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The debate around "fake news" has raised the question of whether liberals and conservatives differ, first, in their ability to discern true from false information, and second, in their tendency to give more credit to information that is ideologically congruent. Typical designs to measure these asymmetries select, often arbitrarily, a small set of news items as experimental stimuli without clear reference to a "population of information." This pre-registered study takes an alternative approach by, first, conceptualizing estimands in relation to all political news. Second, to represent this target population, it uses a set of 80 randomly sampled items from a large collection of articles from Google News and three fact-checking sites. In a subsequent survey, a quota sample of US participants (n = 1,393) indicate whether they believe the news items to be true. Conservatives are less truth-discerning than liberals, but also less affected by the congruence of news. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Relying on feelings to guide thoughts and plans may be functional from the perspective of the individual but threaten the cohesion of social groups. Thus, liberals, who prioritize caring and fairness for individuals, may view emotion as more functional than do conservatives, who prioritize preserving social groups, hierarchies, and institutions. To test this, participants in three studies (total N = 1,355) rated political partisanship, beliefs about the functionality of emotion, and well-being. Study 3 also assessed how much participants prioritized "individualizing" versus "socially binding" values (Graham et al., 2011). Across all studies, the more liberal participants were, the more they viewed emotion as functional, despite reporting less emotional well-being. In Study 3, the link between liberalism and valuing emotion was mediated by more liberal participants' greater endorsement of individualizing than socially binding values. These results suggest that emotion is viewed as more functional by those who prioritize the needs of individuals, but as less functional by those who prioritize the cohesion of social groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Soliciting charitable giving is a day-to-day challenge for nonprofit organizations (NPOs); thus, scholars and practitioners are increasingly looking for reliable and practical segmentation variables that NPOs can use to optimize their communication to potential donors. The present research examines how the sociocultural dimension of a political orientation may affect their donations according to the communication framing used by an NPO. Combining secondary field data and experiments, we highlight approach–avoidance motivations as a relevant framework for NPOs in adapting their communication to the political orientation of their audience. This research contributes to the existing literature by highlighting the conditions under which liberals and conservatives may donate more. We show the efficacy of approach-based framing for liberals and avoidance-based framing for conservatives. We also point out the influence of the perceived proximity of the beneficiaries and the degree of social justice associated with the cause according to the political orientation of donors. This article provides strong insight for NPOs to segment, adapt, and improve their communication with their audience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous research suggests that conservatives (right-wingers) tend to show more negativity bias than liberals (left-wingers) in several tasks. However, the majority of these studies are based on correlational findings and do not provide information on the cognitive underpinnings of this tendency. The current research investigated whether intuition promotes negativity bias and mitigates the ideological asymmetry in this domain in three underrepresented, non-western samples (Turkey). In line with the previous literature, we defined negativity bias as the tendency to interpret ambiguous faces as threatening. The results of the lab experiment revealed that negativity bias increases under high-cognitive load overall. In addition, this effect was moderated by the participants' political orientation (Experiment 1). In other words, when their cognitive resources were depleted, liberals became more like conservatives in terms of negativity bias. However, we failed to conceptually replicate this effect using time-limit manipulations in two online preregistered experiments during the COVID-19 pandemic, where the baseline negativity bias is thought to be already at peak. Thus, the findings provide no strong evidence for the idea that intuition promotes negativity bias and that liberals use cognitive effort to avoid this perceptual bias. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To successfully battle climate change, it is crucial to reach people across political camps and national borders. Research from dual-party systems indicates that climate change communication is most effective when it addresses how climate action promotes recipients' political values. Yet, to our knowledge, there is no such evidence from multi-party systems. To fill this gap, we conducted three studies in two Central European, German-speaking countries: Germany and Austria. In Study 1, we framed conservative and liberal climate protection messages using values from Schwartz's Theory of Basic Human Values. Liberals agreed more with the liberally framed than with the conservatively framed climate protection message. In Study 2, we framed the climate protection message based on moral foundations. Conservative participants agreed more with the conservatively framed climate protection message than with the liberally framed one. Study 3 integrated values from multiple frameworks, and ultimately conservatives as well as liberals agreed more to climate protection statements that touched