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Asymmetric shocks Regional non-adjustment and fiscal policy How will countries handle idiosyncratic macroeconomic shocks under the single currency? Since the regional adjustment patterns currently prevailing within European currency unions are likely to prevail at the national level under the single currency, looking at the ways in which European countries react to internally asymmetric shocks today provides a good preview for the answer to that question. In this paper, we compare the USA with Germany, Italy and the UK, and with Canada, which is closer to Europe than the USA in its labour market and fiscal institutions. Europe's (and to some extent Canada's) model of regional response differs from that of the USA. Changes in regional real exchange rates are small in all countries. Outside of the USA, however, there is more reliance on interregional transfer payments, less on labour migration, and the pace of regional adjustment appears to be slower. If EMU aims at the same degree of economic and social cohesion that its constituent nations enjoy today, this suggests that its members may find it hard to resist the eventual extension of existing EU mechanisms of income redistribution - a transfer union. We propose an alternative strategy based on a relaxed Stability Pact, further strictures against central EU borrowing, labour market and fiscal reform, and the issuance by individual member states of debt indexed to nominal GDP. — Maurice Obstfeld and Giovanni Peri

This paper surveys recent research in open-economy macroeconomics, using questions raised by European economic and monetary unification to guide the topics discussed. A striking empirical regularity is the tendency for changes in the nominal exchange rate regime systematically to affect the variability of nominal and real exchange rates alike. This regularity (which disappears in high-inflation conditions) can be explained by sticky-price theories or by models of asset-market liquidity effects. But plausible liquidity models have difficulty generating enough persistence (in output and real exchange rates, in particular) to match the data. Thus the macroeconomic costs of giving up the exchange-rate realignment option, emphasized in Mundell's optimum currency area concept, seem empirically relevant. The paper discusses other possible costs of currency unification associated with a reduced number of asset markets. On the benefit side, our theories of the efficiences due to a common currency remain unsatisfactory, despite recent advances. A key motivation for the choice of a common currency over a fixed exchange rate between national currencies is the fear of speculative attack. The paper concludes by showing how self-fulfilling currency crises can occur, and describes recent progress in narrowing the range of multiple equilibria in adjustable-peg regimes.

We propose that analysis of purchasing power parity (PPP) and the law of one price should explicitly take into account the possibility of “commodity points”—thresholds delineating a region of no central tendency among relative prices, possibly due to lack of perfect arbitrage in the presence of transaction costs and uncertainty. More than 80 years ago, Heckscher stressed the importance of such incomplete arbitrage in the empirical application of PPP. We devise an econometric method to identify commodity points. Price adjustment is treated as a nonlinear process, and a threshold autoregression offers a parsimonious specification within which both thresholds and adjustment speeds are estimated by maximum likelihood methods. Our model performs well using post-1980 data, and yields parameter estimates that appear quite reasonable: adjustment outside the thresholds might imply half-lives of price deviations measured in months rather than years, and the thresholds correspond to popular rough estimates as to the order of magnitude of actual transport costs. The estimated commodity points appear to be positively related to objective measures of market segmentation, notably nominal exchange rate volatility.J. Japan Int. Econ.December 1997,11(4), pp. 441–479. Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley, California 94720-3880; and Department of Economics, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois 60208-2600.

This paper studies policy rules with escape clauses, analyzing as an example fixed exchange rate systems that allow member countries the freedom to realign in periods of stress. While well-designed, escape-clause rules can raise society's welfare in principle, limited credibility makes it difficult to implement such rules in practice. An EMS-type institution that imposes political costs on policymakers who realign may raise welfare, but can also produce equilibria far inferior to an irrevocably fixed exchange rate. Switches between multiple equilibria may have the character of sudden speculative attacks.

Banking systems have rapidly grown to a point where for many countries bank assets amount to multiples of GDP. As a consequence, government fs capacity to provide stability-enhancing fiscal guarantees against systemic crises can no longer be taken for granted. As regulation of dynamic financial markets will inevitably be imperfect, prudent governments need to adjust other facets of macroeconomic policy in order to mitigate financial instability. A precautionary approach to fiscal policy, leading to moderate levels of public debt relative to GDP over the medium term, is essential for the credibility of government promises to support the financial system, as well as the broader economy.

