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The Navy recruits a portion of its physician manpower directly from the civilian work force and from medical residency programs. the Navy has had difficulty recruiting these doctors, called direct appointment physicians, for the past 13 years. This study analyzes some of the pecuniary and nonpecuniary aspects of physician recruitment in an effort to improve the recruitment process. A regression model was estimated to establish a baseline projecting model for physician supply. The results support the hypothesis that, if the pay gap between military and civilian physicians narrows or if the number of recruiters increases, the number of direct appointment physicians accessed will increase, all else constant. However, the changes necessary to increase the number of physicians, recruited are substantial. A survey was conducted to ascertain what nonpecuniary factors were important to direct appointment physicians. Only one factor, patriotism, was indicated by a majority of survey respondents as a reason for joining the Navy, and that was mentioned by only 51. 9 percent of the respondents. The thesis recommends that additional data be collected to estimate a more robust regression model and that the survey of all Navy direct appointment physicians be redesigned.

DoD budgets consist of two principal types of expenditures: those that pay active duty military, selected reserve military, DoD civilian workers, and retirees; and those that purchase goods and services from the private sector. This report analyzes how DoD purchases impact the private sector and estimates the economic effects of reduced defense spending for goods and services. We use a broad definition of defense industries and workers that includes all defense prime contractors, their major subcontractors, and other private-sector suppliers to defense producers. Using various data and analytical tools, the economic impacts of DoD purchases of goods and services are considered at the industry, state, county, and occupational levels. While the overall effects of defense downsizing at the national level are minimal, some industries, states, counties, and occupations are substantially dependent upon DoD purchases and will experience severe negative impacts between 1991 and 1997.... Defense conversion, Defense downsizing, DoD Purchases, Defense workers.

The report presents the results of the two-year study performed by the presidentially chartered Seventh Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (7th QRMC). The 7th QRMC conducted a fundamental review of the compensation system of the seven uniformed services, evaluating basic pay, allowances, special pays and bonus programs, and the mechanisms for their periodic adjustment. The 7th QRMC found that the current compensation system is viable; however, existing deficiencies and inconsistencies must be addressed to ensure continued success. The QRMC's recommendations include changes to the basic pay table; changes to the basic allowances for subsistence and housing; creation of a CONUS cost-of-living allowance; improved management of special and incentive pays; an annual pay adjustment mechanism linking RMC growth to the employment cost index; and a timetable for implementation

This study was conducted to determine if the management controls currently being used by the Naval Reserve Force to control Aviation Career Incentive Pay (ACIP) to members of the Naval Reserve are effective in preventing erroneous payments. The current method of control was compared to the Mockler Management Control Model presented in the thesis. A systematic analysis of the different reports and documents currently being used by reserve field activities was conducted and determined to be inadequate. Based on the research conducted, this thesis recommends of a new control report that combines all information necessary for reserve field activities to effectively and efficiently determine ACIP entitlement for Selected Reserve personnel.

This is the third edition of the USAF Summary. This edition provides an update of fiscal year 1977 estimates. It also provides estimates for fiscal year 1978 based on the Amended FY 1978 President's Budget submitted in February 1977. Users of this document should note that information for fiscal years 1965 through 1967 bas been deleted. In order to have information available for these years, the October 1976 edition of the USAF Summary should be retained. The USAF Summary is compiled and published by the Directorate of Management Analysis, Comptroller of the Air Force (HQ USAF/ACMI). Air Staff offices participate by providing current information for each update., USAF Summary, 3rd ed.

The US Army currently provides various types of enlistment incentives to quality recruits, both to expand the market for obtaining recruits and to redistribute the recruits as needed across the various Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs). Two of these enlistment incentives are (1) the Army College Fund (ACF), with different benefits for 2, 3, and 4-year terms; and (2) enlistment bonuses (EBs), for a 3- or 4-year terms of service. The latter range up to 8,000 for critical MOSs. For FY1986 EBs have been budgeted at $115M and the ACF at $187M, for a total of $302M. Approximately one fourth of all MOSs have, at any given time, an enlistment incentive, the application and removal of which is based on observed individual fill rates and contract requirements by MOS for quality recruits. The total dollar level of incentives needed and their efficient allocation to individual MOSs are quite complex due to such factors as interactive competitive effects (i.e., competition for recruits between different MOSs); the well known diminishing returns nature of recruiting resources, whereby each additional quality recruit becomes more difficult and expensive to obtain; the impacts of key demographic and economic variables; and the impacts of other recruiting resources (e.g., recruiters, Army advertising, military/civilian pay ratios).

