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The article offers information on the intervals of the Cabinet appointment in the U.S. during the transition period. Topics discussed include various positions that have been accorded Cabinet rank, like the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), finalization of the medial Cabinet appointment, and the table on the length of appointment process intervals for the Cabinet positions from 1981-2009.

The length of the appointment processes during presidential transitions has been of concern to observers for more than 30 years. The process is likely to develop a bottleneck during this time due to the large number of candidates who must be selected, vetted, and, in the case of positions filled through appointment by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate (PAS positions), considered by that body. The appointment process has three stages: selection and vetting, nomination and Senate consideration, and presidential appointment. Congress has taken steps to accelerate appointments during presidential transitions. In recent decades, Senate committees have provided for prenomination consideration of Cabinet-level nominations; examples of such actions are provided in this report. In addition, recently adopted statutory provisions appear designed to facilitate faster processing of appointments during presidential transitions. Among the new statutory provisions were those enacted by Congress in response to certain 9/11 Commission recommendations, mainly in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. Also part of this act was a sense of the Senate resolution stating that nominations to national security positions should be submitted by the President-elect to the Senate by Inauguration Day, and that Senate consideration of all such nominations should be completed within 30 days of submission. The President has certain powers--constitutional recess appointment authority and statutory authority under the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998--that he or she could, under certain circumstances, use unilaterally to fill PAS positions on a temporary basis. Analyses of data related to Cabinet and selected subcabinet appointments during the last five transitions from 1981 through 2009 suggest the following: In general, transition-period Cabinetlevel nominees were selected, vetted, considered, and confirmed expeditiously; they generally took office shortly after the new President's inauguration. Comparisons among the five transitions suggest that some Presidents announced their Cabinet-position selections sooner than did others, but that this did not appear to affect the pace of the overall appointment process. On average, the interval between election day and final disposition of nominations to selected subcabinet positions was more than twice as long as that of nominations to Cabinet-level positions, though nominees to subcabinet positions in some departments were faster than others. Comparisons among the median intervals for the five transitions suggest that (1) the time required for selection and vetting of nominees for these positions has grown longer; (2) the period of Senate consideration has also grown longer; (3) Senate consideration of nominations is generally faster than the selection and vetting process that precedes it; and (4) the median durations of the appointment process for the George H.W. Bush, Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama transitions were notably longer than for the Reagan transition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Presidential Transition Act of 1963 (PTA) authorizes funding for the General Services Administration (GSA) to provide suitable office space, staff compensation, and other services associated with the presidential transition process (3 U.S.C. '102 note). The act has been amended a number of times since 1963 in response to evolving understandings of the proper role of the government in the transition process. Since the 2008-2009 transition, the PTA has been amended twice. The Pre-Election Presidential Transition Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-283) did so by authorizing additional support to eligible candidates for pre-election transition planning. The 2010 act also included related provisions that were not included as part of the PTA at that time. The Edward "Ted" Kaufman and Michael Leavitt Presidential Transitions Improvements Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-136), enacted on March 18, 2016, incorporated some provisions of the 2010 law, with modifications, into the PTA. It also further amended the PTA with additional provisions for pre-election transition support for eligible presidential candidates. As amended, the PTA directs the President and the incumbent Administration to establish a specified transition-related infrastructure, with some features ongoing and others during a presidential election year only. It also authorizes the provision by the incumbent administration of certain pre-election transition support for eligible candidates. In addition, the PTA authorizes eligible candidates to fund pre-election transition activities through their campaigns. The statute also establishes a process for designating and preparing career officials who will act as agency leaders during the transition process. It further provides for the negotiation, before the election, of memoranda of understanding between the incumbent President and eligible candidates concerning post-election transition matters. Once the President-elect and Vice President-elect have been ascertained by the GSA Administrator, the PTA authorizes the Administrator to provide, to each President-elect and Vice President-elect, certain facilities, funds, and services, such as office space and payment for office staffs and travel expenses. In order to receive services and funds under the act, eligible candidates, Presidents-elect, and Vice Presidents-elect are required to adhere to certain transition-related contribution limits and disclosure requirements. Other provisions of the PTA provide for expedited security clearance processes for transition team members and the incoming President's top appointees. In general, presidential transition activities under these statutes are coordinated by the General Services Administration (GSA) and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The President's FY2016 budget proposal for GSA included a request for $13.278 million in funding for activities authorized by the Pre-Election Presidential Transition Act of 2010 in anticipation of the 2016-2017 presidential transition. These requests were endorsed by Congress and included in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, which was enacted on December 18, 2015 (P.L. 114-113). The President's FY2017 budget proposal for GSA included a request for $9.5 million for PTA-related activities. Of this sum, not more than $1 million was to be used for training and orientation activities under specified provisions of the act. From enactment of the PTA in 1964 (P.L. 88-277) through the presidential transition of 2008- 2009, much of the PTA-authorized and funded support was provided after the election of the incoming President and Vice President. The pre-election-related provisions enacted in 2010 had effect for the first time during the 2012 presidential election cycle, and those provisions enacted in 2016 will come into effect during the 2016-2017 presidential transition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the process behind the vacant presidentially appointment, Senate-confirmed position under the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998. Topics discussed include functions of a vacant advice and consent office carried out indefinitely by another official, unsuccessful nominations and payment limitations and delegation of duties to another official.

