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Copyright of Pravnik is the property of Czech Academy of Sciences, Institute of State & Law and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Background: Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 ignited the largest armed conflict in Europe since World War II. Ukrainian government agencies, civil society organizations, and international agencies have gathered an unprecedented amount of data about the impact of war on the environment, which is often the silent victim of war. We review these data and highlight the limitations of international governance for protection of the environment during time of war. Methods: We performed an integrative review of academic, institutional, and media information resources using the search terms "Ukraine", "Russia", "war", "environment", "health", "human rights", "international humanitarian law", "international human rights law", "ecocide", and "war crimes". Main text: Nearly 500,000 military personnel have been killed or wounded during the war, and more than 30,000 civilians have been killed or injured. Indirect health effects of the war have likely accounted for an even greater amount of civilian morbidity and mortality. The war has displaced more than 11 million people. Russia's military forces have caused extensive damage to civilian infrastructure. The war has devastated Ukraine's economy and reduced food and energy security in many countries. The war has caused more than $56.4 billion in damage to the environment. There has been widespread chemical contamination of air, water, and soil, and 30% of Ukraine has been contaminated with landmines and unexploded ordnance. Landscape destruction, shelling, wildfires, deforestation, and pollution have adversely affected 30% of Ukraine's protected areas. Russia's seizure of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant and destruction of the Nova Kakhovka Dam have posed risks of long-term environmental catastrophe. Most of these environmental impacts threaten human health. Conclusion: In addition to enormous human costs, Russia's war on Ukraine has had devastating impacts on the natural environment and the built environment. International law mandates that methods of warfare must be implemented with due regard to the protection and preservation of the natural environment. A just and lasting peace necessitates, among other requirements, rebuilding and restoration of Ukraine's natural environment and built environment. The environmental consequences of all wars need to be investigated and more effective measures need to be implemented to protect the environment during war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On 4 August 2022, Amnesty International published its report 'Ukraine: Ukrainian Fighting Tactics Endanger Civilians', in which it accused Ukraine of violating international humanitarian law 'by establishing bases and operating weapons systems in populated residential areas, including in schools and hospitals' and in this way putting civilians at risk. According to the report, '[s]uch tactics violate international humanitarian law and endanger civilians, as they turn civilian objects into military targets. The ensuing Russian strikes in populated areas have killed civilians and destroyed civilian infrastructure'. The report sparked some controversies. The question that the author attempts to answer in this article is whether there are any factual or legal arguments supporting the conclusions of the report. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reflects on the UN response to the earthquakes in Türkiye and Syria in February 2023, and specifically the fact that while the UN responded immediately in southern Türkiye, it did not do so in non-government-controlled northwest Syria. The UN explained that its 'longstanding position' was that aid could not be delivered across an international border without host government consent or Security Council authorisation. This article seeks to understand this position. It reviews the law applicable to cross-border humanitarian assistance, and the guidelines and tools that shape the UN's emergency response. It argues that international law allows cross-border humanitarian assistance without host State consent; however, that the UN's guidelines and tools do not facilitate the provision of assistance in such a scenario. The article concludes by calling for a review of the law, policies and guidelines that shape the way the UN responds to rapid-onset disasters in conflict contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The lethal autonomous weapon systems -LAW- are cybernetic entities capable of selecting and attacking targets without direct human intervention, supported by Artificial Intelligence -AI-, as opposed to conventional weapons, which are controlled by human beings. The objective of this research is to externalise the legal incompatibility of LAWs with respect to the principles of precaution, proportionality and distinction inserted in International Humanitarian Law that have been configured only for human beings as well as to identify the evident moratorium to filter/optimise -as a new weapon- the current critical use of these systems, evidencing the lack of international criminal power that emerges normatively as a result of the indistinction of technological malice, and the need to configure impartiality in the veto power of the substantial decisions regarding peaceful or non-peaceful settlements of the UN Security Council, as a result of their contemporary legal unpredictability. The conclusions aver that a permanent jurisdiction and universal competence are indispensable for their applicability, which should be governed by a potential international instrument regulating the use of LAWs in correlation with the applicable customary norms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Developments in machine learning prompt questions about algorithmic decision-support systems (DSS) in warfare. This