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В произведениях русских писателей, затрагивающих важную и ныне тему Кавказкой войны, для обозначения сопротивления мусульман используется слово «газават», но не используется слово «джихад». В статье на обширном материале рассматривается возникновение и соотношение понятий «джихад» и «газават». А также доказывается с использованием текстов Корана и хадисов, что под джихадом Пророк понимал не террористические акты, не зверскую казнь людей, а возвышенные и благородные поступки. Авторы, полемизируя с известной концепцией Дж. Фридмана, предсказывают, но по другим основаниям, потрясения в Азии., In the works of Russian writers, touching upon the important and now the theme of the Caucasian war, the word “Gazavat” is used to denote the resistance of Muslims, but the word “Jihad” is not used. The article deals with the emergence and correlation of the concepts of “Jihad” and “Gazavat” on the extensive material. And it is also proved, using the texts of the Koran and hadith, that under Jihad the Prophet understood not terrorist acts, not brutal execution of people, but sublime and noble deeds. The authors, arguing with the well-known concept of J. Friedman, predict, but on other grounds, the turmoil in Asia., Вырăс писателĕсем хальхи вăхăтра пысăк пĕлтерĕшлĕ Кавказ вăрçи темине тапратакан хайлавĕсенче мăсăльмансен хирĕç тăрăвне палăртма джихад сăмахпа мар, газават сăмахпа усă кураççĕ. Пысăк материал çине таянса статья авторĕсем «джахад», «газават» ăнлавсем мĕнрен тухнине, вĕсен шайлашăвне пăхса тухаççĕ. Кунсăр пуçне Коран тексчĕсемпе тата хадиссемпе уса курса, статьяра, джихад тени шутне Пророк террор акчĕсене мар, çынсене тискерле вĕлернине мар, пархатарлă та тава тивĕслĕ ĕçе кĕртнине кăтартнă. Дж. Фридманăн паллă концепцине сивлесе авторсем Азие малашне пачах урăх пăтăрмах тавраш кĕтнине сăлтавласа пĕлтереççĕ.

This sociological study explores the past and current higher education (HE) experience of educationalists at Gaza’s universities and how this experience may be evolving in the shifting socio-political context in the Arab World. The thesis is motivated by three questions: 1. What are the perspectives of academic staff in the Faculties of Education at Gaza’s universities on their own past HE experiences? 2. What are the perspectives of students and their lecturers (academic staff) in the Faculties of Education at Gaza’s universities on students’ current HE experiences? 3. How do educationalists in the Faculties of Education at Gaza’s universities perceive the shifting socio-political context in the Arab World, and what current or future impact do they think it will have on the education context at Gaza’s universities? To examine these questions, I conducted an inductive qualitative study. Using 36 in-depth, semi- structured interviews which lasted between (90-300 min), I collected data from educationalists (15 academic staff; 21 students) at two of Gaza’s universities. Due to difficulties of access to the Gaza Strip, the participants were interviewed via Skype from Cambridge. Informed by the literature review, and triangulated with other research activities, such as reviewing participants’ CVs, browsing universities websites, and keeping a reflective journal, a thematic analysis was conducted on the interview data. Theoretically, although this study has benefited from conceptual insights, such as those found in Paulo Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed and in Pierre Bourdieu’s work on symbolic violence, it is a micro-level study, which is mainly data driven. The findings of this research show that in the past, educationalists were relatively more passive in terms of shaping their HE experiences, despite efforts to become resilient. In the present, students and their lecturers continue to face challenges that impact negatively on their participation and everyday life at Gaza’s universities. However, how the HE experience will evolve out of this context in the future is uncertain. The Arab Spring revolutions have had an influence on Gaza HE institutions’ campuses as they have triggered more awareness of students’ grievances and discontent. Because of some political and educational barriers, however, students’ voices are a cacophony; they remain split between “compliance” and resistance (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 471; Swartz, 2013, p. 39). Previously, Sara Roy (1995) rightly indicated a structure of “de-development” in the Gaza Strip (p.110). The findings from this research show that the impact of occupation and of the changes in the Arab World on the educational context in Gaza are more complex than previously thought. There is a simultaneous process of construction and destruction that is both external and internal to educationalists and which undermines academic work at Gaza’s universities. Based on this, the study concludes by explaining six implications of this complex structure for academic practice at Gaza’s universities, offering nine policy recommendations for HE reform, and highlighting six areas for future research., Gates Cambridge Scholarship

