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Employment discrimination jurisprudence assumes that key concepts such as "discrimination," "intent," "causation," and the various prohibited grounds of discrimination refer to discrete and objectively verifiable phenomena or facts. I argue that all of these concepts are not just poorly or ambiguously defined; most are not capable of precise definition. Drawing on familiar developments in private law, such as the legal realist critique of objective causation in torts, I argue that, in practice, the central concepts in antidiscrimination law do not describe objective phenomena or facts at all; instead, they refer to social conflicts between employer prerogatives and egalitarian goals. Ironically, at its best, employment discrimination law does not really prohibit discrimination; instead it imposes a duty of care on employers to avoid decisions that undermine social equality. This suggests that attempts to improve employment discrimination law by making it more attentive to "the facts"--for instance, refining causation in mixed-motives cases using quantitative empirical methods or defining discriminatory intent according to innovations in social psychology--are unlikely to be successful, because these facts are not really at the center of the dispute. Instead, we could better improve employment discrimination law--making it more successful as an egalitarian intervention and less intrusive on legitimate employer prerogatives--if we abandoned attempts to precisely define concepts such as "objective causation" and "discriminatory intent" and instead focused on refining the employer's duty of care to avoid antiegalitarian employment decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is axiomatic that whether speech is protected turns on whether it poses a serious risk of harm--in Holmes's formulation, a "clear and present danger." If this is correct, then the state of mind, or intent, of the speaker should be irrelevant. Yet First Amendment law makes speaker's intent a factor in the protection of many different kinds of speech. This Essay offers an account of why and how speaker's intent matters for speech protection. It argues that strong intuitions work against imposing strict liability for speech. These intuitions are best explained by an interest in speaker's intent. An autonomy-based account of free speech provides reasons for this interest. Such an account also suggests what kind of intent is necessary before a given speaker may be subject to regulation. Elucidating speaker's intent thus explains a mysterious aspect of First Amendment law and uncovers a new argument for autonomy theories of free speech. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the role of intent in the EU case law on abuse of dominance. It demonstrates that the case law mainly uses "subjective intent" and that the use of intent is not limited to predatory pricing, not least because "intent" and "object" are used synonymously. The article argues that the thus-far developed use of intent within the substantive assessment under art. 102 TFEU reduces legal certainty and increases the risk of decisional errors with negative welfare implications. Such an approach also conflicts with the modernisation of art. 102 TFEU, a process aiming to adopt a more economic, effects-based approach. The article argues that intent should not be used as part of the substantive legal test for establishing abuse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the British court case Marley v. Rawlings, which dealt with the issue of intention in wills and the rectification of clerical errors in wills. Topics include the enforcement of mirror wills, the British Wills Act of 1837, the construction of wills, and the failure to satisfy a testator's instructions.

The article focuses on the European court case Credit and Mercantile PLC v. Kaymuu Ltd., which dealt with common intention and land registration. Topics include beneficial ownership, constructive trusts, and priority notices. Information is provided on bankruptcy trustees, primary estoppel, and intention.

The article discusses legal defenses to patent infringement in America and a defendant's potential ability to negate the intent required to be held liable for induced infringement based on a good-faith belief of invalidity as of June 2014. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and notice of infringement allegations are addressed, along with a legal case involving alleged patent infringement by the Cisco Systems computer networking firm. Dissenting opinions are also examined.

The criminal law doctrine of oblique intent was developed at common law to deal with situations in which the agent acted without purpose or desire but where the harmful result of his conduct was foreseen at a very high probability. In its most recent form the doctrine holds that ‘the jury should be directed that they are not entitled to find the necessary intention, unless they feel sure that [the harmful result] was a virtual certainty (barring some unforeseen intervention) as a result of the defendant’s actions and that the defendant appreciated that such was the case.’ Yet, the doctrine does not provide any guidance as to which moral consideration should be taken into account in deciding whether intention may be found. Through a comparison with the parallel doctrine of psik reishei developed in Jewish law as far back as 200 CE the article offers a way for the English doctrine to account for the various moral positions of the perpetrator or the moral character of his actions that such scenarios may raise. The article argues that some cases which are currently dealt with by the doctrine of oblique intent ought to be discussed in the context of actus reus, and any moral considerations ought to be ignored. In all other instances, and based on the understanding that oblique intent is not (direct) intent but rather a claim for moral equivalence, a classification based on the desirability-of-the-results has the potential to replace the general discretion currently left for the juries and help ensure a more consistent assessment and better ex-ante guidance of behaviour. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses the "Restatement (Third) of Torts" legal treatise and the reported causal relevance of intent as of May 2014, focusing on Professor David Robertson's development of a causation hypothetical involving an alleged tortfeasor named Harriet. America's cause-in-fact legal doctrine is mentioned, along with tort cases involving issues such as cyber-torts, child pornography possession, and intentional or reckless contributions to terrorism. Liability is also examined.