The article explains statutory provision types enacted by Congress for the establishment of positions in the executive branch of the federal government. Topics covered include provisions on fixed terms of office such as the Director of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and qualifications required for Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) administrator. Also mentioned are holdover provisions for good performance and provisions for appointing and removing committee chairs.

The article explains the three stages in the process for appointment in advice and consent positions (PAS positions) of top officers in the federal government. Topics covered include selection of appointees by the White House Office of Presidential Personnel, the clearance process of submitting forms to the Office of Government Ethics (GOE) and the Senate confirming the nomination. Also mentioned is the final appointment phase of being given a commission and being sworn in to office.

The article presents an overview of the appointment and confirmation process for top position officers in the executive branch. Topics covered include three stages in the advise and consent process, consideration of the Senate and temporary and recess appointments. Also discussed are statutory provisions, fixed term appointments and removal of limitations as well as appointment and removal of committee chairs and holdover provisions.

The article reports that Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year 2019 has planned initiatives related to government reorganization and also the federal workforce reform. Topics discussed include planned organizational change and federal workforce reform and Funding priorities and Aligning total compensation with private sector.

The article offers information on several employees of Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) who were appointed/promoted as director through the nomination and confirmation process from 1973-2013. Among the FBI employees are L. Patrick Gray III, Clarence M. Kelley, and Frank M. Johnson Jr. It also mentions the termination of James B. Comey Jr., FBI director, by U.S. President Donald Trump.

The article discusses the appointment process of the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) by the president and with the consent of the Senate which is by vetting and selecting candidate for the position. Topics include FBI background checking and financial disclosure, Committee on the Judiciary holds hearings on the nomination for the FBI Director, and Senate confirmations on the nomination which is formally appointed for the FBI Director by the president.

The article reports on efforts of the U.S. Congress to block recess appointments by limiting recess duration. It describes the developments on the scheduling and pro forma session practices implemented unilaterally by the Senate and the impact of these practices on the incidence of recess appointments. It discusses the Senate practices necessitated by the absence of House consent to adjourn and the appointments made during a three-day recess between two pro forma session from 2011 to 2012.

The article discusses the characteristics of recess appointments by U.S. President Barack Obama. Data show the annual number of recess appointments to full-time and part-time positions by recent presidents. It shows the practice on recess appointments within- and between-session of the Senate and the recess appointment power of the U.S. president only to intersession recesses. It looks back at recess appointments to positions to the executive, legislative and judiciary branches of government.

The article answers a question on whether the U.S. Congress can prevent recess appointments.

The article answers a question on how long the U.S. Senate must be in recess before the U.S. president may make a recess appointment.

The article discusses the assistance provided during the Pre-Election Presidential Transition Act of 2010 including services, facilities and funds. The legislation limits the donations for qualified candidates to 5,000 U.S. dollars from any person or organization. The General Services Administration authorizes several initiatives after determining the President and Vice-President elect such as payment of expenses, and procurement of office space, furnishings and equipment.

Several tables which show the full-time positions in multilateral organizations with their respective nominees and incumbents are presented including the African Development Bank (AfDB), the Asian Development Bank (AsDB), and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).

Several tables which show the full-time positions in the Executive Office of the President with their respective nominees and incumbents are presented including the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).

