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A művelettervezés az egyik legösszetettebb katonai vezetői tevékenység, szerteágazó szakterületeket kell összefognia, eredményeiket pedig egy koherens, hatékony és végrehajtható tervvé formálnia. A folyamatban több ponton szükség van jogász szakértelem bevonására, bizonyos esetekben kritikus kérdésekben is. A hadijogász-szakirodalom – tekintettel a jogászok támogató szerepére – talán kicsit takarékosan bánik a tervezési munka folyamán felmerülő feladatok elemzésével. Jelen írás ezen a helyzeten kíván változtatni az egyes módszertanokban foglalt fontosabb feladatok áttekintésével, bizonyos vonatkozásokban pedig javaslatok megfogalmazásával.

Defined as ‘a domain characterized by the use of electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum to store, modify, and exchange data via networked systems and associated physical infrastructures’ cyberspace is created by people for the people. However, this is not always the case. Cyber operations conducted by states may amount to the use of force. The opinions, though, regarding the threshold that must be reached differ, and there are diverse theories on when a cyber operation constitutes the use of force. Furthermore, there are cases of operations that despite not reaching the threshold of use, fall under the definition of threat of force, under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Finally, cyber operations that fail to reach the threshold may still be contrary to international law, constituting a prohibited intervention in the internal affairs of another state. Le cyberespace, défini comme « un domaine caractérisé par l’usage de l’électronique et du spectre électromagnétique pour stocker, modifier et échanger des données via des systèmes en réseaux et les structures physiques qui y sont attachées », est créé par des gens et pour les gens. Ce n’est pourtant pas toujours le cas. Des cyberopérations menées par des États peuvent représenter un emploi de la force. Mais les avis divergent quant au seuil devant être atteint, et les théories pour déterminer quand une cyberopération constitue un emploi de la force sont diverses. En outre, il existe des cas d’opérations qui n’atteignent pas ce seuil, mais qui relèvent pourtant de la définition de menace de la force, au sens de l’article 2(4) de la Charte des Nations unies. Enfin, des cyberopérations n’atteignant pas ce seuil peuvent néanmoins être contraires au droit international, en ce qu’elles constituent une intervention interdite dans les affaires intérieures d’un autre État. Omschreven als ‘een domein dat wordt gekenmerkt door het gebruik van elektronica en het elektromagnetische spectrum om gegevens op te slaan, te wijzigen en uit te wisselen via netwerksystemen en bijbehorende fysieke infrastructuren’ komt cyberspace tot stand door en voor mensen. Dat is echter niet altijd het geval. Cyberoperaties geleid door staten kunnen neerkomen op het gebruik van geweld. Over de drempel die bereikt moet worden lopen de meningen echter uiteen, en er zijn verschillende theorieën om te bepalen wanneer bij een cyberoperatie sprake is van gebruik van geweld. Verder zijn er gevallen van operaties die, ook al wordt de drempel van geweldgebruik niet bereikt, onder de definitie van bedreiging met geweld vallen, zoals bedoeld in artikel 2, lid 4, van het VN-Handvest. Ten slotte kunnen cyberoperaties die de drempel niet bereiken, nog steeds in strijd zijn met het internationaal recht en gelijkstaan aan een verboden interventie in de interne aangelegenheden van een andere staat. Definido como ‘un dominio caracterizado por el uso de la electrónica y el espectro electromagnético para almacenar, modificar e intercambiar datos a través de sistemas en red e infraestructuras físicas asociadas’, el ciberespacio es creado por personas para las personas. Sin embargo, no siempre ocurre así. Las operaciones cibernéticas realizadas por los Estados pueden equivaler al uso de la fuerza. No obstante, las opiniones sobre el umbral que se debe alcanzar difieren, existiendo diversas teorías sobre cuándo una ciber-operación constituye uso de la fuerza. Además, existen casos de operaciones que, a pesar de no alcanzar el umbral de uso propiamente dicho, entran sin embargo dentro de la definición de amenaza de uso de la fuerza, según el artículo 2 (4) de la Carta de la ONU. Finalmente, las operaciones cibernéticas que no alcanzan dicho umbral pueden, no obstante, seguir siendo contrarias al Derecho Internacional, constituyendo una intervención prohibida en los asuntos internos de otro Estado. Definito come ‘un dominio caratterizzato dall'uso dell'elettronica e dello spettro elettromagnetico per memorizzare, modificare e scambiare dati tramite sistemi in rete e infrastrutture fisiche associate’ il cyberspazio è creato dalle persone per le persone. Tuttavia, non è sempre così. Le operazioni cyber condotte dagli Stati possono equivalere all'uso della forza. Le opinioni, tuttavia, per quanto riguarda la soglia che deve essere oltrepassata sono diverse e ci sono differenti teorie su quando un'operazione cyber costituisca uso della forza. Inoltre, ci sono casi di operazioni che, pur non raggiungendo la soglia di utilizzo, rientrano nella definizione di minaccia all’uso della forza, ai sensi dell'articolo 2, paragrafo 4, della Carta delle Nazioni Unite. Infine, le operazioni cibernetiche che non raggiungono la soglia possono tuttavia essere contrarie al diritto internazionale, costituendo un intervento vietato negli affari interni di un altro Stato. Der Cyberspace, der definiert wird als ‘ein Bereich, gekennzeichnet durch den Gebrauch der Elektronik und des elektromagnetischen Spektrums, um Daten über vernetzte Systeme und dazugehörige physische Infrastrukturen zu speichern, zu ändern und auszutauschen’, wird von Menschen für Menschen geschaffen. Dies ist allerdings nicht immer der Fall. Cyberoperationen, die von Staaten durchgeführt werden, können der Anwendung von Gewalt gleichkommen. Allerdings gehen die Meinungen über die zu erreichende Schwelle auseinander, und es gibt verschiedene Theorien zur Frage, wann eine Cyberoperation die Anwendung von Gewalt ausmacht. Außerdem gibt es Fälle von Operationen, die als Androhung von Gewalt im Sinne von Artikel Volume 2 (Issue 4) der Charta der Vereinten Nationen bezeichnet werden können, und dies obwohl die Schwelle der Gewaltanwendung nicht erreicht wird. Schließlich können Cyberoperationen, die die Schwelle nicht erreichen, trotzdem gegen das Völkerrecht verstoßen, und somit ein verbotenes Eingreifen in die inneren Angelegenheiten eines anderen Staates darstellen.

