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For some time now, questions have been asked about the impact of television and video materials on the cognitive and social development of preschoolers and older children. More recently, these same questions have been asked in relation to the extensive exposure to these media that infants and toddlers are currently experiencing. To answer these questions, we review current research that explicitly targets these concerns and provide new insights into the role these media play in early development.

Previous research has shown that survival-related processing of word lists enhances retention for that material. However, the claim that survival-related memories are more accurate has only been examined when true recall and recognition of neutral material has been measured. In the current experiments, we examined the adaptive memory superiority effect for different types of processing and material, measuring accuracy more directly by comparing true and false recollection rates. Survival-related information and processing was examined using word lists containing backward associates of neutral, negative, and survival-related critical lures and type of processing (pleasantness, moving, survival) was varied using an incidental memory paradigm. Across four experiments, results showed that survival-related words were more susceptible than negative and neutral words to the false memory illusion and that processing information in terms of its relevance to survival independently increased this susceptibility to the false memory illusion. Overall, although survival-related processing and survival-related information resulted in poorer, not more accurate, memory, such inaccuracies may have adaptive significance. These findings are discussed in the context of false memory research and recent theories concerning the importance of survival processing and the nature of adaptive memory.

Across five experiments we examined the role of valence in children's and adults' true and false memories. Using the Deese/Roediger-McDermott paradigm and either neutral or negative-emotional lists, both adults' (Experiment 1) and children's (Experiment 2) true recall and recognition was better for neutral than negative items, and although false recall was also higher for neutral items, false recognition was higher for negative items. The last three experiments examined adults' (Experiment 3) and children's (Experiments 4 and 5) 1-week long-term recognition of neutral and negative-emotional information. The results replicated the immediate recall and recognition findings from the first two experiments. More important, these experiments showed that although true recognition decreased over the 1-week interval, false recognition of neutral items remained unchanged whereas false recognition of negative-emotional items increased. These findings are discussed in terms of theories of emotion and memory as well as their forensic implications.

The effects of associative strength and gist relations on rates of children’s and adults’ true and false memories were examined in three experiments. Children aged 5–11 and university-aged adults participated in a standard Deese/Roediger–McDermott false memory task using DRM and category lists in two experiments and in the third, children memorized lists that differed in associative strength and semantic cohesion. In the first two experiments, half of the participants were primed before list presentation with gist-relevant cues and the results showed that: (1) both true and false memories increased with age, (2) true recall was higher than false recall for all ages, (3) at all ages, false memory rates were determined by backward associative strength, and (4) false memories varied predictably with changes in associative strength but were unaffected by gist manipulations (category structure or gist priming). In the third experiment, both gist and associative strength were varied orthogonally and the results showed that regardless of age, children’s (5) true recall was affected by gist manipulations (semantic cohesion) and (6) false recall was affected by backward associative strength. These findings are discussed in the context of models of false memory illusions and continuities in memory development more generally.

One of the most extensively investigated topics in the adult memory literature, dual memory processes, has had virtually no impact on the study of early memory development. The authors remove the key obstacles to such research by formulating a trichotomous theory of recall that combines the traditional dual processes of recollection and familiarity with a reconstruction process. The theory is then embedded in a hidden Markov model that measures all 3 processes with low-burden tasks that are appropriate for even young children. These techniques are applied to a large corpus of developmental studies of recall, yielding stable findings about the emergence of dual memory processes between childhood and young adulthood and generating tests of many theoretical predictions. The techniques are extended to the study of healthy aging and to the memory sequelae of common forms of neurocognitive impairment, resulting in a theoretical framework that is unified over 4 major domains of memory research: early development, mainstream adult research, aging, and neurocognitive impairment. The techniques are also extended to recognition, creating a unified dual process framework for recall and recognition.

