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Copyright of Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía is the property of Universidad Complutense de Madrid and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Cognitio - Revista de Filosofia is the property of Cognitio - Revista de Filosofia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The recent past has witnessed a significant amount of new interest in the intellectual history of the Vormärz, or the period in German history immediately prior to the 1848 Revolutions, and especially in the theories of republicanism developed among those who are variously known as the Young, Left, or New Hegelians. At the same time, scholars have reopened the question of Marx's relationship with republicanism and the republican conception of freedom. But one figure who has been conspicuously overlooked in this context was arguably the most radical and revolutionary republican of the period: Edgar Bauer. This paper fills a gap in the extant literature by providing a survey of Edgar Bauer's work during the crucial years of 1841–1843. It shows that his position differed in important ways from that of his brother Bruno and explains the political stakes of his equally vehement attacks on the Christian state, on the one side, and its liberal opposition, on the other. It proposes that his position developed rapidly over the course of the three years in question, until he was finally arrested, put on trial, and imprisoned for insulting religious society, mocking the law, arousing dissatisfaction with the state, and offending the majesty of the king. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the Winter semester of 1925/26 Heidegger gave what appears to have been his first seminar on Hegel. Still unpublished in any form, this neglected seminar is of extraordinary importance, and not only for the in-depth and critical reading it pursues of Hegel's Logic I, a critique that charges Hegel with not knowing how or where to begin. The seminar is also important for its attempt to demonstrate that Hegel's philosophy was thoroughly Greek. In the class of 25 November 1925, Heidegger is reported to have said: "Therefore am I in the habit of saying that Hegel is the most radical Greek there ever was. With the means that were pre-formed in Greek ontology as if in a seed, the means that lay at the roots of Greek ontology, Hegel mastered something (roughly speaking: spirit, history) that in this form was never experienced by the Greeks. This is only asserted here. Proof of this thesis is naturally very difficult." Heidegger therefore turns towards the end of the seminar to Aristotle's account of time in the Physics to show that both this understanding of time and the conception of being it presupposes are also Hegel's. Yet Heidegger entrusts the initial presentation of Aristotle's conception of time to a student whose reading is at odds with his own, so much so that Heidegger accuses the student of turning everything on its head. The student's name is H.-G. Gadamer. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the conception of absolute idealism elaborated by Czech Hegelian František Sedlák. First, Max Stirner’s position of egoism is presented, as Sedlák was influenced by his critique of the conceptual vertical, i.e. of the subsumption of the individual under abstractions. Second, it examines how Sedlák employed such critique in resolving the so-called “paradox of authority.” Third, it sketches both Sedlák’s reception and critique of Tolstoyanism, at whose conceptual core he encountered a problem associated with conception of abstract morality, which he criticized at first from the standpoint of Stirnerian egoism, later from the standpoint of Hegelian absolute idealism. Finally, Sedlák’s conception of absolute idealism as a philosophy of existence is reconstructed.