Several tables regarding full-time positions in independent agencies in the U.S. are presented including the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

An introduction to a report on the selection and appointment process for full-time positions in independent and other agencies in the U.S. is presented, including topics on the process of filling appointed government positions in independent and other agencies, the nominations for full time positions which were submitted to the 110th Congress, and a profile of each agency.

The article focuses on the selection and appointment process for full-time positions in independent and other agencies in the U.S. It discusses the appointment process from selection, clearance, and nomination, then Senate review, to appointment. Also examined are recess and temporary appointments, and the nominations submitted during the 110th Congress. A list of independent and other agencies is presented which includes the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

The article reports on the aspects of the nomination of Cabinet and high-level positions in the U.S. following the presidential transition. Topics discussed include the roles of the Senate in handling the nomination, the confirmation hearings and voting held by the Senate prior to the formal submission of the nominees, and the role of several federal committees such as the Senate Armed Service Committee.

The article offers information on the U.S. Senate process of confirming the nomination by the president. It mentions that the confirmation process starts with the committee level with activity including investigation, reporting, and hearing stages. It notes that a simple majority vote is required to confirm the nomination.

The President makes appointments, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to some 152 fulltime leadership positions on 34 federal regulatory and other collegial boards and commissions. This appointment process consists of three distinct stages: selection, clearance, and nomination by the President; consideration by the Senate; and appointment by the President. These advice and consent positions can also temporarily be filled by the President alone through a recess appointment. Membership positions on this set of collegial bodies often have fixed terms, and incumbents are often protected from arbitrary removal by the President. The enabling statutes for most of these boards and commissions require political party balance in their membership. During the 110th Congress, President George W. Bush submitted nominations to the Senate for 74 of these 152 positions. (Most of the remaining positions on these boards and commissions were not vacant during that time.) A total of 88 nominations were submitted, of which 46 were confirmed, 15 were withdrawn, and 27 were returned to the President. The number of nominations exceeded the number of positions because the President submitted multiple nominations for some positions. In some cases the President submitted one nomination for the end of a term in progress and a second nomination of the same person to the same position for the succeeding term. In other cases, the President submitted a second nomination after his first choice failed to be confirmed. President Bush made one recess appointment to a board covered by this report during the 110th Congress, and he submitted an "extra" nomination of that individual in order to comply with a law affecting the payment of that appointee. At the end of the 110th Congress, 15 incumbents were serving past the expiration of their terms. In addition, there were 22 vacancies among the 152 positions. This report specifies, for the 110th Congress, all nominations to full-time positions on 34 regulatory and other collegial boards and commissions. Profiles of each board and commission provide information on their organizational structures, membership as of the end of the 110th Congress, and appointment activity during that Congress. The organizational section discusses the statutory requirements for the appointed positions, including the number of members on each board or commission, their terms of office, whether or not they may continue in their positions after their terms expire, whether or not political balance is required, and the method for selection of the chair. Membership and appointment activity are provided in tabular form. The report also includes tables summarizing the collective appointment activity for all 34 bodies, and identifying Senate recesses during the 110th Congress. The calculations of nomination-to-confirmation intervals provided in this report counted all the days within the interval, including those during summer recesses and between sessions of the Senate. The inclusion of all days differs from the methodology used in similar CRS reports for previous Congresses. The new methodology takes into consideration changes in Senate adjournment practices and is consistent with published research in this area. This change may reduce the comparability of statistics in this report with those of the earlier research. Information for this report was compiled from data from the Senate nominations database of the Legislative Information System at http://www.congress.gov/nomis/, telephone discussions with agency officials, agency websites, the United States Code, and the 2008 edition of United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions (more commonly known as the "Plum Book"). This report will not be updated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On April 20, 2010, an explosion and fire occurred on the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig in the Gulf of Mexico. This resulted in 11 worker fatalities, a massive oil release, and a national response effort in the Gulf of Mexico region by the federal and state governments as well as BP. Based on estimates from the Flow Rate Technical Group, which is led by the U.S. Geological Survey, the 2010 Gulf spill has become the largest oil spill in U.S. waters, eclipsing the 1989 Exxon Valdez spill several times over. The oil spill has damaged natural resources and has had regional economic impacts. In