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Der Autor untersucht die Verwaltung der Erdöleinnahmen in Ghana während der ersten fünf Jahre seit Beginn der Förderung im Jahr 2010. Seine Analyse beruht auf Berichten des Petroleum Transparency and Accountability Index, amtlichen Dokumenten wichtiger staatlicher Stellen und Interviews mit Persönlichkeiten des Ölsektors. Er konzediert zwar Fortschritte in Richtung auf eine transparente und verantwortliche Nutzung der Erdöleinnahmen, aus seiner Sicht könnte allerdings deutlich mehr erreicht werden, wenn entscheidende Gesetzesvorhaben umgesetzt würden und Staat und Politiker proaktiv und ohne Verzögerung im Erdölsektor intervenieren würden. Das könne zur Vermeidung gesellschaftlicher Konflikte beitragen, die aufgrund mangelnder Information über die Verwendung der Erdöleinnahmen entstehen könnten, sowie zur Verhütung korrupter Praktiken durch Politiker und Verantwortliche im Erdölsektor., This paper undertakes a five-year review of the management of oil revenues in Ghana since the commencement of oil production in 2010. Using reports from the Petroleum Transparency and Accountability Index, official records from key state agencies, and interviews with core individuals within the petroleum sector, the paper assesses the quality of transparency and accountability in the management of Ghana’s oil revenue. It argues that even though some progress has been made in the transparent and accountable use of oil revenues, more can be achieved if certain critical bills are passed and proactive interventions pursued without further delay on the part of government and policymakers within Ghana’s petroleum sector. These would help prevent both potential social conflict that may result from a lack of information on how oil revenues are utilised and the corrupt use of oil funds by politicians and people in authority within the oil industry.

After the 2016 Algiers Accord, all eyes are on Vienna where the 14-member OPEC will meet on November 30, 2016, to finalize and formalize the agenda to cut oil production, the first one since the financial crisis of 2008. At the Algiers meeting in September, the OPEC agreed to reduce output from 33.24 million barrels per day (mbpd) to a level between 32.5 million and 33 million barrels per day (mbpd) [1]. Accordingly, quotas for each of the member countries are expected to be decided in the Vienna at the 171st meeting of OPEC. The oil production cuts attempt to tackle the economic crisis being faced by the OPEC countries owing to a persistent fall in oil prices since mid-June 2016. Saudi Arabia, for its part, hopes to leverage its efforts to jump-start economic reform process under its ‘Vision 2030’ plan. The news of production cuts from some of the biggest oil producers brought cheers to the markets, propelling the prices upwards by more than 6 percent [2]. Subsequently, on October 27, 2016, oil prices recorded a 15-month high with Brent crude and U.S. West Texas Intermediate (WTI) at $50.47 and $49.72 respectively.[3] But the very next day, given the uncertainties around OPEC’s ability to sustain production cuts, both Brent and WTI registered a fall to $50.39 and 49.67 a barrel respectively. Given OPEC’s past record of quota violations, uncertainty regarding the group’s willingness to carry through with the cuts is expected. This skepticism prevalent in the oil market could be reflected during the Vienna meet which risks falling just short of a deal, thus aggravating the perception of an OPEC with increasingly diminishing relevance.

The rights to prior consultation and compensation have been established within the framework of international indigenous peoples' rights. However, in practice these processes have often gone hand in hand with adverse social consequences for local populations, such as the exacerbation of conflicts, the division of communities and the weakening of indigenous organizations. These phenomena have received little attention, despite their great relevance for these populations. This article sheds light on the use by the Bolivian state and extraction corporations of exclusionary participation and negotiation processes, on the one hand, and ‘carrot-and-stick’ techniques on the other, which have together accounted for negative social impacts on the ground. The article is based on recently conducted field research, focus group discussions and semi-structured interviews in Guaraní communities in Bolivia. The findings extend the existing literature by providing a fine-grained and systematic analysis of divisive undertakings and their sociocultural and sociopolitical consequences in neo-extractivist Bolivia. The broader implications of the study add to academic debates about participation in development, about ‘divide-and-rule’ tactics and about the practice of indigenous peoples' rights.