article explores how the use of these technologies impact practices of legal reasoning in military targeting. International Humanitarian Law (IHL) requires assessment of the proportionality of attacks, namely whether the expected incidental harm to civilians and civilian objects is excessive compared to the anticipated military advantage. Situating human agency in this practice of legal reasoning, this article considers whether the interaction between commanders (and the teams that support them) and algorithmic DSS for proportionality assessments alter this practice and displace the exercise of human agency. As DSS that purport to provide recommendations on proportionality generate output in a manner substantively different to proportionality assessments, these systems are not fit for purpose. Moreover, legal reasoning may be shaped by DSS that provide intelligence information due to the limits of reliability, biases and opacity characteristic of machine learning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Gdansk Journal of East Asian Studies / Gdanskie Studia Azji Wschodniej is the property of Jagiellonian University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Luridica is the property of Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Lodzkiego and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Luridica is the property of Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Lodzkiego and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Luridica is the property of Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Lodzkiego and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Luridica is the property of Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Lodzkiego and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Acta Iuris Stetinensis is the property of Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecinskiego / University of Szczecin Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Autonomous Weapon Systems have been on the international agenda for more than ten years now. Autonomy in warfare and its attached promises have been dubbed as the most recent revolution in military technologies. Many commentators have a rather sceptical view of these systems. They believe that the very existence of international humanitarian law and the minimal protection offered by it are at risk due to the gradually increasing use of autonomous weapons. Albeit a minority, some other commentators welcome the development of these warrior machines, with the insinuation that wars will be conducted more humanely due to the dehumanisation of warfare. This paper undertakes to evaluate these autonomous systems in terms of their compatibility with the requirements brought about by the principle of distinction, one of the cardinal principles of international humanitarian law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The war in Ukraine brought the collective security system towards a dead-end street. After raising the question of nuclear threat, another long-time forgotten question arises again, waking up the ghosts that slept for more than a half-century-the use of cluster bombs. Although an international convention prohibits this type of weapon, neither Ukraine, Russia, nor the United States are part of it, which leads back to the agony of fragmentation of international law versus the erga omnes concept of universally applicable norms and customary rules. Since the war is official and intensive, the law of armed conflict applies no matter which of the states involved denies it or names it differently. The use of cluster munitions from both sides is highly contested in international law--the paper aimed to provide an overview of the applicable legal framework through analytical and comparative methods. Although there is a general notion that cluster munition is banned under international law, the paper's results show this is not the ultimate case. Contextualisation relies on the four basic principles of humanitarian law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Justicia (0124-7441) is the property of Universidad Simon Bolivar and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article examines the creation of courts by non-State armed groups ("NSAG") in non-international armed conflicts ("NIAC") through the lens of classical Islamic law and its relationship to International Humanitarian Law ("IHL"). We begin with an overview of the IHL rules related to judicial guarantees and the establishment of NSAG courts. Although the creation of courts is generally the purview of States, it is possible for an NSAG to establish a parallel judicial system during a NIAC, with courts that can be IHL-compliant. We then move to a discussion of the classical Islamic law framework, and whether or not a court established thereunder would meet the relevant IHL requirements related to such a court. Classical Islamic law generally meshes with IHL in this respect, although there are some areas where the two seem to diverge (in particular, the independence of the judiciary, and potential discrimination issues due to certain jurisdictional principles). Finally, we explore NSAG courts in NIAC situations today, using the examples of two groups purporting to follow Islamic law, namely the Islamic State and Boko Haram. We find that, in relation to courts and judicial guarantees, neither group practices Islamic law as it was conceived during the classical period, and that the courts of these particular groups would be at odds with IHL. Nonetheless, the classical Islamic law framework is useful for anyone more generally attempting to ensure that courts in armed conflict are IHL-compliant, and they should not overlook it in their efforts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Taiwan Law Review is the property of Angle Publishing Co., Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In today's world, peace, human rights respect, and ensuring a decent life for individuals still represent an objective we strive for. This paper