The post-war baby boom and the baby bust that followed have produced dramatic changes in both the size and in the age composition of the labor force. These demographic changes have been accompanied by changes in the age structure of civilian wages. The evidence suggests that as members of the baby boom cohorts entered the labor market in the 1960's and 1970's, their wages fell in comparison with the wages of prime age workers. The question addressed in this study is how the wage structure will change as the demographic trend reverses itself and as smaller birth cohorts enter the labor market in the 1980's and 1990's. Keywords: Youth population, Projections, Compensation, Manpower.

This report investigates the factors associated with service members' decisions to remain in or leave the military. Results are presented from a literature review and analysis of current data provided by the services on reenlistment and first-term attrition. Retention of those who have skills and experience is a major goal of the military. The services compete with each other and with the civilian sector. Both the military and the potential service member have a package of positive and negative values. The services offer pay and security but also have difficult and sometimes dangerous jobs. The prospective military member offers his or her skills for the maximum value. Lump sum bonuses appear to increase first-term reenlistment. Lump sum rather than installment bonuses are more effective. Pay is an important factor of second-term and subsequent reenlistment. Promotions have a powerful effect on reenlistment while retirement benefits become the incentive in later terms of service. Although the service member complains about relocation, location of assignment and separation from family, these factors appear to only modestly affect reenlistment. Quality- of-life factors appear to have little effect on the first term but increase markedly in importance thereafter. The higher the test score and education level the lower the probability that first-term reenlistment will occur. It is presumed that a better education and stronger aptitudes are more competitive in the civilian labor force. In second term and subsequent reenlistments these factors have little effect.

Air Force development and civil engineering officers (n=120) were surveyed to determine how they percieved Engineering and Scientific Career Continuation Pay (ESCCP) and how pay, in general, affects their career decisions. Results indicated that these officers perceived ESCCP to be important in their career decisions if (1) they were not really sure about their intent to make the Air Force a career, (2) they had less than eight years of commissioned service, and (3) they were less than 31 years old. Out of the 19 motivational factors examined, salary was perceived to the the 17th most influential in career decisions. In addition, Air Force engineering officers percieved that they received less pay than their civilian counterparts. This study indicated that the use of ESCCP can influence the career decisions of some Air Force engineering officers. Keywords: Military engineers, Personnel retention.

A formal analysis of the Navy Primary Standards Laboratory-West (NPSL-W) was performed to: 1) assess the strengths and weaknesses of current job design and organizational support system; and 2) determine the readiness for job design change. Evaluation of the current job and organizational characteristics was performed using the Job Diagnostic Survey (JDS), the Job Rating Form (JRF), two feedback sessions and questionnaires. The results of the data shows that the organization has strengths in its job characteristics. The jobs are worth doing as perceived by the employees. The weakness in the organization comes from the organizational support systems. These weaknesses are exemplified by dissatisfaction with p;ay, co-workers and supervision. Keywords: Job characteristics model; Organizational strengths and weaknesses. (Theses)

The Navy's enlisted advancement system seeks to satisfy the requirements for petty officer personnel among ratings and paygrades and control the expenditure of its manpower budget. In addition, the system is intended to create a pool of petty officers for assignment to duty by paygrade and skill. Until recently, the tools for managing the advancement system were deficient. This report provides an overview of the new enlisted Advancement Interface System (ADIN), and a description of the advancement planning process. ADIN improves on the former system by using current versus up to 11-month-old personnel inventories, interfacing with other manpower forecasting models, computing 'carrydown' vacancies, and incorporating features for easy use by computer-naive advancement planners. Keywords: Enlisted advancement planning, military personnel, personnel promotions, manpower models.

This publication provides statistical data on United States Military casualties in Southeast Asia as of November 11, 1986. Although the official period of time covered by the Southeast Asia conflict extends from January 1, 1961, through April 30, 1975, there were instances where personnel are still dying from wounds incurred during the Conflict or where bodies are still being recovered and identified. Partial contents: Deaths by Pay Grade and Military Service, Deaths by Home State of Record and Military Service, Deaths by Cause of Casualty and Military Service, Deaths by Attained Age and Military Service, and Deaths by Race, Pay Grade, and Military Service.