The effects of associative strength on rates of 7- and 11-year-old children's true and false memories were examined when category and Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) lists were used to cue the same critical lure. Backward associative strength (BAS) was varied such that the category and DRM lists had the same strength (DRM=category), DRM lists had more BAS (DRM>category), or category lists had more BAS (DRM

We studied the semantic properties of a class of illusions, of which the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm is the most prominent example, in which subjects falsely remember words that are associates of studied words. We analyzed DRM materials for 16 dimensions of semantic content and assessed the ability of these dimensions to predict interlist variability in false memory. For the more general class of illusions, we analyzed pairs of presented and unpresented words that varied in associative strength for the presence of these same 16 semantic properties. DRM materials proved to be exceptionally rich in meaning, as indexed by these semantic properties. Variability in false recall, false recognition, and backward associative strength loaded on a single semantic factor (familiarity/meaningfulness), whereas variability in true recall loaded on a quite different factor (imagery/concreteness). For word association generally, 15 semantic properties varied reliably with forward or backward association between words. Implications for semantic versus associative processing in this class of illusions, for dual-process theories, and for semantic properties of word associations are discussed.

The effects of within- versus between-languages (English–French) study and test on rates of bilingual children’s and adults’ true and false memories were examined. Children aged 6 through 12 and university-aged adults participated in a standard Deese–Roediger–McDermott false memory task using free recall and recognition. Recall results showed that: (1) both true and false memories increased with age, (2) true recall was higher in within- than between-languages conditions for all ages, and (3) there were fewer false memories in between-languages conditions than within-language conditions for the youngest children, no differences for the 8 and 12 years old, and by adulthood, there were more false memories in between-languages than within-language conditions. Recognition results showed that regardless of age, false recognition rates tended to be higher in between-languages than within-language conditions. These findings are discussed in the context of models of false memory development.

In this commentary, assumptions about the nature and development of children's false memories as described in a recent article by C. J. Brainerd, V. F. Reyna, and S. J. Ceci (2008; see record 2008-04614-001) are reviewed. Specifically, questions are raised about what drives the development of false memories in fuzzy-trace theory (FTT). Recent studies that challenge a core assumption of FTT, that false memory illusions increase across development as children learn to establish meaningful connections across items (i.e., establish gist), are discussed. An alternative conceptualization of the development of false memory illusions, associative-activation theory (AAT), is presented. AAT provides as viable an account of the development of false memory illusions as does FTT and anticipates a unique set of outcomes that have recently appeared in the developmental literature on false memory illusions.

The capability of adult and child witnesses to accurately recollect events from the past and provide reliable testimony has been hotly debated for more than one hundred years (Binet, 1900). Prominent legal cases of the 1980s and 1990s sparked lengthy debates and important research questions surrounding the fallibility and general reliability of memory. But what lessons have we learned, some forty years later, about the role of memory in the judicial system? In this review, we focus on what we now know about the consequences of the fallibility of memory for legal proceedings. We present a brief historical overview of false memories that focuses on three critical forensic areas that changed memory research: Children as eyewitnesses, historic sexual abuse, and eyewitness (mis)identification. We revisit some of the prominent trials of the 1980s and 1990s to not only consider the role false memories have played, but also to see how this has helped us understand memory today. Finally, we consider the way in which the research on memory (true and false) has been successfully integrated into some courtroom procedures.

The role of inhibition in children's (5-, 7-, and 11-year-olds') false memory illusions in the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm was examined using a list-wise directed-forgetting procedure. Children studied either a single DRM list (control) or two DRM lists in succession with a directed-remembering instruction or a directed-forgetting instruction between list presentations. The findings indicated that, like adults, children effectively suppressed the output of true memories when given a directed-forgetting instruction. Unlike adults, whose false memories are not attenuated in directed-forgetting conditions, children suppressed false memories at recall in the directed-forgetting condition. Because recognition data indicated that the children did generate false memories regardless of instruction, it appears that although adults' false memories are generated automatically and do not become part of their conscious experience, children's false memories are produced with greater effort and conscious processing, and as a result are easier to suppress at output.

We outline the nature of dynamic systems, both linear and nonlinear, and we review dynamic systems principles that apply well to various aspects of human development, including the emergence of new forms, phases of stability and instability, continuous and discontinuous change, and differentiation among individual trajectories. We then document the growth and popularity of dynamic systems approaches for understanding a diverse array of developmental domains. Finally, we acknowledge the contribution and impact Esther Thelen has made in this area of developmental science, and dedicate this special issue to her memory.

