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The public policy doctrine in the conflict of laws has been often characterised as uncertain and ambiguous. This article aims to examine the doctrine at common law from a theoretical perspective in order to: first, determine whether the substantive considerations which courts have invoked under the public policy doctrine are theoretically justifiable; second, discern principled boundaries around the courts’ exercise of the defence. Through a study of case law and an examination from first principles of the normative basis for the recognition of foreign laws and judgments, this article proposes a set of principles that can form the theoretical underpinning of the public policy doctrine, and will examine how the proposed principles can provide practical guidance to judges in their application of the public policy doctrine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contemporary judgments of George W. Bush's foreign policy were often quite harsh and polemical. In this article, we argue that a moderate form of Bush revisionism is likely to emerge in the coming years, as scholars take a more dispassionate look at his achievements in global affairs and the difficult circumstances under which his administration labored. We offer the six most persuasive arguments in favor of Bush revisionism; we then discuss the most reasonable critiques of these arguments. The overall thrust of this essay is not that Bush will someday be seen as one of America's most successful statesmen, but simply that his reputation should improve as partisan passions fade and new evidence is considered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

El articulo discurre sobre el pago de daños punitivos según las leyes italianas, con un enfoque en las sentencias extranjeras.

The article examines the current state of the interaction between the forum non conveniens doctrine and the enforcement of foreign judgments in the U.S.. Topics discussed include challenges faced by corporate defendants litigating in foreign countries; enforcement of judicial estoppel in such cases; and Delgado v. Shell Oil Co. court case on same.

The uncertainty of enforcement of foreign court judgments in the United Arab Emirates (the UAE) directly before its 'onshore' courts has driven some judgment creditors to seek alternative recourse. One such alternative includes the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) Courts, an 'offshore' judicial entity through which judgment creditors may more readily achieve enforcement and recognition in the 'onshore' courts of the UAE. In this way, the DIFC Courts have come to be known as a 'conduit jurisdiction'. Recent DIFC Court jurisprudence, which has opened the door to such a mechanism, has given rise to concerns about misuse and, in particular, circumventing the enforcement requirements of the Dubai courts. As a possible response to those concerns, the Ruler of Dubai established a judicial committee with the objective of resolving jurisdictional conflicts between the DIFC Courts and the Dubai courts. The early decisions of that judicial committee have not closed the door to the use of the DIFC Courts as a conduit jurisdiction, but it remains to be seen whether the Dubai courts will enforce foreign court judgments that have come via the DIFC Courts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper contains the Commonwealth Model Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Bill. The paper describes the background to the Model Bill, including its relationship with The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, and the present resumed Hague Conference work on a possible Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. The paper highlights the differences between these different initiatives and the relative advantages of the draft Commonwealth Model Bill. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ECtHR's Grand Chamber judgment in Avotiņš v Latvia concerning the execution of default judgments emanating from other Member States strikes a viable balance between admonishment of the Latvian Supreme Court and deference to EU law. The judgment is somewhat less convincing in its assessment of the specific procedural obligations at stake. Any appreciation of EU law mechanisms based on mutual trust should focus on whether doubts as to the respect of fundamental rights in the course of transnational judicial co-operation are effectively addressed in court. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article’s main purpose is to analyse the implications of some recent developments relating to reciprocity on the practice of the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. It shows that reciprocity has become a toothless principle that should not pose serious concern. It also argues that even if it is not abolished entirely, reciprocity no longer plays a significant role in the field of the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, and therefore, should not be an issue of concern for jurisdictions that accept the principle of recognition. This is because, the test for establishing reciprocity has now become so relaxed that the requirement will normally be met if it is shown that the courts of the rendering State are likely to recognize the enforcing State’s judgments. In other words, reciprocity can prove to be a serious hurdle only when it comes to the recognition of judgments rendered in a State that manifestly adheres to an unduly restrictive recognition regime such as regimes where recognition and enforcement are subject to the existence of a treaty or based on the outdated practice ofrévision au fond. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The federal courts are often accused of being too parochial, favoring U.S. parties over foreigners and U.S. law over relevant foreign or international law. According to what this Article terms the "parochial critique," the courts' U.S.-centrism generates unnecessary friction with allies, regulatory conflict, and access-to-justice gaps. This parochialism is assumed to reflect the preferences of individual judges: persuade judges to like international law and transnational cases better, the standard story goes, and the courts will reach more cosmopolitan results. This Article challenges that assumption. I argue instead that parochial doctrines can develop even in the absence of parochial judges. Our sometimes-parochial procedure may be the unintended result of decisionmaking pressures that mount over time within poorly designed doctrines. As such, it reflects not so much the personal views of individual judges but the limits of institutional capacity, the realities of behavioral decisionmaking, and the path dependence of the common law. This Article shows how open-ended decisionmaking in the midst of complexity encourages the use of heuristics that tend to emphasize the local, the familiar, and the concrete. These decisionmaking shortcuts, by disfavoring the foreign, put a parochial thumb on the scale--but that tilt is not limited to individual cases. Rather, it is locked in and amplified through the accumulation of precedent, as later judges rely on existing decisions to resolve new cases. Over time, even judges with positive conceptions of international law and transnational order will find themselves, in applying these doctrines, consistently favoring U.S. litigants over foreigners and U.S. law over foreign or international law. To explore this theory, this Article traces the evolution of four procedural doctrines: discovery of foreign evidence, forum non conveniens, service of process abroad, and the recognition of foreign judgments. The decisionmaking pressures outlined here can explain why the first two doctrines (framed as open-ended standards) are often criticized as parochial while the latter two (framed in more rule-like terms) are not. And if that account is at least plausible, it supports the primary claim of this Article: the occasional parochialism of our courts does not necessarily reflect the personal prejudices of our judges. If so, then avoiding the costs of parochialism will require structural, not just personal, solutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the issues of piercing the corporate veil and enforcement of foreign judgment in the U.S. Topics discussed include analysis of Res Judicata which means a matter that has been adjudicated by a competent court and therefore may not be pursued further by the same parties; Bank of Montreal v. SK Foods, LLC court case on same; and On Command Video Corp. v. Rod court case on same.