The article was submitted on 15.09.2018. Статья посвящена анализу влияния «арабской весны» на развитие ситуации в Палестине. Автор приходит к выводу о том, что «палестинская весна» не привела к существенным изменениям в автономии. Власть ФАТХ на Западном берегу и ХАМАС в секторе Газа не пошатнулась, стороны не преодолели раскол, а оккупация Израилем палестинских территорий продолжилась. Вместе с тем автор отмечает, что говорить о провале «палестинской весны» было бы некорректно, так как изначально выступления палестинских активистов имели ограниченный и спорадический характер. The article analyzes the “Arab spring’”s impact on the state affairs in Palestine. The author comes to the conclusion that the “Palestinian spring” did not lead to significant changes in the autonomy. The Fatah authorities in the West Bank and Hamas in the Gaza Strip have not been shaken, the parties have not overcome the split between them, and Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territories has continued. At the same time, the author points out that it would be wrong to speak about the failure of the “Palestinian spring”, since initially the protests of Palestinian activists were limited and sporadic.

National audience; Le Fatah, le Hamas et le Mouvement du Jihad islamique en Palestine renvoient à des usages distincts du religieux et du politique en Palestine : le premier est un nationalisme islamisé, le second est un islamisme nationalisé, le troisième est un islamo-nationalisme. Cependant, dans les trois cas, une question se pose : est-ce le religieux qui surdétermine le nationalisme, ou, au contraire, est-ce le nationalisme qui surdétermine le religieux ? Le secret du nationalisme palestinien est-il l’islam, ou, au contraire, le secret du religieux est-il le nationalisme ?

This thesis examines the political trajectory of the Popular Front for the Liberation Palestine (PFLP) during the period from the 1982 eviction of the Palestinian factions from their headquarters in Beirut, to the 2006-07 division between Hamas and Fatah in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT). During this period, the PFLP experienced a process of decline that resulted in its marginalisation within the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and the wider Palestinian national movement. This study addresses the issue of the PFLP’s decline by focusing on its own political agency to determine the role of policy and decision making, ideology and political narrative in the marginalisation process. This work therefore, on the one hand, aims at putting the PFLP’s decline into historical perspective, identifying it as a process rather than simply the effect of outstanding events as it is often argued. On the other, its goal is to ascribe to ‘subjective factors’, namely aspects directly linked to the PFLP’s agency, the adequate weight in determining its decline. This appears particularly significant as the weakening of the Palestinian left has been frequently explained as a by-product of global and local external or ‘objective’ developments such as the downfall of the Soviet Union or the emergence of political Islam. By providing a comprehensive and processual analysis of the PFLP’s decline, this study not only aims at complementing the literature on the Palestinian national movement, which still lacks a focused approach on the main Palestinian leftist force. It also aims at shedding light on a major cause, and its historical origins, of the current Palestinian political impasse, namely the absence of an alternative between Hamas and the PNA’s governing entities, both crippled by a legitimacy crisis and unable to progress Palestinian interests. By virtue of its close survey of the PFLP’s conduct, a further goal of this thesis is to address the historical role of the PLO and its de-facto heir, the PNA. What is evidenced is the double, and contradictory, role of the essential but also constraining framework that the PLO and later the PNA represented for the PFLP’s policies. The focus on the PFLP’s political agency allows the identification of a pattern in its policy which affected negatively its standing within the Palestinian national movement. Throughout the period addressed, policy fluctuation marked the PFLP’s action, undermining the effectiveness of its political line and jeopardising its political weight. The present study highlights how such a policy fluctuation pattern originated from major dilemmas and contradictions that the PFLP had to consider while producing its policies. The main dilemma, informing all other sources of tensions affecting the PFLP, has been defined as an ‘opposition-integration’ dilemma. In other words, the PFLP, while opposing the PLO leadership’s policies, first and foremost its quest for a diplomatic settlement with Israel under US patronage, needed to maintain its integration within the PLO regime, which represented an essential economic and political framework. This produced inconsistent, ‘fluctuant’ policies that prevented the PFLP from maintaining its political weight and stopping its marginalisation process. This opposition-integration dilemma was combined with other sources of tensions marking the PFLP such as: relations with other PLO opposition factions, relations with Arab partners, its contacts with Palestinian Islamists, the confrontation with the PNA after the 1993 Oslo accords or the internal divide between the exiled leadership and the cadres located in the OPT. The PFLP’s official publications, mainly retrieved from its mouthpiece, Al-Hadaf magazine, embodied the main source upon which this study relies. Beside this corpus of documents, other primary sources, such as documents issued by relevant actors, have been scrutinised, while all information has been read against the background of the wider academic literature currently available on the Palestinian national movement. This research also drew information from interviews with former and current PFLP members as well as with experts of the Palestinian national movement.

