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The EU network codes and guidelines for electricity, first introduced in the third energy package, are designed to enable the implementation of an EU internal electricity market. This text is intended as an introductory guide that highlights some of the legal issues surrounding the drafting, implementation and amendment procedures of these network codes and guidelines.

This article explores the impact of an important ruling from the ECJ in Baltic Cable AB v Energimarknadsinspektionen on 11 March 2020 in which that court narrowly avoids giving the referring Swedish court a green light to interpret a key provision of the EU internal energy market legislation contra legem. Invoking instead the principle of non-discrimination, the ECJ relies on a classic remedy to recognise that a company owning and operating an electricity interconnector should be entitled to earn a reasonable profit. Although the interconnection of energy networks is an objective enshrined in Article 194(1) TFEU, the realisation of this objective has spawned a dense and highly technical web of regulation. This article explains the Court’s reasoning and its potential legal as well as economic impact in this complex and evolving regulatory space. We explain that while valuable progress has been made on technical harmonisation, classic fundamental principles of EU law, such as the non-discrimination principle, remain pivotal for resolving modern and central issues of electricity market integration.

This article explores the impact of an important ruling from the ECJ in Baltic Cable AB v Energimarknadsinspektionen on 11 March 2020 in which that court narrowly avoids giving the referring Swedish court a green light to interpret a key provision of the EU internal energy market legislation contra legem. Invoking instead the principle of non-discrimination, the ECJ relies on a classic remedy to recognise that a company owning and operating an electricity interconnector should be entitled to earn a reasonable profit. Although the interconnection of energy networks is an objective enshrined in Article 194(1) TFEU, the realisation of this objective has spawned a dense and highly technical web of regulation. This article explains the Court’s reasoning and its potential legal as well as economic impact in this complex and evolving regulatory space. We explain that while valuable progress has been made on technical harmonisation, classic fundamental principles of EU law, such as the non-discrimination principle, remain pivotal for resolving modern and central issues of electricity market integration.

This paper explores how EU competition law enforcement might be affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. Each section of this paper reviews how various components of EU competition law are impacted. The paper evaluates the state of play and, where relevant, it makes policy proposals for how competition law might develop. It suggests that the Commission’s state aid policy is unprecedentedly lax but more tightening up might be welcomed to ensure state funds are not misspent. In the field of antitrust it recommends that competition authorities should be watchful of excessive prices and price discrimination, using interim measures more boldly. Collusion should remain an enforcement priority but a procedural pathway to review agreements that may be in the public interest is proposed, drawing on practices developed in the US in the aftermath of major natural disasters. In merger control, the Commission’s strict interpretation of the failing firm defense is appropriate but, in general, a more skeptical attitude towards mergers may be warranted during this period. Advocacy plays a key role: competition agencies can both point to existing regulations that limit competition and monitor proposed emergency legislation that would harm competition for no good reason.

The EU Clean Energy Package (CEP) was finalised in June 2019 after the publication of its final texts in the Official Journal of the European Union, following trilogue negotiations between the European Commission, Council, and Parliament. It includes eight legislative texts - four directives and four regulations - on the electricity market and consumers, energy efficiency and the energy efficiency of buildings, renewables and bioenergy sustainability as well as governance of the Energy Union. In this report, we will focus on three of the eight legislative texts. First is the Regulation on the Governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action (Regulation (EU) 2018/1999). Second is the directive on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources (Directive (EU) 2018/2001) that is commonly referred to as RED II. Third is the directive on common rules for the internal market in electricity (Directive (EU) 2019/944). We will assess the impact of this legislation on the European internal electricity market rules compared to the framework established by the Third Energy Package. In this report, we present the background to the CEP provisions and weigh the possible implications of these measures.

In maart 2019 is het wetsvoorstel ongewenste zeggenschap telecommunicatie ingediend bij de Tweede Kamer. Dit wetsvoorstel introduceert een investeringstoets in de telecommunicatiesector. Het is een aanvulling op het bestaande wet- en regelgevend kader dat veelal is ingevoerd ten tijde van de privatisering en liberalisering van vitale infrastructuursectoren. Dit kader biedt volgens de regering niet langer afdoende bescherming tegen nationale veiligheidsrisico’s die in de huidige tijd door buitenlandse overnames en investeringen in de vitale infrastructuur kunnen ontstaan. De investeringstoets behoort tot een nieuw soort instrumentarium (de zogenaamde “tweede generatie instrumenten”) met een grotere reikwijdte en breder toepassingsbereik dat in steeds meer EU-lidstaten zijn intrede doet. Hoewel het recentelijk vastgestelde EU-screeningskader aanzienlijke ruimte laat aan EU-lidstaten om screening van investeringen vorm te geven, moet de wijze waarop deze ruimte wordt ingevuld in overeenstemming zijn met de fundamentele Europese vrij verkeer bepalingen. Dit artikel concludeert, dat het wetsvoorstel in de huidige vorm een ongerechtvaardigde belemmering van het vrij verkeer vormt en herbezinning behoeft.

Published 12 December 2018 This note examines the recent ruling of the General Court on the application lodged by the Republic of Austria to annul the European Commission’s (EC) decision declaring state aid for the construction of a new nuclear power station in the United Kingdom to be compatible aid. It sets out the background to the project and briefly summarizes the EC decision before moving into a more detailed analysis of the General Court’s findings. This case is important not least as it concerns the interaction of the Euratom Treaty with the general state aid regime, and the compatibility of support for nuclear power in the EU’s liberalized electricity market. Moreover the court ruling raises questions as to the role of detailed economic analysis in cases where support for particular projects is deemed to be in the ‘public interest’. Furthermore the Court has given some guidance on the scope for member states to rely on Article 194(2) TFEU to determine their own ‘energy mix’.