A study was conducted to evaluate the (1) developmental course and (2) the temporal sequencing of visual (mirror, photo) and verbal (personal pronoun use) measures of self-recognition as well as the ability to locate a toy from its mirror image in relation to the child's own mirror image. A microgenetic approach was adopted to assess 10 toddlers biweekly between 15 and 23 months of age and for comparison, a cross-section of children tested once across the same age range. Longitudinal data indicated that visual self-recognition emerged gradually and showed wide variability in expression prior to becoming stable, a finding masked in the cross-sectional data where performance appeared to improve abruptly. Both cross-sectional and longitudinal data confirmed that mirror self-recognition was the earliest precursor of the indices of self-recognition to emerge followed by the use of personal pronouns and photo identification. Implications for the emergence and integration of the self are discussed.

Over the past three decades impressive progress has been made in documenting the development of encoding, storage, and retrieval processes in preverbal infants and children. This literature includes an extensive and diverse database as well as theoretical conjecture about the underlying processes that drive early memory development. A selective review of some of this literature is provided to illustrate the extent and scope of this research, what is currently known about how memory develops over time, and some of the questions that remain to be answered. Importantly, research on early memory development has provided insights into a number of longstanding issues that have been prominent in the memory literature more generally (e.g., the memory systems question, infantile amnesia). It has also yielded practical information relevant to memory functioning in real world settings (e.g., for forensic and clinical psychology). We conclude that the basic processes needed to encode, store, and retrieve information are present very early in life and that although significant developmental advances take place across early childhood, many of the processes that govern memory in preverbal children are common with those of verbal children and adults. These issues are discussed and future directions for research are suggested.

A longstanding issue in psychology has been, When does human memory begin? More particularly, when do we begin to remember personal experiences in a way that makes them accessible to recollection later in life? Current popular and scientific thinking would have us believe that memories are possible not only at the time of our birth, but also in utero. Indeed, some writers in the popular press (as well as some recent television programs) suggest that we can remember past lives and that such memories are affecting our current behaviors. The purpose of this special issue is to examine, in a scientific context, what the most recent empirical data have to say about the nature of early memory and its development. In this article, we provide the background to the questions that prompted this special issue and suggest that memory for personal events, although it may start quite early in life, does so much later than claimed in popular writings about early memory.

The authors review competing theories concerning the emergence and early development of autobiographical memory. It is argued that the differences between these accounts, although important, may be more apparent than real. The crux of these disagreements lies not in what processes are important, but rather, the role these different processes play in the emergence of autobiographical memory and the temporal primacy of these controlling variables. These differences are explored theoretically and then extant as well as new data are brought to bear on these issues. What emerges is a new, more inclusive, multifactorial framework that integrates the controlling variables from diverse perspectives providing a more complete account of the beginnings of autobiographical memory.

How far back can we, as adults, remember details of our life experiences? Current popular and scientific beliefs are contradictory, with the latter stipulating that personal memories do not begin until the late preschool years (age 4–5 years) and the former claiming that we not only remember being born, but can also remember in utero experiences. In this review, these beliefs are examined in a scientific context and evaluated in terms of empirical data about the development of early memory. The theory proposed here is that memories for personal experiences are not possible until the advent of the cognitive self, around the age of 18 to 24 months. This age is much earlier than that proposed as the age of the earliest memories in other scientific accounts and much later than that proposed in popular beliefs about early memory. New data from a cross-sectional and longitudinal study of early memory development and the emergence of the self clearly show the origins of personal memory coincide with the emergence of the early self.

Preschool and kindergarten children's retention of stories was examined in the presence of interfering information and instructions to forget. Children learned 2 stories and, 24 hr later, were asked to recall the 1st or 2nd story learned. Some of the children were instructed, either following acquisition or just prior to the retention test, to forget the 2nd, or interfering, story. A model was used to isolate storage and retrieval effects, and the results showed that (a) retroactive interference affected both storage- and retrieval-based forgetting rates for the younger children but only storage-based forgetting rates for the older children, (b) intentional forgetting reduced retroactive interference primarily by attenuating storage-based forgetting regardless of age, (c) intentional forgetting instructions were effective only at acquisition for preschoolers but at both acquisition and retention for kindergarteners, and (d) all children recalled the to-be-forgotten story as well as they recalled the to-be-remembered story. These results are interpreted in terms of reorganization and distinctiveness effects in storage.