Cette thèse s’intéresse au rôle de l’aide comme outil de construction de la paix et à ses impacts sur les dynamiques de conflit en Palestine. Depuis le milieu des années 1990, l’aide a été associée à la sécurité, le peacebuilding, le state-building, la prévention et la résolution des conflits. En Palestine, l’aide a été directement associée à la construction de la paix dès la signature des accords d’Oslo en 1993. Pourtant, les liens entre aide et dynamiques de paix et de conflit demeurent incertains. Les programmes d’aide qui ont pour intention de construire la paix finissent parfois par alimenter la violence. Comment comprendre les impacts négatifs de « l’aide pour la paix » ? J’identifie deux problèmes majeurs : premièrement, la norme de l’aide pour la paix n’est pas toujours traduite en pratiques ; deuxièmement, les pratiques de l’aide peuvent structurer de manière négative les dynamiques de conflit. Afin de répondre à ce double problème, je m’appuie sur le tournant pratique en Relations internationales. En me basant sur la littérature sur les causes des guerres civiles, je développe un cadre théorique permettant de lier les pratiques de l’aide aux dynamiques de paix et de conflit. L’aide peut avoir un impact sur les dynamiques de conflit à travers trois mécanismes : l’économie politique du conflit, les inégalités horizontales et la qualité du contrat social. En Palestine, cela se traduit par des divisions entre le Fatah et le Hamas mais aussi entre la société et l’Autorité palestinienne. Afin de capturer les diverses manières dont la norme est mise en oeuvre et analyser l’influence des acteurs et secteurs d’intervention sur les impacts de l’aide, j’étudie différents bailleurs et secteurs d’intervention. Je compare les pratiques européennes et américaines dans les secteurs de la sécurité et du développement agricole en Palestine. J’offre ainsi une relecture de vingt ans de pratiques européennes et américaines en matière de Réforme du Secteur de la Sécurité et montre comment l’aide dans ce secteur a contribué aux dynamiques de conflit internes en Palestine. J’analyse également la manière dont les pratiques européennes et américaines dans le secteur agricole façonnent l’économie politique du conflit, les inégalités horizontales, et la qualité du contrat social. Ce faisant, je donne du crédit à l’argument, souvent développé dans la littérature spécialisée, selon lequel la communauté internationale a contribué à la fragmentation sociale et politique en Palestine. Plus important encore, j’explique comment cela a été le cas. Au total, j’avance que les impacts limités et parfois problématiques de l’aide pour la paix sont liés à l’absence de traduction de la norme en pratiques et aux impacts des pratiques sur les dynamiques de conflit. Les impacts de l’aide dépendent moins des acteurs et secteurs d’intervention que des pratiques mises en œuvre. Les contributions de la thèse sont à la fois académiques et pratiques. Je clarifie les liens entre aide, construction de la paix et dynamiques de conflit ; analyse l’existence d’une « communauté de pratique » de l’aide pour la paix ; récolte des données sur la manière dont l’aide pour la paix est mise en œuvre ; et identifie des pratiques particulièrement problématiques en termes de leurs impacts sur les dynamiques de conflit., This dissertation focuses on the role of development aid as a tool of peacebuilding and its impacts on the dynamics of conflict in Palestine. Since the mid-1990's, development aid has been continuously associated with security, peacebuilding, state-building and conflictprevention and/or mitigation. In Palestine, aid has been directly associated with peacebuilding since the signature of the Oslo accords in 1993. However, the links between aid and peace and/or conflict remain unclear. Aid programs that intend to restore order sometimes end up fostering violence. How can we understand aid-for-peace’s limited and negative impacts? Two major problems are identified: first, the internationally promoted norm on aid-for-peace does not always translate into practices; second, aid practices may negatively structure conflict dynamics. In order to tackle this two-level problem, I build on the practice turn in International Relations in order to investigate both the translation of the norm into practices and the structuring impacts of these practices on conflict dynamics. Building on the literature on the causes of conflict, I develop a theoretical framework linking aid practices to peace and conflict dynamics. I argue that aid programs may affect conflict dynamics through three mechanisms: the political economy of conflict, the existence and depth of horizontal inequalities, and the quality of the social contract. In Palestine, this translates into divisions between Hamas and Fatah as well as between Palestinian society and the Palestinian Authority. In order to capture the diversity of ways in which the norm is implemented and to investigate the influence of actors and sectors of interventions on aid’s impacts, I study different donors and sectors of intervention. Specifically, I compare European and American practices in Security Sector Reform (SSR) and agricultural development in Palestine. I offer a complete re-reading of twenty years of American and European SSR practices in Palestine and highlight how SSR assistance has contributed to the dynamics of conflict in Palestine. I also investigate how European and American practices in the agricultural sector shape the political economy of conflict, horizontal inequalities and the quality of the social contract. In so doing, not only do I give credit to Palestine observers who argue that the international community has contributed to the processes of social and political fragmentation in Palestine; I also, and most importantly, explain how this has been the case. I argue that aid-for-peace’s limited and sometimes problematic impacts stem from both the lack of norm-translation into practices and practices’ impacts on conflict dynamics. I further argue that aid’s impacts on conflict dynamics are neither a function of the type of assistance nor a question of the intervening donor: it is a question of practices structuring impacts. The research contributions are both academic and policy-oriented. I clarify the links between aid, peacebuilding and conflict; investigate the existence of an “aid-for-peace” community of practice; collect information on the way aid-for-peace is implemented; and identify problematic practices.