aims to highlight the potential of the two frameworks, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Agenda for Humanity, but more importantly why it is crucial for them to work together to address ongoing conflicts, such as in the Gaza Strip, where both frameworks can tackle a complex cause and promote lasting peace in the region. Thus, the objectives of this paper are to analyze the two frameworks, identify connecting elements for them to work together, and examine the unfolding conflict in the Gaza Strip, particularly in the context of the violation of International Humanitarian Law, the insecurity of civilians in this territory, and the challenges of intervening or alleviating the conflict in this region. Finding answers to these questions will help achieve the goal of identifying how to strengthen the relationship between International Humanitarian Law and the 2030 Agenda and promote lasting peace [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Law & Justice Review is the property of Justice Academy of Turkey and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article takes up the significant yet understudied issue of belligerent rights regarding submarine communication cables in armed conflict. The article takes up three key questions that have persistently evaded clarity. First, what actually is the law applicable to cables in wartime? Second, how is this law to be applied in practice? And third, is it fit for purpose? The article concludes that, as a matter of lex lata , no lex specialis rules have emerged specific to the protection of submarine cables in armed conflict, either in treaty or customary international law. However, this does not MEAn that belligerents are free to target submarine cables in times of armed conflict. Instead, important international law constraints are to be found in general IHL principles, the law of neutrality, and law of the sea protections that persist in times of armed conflict. Applied to the technical configurations of submarine cables as currently deployed and used, it is far from clear that these rules and principles permit the targeting of submarine cables in wartime. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The issue of protection of cultural property during armed conflict has long been considered in the doctrine of international law of Ukraine under the prism of the bitter experience of destruction in Yugoslavia in 1990, Afghanistan and Iraq in 2000, Syria and other countries. However, starting in the spring of 2014, we began to receive our own examples of the consequences of the armed conflict that began with the annexation of Crimea and the taking of control of several areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Much of the scholarly work on the protection of cultural property during armed conflict usually contains a general analysis of international and national legal acts in this area, but there is insufficient attention to the applied aspects and the issue of international responsibility for such offenses. The purpose of the article is to determine the basic rules of international humanitarian law applicable to the protection of various types of cultural property in the armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine, and also the rules determining the degree of responsibility for the offenses and crimes in this area. It is established that, first of all, the protection of cultural property during an armed conflict is regulated by international law, and the norms of national legislation specify certain provisions. The key document is the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of May 14, 1954, which enshrines the protection of cultural property in two classical aspects: positive protection, which imposes on the State the obligation to prepare for the protection of cultural property in peacetime, preparing it for the potential consequences of armed conflict, and negative protection - respect for cultural property - prohibition of the use of cultural property for military purposes and prohibition of attacks on such property. In the armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine there are two main areas of cultural property protection: taking appropriate measures in the territories where active hostilities are taking place, as well as protecting cultural property located in the occupied territories and returning illegally exported property from these territories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of GeSec: Revista de Gestao e Secretariado is the property of Sindicato das Secretarias e Secretarios do Estado de Sao Paulo (SINSESP) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The trend toward the "humanization" of international law reflects a greater emphasis on individuals rather than simply states as objects of concern. The advance of human rights law (HRL) has been an important impetus for this trend. Some observers suggest that humanization can be furthered even more by applying HRL rather than international humanitarian law (IHL) to hostilities between states and nonstate armed groups, unless a state explicitly declares that it is engaged in an armed conflict. This essay argues, however, that a court should not defer to a state's characterization of hostilities, but should base its analysis on whether hostilities meet the criteria for an armed conflict. Applying HRL to hostilities that effectively are an armed conflict but not acknowledged as such risks diluting the legitimacy and normative force of HRL. On the one hand, if a court applies conventional stringent HRL standards, this body of law may be seen as unrealistic and is likely to be ignored. On the other hand, a court that adapts HRL standards to armed conflict may need to take a consequentialist approach at odds with HRL's deontological foundations. Clearly differentiating between HRL and IHL may thus best promote the humanization of warfare. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article outlines and evaluates the US perspective on how treaty and customary international law protect the natural environment during international armed conflict. It surveys the relevant treaties to which the United States is a party and examines US views on their pertinent provisions. It then assesses claims that the environmental obligations residing in the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions have attained customary status, outlines the United States' rejection of those claims, and evaluates the reasonableness thereof. Finally, it highlights ambiguities in certain US environmental positions, the resolution of which would bring much-needed clarity to the law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2020, the International Committee of the Red Cross's work on the protection of the natural environment under international humanitarian law (IHL) produced the Committee's Guidelines on the Protection of the Natural Environment in Armed Conflict (ICRC Guidelines), an update of their 1994 predecessor. The ICRC Guidelines consist of thirty-two rules and recommendations under IHL, each accompanied by a commentary explaining their legal basis and providing guidance for interpretation. This article presents an overview of the context surrounding the Guidelines, certain key legal content, and practical implications for the conduct of parties to armed conflict as they fight. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this iteration of the Review 's "Beyond the Literature" series, we have invited Ezequiel Heffes to introduce his recent book Detention by Non-State Armed Groups under International Law , before then posing a series of questions to Tilman Rodenhäuser, René Provost, Mariana Chacón Lozano and Katharine Fortin, who have agreed to serve as discussants of the book. Tilman Rodenhäuser is a Legal Adviser at the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), with particular expertise in non-State armed groups (NSAGs) and detention. René Provost is the James McGill Professor of Law at McGill University and has written extensively on public international law, including his recent monograph Rebel Courts: The Administration of Justice by Armed Insurgents. Mariana Chacón Lozano has served as the Operational Legal Coordinator for the ICRC in Colombia since October 2020 and has worked for the ICRC since 2011. Katharine Fortin is Associate Professor at the Netherlands Institute of Human Rights within the Faculty of Law, Economics and Governance of Utrecht University. The Review team is grateful to all four discussants, and to Ezequiel, for taking part in this engaging conversation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dr Marja Lehto is Ambassador for International Legal Affairs at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, and Adjunct Professor of International Law at the University of Helsinki. She was a member of the United Nations (UN) International Law Commission (ILC) and served as the Special Rapporteur for the topic "Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts" from 2017 to 2022. Dr Lehto is also a member of the Council of the International Institute of Humanitarian Law since 2019. She has formerly served, inter alia , as Legal Adviser to the Finnish UN Mission in New York (1995–2000), as Head of the Unit for Public International Law (2000–09), and as Finland's Ambassador to Luxembourg (2009–14). For most of her career, she has worked on issues related to international peace and security, including international criminal justice and international humanitarian law (IHL), and she has published on a broad range of international legal questions related to the law of the sea, international environmental law (IEL), State succession, use of force, armed conflicts, terrorism and cyber security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Protected areas safeguard biodiversity of global ecological importance, even throughout armed conflicts. The International Law Commission's Principles on Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts propose that certain ecologically important areas could be designated as protected zones during armed conflicts. This article uses a geospatial analysis of armed conflicts and Key Biodiversity Areas and three case studies to inform recommendations on how the protection of ecologically important areas could be enhanced through visibility, local actors and international stakeholders as part of a broader interpretation of a protected zone. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The protection of the environment during warfare attracted significant attention in the 1990s, especially after the 1990–91 Gulf War. It became clear at that time that the few rules provided by international humanitarian law (IHL) aimed specifically at protecting the environment were insufficient. Various studies have since been undertaken with the aim of strengthening that protection from an IHL perspective. It is only recently that scholars and institutions like the International Law Commission have started to reflect on how to better protect the environment in armed conflict through the lens of another branch of international law, namely, international environmental law (IEL). Such an approach has involved examining the interplay between IHL and IEL, and scholars have subsequently proposed and then elaborated on frameworks in that respect. This paper intends to identify common trends of those frameworks and to critically appraise them, with the aim of providing a suitable approach to the interplay between IHL and IEL. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Given the increasing size and functions of United Nations (UN) peace operations (POs) and the fact that they often operate in contexts where natural resources are degraded, POs have repercussions on the environment. Yet, there is not much literature on their obligations regarding the protection of the environment in relation to armed conflicts. This article provides insights into the obligations of POs in relation to armed conflict. First, it highlights POs' customary international environmental law obligations. Second, it delves into their environmental obligations under the UN's internal rules and the host State's laws. Third, it explores obligations that arise from their mandates. In each of these sections, the article highlights the relevance and application of these obligations in armed conflicts. The last section examines the obligations of POs to protect the natural environment under international humanitarian law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Actors engaging in a diverse set of environmental protection activities are experiencing serious difficulties executing their mandates during armed conflict, leading to environmental harm that could otherwise have been mitigated. This article examines to what extent the international legal and policy framework can ensure the protection of environmental protection actors during armed conflict. It is argued that environmental protection actors can be seen either as part of civil defence organizations or as humanitarian relief actors, and are therefore covered by special protections under international humanitarian law. However, two main challenges remain: (1) despite these existing provisions, environmental protection actors may still face access and safety issues during armed conflict, and (2) within this framework, environmental protection activities must be linked to civilian needs and cannot be conducted based on ecocentric motivations. To overcome these challenges, the article introduces the concept of "environmentarian corridors". Environmentarian corridors would allow for the unimpeded movement of environmental protection workers and resources through contested territory and into emergency areas to protect the environment. They would also serve to increase awareness about obligations to protect the environment and would help to ensure the safety of environmental protection actors during armed conflict, as the role and mandate of these actors is explicitly accepted by stakeholders. Additionally, environmentarian corridors offer potential for conducting environmental protection activities on ecocentric grounds. The article concludes by advocating for stakeholders to employ the provisions and concepts articulated herein as a means to further promote and strengthen initiatives aimed at protecting the environment during armed conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Both gender and the environment have traditionally been positioned at the periphery of international humanitarian law (IHL). In recent decades, there has been important progress in moving both concerns closer to its centre; to date, however, an understanding of the intersection of gender and the environment in the legal regulation of armed conflict remains largely underdeveloped. Nevertheless, as the present article documents, there are important similarities in strategies pursued to advance both gender and the environment from the periphery to the mainstream of IHL, namely: first, a focus on sources of IHL, in particular concretizing arguably limited specific treaty content with interpretive guidance and implementation frameworks; second, a conceptual critique of prevailing definitions of "harm" in IHL; and third, advancing, through close empirical documentation and household-level analysis of conflict's effects, understandings of harm that capture so-called "second-round" effects of conflict. Recognizing these important affinities between gender and environment work in IHL, this article draws on these insights to propose a typology of gendered environmental harm in conflict. The article concludes with proposals for enhancing the legal and operational capture under IHL of the gender–conflict–environment nexus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International human rights law and international humanitarian law (IHL) contain few obligations for rebel groups, yet those groups are nonetheless under pressure to comply with their foundational international norms. This case study of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) analyzes the evolution of its discourse and behavior related to human rights and IHL. It then compares changes in the group's discourse to evidence of changes in behavior. The study finds that the KLA does significantly change its language, gradually incorporating such language over time, but it also demonstrates that this change is not accompanied by improvements in human rights and IHL adherence in its behavior. The study considers whether greater adoption of these norms is better explained by a constructivist or a rationalist approach and, in particular, looks at the role of legitimacy. In addition, it offers insight into how groups may respond to future pressure to follow these norms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While ambiguity is a common feature of international obligations, there is a strong theoretical anticipation that ambiguities may be exploited, and obligations circumvented, under competing interests. This article largely backs this anticipation. The article scrutinises how ambiguous arms export control obligations are handled under strong incentives for arms export. The empirical case explored is the UK government's arms exports to Saudi Arabia during the war in Yemen. Exports continued despite evidence that the Saudi-led coalition was violating international humanitarian law (IHL) in Yemen, and despite obligations not to export if there is a risk that the exported equipment can be used in IHL violations. A resulting legal challenge against the UK government provides valuable information about the role of ambiguity in the implementation of arms export controls. Drawing on primary sources from the legal process, this article argues that the UK government has taken advantage of linguistic ambiguity. The article also argues that the government has engaged in the continuous construction of ambiguity around events in Yemen and around the ideal parameters