Recent research has increasingly questioned the link between natural resources and violent conflict while stressing the importance of resource-specific context conditions under which internal conflicts become more likely. This paper engages in a systematic analysis of six of these resource-specific conditions comparing 15 African oil and diamond producing countries. Employing a Boolean logic, the results of our analysis indicate that, typically, a conflict-ridden diamond or oil producer is highly dependent on resources, its revenues are hardly spent on distributional policies and the security apparatus and, moreover, it suffers from intercommunal problems in the producing regions. Little income from resources per capita and substantial production of lootable resources in peripheral regions seem to constitute necessary conditions for civil war. Thus, our findings imply that future theoretical models and empirical strategies should integrate the full set of (resource specific) context conditions. Efforts to raise a more integrative approach combining quantitative and qualitative research designs seem particularly promising.

Der Ölpreis stürzte zwischen Juni 2014 und Februar 2015 von 116 auf 47 US-Dollar je Barrel ab. Nachdem sich Saudi-Arabien beim letzten OPEC-Treffen im November 2014 geweigert hatte, die Ölproduktion zu drosseln und so dem Preisverfall entgegenzuwirken, wurde erneut die Frage laut, welches Ziel das Land damit verfolge. Die gängige Meinung, Saudi-Arabien beabsichtige, sowohl US-amerikanische Schieferöl- und Schiefergasproduzenten als auch ölproduzierende Länder wie Iran oder Russland in die Knie zu zwingen, greift zu kurz und berücksichtigt nicht die tiefgreifenden Veränderungen auf den Rohstoffmärkten und die Rolle institutioneller Investoren. Der aktuelle Preisverfall ist vielmehr ein Zeichen dafür, wie sehr der Ölpreis gegenwärtig weniger auf politische Entscheidungen als auf Marktmechanismen reagiert.

This paper investigates the causal relationship between non-oil international trade and the GDP in a panel of 11 selected oil exporting countries by using panel unit root tests and panel cointegration analysis. A three-variable model is formulated with oil revenues as the third variable. The results show a strong causality from oil revenues and economic growth to trade in the oil exporting countries. Yet, non-oil trade does not have any significant effects on GDP in short- and long-run. It means that it is the oil and GDP that drives the trade in mentioned countries, not vice versa. According to the results, decision makings should be employed to achieve sustainable growth through higher productivity and substantially enlarging the economic base diversification in the future.

Seit Sommer 2014 reißt der Verfall der Weltölpreise tiefe Löcher in die Haushalte der Mitglieder des Golfkooperationsrates. Neben der ­Privatisierung von Staatsunternehmen planen dessen Regierungen deswegen zum ersten Mal seit ihrer Staatsgründung auch die Einführung von Steuern. Für Anfang 2018 ist die Erhebung einer fünfprozentigen Mehrwertsteuer in allen sechs Golfmonarchien angekündigt. Allerdings hat eine systematische Besteuerung weitreichende Folgen: Die bislang mit Steuerfreiheit und hohen Subventionen verwöhnten Bürger könnten als Steuerzahler politische Teilhabe einfordern. Der Einfluss der G20 auf diese Reformen ist vor allem symbolischer Natur. Selbst optimistische Vorhersagen gehen davon aus, dass der Ölpreis auf absehbare Zeit nicht wieder auf das im Juni 2014 erreichte Niveau von ca. 110 USD pro Barrel ansteigen wird. Die Ölmonarchien am Golf stellt das vor enorme Herausforderungen. Die meisten von ihnen geben derzeit weit mehr aus, als sie durch den Verkauf von Hydrokarbonprodukten einnehmen. Die Golfstaaten haben bisher auf die steigenden Budgetdefizite mit Ausgabenkürzungen, dem Rückgriff auf Finanzreserven, Steuerreformen und der Privatisierung von Staatsbetrieben reagiert. Besteuerung bedingt ein reziprokes Verhältnis zwischen Regierung und Bevölkerung. In der Golfregion ist die Ausweitung repräsentativer Institution allerdings keine politische Option. Vor diesem Hintergrund werden die ­ölreichen autoritären Monarchien versuchen, alternative Governanceleistungen zu ent­wickeln. Dazu gehören z.B. die verstärkte Digitalisierung, der Aufbau von Freund-Feind-Schemata und die Herausstellung globaler Exklusivität der ­eigenen Staatsbürger. Saudi-Arabien als einflussreichstes Mitglied innerhalb des Golfkooperations­rates wird im Kreis der 20 mächtigsten Länder der Welt als einzige absolute Monarchie massiv für eine Anerkennung seiner geplanten Strukturreformen ­werben. Eine Unterstützung der saudischen Reform- und Regionalpolitik auf dem G20-Treffen im