This research attempts to introduce and integrate two relatively foreign concepts to each other; paradigm of restorative justice and military justice system. The aim is simple, namely to explore the extent and under what conditions these two routes of adjudication can function side by side without violating core principles of traditional military justice. This goal implies one important point; not all criminal cases that fall under the jurisdiction of military justice can be resolved using a restorative justice approach. The application of restorative justice in the settlement of traffic accident cases committed by TNI soldiers can only be implemented by reforming the three components of the legal system as stated by Lawrence Friedman, namely legal substance, legal structure and legal culture. Operationally, the application of restorative justice can be carried out in 3 (three) stages, namely investigation, prosecution and trial. However, the application of restorative justice at these three stages is not intended to replace the criminal justice system within the military court, because the restorative justice program is basically complementary and not a substitute for the criminal justice system.

The objective of the article is to show the phenomenon of the internal standardization of the units of the Polish cavalry in the 16th century. The references to this process, during which the diversisty of arms and equipment of soldiers was abandoned, are scarce in descriptive sources and are only reflected in normative acts. The only type of sources which enables to reconstruct the combat potential of units is inspection (rejestry popisowe). Consequently, the process of specialization of units and of formation of different types of cavalry was basically marginalized. In the Crown, as late as the 1530s, cavalry rotas were very diverse. They consisted of lancers, Polish winged hussars (later: hussars) and light cavalry combined in various proportions. This state of affairs is connected with three factors. Firstly, the units of Permanent Defense (obrona potoczna) in their structure referred to Mass Mobilization (pospolite ruszenie). Secondly, provisions of law were not used for standardizing the arms and armor; on the contrary, at least by the 1530s they stimulated the internal diversification. Thirdly, the Crown professional units were internally divided into towarzyszes and pocztowys, which prompted the diversification of armament inside a unit. The text shows the changes which occurred in the 1540s and 1550s, and brought about a situation in 1557, when the rate of standardization was as high as 82.93 %. The transformations were dynamic but were not top-down planned reforms, representing instead a bottom-up initiative of rotmistrzes.

El principal objetivo del artículo será contemplar y analizar escueta y globalmente el proceso de modernización de las Fuerzas Armadas en los últimos decenios del siglo XX, así como poner de relieve la obligada interdependencia entre aquel y el cambiante entorno político-social e internacional. A tal efecto, se prestará atención a los cuatro principales hitos del citado proceso: reorganización de la superestructura española de defensa; reforma de la organización y revisión de las funciones encomendadas a los ejércitos; inserción de España en los organismos defensivos occidentales, y homologación de la justicia militar con la ordinaria. The main objective of the article will be to consider and analyze the process of modernization of the Armed Forces in the last decades of the twentieth century, as well as to highlight the obligatory interdependence between it and the changing political-social and international environment. To this end, attention will be paid to the four main milestones of this process: reorganization of the Spanish defence superstructure; reform of the organization of the armed forces and review of the functions entrusted to them; insertion of Spain into Western defensive alliances, and accommodation of the military justice to the common one.

The article analyzes a number of destructive factors that cause objective difficulties in the examination of the crime scene in the areas of armed conflict, including in the process of investigating war crimes committed by the opposing sides of an armed conflict with the use of missile-artillery and aerial missile-bomb weapons. These difficulties are primarily connected with the committing crimes by representatives of the opposing side of the armed conflict, their obstruction of the activities of military justice bodies, including by mining the area, the use of small arms, mortar and missile-artillery weapons, the presence of significant casualties and destruction, which generally complicates the examination of the scene. The analysis carried out by the author makes it possible to propose scientifically grounded recommendations for the examination of the crime scene in areas of an armed conflict when investigating war crimes committed by the opposing side of an armed conflict using missile-artillery and aerial missile-bomb weapons, which will help to significantly minimize the consequences of these factors and in general, to increase the efficiency of the inspection of the places of incidents in the areas of armed conflict.

Article based on a presentation delivered at the Conference on War in Cities: ‘Searching for practical solutions to the contemporary challenges’, April 2019.

The notion of ‘precautions in attack’ is an important concept in the law of armed conflict. It requires attackers to verify their targets, to ensure that only proportionate strikes are launched, to mitigate the potential for collateral damage in the selection of means and methods of warfare and, where possible, to issue warnings in advance of attacks. The emergence of ‘autonomous weapons’ requires us to review how these precautions might apply in a new era of delegated warfare in which the fulcrum around which the regime revolves – the human combatant – would be replaced by artificial intelligence-powered machines. This paper contends that technology is fast approaching the point at which the use of autonomous weapons will be compatible with the requirements of precaution. The author pushes further than most commentators in demonstrating just how capable the technology is becoming; in explaining how close it is to supplanting humans on the battlefield and in showing the potential for machines to discharge precautionary obligations better than humans in at least some areas. However, the article recognizes that technological innovations are still required before this transition comes to pass and so it also illuminates the way forward by identifying where remaining deficiencies linger.

This article reviews the existing scholarship concerning the applicability of IHL norms to cyberspace, and in particular the Tallinn Manual, which is considered to be the most authoritative restatement of international law applicable in the cyber context. In doing so, it seeks to answer the question of whether purely disruptive (as opposed to physically destructive) cyber operations could be prosecuted as war crimes at the International Criminal Court under Article 8 of the Rome Statute. The Tallinn Manual, being a restatement of lex lata at the time that it was drafted, places a heavy emphasis on physical effects when applying the jus in bello to cyber warfare. If the ICC were to rely on the Tallinn Manual’s conclusions to inform its interpretation of Article 8 in relation to cyber-based war crimes, this could have the effect of excluding disruptive cyber operations from its jurisdiction. This is a cause for concern in a world where militaries and civilian populations alike are becoming increasingly reliant on computer systems and the internet. Disruptive cyber operations can result in devastating consequences even though they do not cause physical damage, and are likely to become more powerful and sophisticated in future as technology develops.