The discomfort a government suffers from speculation against its currency determines the strategic incentives of speculators and the scope for multiple currency-market equilibria. After describing an illustrative model in which high unemployment may cause an exchange-rate crisis with self-fulfilling features, the paper reviews some other self-reinforcing mechanisms. Recent econometric evidence seems consistent with the practical importance of these mechanisms.

In the model of Obstfeld (1983), a country hurt by a temporary shift in its terms of trade, whether the shift is infinitesimal or not, always runs a temporary current-account deficit. Temporary rises in relative export prices always cause surpluses in the model. This note derives these results within an analysis that clarifies how temporary terms-of-trade shocks affect the consumption-based real interest rate on external debt and, hence, the current account.

This paper examines the claim that exchange rate regimes are of little salience in the transmission of global financial conditions to domestic financial and macroeconomic conditions by focusing on a sample of about 40 emerging market countries over 1986–2013. Our findings show that exchange rate regimes do matter. Countries with fixed exchange rate regimes are more likely to experience financial vulnerabilities—faster domestic credit and house price growth, and increases in bank leverage—than those with relatively flexible regimes. The transmission of global financial shocks is likewise magnified under fixed exchange rate regimes relative to more flexible (though not necessarily fully flexible) regimes. We attribute this to both reduced monetary policy autonomy and a greater sensitivity of capital flows to changes in global conditions under fixed rate regimes.

Because of recent economic crises, financial fragility has regained prominence in both the theory and practice of macroeconomic policy. Consistent with macroeconomic paradigms prevalent at the time, the original architecture of the euro zone assumed that safeguards against inflation and excessive government deficits would suffice to guarantee macroeconomic stability. Recent events, in both Europe and the industrial world at large, challenge this assumption. After reviewing the roots of the euro crisis in financial-market developments, this essay draws some conclusions for the reform of euro area institutions. The euro area is moving quickly to correct one flaw in the Maastricht treaty, the vesting of all financial supervisory functions with national authorities. However, the sheer size of bank balance sheets suggest that the euro area must also confront a financial/fiscal trilemma: countries in the euro zone can no longer enjoy all three of financial integration with other member states, financial stability, and fiscal independence, because the costs of banking rescues may now go beyond national fiscal capacities. Thus, plans to reform the euro zone architecture must combine centralized supervision with some centralized fiscal backstop to finance bank resolution in situations of insolvency.

Until now, thinking on open economy macroeconomics has been largely schizophrenic. When it comes to analyzing exchange rate dynamics, an empirically-minded economist abandons modern current account models which, while theoretically coherent, fail to address the awkward reality of sticky nominal prices. In this paper we develop an analytically tractable two-country model that marries a full account of dynamics to a supply framework based on monopolistic competition and sticky prices. It offers simple and intuitive predictions about exchange rates and current accounts that sometimes differ sharply from those of either modern flexible-price intertemporal models, or traditional sticky-price Keynesian models. The model also leads to a novel perspective on the international welfare spillovers of monetary and fiscal policies.

The expert contributors compare the recent crisis with earlier crises, explore international aspects of the crisis from the perspectives of financial markets and trade, and examine macroeconomic policy responses. In so doing, they address important questions including: How did this crisis differ from those suffered previously? How and why did flaws in financial markets contribute to the crisis? How important were global imbalances and global overheating in explaining the global meltdown? Did different pre-crisis fundamentals generate different post-crisis performances? And, how severe were the economic shocks to countries such as Korea and other emerging economies?

This paper analyzes current stresses in the two key areas that concerned the architects of the original Bretton Woods system: international liquidity and exchange rate management. Despite radical changes since World War II in the market context for liquidity and exchange rate concerns, they remain central to discussions of international macroeconomic policy coordination. To take two prominent examples of specific (and related) coordination problems, liquidity issues are paramount in strategies of national self-insurance through foreign reserve accumulation, while recent attempts by emerging market economies (EMEs) to limit real currency appreciation have relied heavily on nominal exchange rate management. A central message is that a diverse set of potential asymmetries among sovereign member states provides fertile ground for a variety of coordination failures. The paper goes on to discuss institutions and policies that might mitigate some of these inefficiencies.