addition, questions have been raised as to whether the regulations and regulators of offshore oil exploration have kept pace with the increasingly complex technologies needed to explore and develop deeper waters. Crude oil has been washing into marshes and estuaries and onto beaches in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. Oil has killed wildlife, and efforts are underway to save oil-coated birds. The most immediate economic impact of the oil spill has been on the Gulf fishing industry: commercial and recreational fishing have faced extensive prohibitions within the federal waters of the Gulf exclusive economic zone. The fishing industry, including seafood processing and related wholesale and retail businesses, supports over 200,000 jobs with related economic activity of $5.5 billion. Other immediate economic impacts include a decline in tourism. On the other hand, jobs related to cleanup activities could mitigate some of the losses in the fishing and tourism industry. The Minerals Management Service (MMS) and the U.S. Coast Guard are the primary regulators of drilling activity. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has multiple responsibilities, with a representative serving as the vice-chair of the National Response Team and Regional Response Teams. The Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) has responsibilities with respect to the economic impacts of the spill; its role so far has been primarily that of an observer, but that may change once the scope of impacts can be better understood. MMS is also the lead regulatory authority for offshore oil and gas leasing, including collection of royalty payments. MMS regulations generally require that a company with leasing obligations demonstrate that proposed oil and gas activity conforms to federal laws and regulations, is safe, prevents waste, does not unreasonably interfere with other uses of the OCS, and does not cause impermissible harm or damage to the human, marine, or coastal environments. On May 13, 2010, the Department of the Interior announced that Secretary Ken Salazar had initiated the process of reorganizing the MMS administratively to separate the financial and regulatory missions of the agency. The Coast Guard generally overseas the safety of systems at the platform level of a mobile offshore drilling unit. Several issues for Congress have emerged as a result of the Deepwater Horizon incident. What lessons should be drawn from the incident? What technological and regulatory changes may be needed to meet risks peculiar to drilling in deeper water? How should Congress distribute costs associated with a catastrophic oil spill? What interventions may be necessary to ensure recovery of Gulf resources and amenities? What does the Deepwater Horizon incident imply for national energy policy, and the trade-offs between energy needs, risks of deepwater drilling, and protection of natural resources and amenities? This report provides an overview of selected issues related to the Deepwater Horizon incident and is not intended to be comprehensive. It will be updated to reflect emerging issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the beginning of the federal government, Presidents have called upon executive branch officials to provide them with advice regarding matters of policy and administration. While Cabinet members were among the first to play such a role, the creation of the Executive Office of the President (EOP) in 1939 and the various agencies located within that structure resulted in a large increase in the number and variety of presidential advisers. All senior staff members of the White House Office and the leaders of the various EOP agencies and instrumentalities could be said to serve as advisers to the President. Occasionally, these executive branch officials playing a presidential advisory role have been called upon to testify before congressional committees and subcommittees. Sometimes, such invited appearances have been prompted by allegations of personal misconduct on the part of the official, but they have also included instances when accountability for policymaking and administrative or managerial actions have instigated the request for testimony. Because such appearances before congressional committees or subcommittees seemingly could result in demands for advice proffered to the President, or the disclosure—inadvertent or otherwise—of such advice, there has been resistance, from time to time, by the Chief Executive to allowing such testimony. Congress has a constitutionally rooted right of access to the information it needs to perform its Article I legislative and oversight functions. Generally, a congressional committee with jurisdiction over the subject matter, which is conducting an authorized investigation for legislative or oversight purposes, has a right to information held by the executive branch in the absence of either a valid claim of constitutional privilege by the executive or a statutory provision whereby Congress has limited its constitutional right to information. A congressional committee may request (informally or by a letter from the committee chair, perhaps co-signed by the ranking Member) or demand (pursuant to subpoena) the testimony of a presidential adviser. However, Congress may encounter legal and political problems in attempting to enforce a subpoena to a presidential adviser. Conflicts concerning congressional requests or demands for executive branch testimony or documents often involve extensive negotiations and may be resolved by some form of compromise as to, inter alia, the scope of the testimony or information to be provided to Congress. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the office designations made by President Barack Obama and the Cabinet Secretaries in the White House in the U.S. which is coined by news media as czars. It provides a comprehensive discussion on several constitutional concerns that have been evoked about Obama's presidential advisors and some selected appointees in the Obama administration. Additionally, it also mentions several legislations introduced to President Obama regarding the appointments in his administration.