This comparative analysis explores the question of preclusive effects arising from arbitrationrelated judgments, particularly when a foreign court has already ruled upon an issue relevant to the grounds for refusal under Article V of the 1958 New York Convention. It argues that arbitration-related judgments like exequatur or non-annulment decisions, along with the res judicata and estoppel effects arising from them, can be subject to recognition in other countries. The article thereby rejects some of the views contending that various legal obstacles stand in the way of such recognition, including its compatibility with the 1958 New York Convention. However, risks of forum shopping and undue imbalances in the parties' rights ultimately support restricting this recognition to judgments rendered at the arbitral seat only. Such judgments should be able to preclude the re-litigation of identical issues in non-seat countries as a matter of res judicata and estoppel. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The article discusses the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit's ruling in the 2016 case Chevron Corp. v. Donziger which deals with American foreign relations and corporate laws and equitable relief from a foreign judgment under the U.S. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). A call for America's political branches to federalize judgment recognition law through statute or treaty is examined, along with state laws and a judgment from an Ecuadorian court.

This article deals with the recognition and enforcement of judgments in employment matters in EU private international law. After looking into the theoretical underpinnings of the protection of employees by rules of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, this article examines the recognition and enforcement of judgments concerning individual employment contracts under the Recast of the Brussels I Regulation, the European Enforcement Order Regulation and the European Order for Payment Procedure Regulation. It is shown that the lack of a jurisdictional defence for employment disputes in the latter two instruments has the potential to undermine, at the overlap of the fields of application of these instruments and the Brussels I Recast, the protection offered to employees by the Recast’s jurisdictional defence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The parties have the opportunity of granting jurisdiction to a Turkish court or to a foreign court in the field of law of obligations under Turkish law. This is considered as the reflection of the principle of freedom of will inherent in the field of law of contracts. The jurisdiction agreements granting jurisdiction to Turkish courts are subject to the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) Articles 17-18; whereas, the competence of foreign courts through the agreement of parties is subject to the Private International Law Act (PILA) Article 47. The recognition and enforcement of foreign court decisions are provided in Articles 50-60 of the PILA. Turkey did not sign the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (Hague Convention). In this article, I will give basic information on the validity of jurisdiction clauses; and recognition and enforcement of foreign court judgments under Turkish law in comparison with the Hague Convention. I will try to demonstrate the consequences of future ratification of the Hague Convention by Turkey to these issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In October 2015, the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements from 2005 entered into force. By comparing the relevant provisions of the Hague Convention 2005 with the corresponding provisions on choice of court agreements from Private International Law Act in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter: PIL Act BH), the author points out most of the shortcomings of the existing legislative solutions in BH, as well as the benefits that BH would certainly achieve had it made accession to the Hague Convention 2005. The later does not apply only to substantially improving the existing legislative solutions, but also to the fact that with accession to the Convention, BH would also fulfill its obligations under the Stabilization and Association Agreement in terms of harmonization of respective legislation with the relevant part of the acquis communautaire. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements was the result of more than a decade of negotiations at the Hague Conference on Private International Law. While the negotiations began with the goal of a more comprehensive convention, regulating both jurisdiction in the court of origin and recognition of the resulting judgment, the result is an important instrument. It provides the opportunity for predictability when a choice of court agreement is included in an international commercial contract, and places that choice on a more even plane with an arbitration agreement under the New York Convention. By giving effect in all Contracting States to both the choice of court agreement and the resulting judgment, the Hague Convention makes the choice between arbitration and litigation more evenly balanced for purposes of choosing a forum for dispute resolution in international commercial contracts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Pandectele Române is the property of Wolters Kluwer Romania and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

It is black-letter law that in order to recognize and enforce a foreign judgment, the rendering court must have had personal jurisdiction over the defendant. While the principle is clear, it is an open question as to whose law governs the question of personal jurisdiction: that of the rendering court or that of the recognizing court. In other words, is the foreign court's jurisdiction over the defendant governed by foreign law (the law of FI), domestic law (the law ofF2), or some combination thereof? While courts have taken a number of different approaches, it seems that many courts regard foreign law as relevant to the question of whether the foreign court possessed personal jurisdiction over the defendant. In this Article, I argue that U.S. courts should not be looking to foreign law (in whole or in part) to determine whether a foreign court hadjurisdiction over the defendant in the original action. I present five arguments in support of this contention: (1) there is no statutory authority pointing to the application of foreign law; (2) U.S. courts are not well-positioned to apply foreign jurisdictional law; (3) re-examining assertions of jurisdiction under foreign law violates international comity; (4) an examination of foreign law is usually unnecessary because jurisdiction is also assessed according to U.S. standards; and (5) U.S. courts do not do a good job applying foreign jurisdictional law. Instead, I argue that courts should apply American law to assess whether a foreign court was jurisdictionally competent. This, in turn, raises the question: What is "American" law? I maintain that courts should apply broad federal standards of jurisdiction, and not state-based ones, to determine whether the rendering court had personal jurisdiction over the defendant. This Article also looks closely at two particular areas of jurisdiction law that are particularly complicated as they relate to the choice of law issue: submission and notice. With respect to submission, U.S. courts seem to be unclear as to whose law applies in assessing whether a defendant in a foreign action submitted to the jurisdiction of the foreign court. In particular, many U.S. courts defer to the foreign court's interpretations as to whether the acts of the defendant constituted submission. With respect to notice, there is a lack of clarity as to how notice relates to personal jurisdiction in the context of the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. Here too, there is confusion as to whose law of notice applies in assessing whether a defendant received adequate notice of the proceeding. Consistent with the argument above, this Article takes the position that U.S. standards, and not foreign ones, should ultimately guide the submission and notice inquiries in the recognition context. Finally, because much of the law in this area is codified in either the 1962 Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act or the 2005 Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act, I propose concrete changes to the language of the uniform acts that would address the choice of law problem in the recognition of foreign judgments and would clarify the intersection between notice and personal jurisdiction in the uniform acts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on U.S. Supreme Court citations that involve the European Union and the so-called European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) with the role of foreign jurisprudence. Topics discussed include U.S. Supreme Court decisions containing foreign citations that fueled debate on the utilization of foreign law within U.S. legal scholarship, U.S. Supreme Court interprets foreign legal orders and inquiries into comparative law by drafting a judicial opinion.