This paper argues that if policymakers seek to enhance global liquidity, then the international community must provide a higher and better coordinated level of fiscal support than it has in the past. Loans to troubled sovereigns or financial institutions imply a credit risk that ultimately must be lodged somewhere. Expanded international lending facilities, including an expanded IMF, cannot remain unconditionally solvent absent an expanded level of fiscal backup. The same point obviously applies to the European framework for managing internal sovereign debt problems, including proposals for a jointly guaranteed eurozone sovereign bond. Even attainment of a significant role for the Special Drawing Right depends upon enhanced fiscal resources and burden sharing at the international level.

This paper presents a simple diagrammatic analysis of an open economy's external adjustment process under habit-forming individual preferences. The exposition focuses on the consumption side and aims to make transparent the linkage among wealth, past consumption experience, and current consumption. An extension of the standard representative-agent model to a growing economy of overlapping generations completes the paper. Under habit formation an agent's consumption exhibits a form of hysteresis, in that his current consumption depends on his past consumption experience as well as initial assets. In the overlapping-generations model aggregate hysteresis disappears in the long run.

In a recent article, Brennan and Solnik (1989) attempt to quantify numerically the welfare benefits of risk sharing by a group of OECD economies. The result of their calculation is striking; in their words (p. 371), ‘The estimated welfare loss due to impairment of efficient risk sharing if capital flows were eliminated is of the order of 448 per cent of the level of consumption prevailing in the early 1970s.’ This note argues that the Brennan-Solnik welfare measure is faulty and leads to a substantial overstatement of the potential welfare benefits of international risk sharing within their sample of countries. For standard levels of risk aversion, the Brennan-Solnik measure may overstate these benefits by as much as two orders of magnitude. This is true even if one accepts as valid the empirical assumptions the authors make in calculating the consumption-variability estimates that underlie their welfare conclusions.

This paper explores the links between macroeconomic developments, especially monetary policy, and the exchange rate during the period of Japan's bubble economy and subsequent stagnation. The yen experienced epic gyrations over that period, starting with its rapid ascent after the March 1985 Plaza Accord of major industrial countries. Two distinct periods of endaka fukyo, or recession induced by a strong yen, occurred in the late 1980s and the early 1990s at critical phases of the monetary policy cycle. My approach emphasizes the interaction of short-term developments driven by monetary factors (as they affect international real interest rate differentials) and the long-term determinants of the real exchange rate's equilibrium path. Chief among those long-run determinants are relative sectoral productivity levels and the terms of trade, including the price of oil. Since the mid-1990s, the yen's real exchange rate has generally followed a depreciating trend and Japan's comprehensive terms of trade have deteriorated.

When changes in the economic policy regime occur stochastically, asset prices will reflect the possibility of such shifts. In this paper we apply techniques of regulated Brownian motion to obtain closed-form analytic price solutions when policy reaction functions are subject to prospective changes. We focus on the case in which the authorities promise to peg a currency's exchange rate once it reaches a predetermined future level. We also show how an open-ended commitment to exchange-rate targeting may lead to multiple equilibria.

This paper shows how a government that cannot make credible policy commitments might manage its exchange rate and fiscal stance in a world of rational expectations. The dynamic-game model developed here potentially can generate diverse patterns of macroeconomic behavior, patterns that differ as a result of assumed differences in government objectives. Under some types of government, the ongoing strategic interaction between the public and private sectors leads to a disinflationary outcome. Other governments may push the economy into a spiral of rising debt and inflation.

The rapid growth of international reserves, a development concentrated in the emerging markets, remains a puzzle. In this paper, we suggest that a model based on financial stability and financial openness goes far toward explaining reserve holdings in the modern era of globalized capital markets. The size of domestic financial liabilities that could potentially be converted into foreign currency (M2), financial openness, the ability to access foreign currency through debt markets, and exchange rate policy are all significant predictors of reserve stocks. Our empirical financial-stability model seems to outperform both traditional models and recent explanations based on external short-term debt. (JEL E23, E43, E44, F31, F32, F34)

The recovery in GDP growth since the global financial crisis has been halting and weak. Concern is widespread that countercyclical policies have run out of space or lack the power to raise growth or deal with the next negative shock. This note argues that room exists for effective policies and that it should be used if appropriate. The most promising route involves a comprehensive, consistent, and coordinated approach to policy making. Comprehensive policy actions within a country exploit synergies, making the whole greater than the sum of parts. Consistent policy frameworks anchor long-term expectations while allowing decisive short- to medium-term accommodation whenever necessary. Coordinated policies across major economies amplify the helpful effects of individual policy actions through positive cross-border spillovers. The findings of this paper indicate that policy coordination adds particular value if the current approach falls short of reviving growth, or in the event of a further downward shock.