Because the military relies on voluntary enlistments of fill its entry-level positions, there has been widespread interest in estimating how military enlistments respond to various supply factors, both those originating in the civilian sector (e.g., business cycles) and those over which the military exerts some control (e.g. recruiters). To help the military anticipate manpower shortages before they actually develop, these estimated supply parameters are used to predict the future course of enlistments under various hypothetical situations. This report documents research on a model of the supply of high aptitude, high school diploma graduate, non-prior service male enlistees. The emphasis is on methodology, including variable construction and methods of estimation and forecasting. The methodology is applied to monthly state-level data over the period October 1974 through March 1981. The output is fitted equations for the four Services that relate the enlistment rate to military/civilian pay, the number of recruiters per potential enlistee, a business cycle variable, and other control variables reflecting changes in enlistment policy, including the end of the GI Bill. The fitted models are then used in conjunction with future scenarios to obtain forecasts of high quality (AFQT category I-IIIA, high school graduate), non-prior service male enlistments.

The authors develop a theoretical model of profit maximization in which the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) is treated as a wage premium payable to servicemen who are more productive, more costly to recruit and train, and less likely to continue in the Army in the absence of the SRB. Empirical estimation of the model is based on measuring a serviceman's productivity (in terms of his civilian counterpart's occupational wage), recruitment and training costs, and separation rates. Multiple regression equations are used to estimate civilian wages (a proxy for productivity) as a function of civilian occupation, education, and age of the worker. The empirical model groups Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) into three categories--Combat Arms, Technical, and Support Services. The results for servicemen in grade E-4 reveal that the average SRB calculated by the model ($5,247) should be about the same as the actual payments ($5,297) for servicemen in Combat Arms, but should be higher ($7,308) compared to the actual ($5,312) for Technical occupations, and lower ($1,942) compared to the actual ($3,757) payments in the Support Services. The research shows that retention rates in Technical MOS can be raised by increasing the SRB. The required increase in SRB expenditures can be funded by reducing SRB payments in the Support Services. Keywords: Economics; Retention; Military pay; Recruitment cost; Human capital; Training cost; Civilian pay; Economic analysis; Military essentiality code.

An objective of this study is to analyze the impact of economic incentives such as selective reenlistment bonuses (SRBs) and competitive military pay on the probability to reenlist. Mental category, race, number of dependents, and unemployment are also included in a multinomial logit model. Servicemen eligible to reenlist in 98 Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs) were grouped into 15 career management fields (CMFs) for estimating the logit equations. The results reveal that economic incentives in the form of SRBs and relative pay significantly increase the probability to reenlist in all CMFs. Also, the reenlistment probability is higher among blacks, servicemen with dependents, and individuals with higher mental abilities. The unexpected negative effects of unemployment, although puzzling at first glance, could be attributed to (1) the use of unemployment rate data that are too aggregative to measure local labor market conditions, (2) collinearity of unemployment with civilian wages, and (3) the fact that reenlistment-eligible servicemen are already employed and do not view unemployment as a threat.

This supplement to the Report to Congress on Health Professional Special Pays, issued December 1, 1988, reviews accession, retention, and relative compensation status of 13 health care specialties within the military health care system: dentistry, veterinary medicine, optometry, pharmacy, clinical psychology, physical therapy, occupational therapy, audiology, speech pathology, podiatry, social work, dietetics, and physician assistant. One clear finding of this review of health care providers is that the inventory of "other" health care providers in the military is declining, both in absolute terms, and as compared to authorizations. The FY83 inventory of all 13 disciplines studied was 9949, against 9856 authorizations. By FY88, authorizations were 9730, while inventory had declined to 9374 individuals assigned, a drop of 575, or 6% in 5 years. Some disciplines sustained significant losses, such as Army Optometry, which lost 40% of its force in those years, while others were able to maintain their size fairly well. Various factors have contributed to the relative health of each professional discipline, but substantially it is the outside environment driving up prices and cutting into the supply that has proved most troublesome. An additional difficulty results from the small personnel numbers of most of the "other" health care disciplines. Small communities can develop management problems when managed within the overall environment of Corps, Military Department, and Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) standards. Complications, such as awarding constructive credit for experience and education may then play havoc with promotion opportunities in small communities constrained by various grade controls, making it particularly difficult to put forth an encouraging career plan for potential recruits.