This report focuses on the processes, during a presidential transition, by which top-level executive branch PAS positions are filled. Outside of top White House staff appointments, these are a new President's earliest and arguably most important appointments. In the next section, the usual process is described in three stages [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the 109th Congress, President George W. Bush submitted nominations to the Senate for 90 of the 152 full-time positions on 33 regulatory and other boards and commissions that have such positions. (Most of the remaining positions were not vacant during that time.) A total of 111 nominations were submitted for these 90 positions, of which 79 were confirmed, 6 were withdrawn, and 26 were returned to the President. The number of nominations exceeds the number of positions because the President submitted multiple nominations for some positions. In some cases, for example, the President submitted one nomination for the end of a term in progress and a second nomination of the same person to the same position for the succeeding term. In other cases, the President submitted a second nomination after his first choice failed to be confirmed. The President also usually submitted an "extra" nomination of an individual to whom he had given a recess appointment in order to comply with a law affecting the payment of that appointee. President Bush made 10 appointments to regulatory and other boards and commissions when the Senate was adjourned during a session (known as intrasession recess appointments) and 2 other appointments between sessions (known as intersession recess appointments). At the end of the Congress, 12 incumbents were serving past the expiration of their terms. In addition, there were 11 vacancies among the 152 positions. This report provides an overview of the process for filling positions to which the President makes appointments with the advice and consent of the Senate. It also specifies, for the 109th Congress, all nominations to full-time positions on 33 regulatory and other collegial boards and commissions. Profiles of each board and commission provide information on their organizational structures, membership as of end of the 109th Congress, and appointment activity during that Congress. The organizational section discusses the statutory requirements for the appointed positions, including the number of members on each board or commission, their terms of office, whether or not they may continue in their positions after their terms expire, whether or not political balance is required, and the method for selection of the chair. Membership and appointment activity are provided in tabular form. The report also includes tables summarizing the collective appointment activity for all 33 bodies, and identifying Senate recesses during the 109th Congress. Information for this report was compiled from data from the Senate nominations database of the Legislative Information System at [http://www.congress.gov/nomis/], telephone discussions with agency officials, agency websites, the United States Code, and the 2004 edition of United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions (more commonly known as the "Plum Book"). This report will not be updated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under the Constitution, the President and the Senate share the power to make appointments to the highest-level politically appointed positions in the federal government. The Constitution also empowers the President unilaterally to make a temporary appointment to such a position if it is vacant and the Senate is in recess. Such an appointment, termed a recess appointment, expires at the end of the following session of the Senate. This report identifies recess appointments made by President George W. Bush from the time he took office on January 20, 2001, through October 31, 2008. Basic descriptive statistics regarding these appointments are also provided. As of October 31, 2008, President Bush had made 171 recess appointments. President William J. Clinton, in comparison, made a total of 139 recess appointments during the course of his presidency. Of President Bush's 171 recess appointments, 99 were to full-time positions, and the remaining 72 were to part-time positions. Thirty were made during recesses between Congresses or between sessions of Congress (intersession recess appointments). The remaining 141 were made during recesses within sessions of Congress (intrasession recess appointments). The duration of the 24 recesses during which President Bush made recess appointments ranged from 10 to 47 days. The average (mean) duration of these recesses was 25 days, and the median duration was 26 days. In 165 of the 171 cases in which President Bush made a recess appointment, the individual was also nominated, by October 31, 2008, to the position to which he or she had been appointed. In 162 of these 165 cases, the individuals being appointed had previously been nominated to the position. In the three remaining cases, the individuals were first nominated to the position after the recess appointment. Of the 165 cases in which the President submitted a nomination for the recess appointee, as of October 31, 2008, 95 had resulted in confirmation, 6 were pending in the. . . [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Presidential Transition Act of 1963 (PTA), as amended, authorizes funding for the General Services Administration (GSA) to provide suitable office space, staff compensation, and other services associated with the presidential transition process.1 Section 6 of the PTA directs the President to include in his budget request, for each fiscal year in which his regular term of office will expire, "a proposed appropriation for carrying out the purposes of this Act." The President's FY2009 budget proposal included $8.52 million in funding for the 2008-2009 presidential transition. Of this sum, not more than $1 million was to be used for training and orientation activities under specified provisions of the PTA. These recommendations were endorsed by Congress and included in the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act.2 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article provides an overview on the significant role of the U.S. Senate Congress in the confirmation process on political nominations and appointments. It discusses the categorization of positions and referral to several U.S. Senate Committees which include the Senate Committee on the Budget, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs.