Drafters of international humanitarian law (IHL) treaties clearly envisaged a role for military justice systems in the implementation and enforcement of these treaties. Nevertheless, the adequacy of military jurisdiction over violations of international law is being questioned in certain spheres. In the context of these debates this article considers the domestic rationale for military justice systems and explores the role and limits of military jurisdiction in combating impunity for violations of IHL. In focusing on the need to effectively repress and suppress all violations of IHL, the article addresses the extent to which some sort of military justice may be necessary for the effective enforcement of certain provisions. It also explores the way in which increased scrutiny of the impact of these justice systems on the rights of individuals has led to restrictions on the format and scope of military jurisdiction. Although there are difficulties in internationalising the discussion on military jurisdiction because of differences in domestic legal traditions, the choice of effective IHL enforcement mechanisms, which includes the choice of military or civilian jurisdiction, is key in combating impunity for violations of this body of law and protecting the rights of those involved.

In this article, we show how the U.S. military treats domestic violence and sexual assault as distinct forms of abuse, which has particular consequences for victims of intimate partner sexual violence. We explore how a specific U.S. military branch, the Marine Corps, complicates these issues further by providing services to intimate partner sexual violence victims from two different programs. Analyzing military orders and documents related to Family Advocacy Program and Sexual Assault Prevention and Response program, interviews with eight military prosecutors, and the experiences of one military lawyer, we examine program and interactional-level factors that shape victim services, advocacy, and processes. We find that there are program differences in specialized services, coordinated services, and potential breaches of confidentiality related to victim’s cases. We recommend that the Marine Corps recognize the intersections of sexual violence and domestic violence and offer more tailored services to victims of intimate partner sexual violence.

Given that the Geneva Convention of 1929 placed prisoners of war under the laws of the detaining state, Nazi courts martial could sentence prisoners of war for offences that did not exist in the western democracies, such as insults to the Führer, or severely punish them for acts leading only to mild disciplinary sanctions in Britain or America. Moreover, convicted prisoners of war had to experience the singularly brutal German prison system. These asymmetries, which influenced the Geneva Convention on prisoners of war of 1949, challenge the paradigm of reciprocity and symmetry in prisoner of war regimes between Germany and the western countries in World War II.

In June 2019, the Supreme Court of Canada pronounced judgment in the case of R v Stillman, upholding the military justice system’s ability to try serious civil offences. The Stillman decision highlighted one key mechanism of military justice reform: court judgments. This article argues, however, that military legal experts have overlooked Parliamentary debate as a key driver of military reform. By drawing on analysis of Hansard from past decades, this article argues that the Canadian Parliament has historically pushed for radical reform to the military justice system. This reformist consensus continues to shape Parliamentary discussions on military justice in the twenty-first century.