Ten years after Hamas violently seized power in Gaza, and following a string of failures to reconcile the Palestinian factions, there are now signs of a rapprochement between Fatah and Hamas. In September 2017 the Hamas leadership announced it would dissolve the administrative committee it had established in March, opening the way for the Palestinian Authority (PA) to take over the government in the Gaza Strip. In mid-October representatives of Hamas and Fatah signed an Egyptian-mediated reconciliation agreement. On 1 November PA forces were deployed to the Palestinian side of the Rafah border crossing with Egypt. Even if there are still major obstacles to merging the two security apparatuses, establishing a unity government, restoring the democratic process and achieving comprehensive reconciliation - the chances of the rapprochement preventing another round of armed conflict and improving the situation for the population in crisis-ridden Gaza are considerably better this time around. Germany and its European partners should help to accentuate the positive dynamics, support permanent improvements of the situation in Gaza through practical steps and work towards comprehensive reconciliation between the Palestinian factions. (author's abstract)

The formation of the Palestinian public opinion is a unique process in which wide number of players and factors including the Israeli are taking part in. Historically, media has been one of the most important factors in the formation of the Palestinian opinion. Palestinians have been using media since the beginning of the Israeli – Arab conflict to gain the international support and unite the Palestinians over the idea of freedom and independence. The recent growth of Internet and technologies turned Social Network Sites (SNS) to be one of the most important factors that can affect and influence the Palestinian public opinion. Although Sarcastic media has been used since the beginning of the conflict through the traditional media channels, it took more importance and influence over Palestinians as social network sites become widely used in Palestine. In 2006, The Palestinian internal conflict took place and opened a wide door for activists and institutions to use sarcasm through social networks as a weapon that can influenced people and deliver political messages. The present study focuses on the role of sarcastic media in the formation of the public opinion towards the political issues in Palestine taking a Facebook page called “Mesh.hek” as a case study. Mesh.hek has been selected for the study due to its wide follow among Palestinians as a sarcastic page, the unknown administration of the page and the contents that it shares. Few Palestinians wrote about the formation of the Palestinian Public Opinion and the role of media in this process but no one conducted any research or article related with the sarcastic media in Palestine and its influence over the Palestinian public opinion. One the other hand, the lack of researches in this field gives the study additional importance, another fact that makes it valuable is using the English language in conducting it. The study is based on tow testing theories; Uses and Gratification Theory and the Agenda Setting Theory. Furthermore, the quantitative methodology has been carried out in this study as the researcher created an online questionnaire that includes 49 questions and filled out by 500 participants from the followers of the Facebook page of “Mesh.hek”. The main findings and results of this study can be summarized in several points which include the high level of