Under the Constitution, the President and the Senate share the power to make appointments to the highest-level politically appointed positions in the federal government. The Constitution also empowers the President unilaterally to make a temporary appointment to such a position if it is vacant and the Senate is in recess. Such an appointment, termed a recess appointment, expires at the end of the following session of the Senate. This report identifies recess appointments made by President George W. Bush from the time he took office on January 20, 2001, through June 4, 2007, the end of the 2007 Memorial Day recess. Basic descriptive statistics regarding these appointments are also provided. As of June 4, 2007, President Bush had made 171 recess appointments. President William J. Clinton, in comparison, made a total of 139 recess appointments during the course of his presidency. Of President Bush's 171 recess appointments, 105 were to full-time positions, and the remaining 66 were to part-time positions. Thirty were made during recesses between Congresses or between sessions of Congress (intersession recess appointments). The remaining 141 were made during recesses within sessions of Congress (intrasession recess appointments). The duration of the 24 recesses during which President Bush made recess appointments ranged from 10 to 47 days. The average (mean) duration of these recesses was 25 days, and the median duration was 26 days. In 165 of the 171 cases in which President Bush made a recess appointment, the individual was also nominated, by June 4, 2007, to the position to which he or she had been appointed. In 162 of these 165 cases, the individuals being appointed had previously been nominated to the position. In three additional cases, the individuals were first nominated to the position after the recess appointment. Of the 165 cases in which the President submitted a nomination for the recess appointee, as of June 4, 2007, 91 had resulted in confirmation, 27 were pending in the Senate, and the remaining 47 had failed to be confirmed. In 14 of these 47 recess appointment cases, the President withdrew the nominations of the appointees, and in the remaining 33 cases, the nominations were returned to the President. Additional information may be found in other CRS reports. For general information on recess appointments practice, see CRS Report RS21308, Recess Appointments: Frequently Asked Questions, by Henry B. Hogue. For information on judicial recess appointments, see CRS Report RS22039, Federal Recess Judges, by Louis Fisher. For information on related legal issues, see CRS Report RL32971, Judicial Recess Appointments: A Legal Overview, and CRS Report RL33009, Recess Appointments: A Legal Overview, both by T.J. Halstead. This report will be updated periodically, as additional recess appointments are made.< [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, some Members of Congress and others questioned the competence of leadership at the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). After investigating the federal response to the hurricane, the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs concluded that the agency's leader had "lacked the leadership skills that were needed for his critical position." In response, the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-295, 120 Stat. 1394) stipulated that the FEMA Administrator, among other top agency leaders, must meet certain qualifications. President George W. Bush's signing statement for this act seemingly challenged the constitutionality of these requirements, and it stated that the "executive branch shall construe [the applicable provision] in a manner consistent with the Appointments Clause of the Constitution." Three Members of Congress then urged the President to "reconsider [his] position and join [them] in calling for strong standards and the highest professional qualifications for the leadership of FEMA and for open dialogue between the executive and legislative branches on issues of such significant importance to out nation's safety and security." These events reflect broader interbranch differences over congressional authority to establish statutory qualifications. The preponderance of evidence and historical practice suggests that Congress generally has the constitutional authority to set such qualifications. The boundaries of this authority have not been conclusively drawn, however, and the executive branch, in recent years, has asserted that congressional authority in this area is more limited than congressional practice would suggest. Statutory qualification requirements might continue to be an area of conflict between Congress and the President. Inasmuch as these provisions are not self-enforcing, their success as a means of assuring competent leadership of the federal government will depend upon the two branches' adherence to them during the selection and confirmation processes. In practice, it has not been unusual for Congress to mandate that appointees to certain positions meet specified requirements. Some statutory qualification provisions, like those for the FEMA Administrator, require that appointees have certain experience, skills, or educational backgrounds that are associated with competence. Other qualification provisions address a variety of characteristics, such as citizenship status, residency, or, for the purpose of maintaining political balance on regulatory boards, political party affiliation. Congress has used such statutory provisions selectively; most executive branch positions do not have them. This report provides background on the constitutional appointments framework, discusses Congress's constitutional authority to set qualifications, discusses congressional practices in this area, and provides related analysis and options. The report includes two tables with examples of existing positions with qualification requirements. This report will be updated in response to policy developments related to statutory qualifications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article reports on the stability missions of the U.S. military forces as preparation for the 110th Congress. According to the article, a November 28, 2005 Department of Defense (DOD) directive demonstrates a greater shift in attitudes regarding the peacekeeping and stabilization operations. It is stated that the September 11, 2001 event has brought doubt to the U.S. national security's ability to ensure safety around the world. Additional issues related to the peacekeeping missions of the U.S. military are discussed.