The article focuses on the impact of jurisprudence of the U.S. and Republic of Korea on the intent of the single-firms to refuse for business deals. Topics discussed include fairness of the intent to refuse under the antitrust laws of both the jurisdictions, legal standards implied by the jurisdictions for limiting the intent-to-refuse cases and the anti-competitive intent of the refuser. It further analyses the antitrust liability for single firm refusals.

The article focuses on the laws made for the evolution of restrictive covenants in West Virginia in reference to the court cases Teays Farms v. Cottrill and G. Corp. Inc. v. Mack Jo Inc. Topics discussed include intentions of the party for placing restitution in the property, judicial opinions of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals on the requirements of common law in the property disputes and rights of the land owners for enforcing the covenant. It also discusses the role of privity.

Copyright of Collected Papers of the Faculty of Law in Split / Zbornik Radova Pravnog Fakulteta u Splitu is the property of Split Faculty of Law and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

As customers' repurchase behavior leads to long-term corporate profitability, managers should know the success factors influencing repurchase intent. Knowledge of gender differences in these success factors would enable managers to separately optimize repurchase intent for men and women. This research thus develops original hypotheses on gender differences in the formation of repurchase intent. Based on hierarchical linear modeling of data from five countries and ten industries, this research finds that public brand image more strongly influences customer satisfaction and repurchase intent for women than for men. Perceived value has a weaker effect on repurchase intent for women than for men. The analyses do not detect any gender difference in the influence of customer satisfaction on repurchase intent. Contrary to conventional wisdom, relational switching costs more strongly influence repurchase intent for men than for women. Further analyses illustrate moderating effects of country differences in gender egalitarianism and of contextual differences between products and services. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Pandectele Române is the property of Wolters Kluwer Romania and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article focuses on the interpretation of guarantees under Chinese contract law. Topics include the suretyship of contracts, the Chinese Guarantee Act of 1995, and how the intention of the contracting parties impacts the independence of a guarantee. Information is provided on the difference between dependent and independent guarantees.

The article discusses the reported relevance of a person's "intentions and wishes" in relation to determinations of actual occupation of property under Schedule 3, Paragraph 2 of Great Britain's Land Registration Act 2002, focusing on factual evidence and judicial thinking in Great Britain as of 2014. British courts and a reasonable person legal standard are mentioned, along with an objective test for actual occupation which involves an evidential appraisal of the facts of a particular case.

The article discusses the limits and exceptions to intent under Florida law as of January 2014, focusing on the legal aspects of a trustee's powers, the construction of a will in Florida, and efforts to understand the intent of a settlor or a testator. The treatise "Scott on Trusts" by Austin Wakement Scott is mentioned, along with the Florida Constitution and ambiguous wills and trusts. Court-made rules and statutory provisions are assessed, along with the book "Black's Law Dictionary."

The article focuses on intentionalism of expert testimony in U.S. art appropriation and infringement cases. Topics include the fair use doctrine, the impact of the decision in the U.S. court case Cariou v. Prince, and if artist testimony is relevant in art appropriation cases. Information is provided on statements of intent.