Since summer 2014, the drop in world oil prices has left holes in the budgets of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members. Thus, in addition to privatising state-owned enterprises, these governments plan to introduce taxation for the first time ever. From the beginning of 2018, a value added tax of 5 per cent will be levied in all six Gulf monarchies. However, systematic taxation has far-reaching consequences: in the Gulf, for instance, citizens have hitherto enjoyed tax exemption and high subsidies but could demand political participation as taxpayers. The G20's influence on these reforms is above all symbolic in nature. Even optimistic predictions do not anticipate the price of oil returning to the level of USD 110 per barrel, which it reached in June 2014. That presents the oil monarchies in the Gulf with enormous challenges. The majority of them spend far more than they earn through the sale of hydrocarbon products. Up to now, the Gulf States have reacted to their growing budget deficits by cutting spending, falling back on financial reserves, reforming taxes, and privatising state-owned enterprises. Taxation requires a reciprocal relationship between a government and its citizens, but the expansion of representative institutions is not a real political option in the Gulf. Instead, the oil-rich authoritarian monarchies will attempt to develop other forms of governance services – such as, enhanced digitalisation, the creation of friend–foe schemes, and the accentuation of the global exclusivity of their own citizens. As the most influential member within the GCC and the only absolute monarchy within the G20, Saudi Arabia will assertively canvass support from among the 20 most powerful countries in the world for its planned structural reforms. However, any support for Saudi reform and regional policy at the G20 summit in Germany in July 2017 should depend on its policies meeting two requirements: respect for the fundamental principles of human rights and interna

Studie untersucht die Genese der globalen Erdölwirtschaft ab dem frühen 19. Jahrhundert und die Abhängigkeit Europas vom Erdölimport im historischen Vergleich. Die Entwicklung der internationalen Ölindustrie und des europäischen Erdölverbrauchs folgte einem pfadabhängigen Verlauf. Die Interaktionen zwischen den Mineralölkonzernen, europäischen Verbraucherländern, erdölexportierenden Staaten und dem Markt werden anhand eines polit-ökonomischen Untersuchungsmodells, basierend auf der Regimetheorie und dem Interdependenzansatz nach Keohane und Nye, analysiert. Die weltweite Erdölwirtschaft ist seit ihren Anfängen von unternehmens-, staats- oder marktdominierten Regelsystemen geprägt, die maßgeblichen Einfluss auf die Interdependenzbeziehungen zwischen den Förder- und Konsumländern ausüben. Mit dem Verlust der Kontrollmacht durch die OPEC und dem Aufstieg des Regimes der globalen Marktkräfte hat die „Ölwaffe“ als wirkungsvolles außenpolitisches Instrument ausgedient. Europas Versorgungssicherheit mit Erdöl hat in den vergangenen Jahrzehnten deutlich zugenommen., study examines the evolution of the global petroleum economy since the early 19th century and European oil import dependence in a historical perspective. The expansion of the international oil industry and European petroleum consumption are conceived as path-dependent processes. An International Political Economy approach is applied for the analysis of the interactions between oil companies, importing countries, producing states, and the market over time. Regime theory and interdependence by Keohane and Nye are used to unveil the power structures that underlie the mutual dependencies between European countries and the oil-exporting nations. Since OPEC lost its market power the global oil business is dominated by a new regime of market forces. The “oil weapon” is no longer an effective tool for the achievement of political ends. European oil supply security has increased considerably over the past decades., von MMag. Alexander Smith, Abweichender Titel laut Übersetzung der Verfassers, Universität Innsbruck, Dissertation, 2016, OeBB, (VLID)1274405

The analysis of Russian energy policies after the political crisis in and around Ukraine offers important insights with respect to the economic and geopolitical repercussions. The structural changes made in the Russian energy sector have been significant and include both internal and external dimensions. The Russian energy sector is under stress and has to adapt to low oil and gas prices, economic sanctions and increasing competition on international energy markets. Against the background of this turbulence on the energy markets, Russian energy companies are pursuing various strategies: a shift to Asia and asset swaps with Chinese and Indian companies, stronger integration within the Eurasian Union and changing strategies on the European energy markets. The structural changes have been reinforced by recent geopolitical developments, which have led to the deterioration of EU-Russia energy relations and the securitisation of energy questions. However, despite immediate intentions to diversify away from one another, the EU and Russia will remain dependent on each other in the gas and oil sectors at least for the next 10 years. The current study provides insights into current changes in the Russian gas, oil and electricity sectors, highlights potential implications for the European energy market, considers the current status of EU-Russia energy relations and presents some recommendations for further bilateral cooperation and energy dialogue." (author's abstract)