influence that sarcastic media has over the Palestinian public opinion, the low level of freedom of express in Palestine and the political agenda that Mesh.hek works accord which mainly depends on supporting the Palestinian resistance and attacks the corruption in the economic in a way that highly influences the Palestinian public opinion. Keywords: Sarcastic Media, Social Media, Mesh.hek, Uses and Gratification theory, Agenda Setting Theory, Palestinian – Israeli Conflict, Palestinian Internal Conflict, Hamas, Fatah, Palestinian Authority, Palestinian Liberation Organization. ÖZ: Filistin kamuoyunun oluşumu birçok oyuncu ve Israil İşgali’ni içeren faktörlerin rol aldığı özgün bir süreçtir. Tarihsel açıdan, medya Filistin kamuoyunun oluşmuna etki eden en önemli faktörlerden biri olmuştur. Filistinliler İsrail-Arap çatışmasının başlangıcından bu yana, uluslararası destek kazanmak ve Filistinlileri özgürlük ve bağımsızlık fikri etrafında toplamak için medyayı kullandı. Internet ve teknoloji alanlarında son zamanlarda meydana gelmiş gelişim Sosyal Medya Ağlarını, Filistin kamuoyunu etkileyen en önemli faktörler haline getirmiştir. Çatışmanın başlangıcından beri geleneksel medya kanalları aracığılıyla kinayeli kavramlar kullanılmasına rağmen, sosyal medya ağlarının kullanımının yaygınlaşmasıyla bu iğnelemelerin Filistinliler üzerindeki önemi ve etkisi artmıştır. 2006’da Filistin’de gerçekleşen iç çatışma aktivistler ve kuruluşların sosyal medyayı iğnelemeler yaparak, insanları etkilemek ve politik mesajlar vermek için kullanmalarına imkan sağlamıştır. Bu çalışmada, “Mesh.hek” adli bir Facebook sayfası vaka çalışması olarak alınarak, Filistin’deki siyasi konulara yönelik kamuoyunun oluşturulmasında sarkastik (iğneleyici) (alaycı) medyanın rolü üzerinde duruluyor. Çalışmada Mesh.hek’in kullanılmasının sebepleri sarkastik bir site olarak birçok Filistinli tarafından takip edilmesi, sayfada paylaşılan içerikler ve yönetiminin bilinmiyor olmasıdır. Birkaç Filistinli, Filistin kamuoyunun oluşumu ve bunun üzerinde medyanın oynadığı rol ile ilgili birtakım şeyler yazmıştır fakat kimse sarkastik medyanın Filistin kamuoyu üzerindeki etkisiyle ilgili bir araştırma gerçekleştirmemiş ve vi makale yazmamıştır. Buna ek olarak, bu konuda araştırma olmaması bu çalışamanın önemini artırıyor; bu çalışmayı İngilizce kullanarak yürütmek çalışmayı değerli kılıyor. Kullanımlar ve Doyumlar Teorisi ve Gündem Belirleme Teorisi olmak üzere iki test teorisi baz alınarak yürütülmüştür. Buna ek olarak, çalışmanın nicel metodolojisi araştırmacı tarafından hazırlanan 49 soruluk anket kullanılarak gerçekleştirilmiştir. Hazırlanan anket Facebook sayfası “Mesh.hek” in 500 takipçisi tarafından doldurulmuştur. Çalışmanın ana bulguları ve sonuçları, birkaç noktayla özetlenebilir. Bu noktalar arasında sarkastik medyanın Filistin kamuoyu üzerindeki yüksek düzeydeki etkisi, Filistindeki ifade özgürlüğünün azlığı yer almaktadır. Bunlara ek olarak, Mesh.hek in Filistin direncini destekleyici ve ekonomideki yozlaşmaya saldıran ve bunu yaparak Filistin kamuoyu üzerinde çok fazla etki yaratan bir siyasi gündem izlediği de ana bulgular arasındadır. Anahtar Kelimeler: Sarkastik Medya, Sosyal Medya, Mesh.hek, Memnuniyet teorisi, Gündem Belirleme Teorisi, Filistin-Israil çatışması, Filistin iç çatışması, Hamas, Fatah, Filistin hakimiyeti, Filistin Özgürlük Organizasyonu. Master of Arts in Communication and Media Studies. Thesis (M.A.)--Eastern Mediterranean University, Faculty of Communication, Dept. of Communication and Media Studies, 2017. Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Metin Ersoy.