for arms trade risk assessment. Together, these strategies have facilitated continued arms exports to Saudi Arabia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the extent to which peacekeeping operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and specifically Operation Sukola II, effectively applied the UN human rights due diligence policy (HRDDP) in the period under review (2014–2021), based upon reports and interviews with individuals with knowledge of the peacekeeping operations. It analyses the complexity and challenges the peacekeepers and Congolese government confronted in the application of HRDDP in the DRC, noting the different challenges in applying this policy due to the highly volatile situations faced. The study argues that in applying the policy in situations such as the DRC, where the conflict is complex, the UN needs to be responsive to unexpected contingencies, with a high degree of flexibility and resilience. It recommends that the UN should review its HRDDP and update its procedures based on gained experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Providing timely and adequate humanitarian access to those affected by natural disasters and conflicts remains a key subject of the United Nations (UN) Summits. This article examines the role of UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions in the formation and advancement of the international legal framework for humanitarian assistance. To examine this role, this article first examines the main international legal provisions developed within the framework of International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law, and how they apply to situations requiring humanitarian assistance. The article then provides a comprehensive analysis of UNGA resolutions titled “Strengthening the coordination of emergency humanitarian assistance of the UN.” This analysis coverage began with the first adopted resolution in 1991 and continued through the most recent resolution adopted in 2022. This article notes how the UNGA identifies the key principles of humanitarian assistance, which are impartiality, neutrality, independence, and humanity that are considered to have a key role in addressing the issues related to humanitarian assistance from the UNGA’s perspective. The analysis reveals the relevant international legal rules applicable to the delivery of humanitarian assistance and demonstrates the critical role of the UNGA in defining the legal grounds for humanitarian assistance. UNGA resolutions cover multiple responsibilities and obligations of states and the international community relevant to humanitarian assistance. The article concludes that UNGA resolutions have played a crucial and significant role in defining, clarifying, and expanding the international legal context for humanitarian assistance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For several decades, transnational (multinational) corporations have been considered significant actors in international relations. It is also an undeniable fact that transnational corporations are economically stronger than many states. They are also increasingly present in situations of armed conflict. On one hand, companies operating in unstable environments are exposed to the violence and consequences of armed conflicts. On the other hand, some of their actions during armed conflicts may lead to violations, particularly of international human rights law. In this paper, however, the authors would like to focus more on the status of the protection of transnational corporations under international humanitarian law. It is possible to put forward the thesis that transnational corporations, having met certain requirements, can enjoy protection under international humanitarian law. Verification of this research thesis requires analysis of issues such as the relationship between international human rights law and international humanitarian law. It also requires the analysis of the legal basis on which the rights of transnational corporations may be founded and their scope. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Anbar University for Law & Political Sciences is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The conflict between Russia and Ukraine has been widely recognized as one of the most significant threats to peace and security in Europe since World War II. The large-scale proliferation of unmanned aerial vehicles in this conflict reveals how drones and autonomous weapons systems are transforming warfare. At the same time, they are raising concerns about the way conflicts are being fought, and how international peace and security is being secured through international humanitarian law. This article therefore provides a deep empirical analysis of the types of drones being deployed in the war between Russia and Ukraine, and their specific contributions to the conflict. The study provides several charts that indicate the make of the drones being used, their type, and the function of each drone employed by both parties to the conflict. The charts highlight various parameters such as maximum speed, endurance, and altitude capabilities. The empirical part of the article then feeds into the second part of the article which delves into the question of whether the drones being used there meet the requirements of the principles of distinction and proportionality as mandated in international humanitarian law. It argues that there seems to be evidence of indiscriminate attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure, and investigations need to be carried out to determine whether there should be accountability. The article argues that the artificial intelligence being used in drones make them distinct from ordinary weapons as it is their autonomy to make decisions which ensures that accountability for IHL violations is problematic. The article argues that IHL ought to be reformed to deal with these new warfare capabilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Arguments have