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Many prominent lines of research on student's reasoning and conceptual change within learning sciences and physics education research have not attended to the role of learners' affect or emotions in the dynamics of their conceptual reasoning. This is despite evidence from psychology and cognitive- and neuro- sciences that emotions are deeply integrated with cognition and documented associations in education research between emotions and academic performance. The few studies that have aimed to integrate emotions within models of learners' cognition, have mostly done so at a coarse grain size. In this manuscript, toward the long-term goal of incorporating emotions into fine-grained models of in-themoment cognitive dynamics, we present a case study of Judy, an undergraduate electrical engineering and physics major. We argue that a fine-grained aspect of Judy's affect, her annoyance at a particular kind of homework problem, stabilizes a context-dependent epistemological stance she displays, about an unbridgeable gulf she perceives to exist between real and ideal circuits., Comment: Submitted to Physical Review Special Topics - Physics Education Research on June 30, 2013 (15 pages; 4 figures)

Many science education researchers have argued that learners' commitment to a substance (matter-based) ontology impedes the learning of scientific concepts that scientists typically conceptualize as processes or interactions, such as such as force, electric current, and heat. By this account, students' tendency to classify these entities as substances or properties of substances leads to robust misconceptions, and instruction should steer novices away from substance-based reasoning. We argue that substance-based reasoning, when it supports learners' sense-making, can form the seeds for sophisticated understanding of these very same physics concepts. We present a case study of a group of elementary school science teachers in our professional development program. The teachers build a sophisticated explanation for why objects of different masses have the same acceleration due to gravity, starting from substance-based metaphors for gravity. We argue that, for conceptual, epistemological, and affective reasons, instructional interventions should focus on tapping these productive matter-based resources rather than attempting to replace them., Comment: Submitted to Physical Review Special Topics - Physics Education Research

Current conceptions of expert problem solving depict physical/conceptual reasoning and formal mathematical reasoning as separate steps: a good problem solver first translates a physical Current conceptions of quantitative problem-solving expertise in physics incorporate conceptual reasoning in two ways: for selecting relevant equations (before manipulating them), and for checking whether a given quantitative solution is reasonable (after manipulating the equations). We make the case that problem-solving expertise should include opportunistically blending conceptual and formal mathematical reasoning even while manipulating equations. We present analysis of interviews with two students, Alex and Pat. Interviewed students were asked to explain a particular equation and solve a problem using that equation. Alex used and described the equation as a computational tool. By contrast, Pat found a shortcut to solve the problem. His shortcut blended mathematical operations with conceptual reasoning about physical processes, reflecting a view - expressed earlier in his explanation of the equation - that equations can express an overarching conceptual meaning. Using case studies of Alex and Pat, we argue that this opportunistic blending of conceptual and formal mathematical reasoning (i) is a part of problem-solving expertise, (ii) can be described in terms of cognitive elements called symbolic forms (Sherin, 2001), and (iii) is a feasible instructional target., Comment: Pre-reviewed draft, now published in Science Education

This paper empirically argues for a closer examination of what we wish to retain when we speak of "retention" in engineering [1]. We present and interpret data from clinical interviews and classroom video of "Michael," a student who feels marginalized by an engineering program that undervalues him because of his stance toward knowledge [2],[3]. Michael is a sophomore Electrical Engineering and Mathematics major in a Basic Circuits course. In his own words, he's a "fringe" student because of his robust tendency to try making sense of the concepts being taught rather than memorizing formulae. He also feels alienated because he views learning in terms of argument and intuition, not algorithm and rote acceptance. Furthermore, for Michael the practice of sense-making defines him; it's an integral aspect of his identity [4]. Thus, Michael's self-reported sense of alienation resonates strongly with existing identity-based accounts of students leaving the field [5],[6]. We contend the field of engineering suffers if individuals like Michael don't pursue it. Through this case study of Michael, we urge the retention discussion to consider not just the demographic categories of people we hope to keep, but also the approaches to knowledge, learning, and problem-solving we aim to support., Comment: 6-page; Under Review for Proceedings of the 2010 Frontiers in Education Conference (ASEE/IEEE)

Researchers have argued against deficit-based explanations of students' troubles with mathematical sense-making, pointing instead to factors such as epistemology: students' beliefs about knowledge and learning can hinder them from activating and integrating productive knowledge they have. In this case study of an engineering major solving problems (about content from his introductory physics course) during a clinical interview, we show that "Jim" has all the mathematical and conceptual knowledge he would need to solve a hydrostatic pressure problem that we posed to him. But he reaches and sticks with an incorrect answer that violates common sense. We argue that his lack of mathematical sense-making-specifically, translating and reconciling between mathematical and everyday/common-sense reasoning-stems in part from his epistemological views, i.e., his views about the nature of knowledge and learning. He regards mathematical equations as much more trustworthy than everyday reasoning, and he does not view mathematical equations as expressing meaning that tractably connects to common sense. For these reasons, he does not view reconciling between common sense and mathematical formalism as either necessary or plausible to accomplish. We, however, avoid a potential "deficit trap"-substituting an epistemological deficit for a concepts/skills deficit-by incorporating multiple, context-dependent epistemological stances into Jim's cognitive dynamics. We argue that Jim's epistemological stance contains productive seeds that instructors could build upon to support Jim's mathematical sense-making: He does see common-sense as connected to formalism (though not always tractably so) and in some circumstances this connection is both salient and valued., Comment: Submitted to the Journal of Engineering Education

An established body of literature shows that a student's affect can be linked to her epistemological stance [1]. In this literature, the epistemology is generally taken as a belief or stance toward a discipline, and the affective stance applies broadly to a discipline or classroom culture. A second, emerging line of research, however, shows that a student in a given discipline can shift between multiple locally coherent epistemological stances [2]. To begin uniting these two bodies of literature, toward the long-term goal of incorporating affect into fine-grained models of in-the-moment cognitive dynamics, we present a case study of "Judy", an undergraduate engineering major. We argue that a fine-grained aspect of Judy's affect, her annoyance at a particular kind of homework problem, stabilizes a context-dependent epistemological stance she displays, about an unbridgeable gulf she perceives to exist between real and ideal circuits., Comment: 6-page, ASEE/IEEE 2010 Frontiers in Education Conference Proceedings, In Review.