Zehn Jahre nach der gewaltsamen Machtübernahme durch die Hamas im Gaza-Streifen und nach mehreren gescheiterten Versuchen, die innerpalästinensische Spaltung zu beenden, zeichnet sich im Herbst 2017 eine Annäherung zwischen Fatah und Hamas ab. Im September gab die Hamas-Führung die Auflösung ihres im März geschaffenen Verwaltungskomitees bekannt; damit machte sie den Weg frei zur Übernahme der Regierung im Gaza-Streifen durch die Palästinensische Autorität (PA). Mitte Oktober einigten sich Vertreter von Hamas und Fatah unter ägyptischer Vermittlung auf ein Versöhnungsabkommen. Auch wenn hohe Hürden einer Zusammenführung der Sicherheitsapparate, einer Einheitsregierung, der Rückkehr zum demokratischen Prozess und einer umfassenden Aussöhnung entgegenstehen: Die Chance, dass die Annäherung eine weitere kriegerische Auseinandersetzung verhindert und zumindest Fortschritte für die Bevölkerung im krisengeschüttelten Gaza-Streifen bringt, ist gegenüber bisherigen Versöhnungsbemühungen deutlich gestiegen. Deutschland und seine Partner in der EU sollten die positive Dynamik stärken, eine dauerhafte Verbesserung der Situation durch praktische Schritte unterstützen und auf eine umfassende Überwindung der innerpalästinensischen Spaltung hinwirken. (Autorenreferat)

Although the UN report of 2012 projected that Gaza would be uninhabitable by 2020, Gaza is likely to collapse into a state of chaos domestically and renewed military confrontation with Israel much earlier. Gaza’s current reality is shaped by the aftermath of military clashes between Israel and Palestinian groups, the tightening of the blockade by Israel in 2007, the closure of the Rafah Crossing by Egypt, and the international community’s no-contact policy towards Hamas. This has created a situation of isolation, in which the infrastructure as well as the social and political fabrics in the Gaza Strip have suffered. Gaza’s once export-oriented economy is now largely defunct, with the population impoverished and dependent on foreign aid. These factors pose serious threats to domestic stability, to Palestinian unity, and to the stability of the sub-region. Immediate intervention by the EU is needed to alleviate the humanitarian crisis, advance Palestinian reconciliation, and lift the Israeli blockade. The current rapprochement between Fatah and Hamas offers opportunities for the Europeans to engage. (Autorenreferat)

This bachelor's thesis compares the policies of Hamas and Fatah during the second intifada and immediately after. The goal of this thesis is to determine how events of the second intifada along with the different policies of both parties affected the results of the 2006 elections and how they influenced israeli- palestinian conflict and position of Palestinian autonomy in the international community.

Next year will the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories celebrate the 50th Anniversary. European Union, the most significant trade partner of Israel as well as the biggest donor of Palestine, was for a long time a mere observer of a situation of deepening of the occupation and postponing of its end because of building of Israeli settlements on the one side and of gradual division of Palestinian territories between radical Hamas and Fatah. Just in the autumn of 2015 the European Union decided to take a restrictive step towards Israel by setting clear rules of labelling of Israeli goods produced in those Israeli settlements. However, a harsh response has come both from the Israeli government and from some of EU member states. Therefore this work focuses on evaluation of the legitimacy of this move and on trying to assess the reason of its partial failure.

Una de las noticias salientes en el período abarcado por este Anuario(julio 2013-junio2014) ha sido la firma de la reunificación de las dos facciones mayoritarias de la política palestina, Hamas y Al-Fatah. Separadas desde el año 2007, el proceso de reunificación, con firma en Doha en mayo 2014, se vio truncado o pospuesto por el secuestro y asesinato de tres adolescentes israelíes que derivó en la operación “Guardián del hermano”2, en el poste-rior lanzamiento de cohetes por Hamas hacia territorio israelí y el bombardeo e incursión te-rrestre por parte del ejército israelí en la Franja de Gaza (operación “Margen protector”). Este último conflicto no será abordado aquí, pues ocurrió luego de finalizado el período abarcado por el presente Anuario. Se hace referencia a él, pues es considerado como uno de los efec-tos de la reunificación., Instituto de Relaciones Internacionales

