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This paper employs several methods to estimate the trade creation and diversion effects of EC enlargement. Treating the original EEC and EFTA each as one country it compares total and external imports and the ratios of these imports to consumption between 1970/71 and 1977/78. The comparable figures for U.S., Canada and Japan are used as a 'normalizer'. Based on several approaches, 1978 trade creation is estimated at $28 billion and diversion at $5 billion, with an implied substitution elasticity between European and non-European sources of 32 The results are consistent with independent estimates constructed for the period 1959/60 to 1977/78, namely, the two stages of integration combined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines the economic implications of the preferential access of the European Economic Community producers to the markets of member states of the Associated African States and Madagascar, known as reverse preferences. Benefit expected from the removal of the monopoly power of the Associated States' suppliers; Problem related to the continued dominance of the French market.

SUMMARY Recent discussions in the literature on tariffs and quotas generally conclude that under competitive market conditions the two policy measures are equivalent, while equivalence in one sense or another breaks down with the introduction of monopoly into one or more markets involved in international trade. This paper shows that this is a misleading conclusion, based entirely on the static nature of the analysis. With partial equilibrium tools it is shown that if changes in demand are allowed for, the two measures give different results. The welfare loss from a quota is more severe than that from a tariff. And under certain restricted conditions a quota can be likened more to exchange control than to a tariff. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]