Unfortunately, many military members complete a career in the service and fail to seriously plan for the possibility of death after retirement. All too often, the military member is suddenly faced with the necessity to deal with this stark reality shortly before retirement day when he receives his initial briefing on te Survivor Benefit Plan (SBP). During this hectic period, there may be little time to do a complicated analysis of SBP or to look for alternative forms of commercial insurance. This paper is an analysis by a career Air Force officer who has taken an in depth look at the SPB and some alternative forms of insurance. It does not contain all the answers. It merely presents one person's views of the SBP and provides a frame work to allow each prospective retiree to compare SBP with commercial insurance. (Author)

This paper presents some estimates of the personal discount rate of Navy enlisted personnel. Prior to April 1979, the reenlistment bonus was paid in annual installments at the beginning of each year of reenlistment. In fiscal year 1979 (FY79), the Department of Defense requested sufficient funds to begin making lump sum payments and, starting on 1 April 1979, the entire bonus has been paid as a lump-sum at the date of reenlistment. By comparing the effects of bonuses before and after the policy change, we estimated the differential impact of lump-sum and installment bonuses. We then use these estimates to compute the implied discount rate. We find that Navy enlisted personnel have a real discount rate of about 17 percent. Although payment of lump-sum bonuses increases the incentive to reenlist it also decreases the incentive to complete the reenlistment contract, thus leading to higher costs of contract enforcement and collection of unfulfilled obligations. Recognizing the difficulties in recoupment of lump-sum bonuses, Congress decided to partially return to the payment of bonuses in installments.

This thesis was an exploratory research effort that determined the differences and similarities in reenlistment factors for prior active service (PAS) and non-prior active service (NPAS) reservists. Reenlistment models, using a breadth of reenlistment factors elicited by the Rand Corporation's 1979 reserve force factors elicited by the Rand Corporation's 1979 reserve force factors elicited by the Rand Corporation's 1979 reserve force studies surveys, were developed for first-term PAS and NPAS reservist of grade E-3 or E-4 who were within 18 months of ETS and who had entered the military after the start of the All Volunteer Force (June 1973). Reenlistment factors examined were: demographic; tenure cognitive/affective orientation, family income, civilian work environment, and perceived alternative job opportunities. The results of this study indicate that the qualitative aspects of the reserve job and the civilian employer's attitude towards reserve participation are important variables to both groups of reservists. Satisfaction with pay, problems associated with obtaining transportation to and from drill sites, the amount of time spent on reserve duties, and the length of time to promotion are also important factors considered by the reservist in making the reenlistment decision.

This study examines the implications of the retention behavior of Air Force volunteer physicians on the Air Force's physician procurement policy. It examines the potential of the volunteer program to become a major, and perhaps, the principal source of physicians based on the retention behavior of volunteer physician accessions from FY1975 to FY1982. The analysis suggest that about one-half of the FY1987 authorized Air Force physician stock might be supported by the direct recruiting program for all groups except medical subspecialists. Predicted retention varies by specialty group, training, and grade (age): (1) Young board-certified surgeons and obstetricians, both U.S.-and foreign-trained are least likely to be retained under current conditions and are most responsive to an increase in military pay; (2) foreign-trained hospital based physicians without board certification have the hightest predicted retention rate; (3) foreign-trained subspecialists and surgeons are retained at a lower rate than U.S.-trained physicians in this group; (4) volunteer retention increases with the physician's military grade. (Author)

This document considers an alternative source of military personnel: the pool of armed forces veterans who served regular tours of duty and who now work in the civilian sector. Section II sets out armed forces regulations governing prior service accessions. Section III examines current prior service accessions in some detail to judge whether this group should serve as a basis for further analysis. Section IV describes labor force characteristics of veterans, including geographic location and geographic mobility, personal characteristics, and distribution by civilian occupation. Section V looks at a major issue in prior service accessions, occupational differences in civilian and military earnings. The Note ends with a discussion of future work planned in this area. Although this research partially answers the question of why so few veterans reenlist, it does not tell manpower planners at what level prior service accessions ought to be. Future research will address this question. (Author)

This thesis is a review of the Air Force bonus pay system and a study of a proposed $15,000 retention bonus for Air Force officer scientists and engineers. The literature has shown that bonuses given to medical and certain enlisted personnel have significantly increased retention rates. With this knowledge the researcher surveyed Air Force officer scientists and engineers (S&E's) to determine the effect of a $15,000 bonus. The respondents (on a average) would be willing to incur an additional three year commitment to receive this bonus. Those respondents who were undecided or answered probably no to a career intent question averaged 3.5 years additional commitment. Those officers who answered definitely no to the career intent question were not as effected by the bonus (average commitment willing to incur was only 1.4 years). (Author)