The current experiment was designed to assess the mnemonic consequences of false denials and forced confabulations. Children (aged 6-8 and 10-12 years) and adults viewed a video and then their memory and belief about the event were tested. Participants were then divided into three groups. In the "cued recall" condition, participants were asked to answer true- and false-event questions, but could choose not to respond if they did not know the answer. In the "forced confabulation" group, participants received the same set of questions, but were forced to answer all of them. In the "false denial" group, participants were instructed to falsely deny in response to each question. One week later, participants received a source memory test, and they had to provide memory and belief ratings once more. Forced confabulations resulted in false memories in the youngest group. Moreover, our analyses showed that repeated false denials led children and adults to be highly inclined to falsely deny that they had talked to the experimenter about certain presented details, when in fact they had done so. Furthermore, false denial and non-believed memory rates were more pronounced in younger than in older children and adults. Our results imply that denying experienced events is not a good strategy in an interviewing setting, as it adversely affects memory statements about the interview.

Previous research has demonstrated that participants remember significantly more survival-related information and more information that is processed for its survival relevance. Recent research has also shown that survival materials and processing result in more false memories, ones that are adaptive inasmuch as they prime solutions to insight-based problems. Importantly, false memories for survival-related information facilitate problem solving more than false memories for other types of information. The present study explores this survival advantage using an incidental rather than intentional memory task. Here participants rated information either in the context of its importance to a survival-processing scenario or to moving to a new house. Following this, participants solved a number of compound remote associate tasks (CRATs), half of which had the solution primed by false memories that were generated during the processing task. Results showed that (a) CRATs were primed by false memories in this incidental task, with participants solving significantly more CRATs when primed than when unprimed, (b) this effect was greatest when participants rated items for survival than moving, and (c) processing items for a survival scenario improved overall problem-solving performance even when specific problems themselves were not primed. Results are discussed with regard to adaptive theories of memory.

The argument advanced in this article is that false memories can arise because of processes that normally affect forgetting, namely, the decline of distinctiveness and the rise of retroactive interference. Specifically, when the distinctiveness of a trace relative to the background of other traces diminishes, the potential for interference among like traces increases. To the extent that memories lose their distinctive properties, including the source of the memory, such memories may become confused with events that are supposed to be recalled as actually having occurred. This idea is elaborated in the context of studies of the effects of distinctiveness on reducing retroactive interference in children's long-term retention. It is concluded that advances in understanding false memories and the role distinctiveness might play in reducing such misrememberings is contingent on the development of additional formal modeling approaches like the one presented in the lead paper by Brainerd and Reyna (1998, this issue).

In this commentary I discuss the work by Fivush and Schwarzmueller (1998) including some methodological limitations to their study. It is perhaps because of these limitations that the data do not provide support for their linguistic hypothesis concerning the onset of autobiographical memory. The data do, however, address important issues in the study of autobiographical memory, particularly in terms of very long-term retention and reconstruction of unique (and perhaps distinctive) events that are pleasant. This is a welcome change from the typical studies of recall of distinctive life events in which the target event is one that revolves around unpleasant medical procedures. Future research efforts should continue along these lines, although alternative suggestions are made for which theoretical issues need to be addressed and new measures developed. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Language: en

In the present experiment, we evaluated the effects of individual differences in reading span and variation in memory demands on class-inclusion performance. One hundred twenty college students whose reading spans ranged from low to medium to high (as indexed by a computerized version of the Daneman and Carpenter [1980] reading-span task) solved 48 class-inclusion problems. Half of the subjects had the solution information available when the problems were presented; the other half performed a detection task between solution information and problem presentation. The results from both standard statistical analyses and from a mathematical model indicated that differences in reading span and memory load had predictable, similar effects. Specifically, the sophistication of reasoning strategies declined when memory demands increased or when reading spans decreased. Surprisingly, these effects were primarily additive. The results were interpreted in terms of global resource models and findings from the developmental literature.

We argue that metamemory has traditionally been conceptualized as factual, truthful knowledge about memory. We suggest that such a conceptualization is overly restrictive, theoretically and empirically, and propose that metamemory should be conceptualized as personalized, constructed knowledge consisting of both accurate and naive beliefs. Using data concerning the development of children’s beliefs about long-term retention, we illustrate the advantages of this more contemporary conceptualization over its traditional counterpart. These advantages are that the contemporary view (a) places considerable value on young children’s beliefs, many of which are naive, and their role in development, (b) encourages metamemory research in areas where it is not known a priori what the accurate metamemory belief should be, (c) helps to make contact with the literature on theories of the mind, and (d) is consistent with contemporary theories of knowledge development in general. We elaborate the contemporary view of metamemory, outlining a model of how it develops and how it impacts on memory. We conclude by sketching some future directions for research in the area.