on values reflecting their political ideology. Thus, empirical findings from dual-party systems hold for countries with more than two parties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In five separate chapters Cherniss examines the work of Max Weber, Albert Camus, Raymond Aron, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Isaiah Berlin, all giants of liberal political thought because of their piercing theoretical analyses. In I Liberalism in Dark Times i , an important, impressive and well documented book, Joshua Cherniss, associate professor of government at Georgetown University, focuses on an aspect of liberal theory that tends to not get very much attention, a gap that he thoroughly and satisfactorily addresses. The problem is that modern, Hobbesian, capitalist, excessively self-regarding liberalism has made the nurture and development of a liberal character a most difficult goal to attain.[9] Contemporary liberal culture does not necessarily promote "the habits and ideals of civility, empathy, fortitude, self-restraint, solidarity, circumspection, respect for nuance and for others" (211) that the five featured tempered liberals (and, at heart, I all i liberals of whatever stripe) would really want. Cherniss then distinguishes tempered liberalism from other forms of liberalism such as the "justificatory or architectonic" liberal egalitarian theories of John Rawls, from those who prefer to achieve liberal ends through institutional restraint and balance of powers, or from the laissez-faire economic approach of the neo-liberals. [Extracted from the article]

Copyright of Historia is the property of Historical Association of South Africa and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The Spanish civil war saw two different Liberal presidencies in Colombia. Contrary to common belief, they did not follow a unified policy towards Spain but instead faced different parameters for action which shaped their response. These policies, in turn, illuminate both the internal dynamics of the two administrations and how they conceived of Colombia's position on the world stage. By providing the national, international and wider structural contexts, this article will therefore use the Spanish conflict to shine a spotlight on the Santos and López governments and the development of Colombian foreign policy during the late 1930s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Liberal party dominated nineteenth century Scottish political life, but the Irish Home Rule crisis of 1886 inflicted damage from which it would never fully recover. This article draws on the author's study of the hundreds of constituency meetings at which the Irish question was discussed in the spring of 1886, the volume and intensity of which heightened and maintained the sense of crisis outside parliament, raised awareness of the policy locally and helped identify its supporters and opponents. These meetings are indicative of the imperative Scottish Liberals felt to discuss Home Rule and declare opinion thereon, and of the conflicting interpretations which emerged of what such opinion meant, what it was worth and who it represented. The crisis arrived at a time of intense Liberal disagreement over the purpose of party organisation and its relationship to 'Scottish opinion', and revealed both a remarkable degree of division within local party associations and a lively debating culture within the constituencies. Examining the relationship between Home Rule and party organisation prompts questions about the cohesion and coherence of 'Liberal Scotland' at both local and national levels. This article reveals the conditional character of party loyalty on Home Rule and the depth and breadth of the split in Scotland. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article challenges the existing scholarship's characterisation of Chinese liberal intellectuals as Trumpian intellectuals. By conducting a close reading of Chinese academic publications, lectures and opinions aired on social media, this article finds that besides Trump's Chinese liberal fans, many leading Chinese liberal intellectuals harshly criticised Trump. However, they do not align themselves with American liberals in making all-out partisan criticisms of Trump and American right-wing politics. Instead, their criticisms are mostly centrist. This article argues that Chinese liberal intellectuals' centrist criticisms of Trump reflect their Confucian, egalitarian and moderate nationalist sympathies, dimensions of their thoughts which have been ignored by existing scholarship regarding them. By exploring Chinese centrist liberal critics of Trump, this article brings to light the ideological heterogeneity within the Chinese liberal camp previously lumped together under the umbrella of "anti-authoritarianism." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A major broadcaster on both radio and television, Eric Sevareid published a memoir of his youth and wartime experiences in 1946. Not So Wild a Dream devoted considerable attention to the complicated emotional registers of male identity. The tensions between physical and mental labour, the revelation or concealment of personal feelings and the relationship between individual autonomy and community responsibility suffused Sevareid's recollections of youth and early manhood. The situational quality of his masculinity and the confessional imperative of his life writing contributes to the complex hermeneutics and intersectionalities of gender and history. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the limited impact of the American Civil War on British Liberal policy makers, focusing on the challenges faced by the Liberal Party during the period of 1855-1885. It examines topics such as the Crimean War, debates over electoral reform, the Irish Question, and the settling of the Alabama claims, suggesting that the American Civil War had minimal influence on British thinking and policymaking.