Both Hegel and the later Wittgenstein were concerned with the problem of how to begin speculation, or the problem of beginning. I argue that despite many differences, there are surprising similarities between their thinking about the beginning. They both consider different kinds of beginnings and combine them into complex analogies. The beginning has a subjective and an objective moment. The philosophizing subject has to begin with something, with an object. For Hegel, the objective moment is pure being. For Wittgenstein, the objective moment is something that cannot be doubted. As regards the subjective moment, the philosophizing subject has to decide, without any reason, to conclude her quest for the presuppositionless beginning and finally begin at the beginning. The arational moment of this decision is echoed throughout any rational thought. Any application of a (rational) rule is, ultimately, a blind decision to apply this rule. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In what way does Kierkegaard's conception of selfhood and despair address the prospect of nihilistic humanism wherein God, sin, and spirit are conceived as the creations of humankind intended to escape the distress of nihilism and imbue life with meaning? By contrasting Kierkegaard's thought with that of a Straussian‐Feuerbachian amalgam of 'Left Hegelianism', I argue that Kierkegaard's work (i.e., taken more holistically than Anti‐Climacus's writings alone so to make the matter of truth more conspicuous than it is in, of note, The Sickness unto Death) may indeed be interpreted as addressing nihilistic humanism. Specifically, I argue that the topic of truth proves essential for demarcating Kierkegaardian selfhood (the 'inside viewpoint') from Left Hegelianism (the 'outside viewpoint'). First, I recapitulate Kierkegaard's concepts of self (Selv) and despair (Fortvivlelse). Second, I present in sequence views from 'outside' and 'inside' of Kierkegaard's authorship. Third, taking Kierkegaard to imply engagement of the viewpoints as necessary, I examine the process of 'prefixture' whereby one prefixes the outside to the inside viewpoint or undertakes the countermovement of prefixing the inside to the outside viewpoint. Finally, I conclude that full integration of the two viewpoints is untenable and underscore truth vis‐à‐vis God as both definitive for deciding between the viewpoints and essential for the way in which Kierkegaard addresses nihilistic humanism as a form of despair. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Looking beyond analytical philosophy which underlies most pedagogical thinking, this study presents a novel idea of fluid education. Fluid dialectic is not only a theory but a method of this study, which draws on the Hegelian dialectics supplemented by Taoism. It recognises the messiness of educational reality by exploring how pedagogic antinomies can help transpose, de-fix or reposition traditional roles in the classroom, and therefore allow a different type of teaching, learning or educational adventure to take place. In contrast to a reality of fixed roles in traditional education, it acknowledges the non-linearity and oppositions that an educational reality usually has. However, instead of arguing against it, we believe the tensions and antinomies presented are valuable in dialectic and interparadigmatic teaching and learning. A framework of fluid education that emphasises the dialectic movements between different antinomies is presented. How one is liberated from fixed time, space and position is discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a meeting between Moacir Gadotti and Karl Marx, two important critical thinkers in education. Gadotti, like Marx, is committed to the worker's point of view, and his work has the potential to drive alternative political projects. Gadotti's book "Concepção Dialética da Educação" highlights the importance of dialectics in history and its role as a new weapon of struggle in Latin America. The article also mentions the relevance of dialectics in pedagogy and its relationship with reality. The text discusses the history of dialectics in philosophy, from its origins in Lao Tse and Zeno of Elea to its development by Hegel and its critique by Marx. It also discusses the value of labor force in capitalism and the importance of class consciousness and revolution in Marx and Engels' scientific socialism. The article concludes by highlighting the importance of dialectics in the transformation of education and society. [Extracted from the article]

Reid's appeal in a practical temper, to the mixed and moral reason in man, as that with which man is inspired - an appeal widened and prolific of deeper questions in Hamilton - was still too cautious to attempt to formulate the mysteries of existence, in fully intelligible principles, which should remove the darkness around the "little light" with which Reid was satisfied. Sir William Hamilton was warning his contemporaries against the "masculine and brilliant" Continental philosophy, and energetically recalling them to Reid, by two essays in the I Edinburgh Review i - one in October 1829, destructive of the "Philosophy of the Unconditioned", the other in October 1830, constructive, on Reid's "Philosophy of Perception". GORDON GRAHAM Alexander Campbell Fraser (1819-1914) was successor to Sir William Hamilton as Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh, a post he held from 1856 to 1891. How has Reid's protest of reason in the name of common sense - a protest against sceptical paralysis of human intelligence, physical and moral - fared in the nineteenth century?. [Extracted from the article]