I focus on the set of problems that arise in identifying both the actus reus and (to an even greater extent) the mens rea needed by an abettor before she should be criminally liable for complicity in a crime. No consensus on these issues has emerged in positive law; commentators are enormously dissatisfied with the decisions courts have reached; and critics disagree radically about what reforms should be implemented to rectify this state of affairs. I explicitly deny that I will be able to solve these problems, although I hope at least to identify a central source of the confusion. In my view, the problem results largely from conceptualizing the liability of abettors as derivative. This diagnosis helps us to understand why the problem is likely to remain insoluble in positive law. If the test of an adequate theory consists primarily in its ability to produce results that conform to our moral intuitions about how particular cases should be resolved, no approach that can be implemented in the real world will prove wholly satisfactory. I advance a hypothesis about why failure is inevitable and what should be done in light of this predicament. Legal realities compel us to adopt a position that is suboptimal from a moral point of view. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Courts and commentators are notoriously puzzled about the mens rea standards for complicity. Accomplices intend to aid, but what attitude need they have towards the crimes that they aid? This paper both criticizes extant accounts of the mens rea of complicity and offers a new account. The paper argues that an intention can commit one to an event's occurrence without committing one to promoting the event, or making it more likely to take place. Under the proposed account of the mens rea of complicity, an accomplice must have an intention that commits him to the crime's occurrence, but need not commit him to making it more likely that the crime occurs. The paper traces the implications of this view both for several difficult complicity cases, and for ongoing debates among philosophers of action about the necessary and sufficient conditions of joint agency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses legal proceedings under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code as of December 2013, focusing on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit's ruling in the 2013 case Western Real Estate Equities LLC v. Village at Camp Bowie I LP which deals with a good faith requirement, congressional intent, and an artificially impaired class of claims in a Chapter 11 reorganization plan. The legal rights of debtors are mentioned, along with unsecured trade creditors.

The article discusses the effects of the United States Supreme Court cases Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 and Brown v. Board of Education on the anti-discrimination protections available for nonwhite plaintiffs. Topics mentioned include how discrimination is defined by the law, an overview of lawsuits involving affirmative action in education, and whether intent is needed in cases of discrimination.

Deliberate firesetting costs our community in destruction to property and lives. Public concern heightens when similar fires occur in a series, raising the specter of copycat firesetting. Difficulties associated with researching copycat crimes in general mean that not a lot is known about copycat firesetting. As an initial step toward filling this research gap, we explore connections between research on copycat crime and research into deliberate firesetting. The intention is to extract salient features from what is known about the phenomena of deliberate firesetting and copycat crime, map them together, and point out shared and unique characteristics. It is argued that a “copycat firesetter” is likely to exist as a distinct subgroup and potentially requiring targeted interventions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the aspects of fairness and antitrust law. Topics discussed include anticompetitive intent, competitive harm and fairness. It also discusses the American antitrust jurisprudence, reconsideration of the fairness and antitrust law and also presents the views of evolutionary biologist Edward O. Wilson regarding the evolutionary stable strategy.

This article tackles the difficult question of what the consequences of failing to comply with the formalities required for the celebration of marriage will be in different circumstances. Whether the marriage will be valid, void or simply non-existent depends both on the degree of compliance with the law and whether any non-compliance was deliberate. While the concept of non-marriage is not to be found within legislation, the Marriage Act 1949 does provide the framework for determining what the minimum degree of compliance to create a valid or void marriage must be and, by inference, when it is necessary to categorise a ceremony as resulting in a non-marriage. Given the need for certainty in this area, it is suggested that the intentions of the parties -whether the positive intention to be married despite having failed to comply with any of the requisite formalities or the negative intention not to be married despite having gone through a formal ceremony of marriage - should not be relevant to the determination of this point. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Fighting tax evasion requires a clear text without ambigous expression, allowing a correct classification of the offence, whenever appropriate, in regulating the typical offence provided in by the law. Unfortunately, within the Law no. 241/2005 there are some regulations, that are less clear, requiring jurisprudence and doctrine for their interpretation. One of these is art. 6 of Law no. 241/2005 which we will analyze in the following, where the existence of intent is not apparent „ex re”. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the legal aspects of perjury in America as of September 2013, focusing on various issues such as a double jeopardy defense, the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and false testimony under three federal perjury statutes in America. Falsity is addressed in relation to grand juries, the reliability of testimony, and an oath requirement. Intent and willfulness are examined, as well as juries and prosecutors.