This study examines the reenlistment intentions of enlisted personnel in their second term of military service. Data were taken from the DoD Survey of Enlisted Personnel, completed in mid-1979. About 2500 enlistees (from all services) met the working definition of having less than one year remaining in their second term, having served six to ten years, and having achieved a pay grade of E3 through E7. A statistical analysis (logistic regression model) was tailored to each service: it related the survey respondent's reenlistment intentions to four types of factors: compensation, promotion, location, and job satisfaction. Compensation and promotion emerged as the key factors, the others assuming varying degrees of importance in different services. As a reenlistment incentive, however, guaranteed location of choice emerged as potentially important, along with bonuses, shorter reenlistment periods, and increased probability of promotion. (See also R-717, R-2935, R-2152, R-2468). (Author)

The author's thesis is that the military pay system can be revised to provide a better incentive to retain skills which require intensive training and for which require intensive training and for which there is a great disparity in pay between the current military pay system and that provided by the civilian employer. He discusses the aspects of the current military pay system that have contributed to our career force retention problems, the pros and cons of the alternatives seen available within the military pay system, and finally what actions he recommends to maximize the retention capability of our pay system. (Author)

Since 1967, military pay has been linked or indexed to changes in General Schedule (GS) salaries via the professional, administrative, technical, and clerical (PATC) index. This effort compares the PATC index to other wage indexes using a set of criteria. They include the similarity of jobs in the military to those in the wage indexes, the timeliness and quality of data contained in the indexes, and the ability of the indexes to maintain real purchasing power. Several existing wage indexes, predominately blue collar, were found to be more appropriate guides for adjusting pay than the PATC index. (Author)

Information obtained from a questionnaire to which 312 male surface warfare junior Officers (JOs) responded was used to determine how JOs felt their wives influenced their intent to pursue a Navy career, and how their wives felt about separations, relocations, pay, and benefits of Navy life. Officers, in general, felt their wives were supportive of their Navy careers. Separation was considered the worst aspect of Navy life and had the most pronounced influence against a Navy career. Wives who were most supportive of a Navy career were most socially and emotionally involved in the career. Wives who worked outside the home were less supportive of a Navy career than were those who worked within the home. Wives who were teachers or Navy officers found relations more difficult to accommodate and were more reluctant for their husbands to remain in the Navy than were wives in other types of jobs. Few Navy wives attended detailer field trip meetings, but those who did were more supportive of a Navy career than those who did not. The assistance of superior officers in helping wives adjust to new duty stations was rated most helpful, and Navy Family Services least helpful, indicating that COs and XOs should recognize their influence on officer retention, and that officers and their wives should be educated on the value and use of Navy Family Services to alleviate stresses of relocation and separation., See also Rept. no. NPRDC-TR-79-29, AD-A073 463 and NPRDC-TR- 80-13, AD-A081 794.

This thesis constitutes one part of a six-team, three-year study designed to determine if it would be practical or feasible for the USAF to eliminate or modify current upward progression policies. One objective of this thesis was to provide a detailed analysis of the career progression systems of the U.S. Air Force, Army, Navy, Royal Air Force, and civilian airlines. The analysis includes the career progression elements of track, tier, skill level, grade, noncommissioned officers, training, identifiable career progression, up or out, grade stagnation, time in service, time in grade, evaluation, compensation, relocation and service contracts. The second objective was to formulate alternatives to the current Air force enlisted career progression system for use by the research team concluding the six-team effort. These alternatives were tier modification, track modification and pay to grade relationship modifications. (Author)

This thesis investigates social, environmental, and economical factors that influence the enlistees' decision to reenlist or leave the U.S. Navy. Results are presented both at the aggregate level, and for each of the largest ratings separately. A model for computation of the U.S. Navy's savings by retaining their personnel, along with a sensitivity analysis of some of the involved variables, are also included. The main conclusions of the study are: (a) Retention controlling policies should be decided upon in accord with separate studies of each rating; (b) It is suggested that pay differentiation and different promotion patterns be established for enlistees with different background and different civilian work opportunities, to make the U.S. Navy more competitive (and to reduce rent for some personnel categories); (c) Objective information ot the enlistees about civilian earning opportunities may improve retention; (d) It should be considered to eliminate the contract system after the first four years of service; and (e) It should be considered to use a higher propagation of older enlistees at sea duty. (Author)