The article focuses on extraterritorial effects of judgments relating to international arbitral awards including contradictory decisions regarding award, foreign judgment principles of the U.S., and principles of private international laws.

On 24 June 2016, after months of public debate, it was confirmed that the people of the United Kingdom (UK) had voted by a narrow majority (51.9% to 48.1%) to leave the European Union (EU). The decision to leave seems likely to have a significant impact on the UK’s civil justice system and, in particular, on the rules of private international law applied to dispute resolution in a cross-border context. It is, however, a highly speculative exercise to predict the future shape of private international law in the UK in these circumstances. Putting speculation to one side, this article seeks to analyse legal events of the past to assess the position that the UK now finds itself in when approaching withdrawal negotiations. In particular, the following discussion seeks to identify the legal baseline of applicable private international law rules under international, EU and national law following withdrawal, with a particular emphasis on the domain currently occupied by the instruments applicable to civil and commercial matters (Brussels I, Lugano, Rome I, Rome II). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Wuhan University Journal (Philosophy & Social Sciences) / Wuhan Daxue Xuebao (Zhexue Shehui Kexue Ban) is the property of Wuhan University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

With the rise of China's economy and the fast globalization of China's IT industry, an increasing number of EU citizens' personal data are collected and processed on Chinese territory. This article aims to discuss to what extent EU citizens' personal data can be protected under the Chinese and EU data protection frameworks, what are the major problems with the present circumstances, and in which ways EU citizens' personal data cam be better protected as future police choice? To provide a general background, Section II briefly discusses foreigners' legal status and the data protection framework in China. Section III analyses in much detail four practical circumstances under which EU citizens' personal data are processed in China and the possible legal remedies available in case of potential data breaches. Section IV further explains the current situations of judicial mutual assistance between China and EU countries on civil, commercial and criminal matters, in particular regarding the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments and arbitration awards. The paper is concluded with some concrete suggestions for both Chinese and EU law and policy makers to consider for improvement in their future work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Daimler AG v. Bauman, the Supreme Court confirmed what it had only hinted at previously-that general jurisdiction over a corporation is limited only to a state which can be regarded as its "home." In doing so, the Court brought the United States closer to the rest of the world in its approach to general jurisdiction. What may have been overlooked, however, is the impact of Daimler on actions brought to recognize and enforce foreign country judgments and foreign arbitral awards if the Daimler standard is applied in that context. Some courts have already done so. Professors Silberman and Simowitz offer an overview of the present jurisdictional regimes for recognition and enforcement actions with respect to both foreign judgments and arbitral awards. Their own analysis concludes that a jurisdictional nexus should be required for recognition and enforcement but that the context of recognition and enforcement presents unique differences from a plenary action. Thus, they argue that Daimler needs to be tailored to fit such actions. Professors Silberman and Simowitz also examine various alternative bases of jurisdiction-propertybased jurisdiction, specific jurisdiction, and consent-that may be pressed into service if Daimler is extended to recognition and enforcement actions, and find both promise as well as limits in those alternatives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the history and role of the Hague Conference on Private International Law with the recognition and enforcement of foreign decisions in the U.S. and the personal jurisdiction over the defendant and subject matter jurisdiction with the international private law.

The article focuses on the enforcement of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act with regulatory effort with act of legal imperialism and limitations on its extraterritorial reach in light of the interests of foreign jurisdictions, business, and foreign relations. It mentions that courts should analyze prescriptive jurisdiction under the FCPA and the personal jurisdiction in FCPA cases. It also mentions that FCPA regulates bribery and false or inaccurate accounting.

The article reports the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) in the case 'Chevron Corp. v. Yaiguaje' in which the court addresses and clarifies the law on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in Canada.

The article looks at the decision of the High Court of Australia in the case regarding the foreign State immunity with the foreign judgment be registered under the Foreign Judgments Act and mentions a report prepared by Australian Law Reform Commission.

The article looks at the decision of the High Court of Australia in the case Firebird Global Master Fund II Ltd v Republic of Nauru regarding the foreign states and sovereigns immunity with the ex parte application to register foreign judgment against sovereign state.