For over a century, some courts--relying upon the landmark Supreme Court opinion in Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York v. Hillmon-- have admitted one person's intentions as evidence of what another person did. But Hillmon is wrong. The Supreme Court made an analytical error in its analysis. This Article seeks to expose and explain the error and therefore demonstrate that the state of mind exception to the general rule of exclusion of hearsay evidence should never support admission of one person's stated intentions as evidence of what another person later did. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the neuroscientific aspects of the intent legal doctrine in America as of September 2013, focusing on civil rights advocacy in the U.S. and an analysis of the cognitive science behind "implicit bias" in the decision making process. Racial implicit association testing and the U.S. Supreme Court are mentioned, along with the Equal Justice Society advocacy group and evidence of explicit racial bias. Amygdala activation in the human brain is also examined.

The article discusses racism in America and the potential use of racial impact statements to counteract a public official's use of a "color-blind" defense in cases of alleged racial discrimination in the U.S. as of September 2013. A plaintiff's burden of proof is addressed in relation to providing proof of an entity's racially discriminatory intent. Equal protection laws, racial disparities, and the U.S. Supreme Court's establishment of an "intent doctrine" in 1974 are examined.

The article focuses on the sex exception in vicarious liability tort litigation in the U.S. Topics include the widespread sexual abuse of children by members of the Catholic Church, if institutions can be held liable for the misdeeds of their members, and tort law in the U.S. Information is provided on compensation for intentional torts.

In both the United States and Canada, bankruptcy preferential transfer avoidance provisions are aimed at creating equality of distribution among similarly situated creditors. However, there is a key difference in the way each jurisdiction's regime treats the notion of intent. An analysis of each regime, using examples, illustrates the way in which Canada's regime effectually does violence to the distributive equality policy objective, while the US regime adheres to it. Aux États-Unis comme au Canada, les dispositions de transfertpréférentiel d'évitement de la faillite visent à créer une répartition égale parmi les créanciers semblables. Cependant, il y a une grande difference dans la manière dont chaque regime juridictionnel traite la notion d'intention. Une analyse de chaque regime illustre, au moyen d'exemples que le regime canadien fait violence à l'objectif de la politique de repartition egale, alors que le regime americain le respecte. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When used in legal terms such as human dignity, equality, prohibition of inhuman or degrading etc. the duty actually incorporates moral standards or the moral argument? Negative responses are diverse and there are several ways to answer positively, both modes will be discussed in this article. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on various cases in the Supreme Court of Florida related to mistreatment of mens rea and drug possession. Topics discussed include mens rea in criminal law, brief history of Section 893.13 of the Florida Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act and role of the judicial deference in criminal activities. It also discusses the powers and ability of the courts for creating the criminal laws.

The doctrine of transferred intent (or transferred 'malice' in England) generally provides that if A attempts to harm B but, because of bad aim, misses and accidentally causes the same harm to befall C, A's harmful intent vis-à-vis B is transferred to C, thus rendering A guilty of intentionally harming C. Commentators acknowledge the doctrine to be a legal fiction, but they differ regarding whether the fiction produces just results, some believing it does, others believing that A is guilty at most of attempting to harm B rather than intentionally harming C. Commentators who agree that the fiction produces just results nevertheless differ regarding whether the fiction should be retained or whether A's intent to harm 'a' person, in this case, B, is the only intent that signifies for crimes of intentional harm, regardless of whom A eventually harms. Doug Husak sought to achieve reflective equilibrium between intuition and theory regarding bad-aim cases by proposing in 1996 that A be punished for attempting to harm B (rather than for harming C) but sentenced as if he had harmed B. I once believed that Husak was correct. But I now have doubts, in part because Husak, along with others, cannot explain why the strength of people's intuitions regarding A's responsibility in bad-aim cases depends upon (1) C's being a reasonably foreseeable victim, and (2) C's being harmed by the same threat of force that A initially unleashed against B. I argue that one cannot achieve reflective equilibrium in bad-aim cases without inquiring into why resulting harm matters in criminal law, and that when one does, one discovers that just as people's intuitions regarding whether intentional harms are proximate depend upon how resulting harms occur, so, too, people's intuitions regarding whether an actor is guilty of intentional harm depend upon how resulting harm comes about. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the Supreme Court case Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, which discussed the structure anchored in the Riviera Beach marina by Fane Lozman. Topics mentioned include the objective observer test for determining if an object is a vessel in the eyes of the law, the role of the owner's intent in determining the functioning of the object, and the ruling's effect on admiralty jurisdiction.