been made both for and against military use of autonomous weapon systems (AWSs) on the basis of how they will help or hinder a state in meeting its international humanitarian law (IHL) obligations. Often, these arguments are made in isolation, or they fail to address all of the potential compliance concerns related to autonomous weapons. This is not ideal. It means the bearers of legal obligations must locate, assess and piece together the disparate arguments into a coherent structure if they are to know whether they can legitimately utilise a particular autonomous capability and, if so, in what circumstances. This article offers a high-level description of a conceptual framework which can be used to organise and assess legal arguments about autonomous weapons. It proposes that the task of integrating autonomous capabilities into an armed force may be viewed as a constrained optimisation problem wherein the task is to find the optimal balance between the fundamental principles of IHL while also satisfying all normative, technological and strategic/operational constraints. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a review in the form of theoretical knowledge and critical understanding of cognitive premises, value formations and ideas about law, conceptualized in the chapter "Ethical and legal foundations of medical triage standards in the Russian military medical service" in the book "Lack of resources in an unfavorable environment: an ethical study principles of medical triage and procedures for providing medical care", published in 2023 by the Springer publishing house (Switzerland). The authors note that the reviewed chapter of the monograph is of theoretical, empirical and practical interest for researchers in healthcare organization, including in conditions of armed (military conflicts), philosophers, lawyers, as well as medical and legal students. This interest is due to the fact that the author of the chapter under review successfully managed to describe, justify and reveal the substantive characteristics of the ethical and legal foundations of medical triage in the activities of the Russian military medical service. Cognitive, legal, informational, value and prognostic aspects are the obvious advantages of the chapter under review, which will contribute to its popularization among readers.

The Israeli army has developed an artificial intelligence-based system called “Lavender”. This approach promises faster and more accurate targeting; however, human rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch (HRW) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) have warned of deficits in responsibility for violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). In the following, we will examine these concerns and show how responsibility for violations of IHL remains attributable to a state that uses automated or semi-automated systems in warfare.

The International Law Commission is preparing to continue discussions on Draft Articles on the Immunity of State Officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction at its forthcoming 75th summer session. This article focuses on two issues: the scope of immunity and its exceptions. These issues, which are widely discussed internationally, are far from being resolved. In this state of flux, a common ground is needed to move forward, which I try to outline in this blog post.

The war in Ukraine brought the collective security system towards a dead-end street. After raising the question of nuclear threat, another long-time forgotten question arises again, waking up the ghosts that slept for more than a half-century- the use of cluster bombs. Although an international convention prohibits this type of weapon, neither Ukraine, Russia, nor the United States are part of it, which leads back to the agony of fragmentation of international law versus the erga omnes concept of universally applicable norms and customary rules. Since the war is official and intensive, the law of armed conflict applies no matter which of the states involved denies it or names it differently. The use of cluster munitions from both sides is highly contested in international law—the paper aimed to provide an overview of the applicable legal framework through analytical and comparative methods. Although there is a general notion that cluster munition is banned under international law, the paper’s results show this is not the ultimate case. Contextualisation relies on the four basic principles of humanitarian law.

The aim and objective of this study is to outline the evolution and mechanisms of humanitarian aid provided by the European Union. Unquestionably, this is a significant issue, which, however, only found a direct legal basis in the Treaty of Lisbon, referring to humanitarian aid, and became the subject of a separate policy. Its principles, structure, and mechanisms of financing were clarified through the unification and harmonization of acts of secondary law. This also includes sui generis acts, which had a specific impact on the area of external actions in the discussed aspect. The fundamental goal of this study is to present the legal and political framework of humanitarian aid along with examples regarding practical aspects of providing assistance. The study employs the method of investigation of the law in force and legal comparison, consisting in, e.g., an attempt to find adequate legal solutions for broadly understood humanitarian aid provided by the European Union.

Nicaragua alleges that Germany violates the Genocide Convention and international humanitarian law by assisting Israel and also by failing to prevent violations of these bodies of law. It requests the International Court of Justice to indicate provisional measures, which would oblige Germany inter alia to stop assisting Israel. While the Court may be barred from exercising its jurisdiction over Nicaragua’s claims relating to the Genocide Convention it may be able to hear the claims regarding Germany’s duties under IHL.