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IN EACH OF OUR BRAINS, 86 billion neurons work in parallel, processing inputs from senses and memories to produce the many feats of human cognition. The brains of other creatures are less broadly capable, but those animals often exhibit innate aptitudes for particular tasks, abilities honed by millions of years of evolution.

This article explores the neglected connection between race and militarism by focusing on a US missile defense system deployed in South Korea. In September of 2017, the two countries installed the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system in a rural village. Manufactured by Lockheed Martin, this missile defense system was to protect South Korea from attacks by North Korea. The system is integral to US global military strategy, but from the perspective of human security, its benefits are dubious at best. By drawing on a theory of the ‘racial state’ and critical studies of the US empire-state, the article examines two fundamental practices of the neocolonial military relation between the two states: wartime Operational Control of the South Korean military and extraterritoriality of US bases in South Korea. It argues that these neocolonial practices in which the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system deployment is embedded reflect ‘the historicist racial ruling’ that denies self-rule for Koreans and its internalization by Koreans who support the unequal military relation. It also analyzes how the South Korean racial state promotes internal homogeneity and otherizes North Korea to bolster national security through the missile defense system.

Studies on missile defense, both in Russia and abroad, have been tradition- ally focused either on capabilities of the US national missile defense system to parry Russian or Chinese strategic nuclear forces, or on regional deter- rence of North Korea and Iran by means of regional missile defense (theater missile defense, TMD). However, the 2019 Missile Defense Review (MDR) emphasized the role of the TMD systems in the regional deterrence of the Russian Federation and China. So far this issue has received little attention and this paper aims to fill that gap. The first section identifies the key points of the MDR concerning the capabilities of regional missile defense for regional deterrence of the major nuclear powers. The author also examines the views of different represen- tatives of the US Department of Defense on this issue, and concludes that the US military-political leadership has a generally positive assessment of the capabilities of the TMD systems to contain Russia and China in case of a regional crisis. In particular, planners emphasize the role of the regional missile defense in countering the ‘anti-access/access-denial’ capabilities and the concept of ‘escalate to de-escalate’ ascribed to Russia. At the same time, US policymakers express in that regard serious concerns about Russia’s and China’s progress in the development of hypersonic missile systems. The second section examines the ongoing debates in Western expert so- ciety on the role of the regional missile defense in terms of deterring Russia and China. The author concludes that in this respect experts can provisionally be divided into two groups. The first group generally supports the arguments of the US military-political leadership and is optimistic about TMD capabili- ties for regional deterrence of Russia and China. The second group is more critical of these capabilities. They point out the lack of accurate data on the combat capabilities of such systems in active warfare and criticize question- able theoretical assumptions of their opponents. The third section provides a critical analysis of the arguments presented in this debate. The author concludes that the current concepts of deterrence based on the use of regional missile defense systems do not fully address possible implications for regional security and strategic stability. The Russian Federation and China possess significant nuclear arsenals, which already make nuclear escalation involving these countries and the United States possible. Adding yet another variable (TMD) into this equation only aggravates the situation.

The United States adopted a policy of de-hyphenation in its relations with India and Pakistan in the post-09/11 period which continued to be operational in the period 2005-2015. This policy apparently meant that the United States would deal each of the two South Asian adversaries, India and Pakistan. The main reason for this phenomenon was that the policy-makers in the US saw India as a heavy-weight to counter the rising economic, political and military power of China in Asia. Pakistan could not be fitted in this strategic calculus. The United States changed its previous position on Kashmir and instead of calling for resolving this issue according to the United Nations resolutions, it stressed on bilateral negotiations. Similarly, the United States endorsed Indian stance that Pakistan was backing terrorist outfits that perpetrated acts of terrorism in India. Strategic partnership between The US and India extended cooperation in civil nuclear technology, missile defense, space technology and defense production. No such cooperation could be extended to Pakistan. Permanent membership in the UN Security Council for India was endorsed despite Pakistan’s objections.

The geography of the United States is not the sole determinant of how its leaders choose to defend the homeland, but geography is certainly the first and most permanent factor. The large, fertile, ...