This paper develops simple geometric methods for analyzing consumer behavior under recursive but intertemporally dependent tastes. Since the preferences studied need not be time-additive, they allow the marginal utility of consumption on a given date to vary with consumption on other dates. Intertemporal dependence is induced by the presence of a variable individual rate of time preference. The optimal consumption responses to transitory and anticipated changes in incomes and interest rates are easily derived and are similar in many respects to the responses implied by the standard, constant time-preference model. Intuitive explanations of the first-order conditions describing optimal paths are provided.

In the face of huge balance of payments surpluses and internal inflationary pressures, China has been in a classic conflict between internal and external balance under its U.S. dollar currency peg. Over the longer term, China fs large, modernizing, and diverse economy will need exchange rate flexibility and, eventually, convertibility with open capital markets. A feasible and attractive exit strategy from the essentially fixed renminbi(RMB) exchange rate would be a two-stage approach, consistent with the steps already taken since July 2005, but going beyond them. First, establish a limited trading band for the RMB relative to a basket of major trading partner currencies. Set the band so that it allows some initial revaluation of the RMB against the dollar, manage the basket rate within the band if necessary, and widen the band over time as domestic foreign exchange markets develop. The ultimate goal is a floating exchange rate coupled with some relative of inflation targeting. Second, put on hold ad hoc measures of financial account liberalization. They will be less helpful for relieving exchange rate pressures once the yuan/basket rate is allowed to move flexibly within a band, and they are best postponed until domestic foreign exchange markets develop further, the exchange rate is fully flexible, and the domestic financial system has been strengthened and placed fully on a market-oriented basis.

Even when the exchange-rate plays no expenditure-switching role, countries may wish to have flexible exchange rates in order to free the domestic interest rate as a stabilization tool. In a setting with nontraded goods, exchange-rate movements may also enhance international risk sharing.

This paper presents a quantitative evaluation of the effect on the yen of some alternative scenarios under which Japan reaches current account balance. The analytical framework is a global general-equilibrium model, based closely on Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005a, 2005b), within which relative prices clear the world markets for traded goods as well as the domestic markets for nontraded goods. Depending on assumptions about the critical substitution elasticities underlying the model, the yen could appreciate by as much as 10 per cent for each 1 percent of GDP reduction in its current account surplus. The effect would be smaller if substitution elasticities are larger, or if adjustment is accompanied by an expansion of Japanese nontradable output, the latter presumably implied by a return to a more efficient level of labor utilization.

Confronting a prolonged period of slow growth, Japan has recently faced a difficult policy environment, with large budget deficits apparently precluding the use of traditional fiscal stimulus, and zero short-term interest rates apparently precluding the use of traditional monetary stimulus. This paper reconsiders each of these conclusions. In earlier work (Auerbach and Obstfeld 2004a,b), we outlined the case for using monetary policy as an effective tool to stimulate growth, end deflation, and reduce the fiscal burden, even in a zerointerest rate environment. In this paper, we review our basic result and its logic, and consider how our argument is affected by the maturity structure of outstanding government debt and a banking sector that may itself hoard liquidity. We also discuss the issue of credibility, and how our conclusions square with recent Japanese policy experience. We then consider a fiscal policy alternative that has been proposed for Japan, to use variations in tax structure rather than in the level of taxation to stimulate growth in a liquidity trap. We find this policy wanting on both welfare and credibility grounds. I. Introduction Japan’s efforts to stimulate its economy over the past decade have led to apparent macroeconomic policy paralysis, with short-term nominal interest rates at their floor of zero and fiscal expansion immobilized by fears of augmenting an already-huge public debt. In earlier work (Auerbach and Obstfeld 2004a,b), we argued that open- market expansions of the money supply could be used effectively in such an environment, as long as (1) agents in the economy already expect that the liquidit y trap is not permanent; and (2) the monetary policy change is permanent and credible. The economic stimulus from such a policy would come through two channels, from a short-run increase in the inflation rate and a long-run reduction in the tax burden. In this paper, we review our basic result and its logic, and consider how our argument is affected by the maturity structure of outstanding government debt and a banking sector that may itself hoard liquidity. We also discuss the issue of credibility, and how our conclusions square with recent Japanese policy experience. We then consider a fiscal policy alternative that has been proposed for Japan, to use variations in tax structure rather than in the level of taxation to stimulate growth in a liquidity trap. We find this policy wanting on both welfare and credibility grounds.