Kant, Schelling, and Hegel research has frequently highlighted differences when considering their three respective concepts of philoso-phy. Especially with regard to natural philosophy, there seems to be little common ground between them. In my paper, however, I want to revise this perspective, picking up on what brings them together. Taking the concept of matter as my primary example, I will argue that neither Kant nor Schelling nor Hegel are interested in conceiving of nature from the viewpoint of empirical observation and as independent of the subject. Rather, their respective philosophical inquiries into nature's first prin-ciples hinge on critical examinations of reason, providing all three with the conceptual resources to address nature from a metaphysical point of view that is ultimately bound up with rational beings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars have recently argued that Hegel posited international recognition as a necessary feature of international relations. My main effort in this article is to disprove this point. Specifically, I show that since Hegel rejected the notion of an international legal system, he must hold that international recognition depends on the arbitrary will of individual states. To pinpoint Hegel's position, I offer a close reading of Hegel's intricate formulations from the final paragraphs of the Philosophy of Right—formulations that are easy to quote out of context just as they are transparent when considered in due context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article traces two lines of philosophical interpretations of the character of Don Quixote. Common to both is the view that Don Quixote should be treated as a paragon of directness, i.e. a subject that strives to attain his ideals - a sphere of sense that is general - without any mediation (in the sense of Vermittlung). For the existentialist Miguel de Unamuno, who in this respect follows Kierkegaard, the individual cannot constitute himself unless he rejects mediation, Quixote is a knight of faith, whose every intervention is an act of heroism analogous to Abraham's leap of faith. For the Hegelian Constantin Noica the opposite is true: any attempt to move from the particular to the general without mediation is a symptom of an existential and ontological disorder. Taking his cue from Hegel's Law of the Heart and the Frenzy of Self-Conceit (Phenomenology of Spirit), Noica repudiates Quixote's unswerving commitment as insane folly. These two diametrically opposed assessments - one inspired by Kirkegaard, the other by Hegel - show the significance of Don Quixote as a focus of the modern debate about mediation and its dilemmas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Contrastes: Revista Internacional de Filosofia is the property of Contrastes: Revista Internacional de Filosofia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The Owl of Minerva only spreads its wings at dusk. This Hegelian realization might also apply to the last days of Donald Trump in office which brought about many a precedent in the relationship not only between the then President of the United States and its constitution but also between him and his main means of communication: Twitter. The president's tumultuous communication surrounding the transition of power climaxed in an angry mob storming the Capitol in a vain attempt to – dependent on whose narrative one credits – either restore or abolish democracy. Twitter's subsequent decision to ban Trump from using its services for arguably inciting or at least condoning the insurrection quickly led to heated discussions rooted in the issue of the allocation of power within contemporary societies. At the core of these discussions lie two central elements: freedom and the (legitimate) power to restrict it. One side argued that the platform operators had infringed Trump's freedom of speech. In contrast, the other side claimed that abridging Trump's ability to communicate whatever came to his mind was an inevitable step to protect the American constitutional order and thus liberal democracy. Meanwhile, attention has gradually been focused on the larger underlying issues. One common aspect is that both positions seem to presuppose a concept of freedom that is all too formalistic. On a more abstract level, the events also boil down to a clash of two separate claims to power: Social media operators opposing the head of state's claim to do as he wishes. Thus, the paper aspires to analyze the sources of legitimacy for the actions taken by platform operators and their respective counterparts. The analysis is based on Hegel's Philosophy of Right. In particular, Hegel's understanding of freedom, the ideal state and of possible legitimate sources for universal rules shall be put to use. The first point of contact in Hegel's Philosophy of Right is his view of the head of state, his relation to the law, especially to the constitution, and to his constituents. Against this backdrop, it shall be determined how power is distributed in Hegel's state. Then, an attempt shall be made to transfer the underlying ideas and considerations to the power structure and the legitimizing factors as they are laid down in the US Constitution. Furthermore, the paper examines the state's possibilities to react to possibly problematic behavior of the head of state. The focus will be placed on the possibility of holding them accountable for actions directed against the state itself or its constitutional order. Particularly against the backdrop of the questionable efficacy of impeachment procedures in deeply divided nations, the question arises as to whether private actors can legitimately intervene. Concretely, whether social media operators may