Artykuł opisuje budzenie się palestyńskiej świadomości narodowej od czasów Imperium Osmańskiego, poprzez okres mandatu brytyjskiego, powstanie państwa Izrael, aż do czasu podziału palestyńskiej władzy narodowej w 2006 roku. Analiza pozwala stwierdzić, że powstanie narodu palestyńskiego nastąpiło na gruncie sprzeciwu wobec dyskryminacji – społecznej, politycznej oraz ekonomicznej – oraz pod wpływem zagrożenia, jakie spowodowała brytyjska, osadnicza polityka żydów na terenie Palestyny. Autorka wskazuje także na ugrupowania, w jakich grupowało się społeczeństwo palestyńskie oraz na cele i środki do ich dochodzenia. Badania przeprowadzone zostały na podstawie literatury polsko- oraz anglojęzycznej. The article describes the awakening of Palestinian national consciousness since the time of the Ottoman Empire, through the period of the British Mandate, the creation of Israel, until the division of the Palestinian national authority in 2006. The analysis shows, that there has been a rise of the Palestinian people on the basis of opposition to discrimination - social, political and economic – and under the threat that caused the British, the Jewish settlement policy in Palestine. The author also points to the groups in which focused the Palestinian society and the objectives and measures for their investigation. The researches were carried out on the basis of English books and articles.

The bachelor thesis deals with the theory of the clash of civilizations especially among Jewish and Islamic cultures, then it tackles the current security issue of terrorism. Theoretical and methodological basis is applied to the issue of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, especially on the Palestinian organization Hamas, which since the late 80s of the 20th century, operates on the territory of the Gaza Strip. This work comprehensively explains the development, activities and the style of attacks perpetrated by Hamas. The main goal of this thesis is to clarify that Hamas embodies one of the obstacles which prevent the Middle East from the lasting peace.

Al igual que en otros países del mundo árabe, las manifestaciones que se produjeron en Palestina a mediados de marzo de 2011 no fueron lideradas por islamistas. Aunque las críticas de los manifestantes se centraron en una amplia serie de aspectos, Hamas fue objeto de duros reproches por su gestión en Gaza, llevando a las autoridades de la franja a reprimir duramente a los manifestantes. Sin embargo, a nivel regional, el triunfo en las urnas de partidos islamistas, en especial en Egipto, fue un balón de oxígeno para Hamas, que tras años de aislamiento político, veía como los cambios que barrían la región le eran favorables, As in other Arab countries, the demonstrations that occurred in Palestine in mid-March 2011 were not led by Islamists. While criticism of the protesters focused on a wide range of issues, Hamas was the target of sharp rebukes by its management in Gaza, prompting officials to fringe hard crowd control. However, at the regional level, the victory at the polls of Islamist parties, particularly in Egypt, was a boost for Hamas, which after years of political isolation, looked like the changes sweeping the region were favorable

Cette étude traite la problématique de la relation entre le Mouvement de LibérationNationale Palestinien « FATAH » et le Mouvement de la Résistance Islamique « HAMAS » .Elle concentre sur les facteurs internes qui l’ont influencé,qui ce sont les différences structurelles au niveaux intellectuels et organisationnels plus, les raisons qui empêchent l’un de faire confiance à l’autre à cause des engagements de Fatah avec l’Autorité Nationale Palestinienne et l’incapacité de Hamas à surmonter ses principes ideologique.ce travaille montre aussi l’influence des facteurs externes. Hamas n’a pas accepté les conditions de la communauté internationale qui ont été accepté par Fatah et l’axe arabequi supporte le processus du paix et ont été rejeté par l’autre qui refuse cet approche. Cettesituation a approfondi la crise entre les deux mouvements.

Für die Zeit nach Ablauf des Fastenmonats Ramadan am 19. August 2012 hat der ägyptische Präsident Muhammad Mursi weitere Bemühungen angekündigt, zwischen den palästinensischen Organisationen Fatah und Hamas zu vermitteln, um die Spaltung der palästinensischen Gebiete zu überwinden. Das am 4. Mai 2011 von allen palästinensischen Parteien in Kairo unterzeichnete Versöhnungsabkommen wurde in den Folgemonaten zwar formell durch mehrere Sondervereinbarungen zwischen der Fatah und Hamas bestätigt, aber wesentliche Schritte zur Umsetzung des Abkommens sind seither von keinem der beteiligten Akteure unternommen worden. Damit bestätigt sich die Befürchtung, dass weder die Fatah noch Hamas bereit sind, das Ziel der palästinensischen Einheit über den eigenen Machterhalt zu stellen. Die innerpalästinensische Spaltung stellt ein entscheidendes Hindernis für die Etablierung eines unabhängigen palästinensischen Staates dar und ist in der palästinensischen Bevölkerung extrem unpopulär. Steigender Druck aus der Bevölkerung und das Bedürfnis der Parteien nach einer strategischen Neuorientierung im Kontext des Arabischen Frühlings führten im Mai 2011 zur Unterzeichnung des Versöhnungsabkommens in Kairo. Vorrangige Ziele des Abkommens sind die Bildung einer Einheitsregierung, die Durchführung von Parlaments- und Präsidentschaftswahlen sowie die Integration der Hamas in die PLO. Das im Februar 2012 geschlossene Folgeabkommen von Doha zeugt zwar von einer Verbesserung der Kommunikation zwischen den Führungsebenen der beiden Konfliktparteien, offenbarte jedoch auch Spannungen innerhalb der Hamas und wurde bis heute nicht implementiert. Die neuesten Entwicklungen sprechen dafür, dass das Versöhnungsabkommen langfristig auf Eis gelegt werden wird. Die Überwindung der palästinensischen Spaltung liegt damit genauso wie die Implementierung einer Zweistaatenlösung nach wie vor in weiter Ferne.