This article asserts that the main polarity that structures the controversy around Islam and its followers in France is the one that opposes the proponents of the liberal motive—that is to say, of a strictly individualistic perspective that does not consider the historical links constituted within the society—to those of the conservative motive—which postulate the strong thesis of the existence of a coordinated conspiracy of the Muslims. The main point of contention is thus the qualification of the main point of contention is the characterization of collective experiences in modern society, denied by some and reified by others. The shift from the fight against radicalization to the anti-separatism apparatus can be understood as the passage from a liberal moment—discursively based on the repression of deviant individuals—to an ongoing conservative one where the Muslim community is explicitly incriminated as an inadequacy within the liberal and secular society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article makes a first approximation to the electoral participation of liberals in Spain. Using the CIS monthly barometers and covering the period of a decade from 2010 to 2020, we analyze whether liberal ideology has influenced electoral participation. The logistic regression analyses employed include ideology in addition to other socioeconomic, attitudinal and conjunctural aspects as control variables. The results show that liberal voters have a lower electoral participation that is directly attributed to their ideological affiliation. For the elections studied, the differential behavior associated with liberal ideology is robustly maintained even after the self-placement on the left-right axis --namely, the metric traditionally used to approximate the effect of ideology-- is included in the model. This greater abstentionism associated with liberal ideology does not seem to be entirely explained by the greater distrust in political institutions that these voters tend to show. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Historical works written during The Reform and the Second Mexican Empire, as well as their discussion in the press are significant for the construction of the modern Mexican State. This text analyses the reception in the newspapers of a corpus of representative historical works published between 1856 and 1874 by liberals and conservatives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mass attitudes in a monarchy context are understudied relative to those in advanced and new democracies. By employing the case of a monarchy enclave in Yogyakarta province, Indonesia, this article tries to uncover mass attitudes towards democracy in such a setting. It is based on public opinion surveys conducted by PolGov Universitas Gadjah Mada with 2181 respondents. The study finds a strong existence of obedient liberals, i.e. people who believe in liberal views and embrace values of self-expression but are proud of having a non-democratic political system. While this distinguished attitude revisits Almond and Verba's allegiant citizens, this article aligns with the revisionists of the civic culture model by arguing that a political regime, i.e. the monarchy enclave, helps pave the way for the presence and persistence of obedient-liberal mass attitudes. This distinct mass attitude in turn explains how the monarchy enclave has survived for decades. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research Summary: CEOs increasingly engage in activism on controversial social and political issues that do not directly affect their core business. Simultaneously, the general public is increasingly politically polarized. We examine how CEOs' support for gun control after two mass shootings differentially affected the behavior of liberal and conservative consumers and the persistence of these effects. Using mobile phone location data to measure store‐level visits, we find (a) consumer visits to stores decreased by 3%; (b) this decrease was asymmetric: visits in the most conservative counties decreased by about 5% but did not change in the most liberal counties; and (c) these effects dissipated within 10 weeks after activism. Our results highlight the strategic implications for executives pressured to take stances on controversial issues. Managerial Summary: We study how consumers respond to CEO support for gun control, and how consumers' partisan views influence their behavior. Visits to the stores of several major retailers declined about 3% in the 4 weeks after their CEOs supported expanding background checks for gun purchases. In the most liberal counties, visits did not change following CEO support for gun control, while in the most conservative counties visits declined about 5%. Hence, the reaction of liberal consumers did not counteract the reaction of conservative consumers. We find, however, that these effects dissipated within 10 weeks; as a result, retailers whose CEOs supported gun control did not experience any long‐term, net decrease in sales despite the short‐term sales decrease in conservative counties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Our article describes how users' decisions to share content alter the frequencies of the frame elements observed by social media peers. Changes