legitimately bar heads of state from using their platforms in order to protect the state, the legal system or democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Aufklärung: Revista de Filosofia is the property of Aufklarung: Revista de Filosofia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Bajo Palabra: Journal of Philosophy is the property of Bajo Palabra: Journal of Philosophy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Kant-Studien is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This essay evaluates Corradetti's compelling assertion that the "primary aim" of his Relativism and Human Rights "is that of reconstructing some central concepts of the Hegelian understanding of the right and of providing a post-metaphysical reinterpretation of the notion of recognition in terms of a dialectical process, granting fundamental rights within the context of an institutional discursive model of rationality." The discussion is divided into four parts. Part 1 reviews Hegel's reception of the tradition of natural right, asserting that the latter plays a role in Hegel's recognitive account of ethical life greater than Corradetti allows. Part 2 considers the use Corradetti makes of Hegel's concept of dialectical negativity, arguing that, while it can and should be understood in terms of relations of recognition and, especially, misrecognition, it also articulates features of Hegel's logic and metaphysics that - pace Corradetti - can play a role in a postmetaphysical theory of social life. Part 3 seconds Corradetti's claims about the value of recognition theory for a Hegelian account of universal human rights, but asserts that that value is best expressed via an intercultural understanding of that account. Part 4 details the normative dimension of such an account, arguing that here, too, Hegel has more to offer than Corradetti allows. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dean Moyar's book, "Hegel's Value: Justice as the Living Good," offers a fresh interpretation of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Moyar argues that the structure of the text can be understood as a "teleologically inferentialist" account, where the content of norms of right is refined through conflicts and their resolution. Additionally, Moyar highlights the importance of the concept of value in Hegel's project, tracing its presence throughout the Philosophy of Right. The book provides new insights into Hegel's views on public reason, history, and the relationship between right and duty. Overall, Moyar's interpretation offers a valuable perspective on Hegel's work and is recommended for those interested in the subject. [Extracted from the article]

With his heterology, the southwest German neo-Kantian Heinrich Rickert developed a doctrine that proved to be groundbreaking not only for neo-Kantianism, but also for the theory of subjectivity in postwar transcendental philosophy in the broad sense. Rickert's heterology is primarily concerned with the original structure of thought. Since the discussion of Hegel plays an important role for Rickert, heterology simultaneously concerns the relationship between Hegel's speculative idealism and (advanced) Kantian transcendental philosophy. However, on the whole, the debate has until now been far from unanimous with regard to the validity of Rickert's critique of Hegel. This study develops a new interpretative perspective, focusing on the issue of formalism as a methodological problem. It turns out that Rickert's heterology is a case of, in Hegel's words, mere external reflection. Rickert hastily moves from the beginning of philosophy to the origin of thinking. Thus, unlike Hegel, Rickert provides an insufficient account of the very concepts with which he determines the origin of thought--the Achilles' heel of transcendental philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent discussions of Hegel's conception of second nature, specifically focused on Hegel's notion of habit, have greatly advanced our understanding of Hegel's views on embodied normativity. This essay examines Hegel's account of embodied normativity in relation to his assessment of good and bad habits. Engaging Hegel's account of the rabble in the Philosophy of Right and Frank Ruda's assessment of Hegel's rabble, this essay traces the relation between ethicality, idleness and race in Hegel. In embodying a position of refusal in its affirmation of idleness, the rabble disallows the progressive revision of the project of modernity central to Hegel's philosophy. Hegel's discussion of the rabble is thus key to assessing the production of race within Hegel's notion of ethical life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article summarizes the major topoi of Hegelianism that Malraux adopts in his texts on art (The Voices of Silence, The Imaginary Museum and The Metamorphosis of the Gods), before focusing, in particular, on Malrucian interpretation of the end of art and on the links that the latter has with his own concept of the imaginary museum. According to some of Hegel's exegetes (Bernard Bosanquet, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Luc Nancy, Thierry de Duve, but also Theodor Adorno, Arthur Danto, Joseph Kosuth, Rainer Rochlitz or Jan Patočka), the end of traditional art paves the way for its retrospective conceptualization, its reconfiguration in the public space, as well as for very exciting debates on the nature of contemporary art, post-religious, post-national, post-historical in a way. The article illustrates the original place that Malraux occupies within this "positive" and creative interpretation of the end of art. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article I try to show that although Robert Pippin’s conceptualist critiques against non-conceptualism are effective in order to refute moderate versions of non-conceptualism, they are insufficient to confront with Robert Hanna’s Kantian strong non-conceptualism. I argue that Pippin fails because (1) his argument on the inseparability of intuitions and concepts only works within a narrow conception of cognition, (2) his rejection of the existence of blind intuitions is inconsistent and (3) the Kantian-Hegelian compatibility that he proposes is not cogent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Issue 79 of the Universitas Philosophica magazine presents a variety of philosophy articles. The first four articles focus on interpretative problems of key authors in the Western canon, such as Plato and Machiavelli. Then, topics such as the relationship between thought and memory in Hegel's philosophy, the importance of Kant's third critique in Heidegger's interpretation of Hölderlin's poetry, and the nature of trust and the body's relationship with the divine are addressed. Contemporary political problems related to time control in neoliberalism are also discussed. Lastly, three articles are presented that use the authors' personal experiences to address philosophical problems. The magazine thanks the reviewers for their participation. [Extracted from the article]

Following Cyril O'Regan's suggestion of possible Balthasarian reflections on the sublime and the avant‐garde, this article argues that actualizing these possibilities could contribute fruitfully to Hans Urs von Balthasar's theological‐aesthetic resistance to Hegelian economy (mastery of all meaning and value through scientific reason) and to postmodern alternative philosophies to Hegel. The article expands the Balthasarian notion of "form" to open new partnerships between Balthasarian aesthetics and artistic currents that share his project of resisting economy. The article examines Balthasar's early rejection of avant‐garde and modern art in historical and cultural context. It effects a critical dialogue between Balthasar and two prominent postmodern precedents for thinking about the sublime and avant‐garde art (Jean‐François Lyotard and Jean‐Luc Nancy). It constructs a different, Balthasarian perspective on the sublime and the avant‐garde, emphasizing the ontological sublime (Goethe, Scheeben) and Christus deformis (Augustine, Bonaventure). Then it sets the Balthasarian sublime in conversation with contemporary artist Sarah Sze to discover new counter‐economic possibilities for the Balthasarian Gestalt. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Alexander Kojève linked two major events that occurred in October of 1806: the first political, Napoleon's victory at Jena; the second philosophical, Hegel's completion of The Phenomenology of Mind. Kojève held these events to be complementary, both completing the initial formation and expression of 'modernity'. This thesis was accepted by Leo Strauss and later by Strauss' disciple Francis Fukayama. The latter's two works The End of History and The Last Man, both 'neo‐conservative' in character, have exercised a powerful influence on the policies of the United States Department of State. Although optimistic in regarding the global advance of democratic societies as the end of history, both Kojève and Fukayama nevertheless conclude that this advance will stop short of its proper end with the appearance of a morally vapid Nietzschean 'Last Man'. This essay connects the birth of Stirner to the events of 1806; Stirner set his own 'cause' before all external ideals or romantic programs, such as a striving to be a Nietzschen Übermensch or joining a revolution of Marxian 'Lumpen'. Following the signals of both Hegelianism and democratic politics, Stirner can be considered, and would be pleased to present himself, as the 'Last Man'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reads Gottfried Keller's Romeo und Julia auf dem Dorfe (1856) alongside Hegel's Philosophie des Rechts in order to explore the novella's account of the origin of the dispossessed Pöbel and demonstrates that Keller's novella ultimately anticipates Marx's critique of Hegel's account of civil society. in the first part of the article, i show that the farmers, driven by an ideal of bourgeois individuality, make a bid for legally substantiated recognition of ownership that eventually results in a process of property liquidation. in the second part, i argue that the fathers' failure is mirrored in the children's failed effort to legitimate their sexual difference in a marital institution. Ultimately, their suicide pact is not contrary to the ethical code they struggle to satisfy throughout the novella but fulfills the capitalistic logic of exchange in the form of asset liquidation. I conclude by reflecting on the status of myth in Keller's realism, arguing that the artwork reveals the contradictions of the social world that it belongs to, not by constructing a vantage point beyond myth, but rather by representing its own appropriation of myth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Araucaria is the property of Araucaria-Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofia, Politica y Humanidades and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper pursues Eugen Fink's dealing with Hegel's philosophy. Unlike Heidegger, Fink comes to the conclusion that Hegel's thought is not merely the achievement of Western metaphysics but contains approaches to overcoming it. In his interpretation, Fink seeks suggestions for a transition to a different way of thinking. He recognises the concept of force as the central concept of the Phenomenology of Spirit, through which one is brought to Hegel's highest philosophical principle of the Absolute as an infinitely moving while at the same time resting all life. Despite its self-divisiveness, however, the Absolute in Hegel remains essentially reconciled with itself and unified. Fink contrasts this to his own view, according to which the Absolute remains determined by an irreconcilable dispute. For this, he leans on his own doctrine of the strife between Earth and Heaven as the essence of the post-metaphysically understood world where every trace of metaphysical substantiality has disappeared. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While avoiding taking part in the discussion of whether Fink's philosophy should or not be considered from two different moments, the intention of the present contribution is to follow the track given by an evident readjustment in the interpretation of Hegel proposed by Fink in two different moments of his intellectual production. The thematic frame concerning his interpretation of Hegel privileges the concepts of absolute and identity, in order to show how they were articulated in two different ways throughout the development of what we here refer to as Fink's philosophical project. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The thesis I defend in this text is that Eugen Fink's most original contribution to the phenomenological tradition consists in the rehabilitation of speculative thinking as a legitimate and compelling mode of approaching philosophical problems. Furthermore, I claim that this theoretical move is accomplished through a constant while critical dialogue with Hegel. I start by exposing the criticism Fink levelled against the canonical, Husserlian, understanding of phenomenology as a descriptive enterprise. Then, I delineate the interpretative strategy Fink puts in place in his reading of Hegel and bring out its underlying commitments. As I will show, his interpretation of Hegel is determined by the concern of rescuing some deep-seated cosmological insights determining Hegel's philosophy. I further show that his understanding of Hegel is worked out in reference to, but also in explicit contrast to, Heidegger's reading of Hegel. Finally, I claim that Fink's sustained attention to Hegel does not amount to an endorsement of his position and examine the reasons he advances for "rejecting Hegel". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to Fink, self-reference is one of the distinct features of philosophy. This isn't merely restricted to her referring to herself thematically. Self-reference is also the key feature of philosophy's principles, inasmuch as any principle has to be a principle for the very philosophical position explicating this principle. Thus, in my article I will look at four ways in which Fink addresses the self-referential structure of philosophy: Firstly, I will recapitulate Fink's concept of a "meontic" philosophy. Secondly, I will link this "meontic" philosophy with Fink's reading of Hegel's concept of theophany, tracing it back to neoplatonic tradition. Thirdly, I will follow Fink's reading of Hegel as it transforms his former phenomenological approach into a speculative dialectics of a metaphilosophy of philosophical principles. In a fourth and last step, I will try to give a sketch of Fink's "phenomenology of the absolute" which combines Husserl, Heidegger, and Hegel into a speculative phenomenology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to explore and lay out crucial aspects of the interpretation of the Hegelian philosophy offered by the American thinker Richard Dien Winfield. Winfield works out an innovative line of interpretation that decisively ties Hegel to a non-foundational type of philosophical epistemology with significant consequences concerning the concept of objectivity in both theoretical and practical philosophical investigation. The article attempts to reconstruct this line of interpretation and assess its argumentative force, in view of an array of epistemological problems regarding theory construction in political philosophy. On this account, the principal question is whether the special brand of epistemological non-foundationalism ascribed by Winfield to Hegel is actually in a favorable position to successfully tackle with these problems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Endoxa is the property of Editorial UNED and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper summarizes the major themes of my current monograph project and my recent co-edited volume on post-Kantian perfectionism. The central thesis is that Kant's critique of rational heteronomy in the Groundwork effectively ruled out certain types of perfectionist ethics and their corresponding political applications, notably the programmes of Christian Wolff and his school, which were dominant in the German territories in the mid-to late eighteenth century. Kant's critiques did not, however, preclude the emergence of a new type of perfectionism, no longer based on the state-sponsored promotion of eudaimonia or material, intellectual, and spiritual thriving, but on the advancement of freedom and the conditions for its exercise. Predicated on the idea of right, post-Kantian perfectionism focuses on maintaining and enhancing the juridical, political, and economic conditions for rightful interaction among self-defining individuals. Humboldt, Schiller, Fichte, Hegel, and the Hegelian School exemplify this new approach in different ways. Marx's problematic relation to this tradition is outlined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is the rational kernel of Hegel's dialectic that Marx famously speaks of? How can