Alexander von Eye is Professor of Psychology and Family and Child Ecology at Michigan State University. His research interests in cognitive development focus on methods for analysis of categorical data, longitudinal data, and modeling. He currently serves as Associate Editor of the Biometrical Journal and Revue Multiciencia . Clifford C. Clogg (1949–1995) was Distinguished Professor of Sociology and Professor of Statistics at Pennsylvania State University. His research interests focused on categorical data analysis, including association models and latent structure techniques. He served as Editor of Sociological Methodology (1987–1990) and Coordinating and Applications Editor of the Journal of the American Statistical Association (1989–1991). Von Eye and Clogg have also coedited Latent Variables Analysis . Mark L. Howe is Professor of Psychology at Memorial University of Newfoundland. His research has focused on early memory development and with models of lifespan memory development. He has edited a number of books; the most recent book, coedited with R. Pasnak, is Emerging Themes in Cognitive Development . F. Michael Rabinowitz is also Professor of Psychology at Memorial University. His research interests have ranged across a number of topics which include cognitive development, dynamics of free recall, implicit and explicit learning, and the construction of computer algorithms.

The trace integrity framework, including the associated mathematical model, is used to summarize a corpus of data on the development of children's and adults' long-term retention. The purpose of this review is to get some leverage on what role storage and retrieval processes play in the forgetting and subsequent recovery of memory traces. What this review shows is that (1) forgetting is dominated by storage, not retrieval, failures; (2) trace recovery is dominated by retrieval, not storage, operations; and (3) storage failure rates decline with age in childhood, whereas only modest developments occur in retrieval recovery operations. These findings are then applied to current issues concerning adult recall of childhood memories.

The authors provide a new framework that integrates autobiographical memory with other early achievements (e.g., gesturing, language, concept formation). In this theory, the emergence and early development of autobiographical memory does not require the invocation of specialized neurological or multiple memory mechanisms but rather arises as a natural consequence of developments in related domains including in the "software" that drives general memory functioning. In particular, autobiographical memory emerges contemporaneously with the cognitive self, a knowledge structure whose features serve to organize memories of experiences that happened to "me." Because this cognitive self emerges in the 2nd year of life, the lower limit for early autobiographical memories is set at about 2 years, with subsequent accumulation of memories linked to improvements in children's ability to maintain information in storage.

1. Otgaar, Howe, Schwartz, & Toglia: What is Adaptive Memory? Section 1: Adaptive memory: What are the factors that drove the natural selection of memory? 2. Stanley B. Klein: Evolution, Memory, and the Role of Self-Referent Recall in Planning for the Future 3. Raoul Bell and Axel Buchner: Remembering cheaters 4. Daniel J. Burns and Joshua Hart: Living, Dying and Remembering: The Encoding Processes Involved in Survival Processing Section 2: Adaptive Memory: A Special Case for Survival Information and Processing? 5. Mark L. Howe and Mary H. Derbish: Adaptive memory: Survival processing, ancestral relevance, and the role of elaboration 6. Nicholas C. Soderstrom & Anne M. Cleary: On the Domain-Generality of Survival Processing Advantages in Memory 7. Jeanette Altarriba and Stephanie Kazanas: Survival Processing, Attention, and Interference 8. Toglia, M. P,, Leedy, A. D., Wilde, A. M., Baker, C. M. & & Dacey, E. M. Cognitive and social factors in the study of survival memory 9. Bennett L. Schwartz & Brock R. Brothers: Survival processing does not improve paired-associate learning 10. Edgar Erdfelder & Meike Kroneisen: Proximate cognitive mechanisms underlying the survival processing effect Section 3: Adaptive Memory in Distinctive populations 11. Memory Errors in Adaptive Recollections Henry Otgaar, Mark L. Howe, Tom Smeets, Linsey Raymaekers, & Johan van Beers 12. Linsey Raymaekers, Tom Smeets, Henry Otgaar, Maarten J.V. Peters & Harald Merckelbach: The Adaptive Value of Survival Processing in Childhood Trauma Victims 13. Corrina Maguinness and Fiona N. Newell: Recognising others: Adaptive changes to person recognition throughout the lifespan 14. Jennifer Vonk & Kelly W. Mosteller: Perceptual versus Conceptual Memory Processes in a Chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes) 15. Patrick Douglas Sellers II and David F. Bjorklund: The Development of Adaptive Memory 16. James S. Nairne. Adaptive Memory: Controversies and Future Directions

