deontological response. In the present article, we present 4 studies that force us to revise this longstanding "corrective" dual process assumption. We used a two-response paradigm in which participants had to give their first, initial response to moral dilemmas under time-pressure and cognitive load. Next, participants could take all the time they wanted to reflect on the problem and give a final response. This allowed us to identify the intuitively generated response that preceded the final response given after deliberation. Results consistently show that in the vast majority of cases (+70%) in which people opt for a utilitarian response after deliberation, the utilitarian response is already given in the initial phase. Hence, utilitarian responders do not need to deliberate to correct an initial deontological response. Their intuitive response is already utilitarian in nature. We show how this leads to a revised model in which moral judgments depend on the absolute and relative strength differences between competing deontological and utilitarian intuitions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examined (1) whether self-justifying bullying (i.e., moral disengagement) differs in hypothetical bullying situations of a newcomer peer depending on his or her immigrant status; and (2) whether the respondent's immigration status, age, gender, real life bullying participant role (as bully, assistant, reinforcer, defender, victim or outsider) and moral disengagement proneness moderate the differences in moral disengagement between non-immigrant vs. immigrant victims. Altogether, 342 ten-year olds (54% immigrants) and 292 twelve-year olds (45% immigrants) answered peer-report measures to assess participation in bullying and peer status, and self-report measures to assess moral disengagement proneness and situational moral disengagement related to vignettes in which the target of bullying was a non-immigrant vs an immigrant new classmate. For both non-immigrant and immigrant participants both types of moral disengagement were higher for non-immigrant than immigrant victims in the vignettes independent of the respondents' own immigration status. However, different participant bullying roles predicted the differences in moral disengagement between non-immigrant versus immigrant hypothetical victims among non-immigrant and immigrant students. Results suggest that, besides being a trait dimension, moral disengagement is also influenced by situational characteristics that need to be taken into account in order to prevent and tackle bullying effectively. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Levels of moral condemnation often vary with outcome severity (e.g., extreme destruction is morally worse than moderate damage), but this is not always true. We investigated whether judgments of purity transgressions are more or less sensitive to variation in dosage than judgments of harm transgressions. In three studies, adults (N = 426) made moral evaluations of harm and purity transgressions that systematically varied in dosage (frequency or magnitude). Pairs of low-dosage and high-dosage transgressions were presented such that the same sets of modifiers (e.g., "occasionally" vs. "regularly," "small" vs. "large") or amounts (e.g., "millimeter" vs. "centimeter") were reused across moral domains. Statistical interactions between domain and dosage indicated robust distinctions between the perceived wrongness of high-dosage and low-dosage harms, whereas moral evaluations of impure acts were considerably less influenced by dosage. Our findings support the existence of a cognitive distinction between purity-based and harm-based morals and challenge current wisdom regarding relationships between intentions and outcomes in moral judgment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A large literature demonstrates that moral convictions guide many of our thoughts, behaviors, and social interactions. Yet, we know little about how these moral convictions come to exist. In the present research we explore moralization—the process by which something that was morally neutral takes on moral properties— examining what factors facilitate and deter it. In 3 longitudinal studies participants were presented with morally evocative stimuli about why eating meat should be viewed as a moral issue. Study 1 tracked students over a semester as they took a university course that highlighted the suffering animals endure because of human meat consumption. In Studies 2 and 3 participants took part in a mini-course we developed which presented evocative videos aimed at inducing moralization. In all 3 studies, we assessed participants’ beliefs, attitudes, emotions, and cognitions at multiple time points to track moral changes and potential factors responsible for such changes. A variety of factors, both cognitive and affective, predicted participants’ moralization or lack thereof. Model testing further pointed to two primary conduits of moralization: the experience of moral emotions (e.g., disgust, guilt) felt when contemplating the issue, and moral piggybacking (connecting the issue at hand with one’s existing fundamental moral principles). Moreover, we found individual differences, such as how much one holds their morality as central to their identity, also predicted the moralization process. We discuss the broad theoretical and applied implications of our results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using a schema-theoretical perspective in the field of moral cognition, we assessed response behavior of adolescent (n = 15) and adult (n = 22) individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) in comparison with adolescent (n = 22) and adult (n = 22) neurotypically developed controls. We conceptualized the Intuitive Moral Reasoning Test—in five moral dilemmas, participants had to choose between two alternative actions and assess their decision with respect to emotional valence, arousal, moral acceptability and permissibility from both the perspective of the acting person and then of the victim. Patients with ASD displayed a different decision and response behavior, particularly when the dilemmas were based on extreme life situations in combination with a social schema involving close social relationships. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objectives Recent literature proved that social cognition impairments may characterize the neuropsychological profile of Multiple Sclerosis (MS) patients. However, little is still known about moral cognition in MS. In this study, we evaluated non-social, social, and moral cognitive performances in 45 relapsing-remitting MS patients. Methods Patients underwent the Brief International Cognitive Assessment for Multiple Sclerosis battery, the Cognitive Estimation and Stroop tasks, the Ekman-60 Faces test, the Reading the Mind in the Eye and Story-based Empathy task. Additionally, a task of moral dilemmas including both "instrumental" and "incidental" conditions was administered to patients. Forty-five age-, gender- and education-matched healthy control subjects (HC) were enrolled for comparisons. Results The majority of patients (i.e. 77.6%) showed deficits at non-social tasks, particularly in the executive domains. A subset of MS sample (i.e. 24%) presented with emotion recognition and socio-affective processing impairments. Overall, MS patients showed comparable levels of moral judgment with respect to HC. The rate of yes/no response in resolution of moral dilemmas and scores of attribution of emotional valence were comparable between groups. Nevertheless, lower moral permissibility and emotional arousal, particularly for the instrumental dilemmas, characterized the MS profile. Significant correlations between the attribution of emotional valence to moral actions and mentalizing scores emerged. Conclusions Our findings expand current literature on MS supporting not only deficits in executive and socio-emotional domains but also low levels of permissibility of immoral actions and emotional detachment in the moral judgment process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why are we willing to help others? Recent behavioral work on episodic processes (i.e. the ability to represent an event that is specific in time and place) suggests that imagining and remembering scenes of helping a person in need increases intentions to help. Here, we provide insight into the cognitive and neural mechanisms that enhance prosocial intentions via episodic simulation and memory. In Experiment 1, we scanned participants using functional neuroimaging as they imagined and remembered helping episodes, and completed non-episodic control conditions accounting for exposure to the story of need and conceptual priming of helping. Analyses revealed that activity in the medial temporal lobe (MTL) subsystem, as well as the right temporoparietal junction (RTPJ) predicted the effect of conditions on the strength of prosocial intentions. In Experiment 2, we used transcranial magnetic stimulation to disrupt activity in the RTPJ, and better isolate the contribution of MTL subsystem to prosocial intentions. The effect of conditions on willingness to help remained even when activity in the RTPJ was disrupted, suggesting that activity in the MTL subsystem may primarily support this prosocial effect. It seems our willingness to help may be guided, in part, by how easily we can construct imagined and remembered helping episodes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Adults and older children are more likely to punish a wrongdoer for a moral transgression when the victim belongs to their group. Building on these results, in violation-of-expectation experiments (n = 198), we examined whether 2.5-year-old toddlers (Exps. 1 and 2) and 1-year-old infants (Exps. 3 and 4) would selectively expect an individual in a minimal group to engage in third-party punishment (TPP) for harm to an ingroup victim. We focused on an indirect form of TPP, the withholding of help. To start, children saw a wrongdoer steal a toy from a victim while a bystander watched. Next, the wrongdoer needed assistance with a task, and the bystander either helped or hindered her. The group memberships of the wrongdoer and the victim were varied relative to that of the bystander and were marked with either novel labels (Exps. 1 and 2) or novel outfits (Exps. 3 and 4). When the victim belonged to the same group as the bystander, children expected TPP: At both ages, they detected a violation when the bystander chose to help the wrongdoer. Across experiments, this effect held whether the wrongdoer belonged to the same group as the bystander and the victim or to a different group; it was eliminated when the victim belonged to a different group than the bystander, when groups were not marked, and when either no theft occurred or the wrongdoer was unaware of the theft. Toddlers and infants thus expect individuals to refrain from helping an ingroup victim's aggressor, providing further evidence for an early-emerging expectation of ingroup support. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract Developmental psychology has paid special research attention to explain how certain moral-nature factors influence behavior. Most research on morality and bullying has focused on studying moral disengagement as a risk factor for peer aggression. However, neuroscience has revealed that morality is a complex phenomenon composed of several factors. Thus, it requires the usage of holistic explanatory models that study the complexity of the moral functioning. The purpose of this review is to explore —from an integrative perspective— the moral elements that influence the transgressive behavior that damages other people, and its relation to bullying, a clear example of unjustified and immoral aggressiveness. This article reviews the state-of-the-art of morality including moral sensitivity, reasoning, emotion, motivation and identity, and group norms, analyzing its protective role against bullying. The need for a comprehensive theoretical approach to morality understood as a complex construct is discussed, starting from the articulated analysis of all its dimensions. This work advances knowledge useful for the design of educational interventions aimed to prevent bullying, to stimulate the socially desirable and prosocial behavior, as well as to improve peer relationships. Highlights • Holistic view from a developmental psychology perspective of morality and bullying. • Widely advanced of the relationship with moral knowledge, reasoning and emotion. • Deepen the relation between moral sensitivity, motivation and identity and bullying. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to address the possibility of explaining the nature of moral cognition as being rooted in an agent's involvement in a social practice. Seen along such lines, not only does the recognition of the extent of moral standards show up as based in the agent's experience that has been gathered in the process of education and developing their capacities for acting autonomously, but it is also thanks to the engagement in the set of such social practices that the agent is able to define the moral aspect, which exceeds the practical aims of a certain area of life. Hence, I argue that in order to redefine the borders of shared morality, a practical experience is necessary to link the various practices that enable ethical reflection based on the moral resources that are obtained in this way. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• Young children deny the possibility and permissibility of unexpected events. • Children's modal judgments were compared to their cognitive reflection (CRT-D). • Children with higher CRT-D scores made more adult-like modal judgments. • CRT-D scores predicted modal judgment independent of age and executive function. • Reflection facilitates children's recognition that unexpected events can happen. Children can be unduly skeptical of events that violate their expectations, claiming that these events neither could happen nor should happen even if the events violate no physical or social laws. Here, we explored whether children's reasoning about possibility and permissibility—modal cognition—is aided by cognitive reflection, or the disposition to privilege analysis over intuition. A total of 99 children aged 4 to 11 years judged the possibility and permissibility of several hypothetical events, and their judgments were compared with their scores on a developmental version of the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT-D). Children's CRT-D scores predicted their ability to differentiate possible events from impossible ones and their ability to differentiate impermissible events from permissible ones as well as their ability to differentiate possibility from permissibility in general. Such differentiations were predicted by children's CRT-D scores independent of age and executive function. These findings suggest that mature modal cognition may require the ability to reflect on, and override, the intuition that unexpected events cannot happen. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research on children’s developing moral cognition has mostly focused on their evaluation of, and reasoning about, others’ intrinsically harmful (non-)verbal actions (e.g., hitting, lying). But assertions may have morally relevant (intended or unintended) consequences, too. For instance, if someone wrongly claims that “This water is clean!,” such an incorrect representation of reality may have harmful consequences to others. In two experiments, we investigated preschoolers’ evaluation of others’ morally relevant factual claims. In Experiment 1, children witnessed a puppet making incorrect assertions that would lead to harm or to no harm. In Experiment 2, incorrect assertions would always lead to harm, but the puppet either intended the harm to occur or not. Children evaluated the puppet’s factual claim more negatively when they anticipated harmful versus harmless consequences (Experiment 1) and when the puppet’s intention was bad versus good over and above harmful consequences (Experiment 2). These findings suggest that preschoolers’ normative understanding is not limited to evaluating others’ intrinsically harmful transgressions but also entails an appreciation of the morally relevant consequences of, and intentions underlying, others’ factual claims.