Research has linked a student's affect to her epistemology (Boaler & Greeno, 2000), but those constructs often apply broadly to a discipline and/or classroom culture. Independently, an emerging line of research shows that a student in a given classroom and discipline can shift between multiple locally coherent epistemological stances (Hammer, Elby, Scherr, & Redish, 2005). Our case study of Judy, an undergraduate engineering major, begins our long-term effort at uniting these two bodies of literature., Comment: 2-page paper: ICLS 2010 Conference Proceedings

There are ongoing divisions in the learning sciences between perspectives that treat cognition as occurring within individual minds and those that treat it as irreducibly distributed or situated in material and social contexts. We contend that accounts of individual minds as complex systems are theoretically continuous with distributed and situated cognition. On this view, the difference is a matter of the scale of the dynamics of interest, and the choice of scale can be informed by data. In this paper, we propose heuristics for empirically determining the scale of the relevant cognitive dynamics. We illustrate these heuristics in two contrasting cases, one in which the evidence supports attributing cognition to a group of students and one in which the evidence supports attributing cognition to an individual., Comment: 8 page ICLS paper. The Proceedings of the International Conference of the Learning Sciences, 2010 (In Press)

Researchers have argued against deficit-based explanations of students' troubles with mathematical sense-making, pointing instead to factors such as epistemology: students' beliefs about the nature of knowledge and learning can hinder them from activating and integrating productive knowledge they have. But such explanations run the risk of substituting an epistemological deficit for a concepts/skills deficit. Our analysis of an undergraduate engineering major avoids this "deficit trap" by incorporating multiple, context-dependent epistemological stances into his cognitive dynamics., Comment: Proceedings of the International Conference of the Learning Sciences, 2010, (In Press)

Physics makes powerful use of mathematics, yet the way this use is made is often poorly understood. Professionals closely integrate their mathematical symbology with physical meaning, resulting in a powerful and productive structure. But because of the way the cognitive system builds expertise through binding, experts may have difficulty in unpacking their well established knowledge in order to understand the difficulties novice students have in learning their subject. This is particularly evident in subjects in which the students are learning to use mathematics to which they have previously been exposed in math classes in complex new ways. In this paper, we propose that some of this unpacking can be facilitated by adopting ideas and methods developed in the field of cognitive semantics, a sub-branch of linguistics devoted to understanding how meaning is associated with language., Comment: GIREP Conference, Leicester, UK, 2009, 15 pages

We investigate the dynamics of student behaviors (posture, gesture, vocal register, visual focus) and the substance of their reasoning during collaborative work on inquiry-based physics tutorials. Scherr has characterized student activity during tutorials as observable clusters of behaviors separated by sharp transitions, and has argued that these behavioral modes reflect students' epistemological framing of what they are doing, i.e., their sense of what is taking place with respect to knowledge. We analyze students' verbal reasoning during several tutorial sessions using the framework of Russ, and find a strong correlation between certain behavioral modes and the scientific quality of students' explanations. We suggest that this is due to a dynamic coupling of how students behave, how they frame an activity, and how they reason during that activity. This analysis supports the earlier claims of a dynamic between behavior and epistemology. We discuss implications for research and instruction., Comment: 4 pages, PERC 2007

We investigate the dynamics of how graduate students coordinate their mathematics and physics knowledge within the context of solving a homework problem for a plasma physics survey course. Students were asked to obtain the complex dielectric function for a plasma with a specified distribution function and find the roots of that expression. While all the 16 participating students obtained the dielectric function correctly in one of two equivalent expressions, roughly half of them (7 of 16) failed to compute the roots correctly. All seven took the same initial step that led them to the incorrect answer. We note a perfect correlation between the specific expression of dielectric function obtained and the student's success in solving for the roots. We analyze student responses in terms of a resources framework and suggest routes for future research., Comment: 4 pages

In a series of well-known papers, Chi and Slotta (Chi, 1992; Chi & Slotta, 1993; Chi, Slotta & de Leeuw, 1994; Slotta, Chi & Joram, 1995; Chi, 2005; Slotta & Chi, 2006) have contended that a reason for students' difficulties in learning physics is that they think about concepts as things rather than as processes, and that there is a significant barrier between these two ontological categories. We contest this view, arguing that expert and novice reasoning often and productively traverses ontological categories. We cite examples from everyday, classroom, and professional contexts to illustrate this. We agree with Chi and Slotta that instruction should attend to learners' ontologies; but we find these ontologies are better understood as dynamic and context-dependent, rather than as static constraints. To promote one ontological description in physics instruction, as suggested by Slotta and Chi, could undermine novices' access to productive cognitive resources they bring to their studies and inhibit their transition to the dynamic ontological flexibility required of experts., Comment: The Journal of the Learning Sciences (In Press)