We show that the when one takes into account the global equilibrium ramifications of an unwinding of the US current account deficit, currently running at nearly 6% of GDP, the potential collapse of the dollar becomes considerably larger (more than 50% larger) than our previous estimates (Obstfeld and Rogoff 2000a). It is true that global capital market deepening appears to have accelerated over the past decade (a fact documented by Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (2005) and recently emphasized by US Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan), and that this deepening may have helped allowed the United States to a record-breaking string of deficits. Unfortunately, however, global capital market deepening turns out to be of only modest help in mitigating the dollar decline that will almost inevitably occur in the wake of global current account adjustment. As the analysis of our earlier papers (2000a, b) showed, and the model of this paper reinforces, adjustments to large current account shifts depend mainly on the flexibility and global integration of goods and factor markets. Whereas the dollar’s decline may be benign as in the 1980s, we argue that the current conjuncture more closely parallels the 1970s, when the Bretton Woods system collapsed. Finally, we use our model to dispel some common misconceptions about what kinds of shifts are needed to help close the US current account imbalance. For example, faster growth abroad helps only if it is relatively concentrated in nontradable goods; faster productivity growth in foreign tradable goods will actually exacerbate the U.S. adjustment problem.

Among the developing countries of the world, those emerging markets that have sought some degree of integration into world finance are characterized by higher per capita incomes, higher long-run growth rates, and lower output and consumption volatility. These characteristics are more likely to be causes than effects of financial integration. The measurable gains from financial integration appear to be lower for emerging markets than for higher-income countries, and appear to have been limited by recent crises. One factor limiting the gains from financial integration is the difficulty emerging economies face in resolving the open-economy trilemma. Given their structural and institutional features, many emerging economies cannot live comfortably either with fixed or with freely floating exchange rates. Most recently, the exchange rates of several emerging countries display attempts at stabilization punctuated by high volatility in periods of market stress.

Prevalent thinking about liquidity traps suggests that the perfect substitutability of money and bonds at a zero short-term nominal interest rate renders open-market operations ineffective for achieving macroeconomic stabilization goals. We show that even were this the case, there remains a powerful argument for large-scale open market operations as a fiscal policy tool. As we also demonstrate, however, this same reasoning implies that open-market operations will be beneficial for stabilization as well, even when the economy is expected to remain mired in a liquidity trap for some time. Thus, the microeconomic fiscal benefits of open-market operations in a liquidity trap go hand in hand with standard macroeconomic objectives. Motivated by Japan's recent economic experience, we use a dynamic general-equilibrium model to assess the welfare impact of open-market operations for an economy in Japan's predicament. We argue Japan can achieve a substantial welfare improvement through large open-market purchases of domestic government debt.

The exchange-rate regime is often seen as constrained by the monetary policy trilemma, which imposes a stark tradeoff among exchange stability, monetary independence, and capital market openness. Yet the trilemma has not gone without challenge. Some (e.g., Calvo and Reinhart 2001, 2002) argue that under the modern float there could be limited monetary autonomy. Others (e.g., Bordo and Flandreau 2003), that even under the classical gold standard domestic monetary autonomy was considerable. This paper studies the coherence of international interest rates over more than 130 years. The constraints implied by the trilemma are largely borne out by history.

This book presents an economic survey of international capital mobility from the late nineteenth century to the present. The authors examine the theory and empirical evidence surrounding the fall and rise of integration in the world market. A discussion of institutional developments focuses on capital controls and the pursuit of macroeconomic policy objectives in shifting monetary regimes. The Great Depression emerges as the key turning point in recent history of international capital markets, and offers important insights for contemporary policy debates. Its principal legacy is that the return to a world of global capital is marked by great unevenness in outcomes regarding both risks and rewards of capital market integration. More than in the past, foreign investment flows largely from rich countries to other rich countries. Yet most financial crises afflict developing countries, with costs for everyone.