Speaker's intent requirements are a common but unremarked feature of First Amendment law. From the "actual malice" standard for defamation to the specific-intent requirement for incitement, many types of expression are protected or unprotected depending on the state of mind with which they are said. To the extent that courts and commentators have considered why speaker's intent should determine First Amendment protection, they have relied upon the chilling effect. On this view, imposing strict liability for harmful speech, such as defamatory statements, would overdeter, or chill, valuable speech, such as true political information. Intent requirements are necessary prophylactically to provide "breathing space" for protected speech. This Article argues that, although the chilling effect may be a real concern, as a justification for speaker's intent requirements, it proves unsatisfactory. It cannot explain existing intent requirements, and the difficulties of measuring and remedying chilling effects cast doubt on whether they could ever provide the sole justification for the choice of one intent requirement over another. The inadequacy of the chilling effect leaves the problem of speaker's intent in need or further explanation and raises more general concerns about the use of deterrence-based arguments in constitutional law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the relationship between intention or dolus and negligence or culpa in the context of vehicular collisions causing the death of fellow passengers and pedestrians in the court case S v. Humphreys. Topics include the elements and interface between dolus and culpa, the facts of the case and the court judgment.

The article focuses on the main cases where tort liability of board members occurs. The main bases of the tort liability are said to be violation of a protective provision, intentional behaviour contrary to good morals and providing incorrect information. The article provides a comparative analysis of Estonian law and court practice and that of other countries.

The article discusses how to teach the concept of mens rea to law students using the oral arguments in the Supreme Court case Flores-Figueroa versus U.S. In this case, the defendant Ignacio Carlos Flores was accused of identity theft and misuse of immigration documents. Oral arguments on the case center on the use of the adverb "knowingly" to determine whether Flores was guilty of identity theft. Other topics tackled include strict liability, predicate felony and lawyering ideas.

Abstract: In some criminal law cases, the defendant is assessed by a forensic psychiatrist or psychologist within the context of an insanity defense. In this article I argue that specific neuroscientific research can be helpful in improving the quality of such a forensic psychiatric evaluation. This will be clarified in two ways. Firstly, we shall adopt the approach of understanding these forensic assessments as evaluations of the influence of a mental disorder on a defendant''s decision-making process. Secondly, I shall point to the fact that researchers in neuroscience have performed various studies over recent years on the influence of specific mental disorders on a patient''s decision-making. I argue that such research, especially if modified to decision-making in criminal scenarios, could be very helpful to forensic psychiatric assessments. This kind of research aims to provide insights not merely into the presence of a mental disorder, but also into the actual impact of mental disorders on the decisions defendants have made in regard to their actions. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

The article discusses the intent requirement in Louisiana destination law which states that a party claiming predial servitude created by destination must prove the "intent" of the common owner to create the servitude. It analyzes the intent requirement entered into the jurisprudential application of Louisiana civil code and presents a relevant French doctrine on the issue.

Early establishment of evidence for genocidal intent would allow responses in the context of RaP, targeted specifically at the prevention of genocide and focus scarce resources and limited political will. This article is an attempt to develop an interpretation of genocidal intent that supports the application of the obligation to prevent genocide in future situations. Past examples, including the situations in Rwanda and Darfur, demonstrated that the interpretation of genocidal intent has important implications for the application of the obligation to prevent genocide under the Convention. While some of the challenges can be traced back to the drafting history of the Convention, a review of the Travaux Preparatoire reveals very limited cross-references between the discussions on Intent and considerations of the obligation to prevent genocide. Since the drafting of the Convention there have been significant developments in the interpretation and application of genocidal intent by national and international courts, and in the development of methodology and institutions for early-warning and early action to respond to situations at risk of genocide. International and national courts would have to acknowledge their role in assisting national and international entities in implementing the obligation to prevent and punish genocide by opting for a `prevention-friendly' interpretation and ensuring punishment as early as possible during unfolding events of genocide through the application of genocidal intent. The interpretation of intent must be opened to subsume relevant precursors of genocide into the definitions of article II and III of the Convention. The interpretation of intent has to evolve over time to link well-established risk factors with the acts of genocide spelled out in the Convention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit's ruling in the 2012 case United States v. Jeffries which deals with the First Amendment to the nation's Constitution, subjective intent, and criminal threats. The court in the Jeffries case considers the legal aspects of the language used in a YouTube Internet video which was performed and posted by Franklin Delano Jeffries II during a custody battle with his wife. American free speech laws are also mentioned.