in the frequency of distinct frame elements shape how individuals interpret, classify and define situations and events. We label this process Network Activated Frames (NAFs). We test the mechanisms behind NAF with an original image-based conjoint design that replicates network activation in three surveys. Results show that partisans share more content than nonpartisans and that their preferences differ from those of nonpartisans. Our findings show that a network of peers with cross-cutting ideological preferences may be perceived as a bubble if partisans amplify content they like at higher rates. Beginning with fully randomized probabilities, the output from our experiments is more extreme than the preferences of the median users, as partisans activate more and different frame elements than nonpartisans. We implement the experiments in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Singapore has been called a state that has "disavowed" liberalism. However, a number of liberals have emerged who see political freedoms as essential to achieve accountable government that acts in the general interest. They draw on an institutional foundation that has been deeply shaped by liberalism while the rejection of liberalism is not based on an ideological alternative. Instead, it is portrayed as a necessity because citizens are told they need to sacrifice freedoms in exchange for economic growth and political stability due to the many vulnerabilities of a small, multi-ethnic country. Over the years, as the city-state became more developed and more secure, the government has liberalized some aspects, although often followed by greater restrictions. Two types of liberals have emerged, one seeking to change the system from the outside, the other advocating for political reform from within. However, both have been unsuccessful as the ruling party has sidelined liberal voices within the party and increasingly insists on the need for illiberal authoritarian rule. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous research suggests that, compared to regular news, satirical news has its own frame repertoire, which differs by outlet characteristics (e.g. medium type, political leaning). We analyzed two large corpora of satirical and regular news: television show episodes (8,925,180 words) and online written articles (64,301,669 words) of liberal and conservative outlets for character, emotional, and moral framing. Contrary to expectations, findings revealed consistent framing differences between the satirical and regular news genres, which were not moderated by medium type or political leaning. Thereby, this study shows how genre-level frame repertoires can offer deeper insights into cross-genre differences in news coverage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We are living in a time when conspiracy theories have never been more maligned by those who occupy the centre ground of politics. Liberal critics and journalists accuse conspiracy theorists to their left and right of paranoia, irresponsibly excessive rhetoric, and fallacies such as strawtargeting, 'anomaly hunting' and 'determined flexibility'. At the same time, major liberal institutions from the BBC to CNN emphasise the risks that such conspiracy theories pose to public order, safety and trust - and to the very future of what they call 'our democracy'. However, we argue that many of the same threats, flaws and fallacies have characterised hegemonic liberal analyses of contentious recent political events in the West from Trumpgate to the British Labour Party's anti-Semitism 'crisis'. With a proclivity for ad hominems, deliberate misrepresentations of evidence and other dubious methods, liberal conspiracy theories have had harmful societal impacts such as discrediting progressive political movements and fanning the flames of war. These are arguably consequences of greater magnitude than those resulting from right-wing conspiracism. Moreover, we show that centrist conspiracy theories often involve the implementation of genuine conspiracies against anti-establishment figures such as Donald Trump and Jeremy Corbyn. Despite the empirical existence of such conspiracies, we conclude by suggesting that the historical materialist critique of social reality has considerably more explanatory power than the conspiracist analytic. To demonstrate this we point to an epistemological weakness at the heart of liberal thought dating back at least to Thomas Carlyle's 'Great Man Theory of History' that, much like the marginal conspiracy theories liberals condemn, involves a vast exaggeration of the role of individual agency and intentionality - and covert interpersonal relationships particularly - in determining social, economic and political affairs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author explains the influence of the biography former U.S. Supreme Court Associate Justice Byron R. White, titled "The Man That Once Was Whizzer White," on the shaping of her research, scholarship and teaching career. She explains how the destruction of White's papers propelled her into archival research and the lessons she learned about the judicial appointment process. She discusses the problem associated with labeling White as liberal and/or conservative and his political values.