The breakthrough innovation of the Wright brothers in 1903 and subsequent developments of aerial technology created significant opportunities for the military, as a new dimension of warfare became an operational space of combat. Many legal questions arise, including the status of air machines deployed by the freshly formed independent air detachments before the outbreak of World War I. From the operational and legal viewpoint, both state practice and international law experts agreed that in order to receive a status similar to warships under the law of naval warfare, military aircraft should bear distinctive insignia, indicating their military character and nationality. This article’s aim is to present the origins and evolution of the military markings and their legal significance, as a core element of the military aircraft definition. It needs to be emphasized that only aircraft considered as military can perform acts of hostility and exercise the specific rights granted by the law of air warfare. The analysis will refer to practical challenges for maintaining the classical rule of air warfare, such as the exact location of the markings on the aircraft surfaces, low-visibility insignia (as a way to reconcile legal and operational demands) and the question of relevance of the duty to mark military aircraft in the context of unmanned air platforms. L’innovation qui a fait connaître les frères Wright en 1903 ainsi que les développements consécutifs dans la technologie aéronautique ont créé de réelles opportunités pour le secteur militaire, alors qu’une nouvelle dimension de la guerre est devenue un espace opérationnel de combat. Cette évolution fait naître de nombreuses questions juridiques, dont le statut des aéronefs déployés par les détachements aériens indépendants formés peu avant l’éclatement de la Première Guerre mondiale. D’un point de vue opérationnel et légal, la pratique étatique et les experts juridiques internationaux s’accordent sur le fait que les aéronefs militaires devraient avoir des insignes distinctifs indiquant leur caractère militaire et leur nationalité, afin qu’ils se voient attribuer un statut similaire à celui des navires de guerre en vertu du droit de la guerre navale. Cet article a pour but de présenter les origines et l’évolution du marquage militaire ainsi que sa signification juridique, en tant qu’élément essentiel de la définition d’un aéronef militaire. Soulignons le fait que seul un aéronef considéré comme militaire peut mener des actes hostiles et exercer les droits particuliers octroyés en vertu du droit de la guerre aérienne. L’analyse fait référence à des défis d’ordre pratique pour maintenir les règles classiques de la guerre aérienne, telles que l’emplacement exact des marquages sur la surface de l’aéronef, la faible visibilité des insignes (comme moyen de combiner exigences juridiques et opérationnelles) et la question de la pertinence de l’obligation de marquer un aéronef militaire dans le contexte de plateformes aériennes sans équipage. De baanbrekende innovatie van de gebroeders Wright in 1903 en de daaropvolgende ontwikkelingen van de luchtvaarttechnologie creëerden grote mogelijkheden voor de strijdkrachten, aangezien een nieuwe dimensie van oorlogvoering een operationele gevechtsruimte werd. Deze ontwikkeling leidt tot veel juridische vragen, waaronder de status van de luchtvaartuigen die door de net voor het uitbreken van de Eerste Wereldoorlog opgerichte onafhankelijke luchtdetachementen werden ingezet. Vanuit operationeel en juridisch oogpunt waren zowel de statenpraktijk als de internationale juridische experts het erover eens dat militaire luchtvaartuigen onderscheidende insignes moeten dragen die hun militaire karakter en nationaliteit aangeven, om een status te krijgen die gelijkaardig is aan die van oorlogsschepen krachtens het recht van de zeeoorlog. Dit artikel heeft tot doel de oorsprong en de ontwikkeling van de militaire markeringen en hun juridische betekenis voor te stellen als een kernelement van de definitie van militaire luchtvaartuigen. Er moet worden benadrukt dat alleen luchtvaartuigen die als militair worden beschouwd, vijandelijke handelingen kunnen verrichten en de specifieke rechten die door het recht van de luchtoorlog worden verleend, kunnen uitoefenen. De analyse verwijst naar de praktische uitdagingen voor het handhaven van de klassieke regels van de luchtoorlog, zoals de exacte locatie van de markeringen op de vliegtuigoppervlakken, insignes met lage zichtbaarheid (als een manier om juridische en operationele eisen met elkaar in overeenstemming te brengen) en de vraag of de verplichting om militaire luchtvaartuigen te markeren relevant is in de context van onbemande luchtvaartuigen. La revolucionaria innovación de los hermanos Wright en 1903 y subsiguiente evolución de la tecnología aérea dieron paso a oportunidades significativas para los ejércitos, creándose una nueva dimensión de la guerra que se convirtió en un espacio operativo de combate. Esto trajo consigo muchas cuestiones legales, incluido el estatus de los artefactos aéreos desplegados por los recién creados destacamentos aéreos independientes en los prolegómenos de la Primera Guerra Mundial. Desde el punto de vista operativo y legal, tanto los Estados a través de la práctica como los expertos en Derecho Internacional estuvieron de acuerdo en que para acogerse al mismo estatus que los buques de guerra bajo las leyes de la guerra naval, las aeronaves militares debían llevar insignias distintivas, mostrando su carácter militar y nacionalidad. El propósito del artículo es examinar el origen y evolución de estas señales militares y su importancia legal como uno de los elementos principales de la definición de aeronave militar. Debe enfatizarse que solo una aeronave considerada militar puede llevar a cabo actos de hostilidad y ejercer derechos específicos reconocidos por las leyes de la guerra aérea. El análisis aborda los retos prácticos para mantener la vigencia de la regla clásica de la guerra aérea, tal como es el lugar exacto de emplazamiento de las señales exteriores en la superficie de las aeronaves, las insignias de baja visibilidad (como una forma de conciliar las exigencias legales y operativas) y la cuestión de la relevancia del deber de señalar las aeronaves militares en el contexto de las plataformas aéreas no tripuladas. L’innovazione rivoluzionaria dei Fratelli Wright nel 1903 e i successivi sviluppi della tecnologia aerea crearono significative opportunità per i militari, poiché una nuova dimensione di guerra divenne uno spazio operativo di combattimento. Sorgono molte questioni legali, tra cui lo status delle macchine aeree dispiegate dai distaccamenti aerei indipendenti formatisi appena prima dello scoppio della Prima guerra mondiale. Dal punto di vista operativo e legale, sia la pratica degli Stati che gli esperti di diritto internazionale hanno convenuto che, per ricevere uno status simile a quello delle navi da guerra disciplinate della legge della guerra navale, gli aerei militari dovrebbero portare delle insegne distintive che indichino la loro natura militare e la loro nazionalità. L'obiettivo di questo articolo è quello di presentare le origini e l'evoluzione delle marcature militari e il loro significato legale, come elemento centrale della definizione di velivolo militare. Va sottolineato che solo gli aerei considerati militari possono compiere atti di ostilità ed esercitare i diritti specifici concessi dalla legge sulla guerra aerea. L’analisi farà riferimento alle sfide pratiche per il mantenimento delle regole classiche sulla guerra aerea, come l’esatta posizione delle marcature sulla superfice dell’aereo, le insegne a bassa visibilità (come modo per conciliare le esigenze legali ed operative) e la questione della rilevanza del dovere di marcatura dei velivoli militari nel contesto delle piattaforme aeree senza pilota. Die bahnbrechende Innovation der Gebrüder Wright im Jahr 1903 und die nachfolgenden Entwicklungen der Luftfahrttechnologie schufen bedeutende Möglichkeiten für den Militärbereich, da eine neue Dimension der Kriegsführung zu einem operativen Kampfraum wurde. Es stellen sich viele rechtliche Fragen, einschließlich jener des Status der Luft­maschinen, die von den neu gebildeten unabhängigen Luftkommandos vor dem Ausbruch des Ersten Weltkriegs eingesetzt wurden. Aus operativer und rechtlicher Sicht waren sich sowohl die staatliche Praxis als auch die internationalen Rechtsexperten einig, dass Militärflugzeuge Kennzeichen, die auf ihren militärischen Charakter und ihre Nationalität hinweisen, tragen sollten, um einen kriegsschiffähnlichen Status nach dem Recht der Seekriegsführung zu erhalten. Ziel dieses Artikels ist es, die Ursprünge und die Entwicklung der militärischen Kennzeichnungen und ihre rechtliche Bedeutung als Kernelement der Definition von Militärflugzeugen darzustellen. Es muss darauf hingewiesen werden, dass nur Flugzeuge, die als militärisch angesehen werden, feindliche Handlungen durchführen und die durch das Gesetz der Luftkriegsführung gewährten spezifischen Rechte ausüben können. Die Analyse wird sich auf praktische Herausforderungen für die Aufrechterhaltung des klassischen Gesetzes der Luftkriegsführung beziehen, wie die genaue Lage der Kennzeichen auf den Flugzeugoberflächen, Kennzeichen mit geringer Sichtbarkeit (als Mittel, rechtliche und operative Anforderungen miteinander in Einklang zu bringen) und die Frage der Relevanz der Pflicht zur Kennzeichnung militärischer Flugzeuge im Zusammenhang mit unbemannten Luftplattformen.