it be extracted from the mystical shell in which it is embedded in Hegel's philosophy? Hegel sets out the general principles of his dialectic in the opening sections of his Logic. Starting from pure abstract "Being," he claims to derive the concepts of "Becoming" and "Determinate Being" by a purely logical process. These arguments are fallacious. However, there is a rational kernel in them. Following Marx, I show how this can be extracted by inverting Hegel's argument. To understand things concretely, we must see them as in relation to other things within a larger totality and as changing. I show how these fundamental tenets of dialectic are implied in Hegel's claims, and I defend them against opposing empiricist ideas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study attempts at analyzing the process of reimagining and reproducing the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947 and Pakistan in 1971 in the textbooks at school level during the dictatorial regimes of Zia and Musharraf. What has appealed me to draw temporal, spatial, and thematic limitations for this research? To begin with, the dictatorial regimes, are believed to, have deeply relied on manipulating the Textbook Boards to further their agendas. Moreover, both the dictators are deemed to be opposing ideologues – e.g., Zia – a fanatic ruler – radicalized the textbooks while Musharraf – a champion of "Enlightened Moderation" – tried to deradicalize the curriculum. Additionally, partitions present two different scenarios for a fascinating comparison – e.g., in 1947, Pakistan was an emergent state while in 1971, a parent state. The content analysis of the textbooks reveals that both the regimes adopted Hegel's "philosophical" approach of treating history – selecting the personalities, events, or periods of their choice while excluding or discarding the other – to reinforce the national narrative. It further suggests that the state-sponsored curriculum fosters religious nationalism, rather than secular nationalism, which, subsequently, nurtures majoritarian nationalism and bolsters the process of othering the minority groups in the country. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Contrastes: Revista Internacional de Filosofia is the property of Contrastes: Revista Internacional de Filosofia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía is the property of Universidad Complutense de Madrid and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Aufklärung: Revista de Filosofia is the property of Aufklarung: Revista de Filosofia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article examines types of abductive inference in Hegelian philosophy and machine learning from a formal comparative perspective and argues that Robert Brandom's recent reconstruction of the logic of recollection in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit may be fruitful for anticipating modes of collaborative abductive inference in human/A.I. interactions. Firstly, the argument consists of showing how Brandom's reading of Hegelian recollection may be understood as a specific type of abductive inference, one in which the past interpretive failures and errors of a community are explained hypothetically by way of the construction of a narrative that rehabilitates those very errors as means for the ongoing successful development of the community, as in Brandom's privileged jurisprudential example of Anglo-American case law. Next, this Hegelian abductive dynamic is contrasted with the error-reducing backpropagation algorithms characterizing many current versions of machine learning, which can be understood to perform abductions in a certain sense for various problems but not (yet) in the full self-constituting communitarian mode of creative recollection canvassed by Brandom. Finally, it is shown how the two modes of "error correction" may possibly coordinate successfully on certain types of abductive inference problems that are neither fully recollective in the Hegelian sense nor algorithmically optimizable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

G.W. F. Hegel sees Oedipus as an epitome of the philosophical quest for self-knowledge. In Hegel's readings of Oedipus, the latter becomes a distant reflection of the modern and mature Hegelian self, who consciously takes on this quest. Yet unlike Oedipus, whose search for the truth about his past is characterized by both metaphorical and literal blindness, the modern self knows itself, precisely because it understands its past and can thus appropriate and situate itself in relation to the present. For Hegel, self-understanding entails grasping the proper relationship between past and present, which in turn necessitates acknowledging his own relationship to Oedipus. This essay examines Henrik Ibsen's turn to the Hegelian engagement with the past (Oedipus being one crucial moment in the Hegelian story of the history of self-consciousness), by focusing on one of the most enigmatic scenes in his 1866 drama, Peer Gynt, where the Norwegian protagonist is cast as Oedipus. The scene examines the drama's own past--through an engagement with a dramatic ancestor--and focuses on the influence of the past on fashioning modern European identity. Moreover, it offers a critique of how the past is utilized in the creation and consolidation of that identity. With this, Ibsen offers an implicit critique of Hegel's understanding of Oedipus, and his encounter with the Sphinx in particular. Revisiting Oedipus through its modern reception, Ibsen questions the act by which the past is revealed as such and is put to work in the service of a particular present. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]