This article deals with the intention principle of family mediation from doctrine and in legal regulation. Intention principle of several participants of the process is reviewed. The article tackles the relationship between mediator's intention and other mediation principles. Eventual exceptions and limitations to the principle are analyzed, such as mediation with domestic violence the well-known "preventive or mandatory mediation." Finally, the article describes the force of the intention principle after the agreement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the legal concept of animus, which refers to intention or attitude, in the U.S. justice system. Topics include animus as part of equal protection doctrine, animus under U.S. constitutional law, and the animus quadrilogy, which is comprised of the U.S. Supreme Court cases Lawrence v. Texas, Windsor v. United States, United States v. Carolene Products, and Romer v. Evans.

The article discusses U.S. courts and the judicial forcing of the quantification of risk in situations involving reviews of agency actions and determinations of whether probabilistic injury satisfies the injury-in-fact standing requirement as of January 2013. Other topics include U.S. congressional intent in regards to public health and safety regulations, as well as quantitative risk assessment (QRA) practices and policies. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is mentioned.

The article focuses on the requirement of the Quid-Pro-Quo intent, "a specific intent to give or receive something of value in exchange for an official act." in section 666 of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 in the U.S. It discusses the circuits that require proof of Quid-Pro-Quo Intent and also presents the legislative history of the above mentioned section. Further, it is concluded that there is a need for quid-pro-quo intent in the section.

Since the early 1970s, the Fourteenth Amendment's emancipatory potential has dramatically eroded, with rapid plunges followed by ever-lower plateaus. In 2007, we entered another cycle of precipitous devolution. Today, this latest drop seems to be accelerating along two supposedly distinct tracks: intent doctrine and colorblindness. Ostensibly, the search for discriminatory intent provides a means of ferreting out unconstitutional racial discrimination. In contrast, colorblindness subjects raceconscious laws to strict scrutiny whether their impetus is benign or invidious, rendering intent irrelevant. On and off the Supreme Court, supporters and critics spar over whether these doctrines fulfill the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection. Nevertheless, both sides accept the seemingly fundamental division in racial jurisprudence between intent and colorblindness. This Article challenges the notion of a divided equal protection. First, it shows that before the advent of colorblindness, intent doctrine formed the undivided--and reasonably efficacious--heart of equal protection. Intent doctrine once worked tolerably well for detecting the mistreatment of non-Whites, and also in distinguishing benign from invidious discrimination--the two tasks at which current equal protection grievously fails. Second, it demonstrates that colorblindness developed in response to intent doctrine, and in turn led to a disastrous reworking of that approach. Intent and colorblindness are not separate, but inextricably intertwined. Rather than seeing equal protection today as bifurcated, we should understand it as again unified, though under what might best be termed "intentional blindness." Combining the names of the two doctrines, this portmanteau captures the marrow of the Court's racial jurisprudence--which seems intentionally blind to the persistence of racial discrimination against non-Whites. It is this resistance that connects the current assaults on antidiscrimination statutes to the impending demise of affirmative action. It also links both of these to a larger history of reversals in equality law spanning four decades. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of human rights reacts to a world that is adikia ("unjust"), as the ancient Greeks put it, or out of joint. However, like the sound made by the tree that falls in the forest when no one is around to hear it, the disjointedness of the world remains invisible unless someone notices it as adikia, as unjust. "What the eye doesn't see the heart doesn't grieve over. Thus, the ethical intentionality of noticing and caring about the very real sufferings of others constitutes the living origin of human rights. Only when concrete suffering is noticed can the abstract concepts and pragmatic maneuvers associated with human rights discourse be brought to bear on it. But there is a paradox here: since the concepts expressing the true do not and cannot express the totality of the real, intentionality's aim is never completely on target. Although an excess of unsaid haunts every event of saying, the ignoble desire to forge a unanimous interpretation tempts us to ignore this excess. This Essay claims that the role of ethics in connection with the justice of human rights is to defy the world's course, whatever that course may be. Only by means of a relentless critique that always attends to the particular can the many abstractions of human rights discourse be prevented from becoming a farce, or worse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]