This article concerns an issue that has become increasingly relevant for international coalition forces participating in joint military operations abroad, viz. the duty to collect, document, record and secure evidence of serious violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights committed in armed conflicts. The point, simple as it seems, is that respect for justice and international humanitarian law requires that perpetrators of war crimes etc. be brought to justice. Yet prosecution and trial of these crimes cannot succeed without material proof and information that meet the standards for admission into evidence in criminal trials. However, judicial experience from international criminal trials suggests that much of the evidence produced in Court fails to meet this standard – and is therefore dismissed. The article highlights the need to secure evidence of these crimes and proposes five simple basic recommendations for military personnel who come across evidence of serious violations of international humanitarian law in armed conflicts: (1) be familiar with the elements of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression; (2) know the rules of the game regarding collection of evidence, including the duty to respect local norms and authorities and to follow any international rules or agreements, and the duty to comply with obligations to seek authorization for investigation from domestic authorities; (3) be careful in your registration and handling of evidence material; (4) be careful not to hurt yourself or others when you search for evidence; and (5) stay critical and impartial to all material and information you receive from others. Cet article aborde un problème que les forces armées des coalitions internationales rencontrent de plus en plus souvent lorsqu’elles participent à des opérations militaires conjointes à l’étranger: l’obligation de rassembler, de documenter, d’enregistrer et de garantir des preuves de violations graves du droit international humanitaire et des droits de l’homme lors de conflits armés. Aussi simple qu’il paraisse, le principe est le suivant: le respect de la justice et du droit international humanitaire implique que les auteurs de crimes de guerre et autres soient traduits en justice. Toutefois, les poursuites judiciaires et le procès qui s’ensuit ne peuvent aboutir sans preuves matérielles et informations qui répondent aux normes d’admission de la preuve dans les procès au pénal. L’expérience judiciaire de ces procès internationaux suggère néanmoins que bon nombre des preuves présentées au tribunal ne répondent pas à ces normes et sont dès lors rejetées. L’auteur insiste sur le besoin de fournir des preuves de ces crimes et propose cinq recommandations de base pour le personnel militaire qui aurait des preuves de violations graves du droit international humanitaire dans les conflits armés: (1) informez-vous sur les différents éléments qui composent le génocide, les crimes contre l’humanité, les crimes de guerre et les agressions; (2) connaissez les règles relatives au rassemblement de preuves, y compris le devoir de respecter les normes et autorités locales, de suivre les règles et accords internationaux, et de se conformer à l’obligation d’obtenir une autoris­ation des autorités nationales pour mener une enquête; (3) soyez prudents lorsque vous enregistrez et utilisez des éléments de preuve; (4) veillez à ne pas causer de tort aux autres ni à vous-même lorsque vous cherchez des preuves; et (5) restez critique et impartial lorsque vous recevez des informations d’autres personnes. Dit artikel bespreekt een kwestie die van toenemend belang is voor internationale coalitietroepen die deelnemen aan gezamenlijke militaire operaties in het buitenland, nl. de plicht om bewijs van ernstige schendingen van het internationaal humanitair recht (IHR) en van de mensenrechten in gewapende conflicten te verzamelen, te staven, vast te leggen en veilig te stellen. Het punt, hoe eenvoudig ook, is dat het respect voor de rechtspleging en het internationaal humanitair recht vereist dat de daders van oorlogsmisdaden enz. voor het gerecht worden gebracht. Toch kunnen deze misdaden niet succesvol vervolgd en berecht worden zonder materieel bewijs en informatie die voldoen aan de normen om als bewijs in strafprocessen te worden toegelaten. De ervaring uit internationale strafprocessen leert echter dat veel van het bewijsmateriaal dat in de rechtbank wordt aangedragen, niet aan deze norm voldoet – en daarom wordt verworpen. Het artikel benadrukt de noodzaak om het bewijs van deze misdaden veilig te stellen en stelt vijf eenvoudige basisaanbevelingen voor aan militairen die in gewapende conflicten bewijzen van ernstige schendingen van het internationaal humanitair recht aantreffen: (1) wees op de hoogte van de elementen van genocide, misdaden tegen de menselijkheid, oorlogsmisdaden en agressie; (2) ken de regels van het spel met betrekking tot het verzamelen van bewijs, met inbegrip van de plicht om de lokale normen en autoriteiten te respecteren en om alle internationale regels of overeenkomsten te volgen, evenals de plicht om te voldoen aan de verplichting dat aan binnenlandse autoriteiten toestemming moet worden gevraagd om een onderzoek in te stellen; (3) let op bij het registreren en behandelen van bewijsmateriaal; (4) zorg ervoor dat je jezelf of anderen geen schade berokkent wanneer je naar bewijs zoekt; en (5) blijf kritisch en onpartijdig ten opzichte van al het materiaal en de informatie die je van anderen ontvangt. El artículo aborda un problema que con el tiempo ha adquirido una importancia relevante para las fuerzas en coalición que participan en operaciones conjuntas en el exterior, tal cual es el deber de recoger, documentar, registrar y asegurar las pruebas de crímenes graves contra el Derecho Internacional Humanitario (DIH) y contra los derechos humanos cometidos en los conflictos armados. El asunto, tan simple como parece, es que el respeto por la justicia y el Derecho Internacional Humanitario exige que en definitiva los perpetradores de crímenes de guerra sean llevados ante la justicia. Sin embargo, la acusación y el enjuiciamiento de estos crímenes no pueden prosperar sin una prueba material e información que reúna los requisitos necesarios para ser admitida como prueba de cargo en juicios penales. Al hilo de esto, la experiencia judicial en procedimientos penales internacionales demuestra que muchas de estas pruebas presentadas ante un tribunal no cumplen con estos estándares y, por consiguiente, son rechazadas. El artículo resalta la necesidad de asegurar la prueba de estos crímenes y propone cinco recomendaciones básicas para el personal militar que deba requisar estas pruebas relativas a crímenes graves contra el Derecho Internacional Humanitario en conflictos armados: (1) Familiarizarse con los elementos constitutivos del crimen de genocidio, crímenes contra la humanidad, crímenes de guerra y crimen de agresión; (2) Conocer las reglas del juego relativas a la recogida de pruebas, incluido el deber de respetar las normas y a las autoridades locales y cualquier otra regla o acuerdo internacional, y el deber de cumplir con la obligación de solicitar autorización a las autoridades locales para llevar a cabo investigaciones; (3) Ser diligente en el registro y manejo de las pruebas materiales; (4) Tener cuidado de no dañarse o dañar a otros en la búsqueda de las pruebas; y (5) tener una actitud crítica e imparcial ante las pruebas e información que se reciba de otros. Questo articolo tratta di una questione che è diventata sempre più rilevante per le forze di coalizione internazionali che partecipano ad operazioni militari congiunte all’estero, vale a dire il dovere di raccogliere, documentare, registrare e mettere al sicuro le prove di gravi violazioni al diritto internazionale umanitario (IHL) e dei diritti umani commesse nei conflitti armati. Il punto, semplice come appare, è che il rispetto della giustizia e del diritto internazionale umanitario richiedono che gli autori di crimini di guerra etc. siano assicurati alla giustizia. Però l’azione penale e il processo per tali crimini non possono avere successo senza prove materiali e informazioni che soddisfino gli standard per l’ammissione come prova nei processi penali. Tuttavia, l’esperienza giudiziaria dei tribunali penali internazionali suggerisce che molte delle prove prodotte nei tribunali non soddisfano questi standard e perciò vengono respinte. Questo articolo evidenzia la necessità di garantire prove di questi crimini e propone cinque semplice raccomandazioni di base per il personale militare che si imbatte in prove di serie violazioni al diritto internazionale umanitario nei conflitti armati: (1) Conoscere gli elementi del genocidio, dei crimini contro l’umanità, dei crimini di guerra e dell’aggressione; (2) Conoscere le regole del gioco riguardo la raccolta delle prove, compreso il dovere di rispettare le norme e autorità locali e di seguire qualsiasi regola o accordo internazionale, e il dovere di rispettare gli obblighi di chiedere l’autorizzazione alle indagini alle autorità nazionali; (3) Fare attenzione nella registrazione e gestione del materiale probatorio; (4) Fare attenzione a non fare del male a se stessi od altri nella ricerca delle prove; e (5) Rimanere critici ed imparziali nei confronti di tutto il materiale e delle informazioni ricevute da altri. Dieser Artikel behandelt eine Angelegenheit, die für die Streitkräfte internationaler Koalitionen, die sich an gemeinsamen Militäreinsätzen im Ausland beteiligen, an Relevanz gewinnt, nämlich die Pflicht, Beweismittel schwerer Verletzungen des internationalen humanitären Rechts und internationaler Menschenrechte in bewaffneten Konflikten zu sammeln, zu dokumentieren, aufzuzeichnen und sicherzustellen. Der Kernpunkt, so einfach dieser scheinen mag, besteht darin, dass Respekt vor der Justiz und dem internationalen humanitären Recht erfordert, dass Täter von Kriegsverbrechen, usw. vor Gericht gebracht werden sollen. Dennoch können die Verfolgung und Ahndung dieser Verbrechen ohne materiellen Beweis und Informationen, die den Standards zur Zulassung als Beweismittel in Strafprozessen gerecht werden, nicht gelingen. Die gerichtliche Erfahrung internationaler Strafprozesse weist allerdings darauf hin, dass manche der dem Gericht unter­breiteten Beweise diesen Standards nicht gerecht werden, und somit abgewiesen werden. Der Autor unterstreicht, dass es notwendig ist, Beweise für diese Verbrechen sicher­zustellen, und schlägt fünf einfache Grundempfehlungen für Militärangehörige vor, die auf Beweise schwerer Verletzungen des internationalen humanitären Rechts in bewaffneten Konflikten stoßen: (1) Sorgen Sie dafür, dass Sie die Elemente des Genozids, der Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit, Kriegsverbrechen und Aggressionen kennen; (2) seien Sie mit den Spielregeln hinsichtlich der Sammlung von Beweisen vertraut, und dies einschließlich der Pflicht, örtliche Normen und Autoritäten zu respektieren, irgendwelche internationale Regeln oder Abkommen zu befolgen und die Verpflichtungen zu erfüllen, um die Genehmigung zur Durchführung von Ermittlungen von den Behörden des betreffenden Landes einzuholen; (3) seien Sie vorsichtig bei Ihrer Erfassung von bzw. Ihrem Umgang mit Beweismaterial; (4) sorgen Sie dafür, dass Sie sich selbst oder anderen keinen Schaden zufügen, wenn Sie nach Beweisen suchen; und (5) bleiben Sie kritisch und unvoreingenommen in Bezug auf all das Material und alle Informationen, die Sie von anderen erhalten.