Political liberals hold that the exercise of state power is legitimate only if it can be publicly justified—justified on the basis of public reasons. Many find this requirement too demanding and propose instead that there are just pro tanto reasons for laws and policies to be publicly justified. Here I argue that this alternative proposal fails to recognize that there are also distinct pro tanto reasons to have institutional requirements that laws and policies are publicly justified. This suggests an intermediate position between political liberals and their critics, which holds that states have reasons to adopt the kinds of institutions that political liberals favor—institutions that require public justification—but whether they should do so will depend on the costs and benefits of those institutions. This allows for a more practical approach to public justification by focusing on its application in particular political contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Current orthodoxy takes representation to be essential to computation. However, a philosophical account of computation that does not appeal to representation would be useful, given the difficulties involved in successfully theorizing representation. Piccinini's recent mechanistic account of computation proposes to do just that: it couches computation in terms of what certain mechanisms do without requiring the manipulation or processing of representations whatsoever (Piccinini 2015). Most crucially, mechanisms must process medium-independent vehicles. There are two ways to understand what "medium-independence" means on this account; however, on either understanding, the account fails. Either too many things end up being counted as computational, or purportedly natural computations (e.g., neural computations) cannot be counted at all. In the end, illustrating this failure sheds some light on the way to revise the orthodoxy in the hope of a better account of computation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes the intense controversy generated by the coup d'etat given by President Ignacio Comonfort and his closest collaborators, on December 17, 1857. The objective is to review some of the interpretative lines of this failed political movement, which began the so-called War of Reform, facing "liberals" against "conservatives" for 3 years. Particularly, through archival sources, press and pamphlets, elements are proposed that respond to some of the reasons that protagonists of the event had, specifically Juan José Baz, to convince the President to promote the movement and abandon it once initiated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines what the author calls 'the dispute about words and things': that is, the Mid-Nineteenth Century international debate on the location of Spanish American ideas and Neogranadan Liberalism (1849-1853). The debate sought to define the position occupied by European ideas in Spanish America and its correspondence, or lack thereof, with the continent's reality. The dispute's principal arguments are organized and unpacked via the comparison and juxtaposition of manifold primary sources such as periodicals and pamphlets: it analyzes how European ideas in Spanish America were accused of being (1) extemporaneous, (2) artificial and (3) potentially barbarous and bloody, before inspecting (4) the reasoned replies wielded by the Neogranadan Liberals, forced to refute their critics and re-think their peculiar position as Spanish American intellectuals. The text offers a structured introduction to a very complex, and still present ad vital, debate in which many actors intervened; and it contributes to Spanish American Intellectual History exploring how it was conceived, invisibilized and legitimated during a crucial juncture -the 1850's- characterized by rising imperialism, a vague consolidation of a 'Latin American conscience' and vigorous political and social mobilization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Bylye Gody is the property of Cherkas Global University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Tabayyun is the property of Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Choosing a subject on the uprising of 1888 reflected in the modern press at that time, an important moment according both to its magnitude and deep social, economic and political results, derived from my concern on immersing in the time atmosphere through the sources, namely through the mean of some autochtone and foreign publications in this case. This scientific approach aimed to analyze every moment of the event, the different political orientation of the publications contributing to improving the researcher's perception and gradating his conclusions. In order to cover as large as possible the subject, I selected the different points of view from the papers to present the importance they gave to one or other of the subjects in the economy of the field, reflecting the ratio the contemporaries had given to them, as we might note on the elements that had contributed to tension the rural environment and to that uprising. My attention was kept by the compassion the main part of the journalists manifested with concern with the peasants'situation, and also their perseverance in trying to identify the liberal or conservative politicians to have been responsible with the situation; I did not omitted to mention the conspiracy theories which called the foreign agents for the main factors in triggering the revolt. The papers at the time payed attention also to the authorities involvement in re-normalizing the situation, their measures being an opportunity to sensibilize the readers both with detalied and moving descriptions of the excesive soldiers'gestures and the victims'pains. There were also journalists to resonate with the politicians'reason according to which the re-establishing of previous order was indispensable to implemnt the reforms that would have solutionate the rural space, where a large amount of people, in a country with 80% rural inhabitants, confronted with lack or insuficiency of land, their main means of survival. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many employees want to either retain their jobs or attain promotion. In doing so, they remain silent and conform to all the decisions taken by the top management. Most studies have treated the causes of this silence as unobserved intervening mechanisms and named them black boxes. The current study therefore, aims to explore those unobserved psychological characteristics of employees. More specifically, it examines the employee’s psychological ideology, namely liberalism and conservatism in affecting commitment to status quo mediated by employee silence and moderated by social dominance. This study proposes that employee ideologies (liberalism and conservatism) affect their voicing behaviour and ultimately their resistance or acceptance to the status quo. Data from 219 faculty members from different universities in Karachi, Pakistan was gathered. The study hypothesised that liberals will tend to voice their opinions and resist the managements status quo while conservatives tend not to voice their opinions and endorse status quo, and they accept management’s decision and will not question their actions. The results showed that liberals have an indirect relationship with silence, namely they do not remain silent. Additionally, silence had an indirect relationship with status quo. Even though they are silent it does not mean they endorse status quo. Further, it was found that silence mediates the relationship between liberals and commitment to status quo. t was also found that conservatives also endorsed status quo but there was no relationship between conservatives and silence. Further, silence did not mediate the relationship between conservatives and status quo. Moreover, social dominance orientation strengthens or moderates the relationship between silence and status quo. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Historia y Comunicación Social is the property of Universidad Complutense de Madrid and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of HiSTOReLo: Revista de Historia Regional y Local is the property of Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Centro Editorial Facultad de Ciencias Humanas y Economicas and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article focuses on the historical context of economic determinism and its impact on the global spread of liberal democracy. Topics include the disappointments in China's political trajectory, the historical roots of placing economics at the center of individual and collective lives in liberal traditions, and the unintended consequences of rapid industrialization and globalization on the economy's disembedding from societal structures.

Though organizations are increasingly active participants in the political realm, little research has investigated how an organization's heightened focus on political ideology impacts employees. We address this gap by exploring how an individual's political ideological misfit with an organization's prevailing ideology impacts departure. By tracking the movements of over 40,000 investment professionals in the U.S. private equity industry over 10 years, we investigate the consequences of the ideological misfit that arises when individuals' political ideologies diverge substantially from the prevailing ideology of their firms. We hypothesize that ideological misfit increases the likelihood of departure, though the effects vary with liberal or conservative ideological orientation. Polynomial regression analyses reveal that the fit relationship between individual and organizational political ideology deviates from the idealized congruence relationship that underlies prevailing theory. Specifically, we find that departure is more likely for employees experiencing conservative misfit (a personal ideology more conservative than the firm's) versus liberal misfit (a personal ideology more liberal than the firm's). Conservatives are more likely to depart than liberals regardless of fit, and departing misfits tend to join new organizations that are closer to their own ideology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research distinguishes between the goal of maintaining status and advancing status and investigates how consumers' political ideology triggers sensitivity to a status-maintenance (vs. status-advancement) goal, subsequently altering luxury consumption. Because conservative political ideology increases the preference for social stability, the authors propose that conservatives (vs. liberals) are more sensitive to status maintenance (but not status advancement) and thus exhibit a greater desire for luxury goods when the status-maintenance goal is activated. Six studies assessing status maintenance using sociodemographic characteristics (Studies 1, 2, and 3a) and controlled manipulations, including ad framing (Study 3b) and semantic priming (Studies 4 and 5), provide support for this proposition. The studies show that the effect is specific to status maintenance and does not occur (1) in the absence of a status goal or (2) when the status-advancement goal (a focus on increasing status) is activated. Overall, the findings reveal that conservatives' desire for luxury goods stems from the goal of maintaining status and offer insights into how luxury brands can effectively tailor their communications to audiences with a conservative ideology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The communication presented, on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the enthronement of Alba Iulia, wishes a tribute and pious gratitude to King Ferdinand and the politician of deep patriotic resonance, who was for almost 15 years the president of the Conservative Party – Alexandru Marghiloman. Both the king and the true conservative politician were animated in the years of the First World War, by a special perseverance to fulfill the great desideratum of the full unification of all Romanian territories and the creation of Great România. The “unifying” king, closely advised by a competent chamberlain, I would say, who had at his top the incomparable liberal leader I.I.C. Brătianu and Queen Maria. Even if he did not excel in the specific skills of a true political leader, being more inclined to scientific and cultural concerns, King Ferdinand knew how to choose his advisers and engage them in the fulfillment of national ideals. Such was the case of Alexandru Marghiloman, who, due to his special abilities, was elected by I.I.C. Brătianu and proposed to the king to form a government that would treat and conclude peace with the Central Powers, when the country was in great danger, in the spring of 1916. In our paper, we insisted on the most realistic presentation of the way in which Alexandru Marghiloman and his team acted to save the country, but especially of those measures and actions taken under the conditions of concluding the armistice and signing the separate capitulation by the defeated Central Powers. I also insisted on a more realistic presentation of the two personalities of the time, who also left their mark on the front page of what would become, through the joint efforts of the sovereign, also of the president of the Conservative Party, Greater Romania.