Adults frequently provide compelling, detailed accounts of early childhood experiences in the courtroom. Judges and jurors are asked to decide guilt or innocence based solely on these decades-old memories using 'common sense' notions about memory. However, these notions are not in agreement with findings from neuroscientific and behavioural studies of memory development. Without expert guidance, judges and jurors may have difficulty in properly adjudicating the weight of memory evidence in cases involving adult recollections of childhood experiences.

We investigated priming of analogical problem solutions with true and false memories. Children and adults were asked to solve nine verbal proportional analogies, three of which had been primed by Deese–Roediger–McDermott (DRM) lists where the critical lure (and problem solution) was presented as the initial word in the list (true memory priming), three of which were primed by DRM lists whose critical lures were the solution to the verbal proportional analogies (false memory priming), and three of which were unprimed. We controlled for age differences in solution rates (knowledge base) in order to examine developmental differences in speed of processing. As anticipated, the results showed that adults completed the problems significantly faster than children. Furthermore, both children and adults solved problems primed with false memories significantly faster than either those primed with true memories or unprimed problems. For both age groups, there was no significant difference between solution times for unprimed and true primed problems. These findings demonstrate that (a) priming of problem solutions extends to verbal proportional analogies, (b) false memories are more effective at priming problem solutions than true memories, and (c) there are clear positive consequences to the production of false memories.

Adults frequently provide compelling, detailed accounts of early childhood experiences in the courtroom. Judges and jurors are asked to decide guilt or innocence based solely on these decades-old memories using 'common sense' notions about memory. However, these notions are not in agreement with findings from neuroscientific and behavioural studies of memory development. Without expert guidance, judges and jurors may have difficulty in properly adjudicating the weight of memory evidence in cases involving adult recollections of childhood experiences.

In 2 experiments, we examined pre-school, grade 1, and grade 3 children's metamemory about long-term retention. Specifically, we examined beliefs about the type of information most likely to be forgotten and beliefs about the impact of suggestions and retroactive interference on memory. Children made and explained paired-comparison judgments concerning the differential forgetting of peripheral versus central information, whether misinformation effects would arise from suggestions by others, and whether retroactive interference would arise from experiencing two similar events. The major findings were that (a) most children believed that events central to a story would be retained better than peripheral details; (b) in preschool and first grade, children believed that memory was invulnerable to suggestion (from a parent or a sibling), but in third grade, children believed suggestion could adversely affect memory; (c) most preschoolers believed that retroactive interference effects would not occur, whereas most first and third graders acknowledged that they would; (d) older children believed that both suggestibility and interference were less likely given a retention interval of several months compared to 1 day; and (e) in explaining their beliefs, children assigned sensory-behavioral factors a major causal role in determining what would be remembered over the long term. These results are discussed in terms of the development of beliefs about memory and the mind in general.

In the current experiment, we evaluated the relationship between reasoning and remembering across the lifespan (10-, 13-, 15-, 23-, and 67-year-olds) using color and number class-inclusion tasks. Subjects made judgments when memory load or information load was either high or low. Reading latency, choice latency, and choice accuracy data were collected and analyzed using formal models that partitioned memory and reasoning as well as type of reasoning strategy. The results showed that: (1) study skills, as indexed by reading latency, were sophisticated across the lifespan; (2) the difference between color and number choice latencies increased with age; (3) reasonably consistent effects were obtained as a function of increasing memory load, with the quality of both reasoning and remembering being adversely affected; (4) different effects were obtained at each age as a function of increasing information load; and (5) the major developmental trend across the lifespan was a tradeoff between class-inclusion and subclass-subclass forms of reasoning. A number of extant theoretical approaches were discussed, none of which were able to account for variations in class-inclusion performance across the lifespan. What was clear, however, was that memory-reasoning dependencies must be incorporated into any comprehensive theory of cognitive development across the lifespan.