RESUMEN El artículo examina el estado del diálogo convencional en Chile, tomando como referencia tres sentencias de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos que consideran igual número de problemas muy sensibles de nuestra transición a la democracia: nos referimos, en primer lugar, a la impugnación de la amnistía a las violaciones de derechos en dictadura; en segundo lugar, a la desmedida extensión de la competencia de los tribunales militares para juzgar civiles; y en tercer lugar, al conflicto mapuche a través de un proceso penal resuelto en lo convencional. Si bien el Estado ha asumido, en general, las obligaciones que le han impuesto las decisiones de la Corte, veremos que no lo ha hecho de manera oportuna, obediente y completa. Además, en lo interno está muy lejos de aplicar el control de convencionalidad en forma plena, es decir, desplazando la norma por la contenida en el pacto. Este es el mayor déficit que existe en el proceso de integración del Estado chileno a la jurisdicción de derechos humanos. ABSTRACT This article examines the state of the conventional dialogue in Chile, taking three sentences of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights as a reference by considering also three very sensitive problems of our transitions towards democracy: we refer, in the first place, to the impugnation to the human rights violation, to the excessive extension of the competence of the military courts for processing civilians, and to the Mapuche conflict through a legal process resolved conventionally. While it is true that the State has assumed, in general, the obligations imposed by the decisions of the court, it can be seen that it has not done it in a timely, appropriate and obedient manner. Furthermore, internally it is far from applying conventionality control completely, i.e., displacing the norm by that contained in the pact. This is the greatest deficit in the integration progress of the Chilean State to the Human Rights jurisdiction. RESUMO Este artigo analisa o estado do diálogo convencional no Chile tendo como referencia três sentenças da Comissão Interamericana de Direitos Humanos que consideran o mesmo número de problemas muito sensíveis da nossa transição à democracia: em primeiro lugar, faz-se referência à impugnação da anistia às violações de direitos na ditadura; em segundo, à extensão sem controle da competência dos tribunais militares para julgar civis; em terceiro lugar, ao conflito mapuche por meio de um processo penal resolvido no convencional. Embora o Estado tenha assumido, em geral, as obrigações que as decisões da Comissão lhe impuseram, vemos que não tem sido de maneira oportuna, obediente e completa. Além disso, no interno, está longe de aplicar o controle de convencionalidade de forma plena, isto é, substituindo a norma pela contida no pacto. Esta é a maior deficiência que existe no processo de integração do Estado chileno à jurisdição de Direitos Humanos.