The Swedish Liberal Party chose a new leader in 2019. It was, in some ways, typical of leader selection in Sweden. It featured an elaborate, institutionalised and yet only semi-public form of “precursory delegation,” in which aspiring leaders are filtered by a “steering agent” on behalf of the party's main power centres. In other ways, though, the process was unusually conflictual and produced an unexpected result, which had considerable consequences for the party and for Swedish politics. Moreover, the selection involved the breakdown of a long-established procedure for leader selection in the party. We seek to explain this deviant case. We emphasise an unexpected cascade of decisions by regional party branches to hold membership ballots on the leadership candidates. This event, we argue, was critical for the outcome. We also suggest a causal mechanism, a shifting perception of procedural legitimacy, that facilitated the outcome—a mechanism that could be useful in understanding leader selection and moments of party change more generally.

The article discusses the link between the future of liberal order and the future of higher education in the U.S. It states that liberal scholars preserve the tradition that enables the existence of an open university. It highlights that the university itself sustains its own liberal values, despite the freedom enjoyed by any individual intellectual movement or scholar to find options to the liberal tradition.

She then raises the possibility that liberal theory "may be appropriate for some sex offenses - most notably, sexual assault or rape", but inadequate to explain other kinds of offenses within the "heterogeneous, diverse field of sex regulation" (p. 42). Michelle Madden Dempsey on rape by coercion Michelle Madden Dempsey's insightful contribution to this symposium picks up, in a sense, where Amit Pundik's leaves off.[16] In the course of his discussion of rape by deception, Pundik alludes to, but does not pursue, parallel issues that arise in the context of rape by coercion. I Criminalizing Sex i is the third in what has turned out to be a career-long series of books on the moral underpinnings of the criminal law's special part, the part that defines the specific offenses.[1] In it, I seek to describe an ideal: a liberal system of criminal law containing provisions that would adequately criminalize all cases in which an offender subjects a victim to nonconsensual sex, but do so without criminalizing any cases involving sex that is genuinely consensual or aconsensual and would not adversely impact third parties. Though expansionist in other areas of rape law, the revision's approach to rape by deception is decidedly old school, restricted as it is to cases of fake medical procedures and impersonation.[8] Even in my own state of New Jersey, which has one of the most progressive sexual assault regimes in the country, legislation proposed in 2014, which would have created a new, I Kashur i -like "rape by fraud" offense, was decisively rejected by the state legislature as being too bold.[9] Thus, we can see something of a culture clash here - between the law in the United States and that in several other liberal democracies. [Extracted from the article]

This article examines Edinburgh's Liberal politics in the wake of the 1884–5 electoral reforms and the introduction of the Irish home rule debate. The objective is to uncover local nuances of this transitional period of Liberal politics. The Third Reform Act and the Redistribution of Seats Act of 1885 fractured the local Liberal Party as Liberals fought to control the newly established single‐member districts' associations. Advanced Liberals gained control over the associations and endorsed parliamentary candidates holding advanced views on the leading questions in the 1885 election. In three districts, unofficial Liberals stood and won against endorsed Liberals. Consequently, after the election the local Liberal associations in each of these districts split creating rival associations. This allows for unique insight into the effects of Irish home rule on Liberal politics as the associations were largely divided along partisan lines. Ultimately this study shows that the ideological stance of Liberals was not the determining factor of support or opposition to Irish home rule and that Gladstone's Irish question created a more united Party in Edinburgh. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author reflects on the decline of the liberal left and the shift of the Jewish majority to the right in Israel. Signs of this decline include the ousting of Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the rise of a governing coalition that included an Arab party. He discusses the illiberalism in the country in political and juridical terms, results of a 2016 Pew survey of Jewish Israelis about the country's laws, and the role of the failure of the Camp David Summit in this transformation into illiberal democracy.