تزعم هذه الورقة أنه حتى لو تم تحقيق مصالح ناجحة بين حركتي فتح وحماس، فإن ذلك لن يوفر للفلسطينيين القيادة التي يحتاجونها، حيث أن شرعيتهم الداخلية قد تآكلت جداً. وبدلاً من ذلك تزعم هذه الورقة كذلك أن الأمل في قيادة فلسطينية شرعية موحدة معقود على نشوء حركة جماهيرية غير فصائلية جديدة ولا تتأثر بجهات أو تدخلات خارجية.

This thesis is an exploratory examination of identity construction and children’s media, with a focus on the Palestinian political groups of Fatah and Hamas. It looks at how children’s media are framed within the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It examines how internal and external social factors contribute to identity formation and the interaction among these elements during times of conflict and war. This thesis hypothesizes that both Fatah and Hamas use various myths to differing degrees in order to frame their conception of a Palestinian identity. Specifically, it explores the use of the Myth of Battle, the Myth of Hero, the Myth of Victim, the Myth of Religion, the Myth of Land and the Myth of Other. It seeks to determine which of these myths each group emphasizes through a qualitative and quantitative visual ethnographic content analysis. The quantitative analysis uncovered interesting, albeit not statistically significant, differences between Fatah’s and Hamas’ use of all of the myths in their videos. Specifically it found that both groups made equal and great use of the Myth of Religion; that Hamas produced the videos with the greatest focus on the Myth of Battle and the Myth of Hero; and that neither group greatly emphasized the Myth of Victim, the Myth of Land or the Myth of Other. Finally, the analysis discovered positive correlations between the Myth of Hero and the Myth of Battle as well as between the Myth of Battle and the Myth of Other.

This article tackles the consequences of the 9/11/2001 attacks on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and on the relationships within the various components of the Palestinian national movement. While the strengthening of the Washington/Tel-Aviv alliance led to the marginalization of the Palestinian leadership and of its viable state project, the chasm between the radical and the moderate components of the Palestinian national movement, and more specifically between the Islamist Hamas and the nationalist Fatah movements, widened. The resulting political and institutional deadlock has led the Palestinians to engage in crucial debates about the future of their nation-building process., Cet article analyse les conséquences des attentats du 11 septembre 2001 à la fois sur les relations inter-palestiniennes et sur la scène israélo-palestinienne. Tandis que le renforcement de l'alliance ont conduit à discréditer la Direction palestinienne et à marginaliser son projet d'Etat viable, de graves fissures sont apparues entre l'aile radicale et l'aile modérée du mouvement palestinien, et plus spécifiquement entre les Islamistes du Hamas et les nationalistes du Fatah, avec des conséquences politiques et institutionnelles qui perdurent. L'ensemble de ces impasses a conduit les Palestiniens a vers des débats cruciaux sur l'avenir de leur projet national.

International audience; Les palestiniens ont traduit avec leurs propres mots les révolutions arabes. La crise politique ouverte en Syrie depuis plusieurs mois pose au mouvement national palestinien un défi d'ampleur. Contrairement à l'Egypte, la Syrie accueille depuis la fin des années 1990 la direction des principales factions palestiniennes, de certaines composantes du Fatah aux islamistes du Hamas et du Mouvement du Jihad islamique en Palestine, en passant par la gauche du Front populaire pour la libération de la Palestine.