On 12 November 1970, the Bhola Cyclone swept across the southern districts of East Pakistan, killing over 300,000 people. Small islands were swept away and dead bodies of humans and cattle lay strewn across the devastated landscape. Following the news of the destruction, journalists, students, artists, and political workers rushed to the affected area with basic relief supplies, without waiting for the Military Law Administration (MLA) to intervene. The cyclone's occurrence just three weeks prior to the first general elections in Pakistan added a new dimension to the already simmering political crisis. The extensive media coverage of the disaster brought the pitiful state of infrastructural development and lack of governance in East Pakistan under local and global scrutiny. The cyclone and the corresponding issues soon became embroiled within the larger political demand for regional autonomy. The MLA came under attack from sections of East Pakistan's politicians, press, and public, as well as international political actors, for its poor disaster governance. This article uses the Bhola Cyclone of 1970 as the lens to explore the complex interconnections between environmental disasters and a key issue of governance. While the Bhola Cyclone has been a subject of recent discussions, this article uses a disaster-politics analytical framework to understand the disaster's role in the subsequent political turbulence and the emergence of Bangladesh. Ministry of Education (MOE) National Research Foundation (NRF) Published version

A Magyar Katonai Jogi és Hadijogi Társaság (MKJHT) több mint 20 éve foglalkozik a szélesebb értelemben vett honvédelmi jog fejlesztésével, a szakterületen felmerülő jogtörténeti, jogi kérdések tudományos igényű elemzésével, kutatásával, a honvédelem szempontjából releváns szakmai rendezvények szervezésével, kiadványok és publikációk készítésével, ezek támogatásával.1 2019. november 19-én az MKJHT kezdeményezésére a Nemzeti Közszolgálati Egyetem Hadtudományi és Honvédtisztképző Kar közös szervezésében került sor „A honvédelmi jog és igazgatás aktuális kérdései” című konferencia megrendezésére, melynek keretében az MKJHT tagjai és felkért szakértők vitatták meg többek között a hibrid fenyegetések kezelésének lehetséges aspektusait közjogi, nemzetbiztonsági, rendszertani és komplex biztonsági megközelítésben. A Honvédségi Szemle jelen számának tematikus blokkja a konferencia előadói által ismertetett gondolatokat villantja fel. Az MKJHT elnökeként arra biztatom a Tisztelt Olvasót, hogy a tárgyban folytatódjon a további gondolkodás, amihez fórumként felajánlom a www.hadijog.hu felületét.

The article deals with the substantive aspects of military law as a specific area of regulation of military relations. The main attention is paid to the coverage and generalization of theoretical positions of achievements of scientists and practitioners in this field, as well as a critical analysis of existing methodological approaches and conclusions concerning the identification and justification of the laws of military law. The thesis about the priority of the military and defense component of military law as its main substantive factor, which, in fact, should determine the legal paradigm of the military phenomenon, is put forward and substantiated.

Many publications are devoted to the identification of social conditionality of criminal regulations. However, the science of criminal law does not have any comprehensive research on the social conditionality of establishing criminal responsibility and punishment for military personnel. In this regard, its essence, features and criteria for identification remain practically unknown. The paper reveals the problematic aspects of the concept and meaning of social conditionality of establishing criminal responsibility and punishment for military personnel; the author’s definition is given. Based on the widespread opinion in the theory of criminal law that the mechanism for identifying this social condition consists of criteria that are studied by the legislator at the appropriate stages of the processes of criminalization (decriminalization) and penalization (depenalization) of military socially dangerous acts, the author analyses them in detail. The problem of ways of legal regulation of criminal responsibility and punishment of military personnel is touched upon. It is stated that the peculiarity of the definition of this social conditionality is the resolution by the legislator, among other dilemmas, of the question of the need for normative fixing of a special military or ordinary prohibition and (or) fixing of the corresponding special military regulationsin the general part of the Criminal Law.The author concludes that the identification of social conditionality of the criminal-normative prescription on responsibility and punishment of military personnel is one of the important tasks of modern science of criminal law, which necessitates the development of a unified approach to the structure and content of this process. The establishment of the theoretical and legal essence of this conditionality should be considered as the most important step in this direction. The author offers the following definition. It is the compliance of criminal regulations that establish responsibility and punishment for criminal behavior of military personnel, resulting from the demand of society in the objective need for criminal law protection of military law and order and other public relations that are most important for the individual, society and the state.