The article looks at some frequently asked questions and answers related to recess appointments in the U.S. Congress, a process wherein the President may make a temporary appointment without Senate approval. It discusses the power shared by the President and the Senate in making appointments to high-level policy-making positions under the Constitution. It explains the purpose of a recess appointment and the legal constraints on the President's recess appointment of power.

Reports issued by committees of the 109th Congress, the White House, federal offices of Inspector General, and the Government Accountability Office (GAO), among others, concluded that the losses caused by Hurricane Katrina and other disasters were due, in part, to deficiencies such as questionable leadership decisions and capabilities, organizational failures, overwhelmed preparation and communication systems, and inadequate statutory authorities. From these conclusions the 109th Congress revised federal emergency management policies vested in the President; reorganized the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA); and enhanced and clarified the mission, functions, and authorities of the agency, as well as those of its parent, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Six statutes enacted by the 109th Congress are notable in that they contain changes that apply to future federal emergency management actions. These public laws include the following: [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Members of Congress have introduced legislation in both the House and Senate to alter federal emergency management organizational structures and responsibilities, amend authorities that guide federal action, impose emergency management leadership qualification requirements, and make other changes. The proposals are based upon investigations conducted on the role of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and other entities in the response to Hurricane Katrina in the fall of 2005. Some observers reduce the matter to one basic question: "Should FEMA remain within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), or should the agency regain the independent status it had before the creation of DHS?" The issue, however, is more complex than just one of organizational placement. Other questions include the following: [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the reorganization legislation of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in the 109th Congress in the U.S. The proposals are said to be based upon investigations conducted on the role of the FEMA and other entities in the response to Hurricane Katrina. Also offered are the questions to consider to determine whether FEMA remain within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), or should the agency regain the independent status it had before DHS was created.

Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf coasts of Louisiana, Alabama, and Mississippi on August 29, 2005, resulting in severe and widespread damage to the region. The response of the federal government, especially the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), in the aftermath of the storm has been widely criticized. Some of the criticism has focused on the organizational arrangements involving FEMA and its parent, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).One month prior to the hurricane, in July 2005, Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff announced plans for a reorganization of DHS, including FEMA. Known as the "Second Stage Review," or "2SR," the reorganization transferred emergency preparedness functions from FEMA to a new Preparedness Directorate, among other changes. The Administration began implementation of the reorganization on October 1, 2005. In response to Administration requests, congressional support for the proposal was provided through approval of the FY2006 appropriations legislation. In the aftermath of the Katrina disaster, administrative structure issues remain a matter of contention. Pending legislation before Congress (H.R. 3656, H.R. 3659, H.R. 3816, H.R. 3685, H.R. 4009, H.R. 4493, S. 1615, S. 2302, H.R. 4840, H.R. 5316, and H.R. 5351) would make further changes. The release of reports by the House, Senate, and White House on the response to Hurricane Katrina may lead to further examination of the issues. This report provides background information on the establishment and evolution of federal emergency management organizational arrangements since the end of World War II and briefly summarizes the legislative proposals. More detailed information and analysis concerning this topic may be found in CRS Report RL33064, "Organization and Mission of the Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate: Issues and Options for the 109th Congress," by Keith Bea. For more information on the Chertoff initiative generally, see CRS Report RL33042, "Department of Homeland Security Reorganization: The 2SR Initiative," by Harold C. Relyea and Henry B. Hogue. This report will be updated as events warrant. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was mandated by the Homeland Security Act of 2002. The creation of DHS resulted in a reorganization of the executive branch on a scale not experienced since the establishment of the Department of Defense (DOD) half a century ago. Originally denominated the National Military Establishment at birth in 1947, DOD was given its current name and underwent the first of what would be a series of structural modifications through statutory amendments in 1949. A similarly complex organization, DHS was the product of legislative compromises, and it was anticipated that congressional overseers, as well as department officials, would monitor the management and operations of DHS with a view to adjusting its structure as conditions warranted. In this regard, Section 872 of the Homeland Security Act authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security to reorganize functions and organizational units within DHS, subject to specified limits. In late January 2003, as components of DHS were being transferred to the department's operational control, President George W. Bush modified his original reorganization plan for DHS to reconfigure the functions of certain border security agencies into two new components -- the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection and the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement -- within the department's Border and Transportation Security Directorate. In one of his first actions as Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge's successor, Michael Chertoff, on March 2, 2005, the day before he was sworn in as Secretary, announced in testimony before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security that he was "initiating a comprehensive review of the Department's organization, operations, and policies." This effort, he said, would begin "within days." The results of that undertaking, which came to be known as the Second Stage Review or 2SR, were made public in mid-July. As Secretary Chertoff explained, 2SR involved the evaluation of a variety of operational and policy issues, and among those was "the DHS organizational structure, to make sure that our organization is best aligned to support our mission." However, no report on the 2SR process and reforms was issued. This report focuses primarily on the conclusions and proposals resulting from 2SR pertaining to organization and managerial lines of authority matters. Initial issues concern the means for realizing the proposed 2SR reorganization; the efficiencies and effectiveness that will result with the proposed flatter, but more sprawling, restructuring; and how new leadership positions will be established, filled, compensated, and situated in the DHS hierarchy. This report will be updated as events warrant. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The statutory basis for the present nomination and confirmation process was developed in 1968 and 1976 and has been used since the death of J. Edgar Hoover in 1972. Over this time, five nominations have been confirmed and two have been withdrawn by the President before confirmation. The position of FBI director has a fixed 10-year term; the officeholder may not be reappointed. There are no statutory restrictions on the authority of the President to remove the FBI director. One director has been removed by the President since 1972. The current FBI director, Robert S. Mueller III, was confirmed by the Senate on August 2, 2001. This report will not be updated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During consideration of the legislation creating the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS), many observers stressed the need to mobilize a new department quickly to respond to threats to homeland security. Yet new government agencies often encounter substantial difficulties that lead to start-up delays. In one study of reorganized agencies, the General Accounting Office identified delays in obtaining key officials as one common start-up problem. Nearly all the top policymaking positions in the new homeland security department are to be filled through appointments by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate. In general, delays in filling such positions have not been uncommon, particularly at the outset of a new Administration. Although appointment delays may raise problems for any agency, delays for new agencies can cause major difficulties; leadership is critical during the transition, when many decisions regarding policies, procedures, and organizational issues must be made. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296) created DHS, which came into existence on January 24, 2003. The act creates or transfers to the new department some 26 full-time, civilian, presidentially appointed positions subject to Senate confirmation. As of January 15, 2004, the President had submitted 14 nominations to these positions, and the Senate had confirmed 13 of these. In addition, the President had used authority provided in the act to appoint six individuals to DHS positions on a temporary basis. Five of these had been nominated and confirmed to the positions after their temporary appointments. The nomination of the remaining individual was pending in the Senate as of that date, and he was given a recess appointment on December 26, 2003. The President had also used authority provided in the act to appoint, without Senate confirmation, one individual who had previously been confirmed for a similar position in another agency. The previously appointed Commandant of the Coast Guard, Commissioner of Customs, and Administrator of the United States Fire Administration continued to serve after their organizations were transferred to the new department. The first Deputy Secretary had left the position, and a replacement had been confirmed. The appointment status of the head of the Transportation Security Administration could not be determined. A DHS confirmation information table and organizational chart are provided. Studies indicate that the appointment process is, on average, taking longer, and that the selection and vetting process often takes much longer than the confirmation process. Given the stated urgency of the new department's business, Congress could choose to facilitate the appointment process for DHS positions. Options for enabling rapid appointment would include making statutory changes to streamline the vetting process and simplifying the Senate confirmation process, particularly at the committee level. Some possible changes, however, could prove controversial. Related information may be found in CRS Report RL31751, Homeland Security: Department Organization and Management -- Implementation Phase, by Harold C. Relyea. The appointment information in this report will be updated as events warrant. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]