The present study examined how 2- to 4-year-old preschoolers in Singapore (N = 202) balance fairness and ingroup loyalty in resource distribution. Specifically, we investigated whether children would enact fair distributions as defined by an equality rule, or show partiality toward their ingroup when distributing resources, and the conditions under which one distributive strategy may take precedence over the other. In Experiment 1, children distributed four different pairs of toys between two puppets. In the Group condition, one puppet was assigned to the same group as the child while the other puppet was assigned to a different group using colored stickers in the No Group condition, no group assignments were made. Children’s distributions were assessed for whether the toys were fairly (equally) distributed or unfairly (unequally) distributed in favor of either puppet. Experiment 2 was identical to the Group condition in Experiment 1, except that a third identical toy was introduced following the distribution of each toy pair. Distributions were separately assessed for whether the first two toys were fairly (equally) distributed or unfairly (unequally) distributed in favor of either puppet, and whether children distributed the third toy to the ingroup or outgroup puppet. Overall, the vast majority of children abided by an equality rule when resources were precisely enough to be shared between recipients, but distributed favorably to the ingroup member when there was limited resource availability. We found that fairness trumped ingroup loyalty except in resource distribution involving limited resources. Our results are consistent with findings from other resource distribution studies with preschoolers and similar studies measuring young infants’ expectations of distributive behaviors in third-party observations. Taken together, there is evidence suggesting stability in the development of knowledge to behavior in the subdomains of fairness and ingroup loyalty.

Autonomous vehicles, though having enormous potential, face a number of challenges. As a computer system interacting with society on a large scale and human beings in particular, they will encounter situations, which require moral assessment. What will count as right behavior in such situations depends on which factors are considered to be both morally justified and socially acceptable. In an empirical study we investigated what factors people recognize as relevant in driving situations. The study put subjects in several “dilemma” situations, which were designed to isolate different and potentially relevant factors. Subjects showed a surprisingly high willingness to sacrifice themselves to save others, took the age of potential victims in a crash into consideration and were willing to swerve onto a sidewalk if this saved more lives. The empirical insights are intended to provide a starting point for a discussion, ultimately yielding societal agreement whereby the empirical insights should be balanced with philosophical considerations.

The present investigation is to examine the way in which morality, positive affect and negative affect plays a necessary and integral role in intuitive moral responses, reflective judgments and as factor of grit and zest. For this 240 participants of first and final year undergraduate and post graduate students both male and female were recruited from age range between 18- 25 years. Standardized tools were used for data collection for the respective variables. The qualitative and quantitative methods were used to collect and analyze the collected data. However, thoughts distortions, judgment and more reflective thought processes likewise play a crucial role, and in fact are inseparable from affective processes. Hence, the variable proved to be having a serviceable impact on grit and zest of the students in various aspects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research into moral identity has provided much support for its role in mature moral functioning, yet the developmental course of this construct remains poorly understood. In this review, we examine the dominant developmental model of moral identity, which emphasizes its key relation with the moral self of early childhood. In reviewing evidence for the model, the assumption of correspondence between the moral self of early childhood and moral identity in adolescence is challenged, in terms of both the moral component and the sense‐of‐self entailed in both constructs. We argue that progress in mapping the developmental course of moral identity stands to be informed by a focus on middle childhood, which to date has been largely neglected in this literature, despite evidence implicating this period from related fields of inquiry. A number of specific directions for future developmental research into moral identity are outlined based on this perspective. Statement of contribution What is already known on this subject? Moral identity is central to adolescent moral functioning. Early childhood ‘moral self’ becomes adolescent moral identity. What does this study add? The current dominant developmental model is examined. The model is found to have questionable validity. Middle childhood may be of unique importance to the emergence of moral identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research on children's developing moral cognition has mostly focused on their evaluation of, and reasoning about, others' intrinsically harmful (non-)verbal actions (e.g., hitting, lying). But assertions may have morally relevant (intended or unintended) consequences, too. For instance, if someone wrongly claims that "This water is clean!," such an incorrect representation of reality may have harmful consequences to others. In two experiments, we investigated preschoolers' evaluation of others' morally relevant factual claims. In Experiment 1, children witnessed a puppet making incorrect assertions that would lead to harm or to no harm. In Experiment 2, incorrect assertions would always lead to harm, but the puppet either intended the harm to occur or not. Children evaluated the puppet's factual claim more negatively when they anticipated harmful versus harmless consequences (Experiment 1) and when the puppet's intention was bad versus good over and above harmful consequences (Experiment 2). These findings suggest that preschoolers' normative understanding is not limited to evaluating others' intrinsically harmful transgressions but also entails an appreciation of the morally relevant consequences of, and intentions underlying, others' factual claims. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]