The research aims to demonstrate the configuration of the Military Justice of Santa Catarina and its adequacy to the precepts of Law no. 13.491/2017. To this end, it seeks to clarify the historical formation of Military Justice within the scope of the Union and to specify the peculiarities of State Military Courts, in particular, the Santa Catarina State Military Justice. More restrictively, it is intended to demonstrate how the Santa Catarina military justice has adapted to the precepts brought by the new legislation. In the end, it was found that the news of the federal law brought new challenges to the military justice of Santa Catarina, making it reconfigure due to the expansion of the competence to investigate crimes committed in service by state police (military) personnel. The research uses the inductive method, based on bibliographic and documentary research and, as a procedural method, the monographic one.

O presente artigo analisa as competências da Justiça militar, de acordo com o Código Penal Militar, identificando a sua aplicabilidade. Sabe-se que a lei militar é aquela que determina direitos e deveres dos militares, distinguindo-se do Código Penal Comum. Surge a necessidade de refletir sobre o Direito Penal na área militar, verificando quais são os crimes militares e como é realizado o procedimento de investigação e de aplicação da pena, nesses casos. O direito penal militar pode ser entendido como um conjunto de normas que elencam os crimes militares, bem como as penas aplicadas para assegurar o bem estar e a ordem jurídica da instituição. Através de pesquisa bibliográfica, busca-se compreender como a justiça militar atua no Brasil. Com a Lei nº 13.491 de 13 de outubro de 2017, houve a ampliação dos crimes militares. Daí a importância de compreender e estudar a competência da Justiça Militar e o que diz o Código Penal Militar sobre a temática.

The treatment of draft dodgers and miscarriages of justice by Argentine military courts provoked mobilisations by families, communities and the major political parties. An examination of the debates and discussions around these issues reveals a widespread sentiment that rarely questioned neither the right of the armed forces to draft young men nor the legitimacy of the armed forces. By adopting the language of patriotism and civic obligation, individual and community petitioners and politicians who represented them challenged the state's broad claim of power over the bodies of young men from a reformist position. Military justice formed a critical platform through which citizens debated the meaning of citizenship and the place of the armed forces in society.

From August 1994 until February 1995 I served as an Australian Defence Force legal officer with the Australian Medical Support Force which was a component of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda. During this deployment three duties I engaged with still stand out for me 25 years later: investigating the mass grave site at Ntarama, the use of force to defend the mandate and individual self-defence, and detention. This paper, in large part, engages with my reflections of these issues in the context of my military law practice, and academic research and writing. I conclude by making six observations from my experiences in Rwanda.

In the article raises the question of the expediency of the existence of military courts within the judicial system of the Russian Federation. The author analyzes the judicial burden on judges, their current status and the location of courts, which gives him grounds to argue about the possibility of abolishing military courts.

У статті, з урахуванням історичного аспекту проблеми та міжнародного досвіду, розкрито організаційні та функціональні особливості здійснення судової та правоохоронної діяльності у Збройних Силах України. Підкреслено, що оборонна міць збройних сил визначається не тільки кількістю військовослужбовців, рівнем їх професіоналізму та майстерності, якістю військової техніки. Боєздатність військових частин та з'єднань напряму залежить від стану законності та правопорядку в них. Тому міжнародний досвід свідчить про те, що у більшості розвинутих країн, які мають сучасні збройні сили і які у той же час відомі своїми демократичними традиціями (США, Великобританія, Франція, Канада, Іспанія – всього близько 40) органи військової юстиції успішно діють і виконують завдання по зміцненню військової дисципліни та правопорядку. Постійним Комітетом Ради Європи з прав людини (м. Страсбург) у червні 2003 р. була взагалі визначена потреба органів військової юстиції, а щодо військових судів висловлена думка про те, що їх наявність в країні не суперечить Конвенції про захист прав людини і її основоположних свобод, а також зобов'язанням держав, які підписали цю конвенцію. Зазначено, що військові суди можуть бути визнані незалежними і неупередженими судами. Звертається увага на те, що в Україні, в умовах раніше – антитерористичної операції, а зараз – операції об'єднаних сил, а фактично проведенні реальних бойових дій на певних територіях країни, нажаль, йде процес ліквідації органів військової юстиції. Так, військові суди були ліквідовані ще у 2010 році, й до цього часу не відновлені, хоча це питання вирішувалося на всіх необхідних рівнях органів державної влади, військові прокуратури зараз на межі ліквідації. У наявності лише органи Військової служби правопорядку, але з вельми обмеженими повноваженнями, виключно профілактичної спрямованості. Наведені аргументи на користь подальшого реформування військової юстиції у Збройних Силах України, з формуваннями спеціалізованих судових і правоохоронних органів, а саме, їх тріади у складі: військових судів, військової прокуратури та органів Військової служби правопорядку (у майбутньому – військової поліції). Тільки у такому разі буде реально забезпечений належний рівень законності, правопорядку та військової дисципліни у Збройних Силах України.

The statute states that the provision of theoretical and legal ambushes for the functioning of the military justice bodies in the sphere of service and combat activity of the law enforcement forces is currently relevant.By means of the statutes is the pre-ambush of the functions of the military justice bodies in the sphere of military service of the law enforcement forces and the establishment and consolidation of the organizational theoretical and legal basis of the legal basis for the normative and legal basisThe reasons for the creation of military justice are the following: the numerical increase in offenses and crimes among servicemen of the Armed Forces and other military formations of Ukraine (law enforcement forces); distribution of weapons from certain districts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions to the rest of territory of Ukraine; incompetence of civil courts and the prosecutor's office in the efficient and prompt consideration and resolution of military cases; lack of professional bodies of inquiry and investigation in the military sphere; low efficiency of the existing organizational and legal mechanism for prevention, detection and investigation of war crimes, etc.The theory of service and combat efficiency of the law enforcement forces of Ukraine is apparently safe in the young science, and from now on, not in the new world, a system of subordinate rights of protection has been formed. For the results of the conducted advancement to the warehouse of forces, law enforcement, you can add the organizers of the military justice of Ukraine. The mechanisms of the formation of the military justice bodies are based on the already existing national legislation and the specifics of the service and combat activity of the law enforcement forces.The submitted scientific developments will be directed to the more detailed normative and legal regulation of the functioning of the military justice bodies in the sphere of service and combat activity of the law enforcement forces.