The Personnel Management in the All-Volunteer Force Study assesses the use of applicant screening, recruit assignment, and reenlistment bonuses to improve the retention of enlisted personnel. (Author)

A model of the Navy recruitment process is developed and tested using 1970-77 quarterly data on recruits by mental category and education attainment. The model is based on a theory of selection by recruiters in which recruit quality is maximized subject to a quota filling constraint. Derived decision rules are applied to examine changes in recruitment standards in response to changes in the demand for accessions and the supply of recruits. Estimation of recruitment equations is carried out with variables measuring age eligibility, labor market conditions, financial incentives, and acceptance probabilities by quality group. Non-prior service male enlistment projections are made through 1994 under several unemployment scenarios. (Author)

An overview of the broad trends and policies that have emerged during the transition from the selective service draft to an all-volunteer military. The report is divided into three parts. Part I discusses the factors underlying the decision to end the draft. The analysis shows that the AVF was essentially the only viable alternative for eliminating the inequities of the draft. Part II examines the early AVF experience and concludes that the AVF has succeeded in attracting a socially representative mix of the desired quantity and quality of recruits at a substantially lower cost than is commonly assumed. Part III examines broader implications raised by the removal of the draft, showing that major changes in manpower utilization and management are required to provide an effective defense at a cost the American public is willing to pay, and that the removal of the draft provides an opportunity for making such changes.

There has been continuing interest in the question of how well paid soldiers are relative to their civilian counterparts. Historical comparisons are shown here for several components of military pay, including basic pay, subsistence and housing allowances, and tax advantages. The results of this study show that soldiers' pay has kept pace with inflation since 1981, but that higher ranking soldier are still underpaid relative to their counterparts who had the same rank, years of service, and marital status in 1972. Keywords: Retirement, Economics; Earnings; Benefits; Recruiting; Recruiting; Retention; Enlistments; Quadrennial Quadrennial Review of Military; Compensation (QRMC); Officer Personnel; Discount rates; Commissary; Housing.

There is concern about the ability of the armed forces to meet their accession requirements as youth population declines over the next 10-15 years. This study addresses this concern by developing a way to predict the supply of high quality accessions to all four services. Accessions are then projected for the rest of the decade under various assumptions. Data organized by Navy Recruiting District for the period 1976-1981 are examined to relate the number of high quality accession contracts to economic and policy factors, as well as to the size of the youth population. The pay of civilian youth, military pay, recruiters, advertising, and economic conditions were key determinants of recruit supply. GI Bill benefits induced many accessions. Population was important, but not as important as many expected. Projections indicate that (with minor exceptions) recruiting goals can be met through the 80s if current plans are executed. Over the longer run, goals can be met if military pay keeps up with civilian youth pay and if recruiting resources are made available quickly when the economy strengthens., Supersedes ADB077544.

Described are the results of a national experiment designed to study factors that influence reenlistment decisions of Army Reserve and National Guard personnel. In the experiment, 15,000 reservists making reenlistment decisions in 1978 served as test participants. The effect of bonus payments up to $1800 on reenlistment rates and length of commitment was estimated by comparing the response of a test group which was offered bonus payments to a matching control group. In addition, a survey instrument given to test participants at the time of making the reenlistment decision provided data to analyze the effect of several other factors on Reserve reenlistment decisions. While the bonus only raised reenlistments rates from 38 to 40 percent, it significantly lengthened the average committed term of service from 1.3 to 4.3 years. Longitudinal tracking of test participants indicates a significant strength gain will result from the longer-term service committments. Survey analysis indicates that conflicts, with family and civilian employers tend to be the main causes for not reenlisting. (Author)

This document is a letter written by R. B. Purdom in 1819, to Major John Childs regarding documents needing signed for one Robert Davis to receive his pay.

MBA Professional Report, The objective of this MBA project is to reassess the Air Force's current Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program and provide a possible alternative for the compensation calculation. To find that alternative method of calculation, the goal of this project was to create an experiment using a second priced sealed bid auction. The experiment would provide an insight to truth revealing compensation requests for future job continuation. This essential tool will allow the Air Force to begin the determination of how to retain vital active duty service members through compensation bonuses while minimizing overall personnel costs to the Department of Defense., http://archive.org/details/reassessingairfo1094510560

PFC Paavola of New York Mills is discharged at Fort Snelling. He receives his final pay from Lt. McCormack. See P81725-P81731.

This document is a letter written by R. B. Purdom in 1819, to Major John Childs regarding documents needing signed for one Robert Davis to receive his pay.