Im Januar und Februar 2016 hat sich der Sinkflug der Ölpreise abermals beschleunigt - anscheinend unbeeindruckt von den geopolitischen Krisen in den wichtigen Förderregionen des Mittleren Ostens und Russlands. Trotz preisbedingt steigender Nachfrage drückt nach wie vor ein massives Überangebot auf den Markt. Zwar profitieren Ölverbraucher weltweit von den niedrigen Preisen. Konjunkturell aber wirkt der Ölpreis-Angebotsschock in einem labilen weltwirtschaftlichen Umfeld allenfalls stabilisierend, jedoch kaum als Wachstumstreiber. Die erwarteten positiven Impulse sind weithin ausgeblieben. Angesichts der kräftigen Einnahmeausfälle der Ölproduzenten mehren sich die Sorgen, dass sich die geopolitischen Verwerfungen in den großen Förderregionen weiter verschärfen. Derweil werden Investitionen in neue Felder unrentabel. Dass in der Folge Kohlenstoffreserven im Boden verbleiben, ist klimapolitisch zwingend notwendig. Wenn aber der Umbau des Energiesystems nicht konsequent vorangetrieben wird, könnte dies künftig die Versorgungssicherheit gefährden. (Autorenreferat)

Hazard Mapping of Industrial Oil Storage in Hussein Dey, Algiers (Algeria). The industrial hazards are a danger to environment. It is the case of the fuel depot of Caroubier in the municpality of Hussein Dey in the outskirts of the capital Algiers. It is a potential danger in this urban area and a real challenge for the local authorities which do not have appropriate tools for risk management. The municipality possesses single maps with colored items corresponding to the identification of spatial risks. The objective of this article is to map the risks generated by fuel depot. This mapping will help us localize the spatial vulnerability to suggest land planning measures.

"The primary objective of this paper is to assess whether Namibia is ready to become an oil producer. The geological estimates suggest that the country may possess the equivalent of as many as 11 billion barrels of crude oil. If the numbers are correct, Namibia would be sitting on the second-largest oil reserves in sub-Saharan Africa, and exploitation could start as soon as 2017. This clearly raises the question of whether Namibia is next in line to become a victim of the notorious 'resource curse'. On the basis of critical discourse analysis and findings from field research, the authors have selected six dimensions of the resource curse and contextualised them within the spheres of Namibian politics and economy. While Namibia still faces a number of important challenges, our findings offer little evidence that the oil will have particularly disruptive effects." (author's abstract), "Die Autoren des Beitrags versuchen einzuschätzen, unter welchen Voraussetzungen Namibia in die Erdölförderung einsteigt. Nach geologischen Schätzungen könnte das Land über 11 Milliarden Barrel Rohöl verfügen. Wenn sich die Zahlen als richtig erweisen, besitzt Namibia die zweitgrößten Erdölreserven Subsahara-Afrikas; die Förderung könnte schon im Jahr 2017 beginnen. Damit ergibt sich die Frage, ob Namibia der nächste Staat ist, der dem 'Ressourcenfluch' zum Opfer fällt. Auf der Grundlage einer kritischen Diskursanalyse und unter Berücksichtigung von Feldforschungsergebnissen haben die Autoren politische und ökonomische Merkmale des namibischen Staates entlang von sechs Dimensionen des Ressourcenfluch-Ansatzes untersucht. Ihrer Einschätzung nach steht Namibia zwar vor erheblichen Herausforderungen, sie sehen aber nur wenige Hinweise darauf, dass die Erdölförderung sich besonders negativ auf die politische und soziale Entwicklung des Landes auswirken wird." (Autorenreferat)

Reactivation of Indonesia's full membership to the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) triggered discussion surrounding global petroleum governance. The country which decided to suspend its full membership at the end of 2008, currently labelled as net oil importer. However, in OPEC terms Indonesia never really left, instead of the organization termed it as a "suspension". Departing from the abovementioned context and perspectives, purpose of this essay is to answer the questions about the significance of the Indonesia's membership reactivation to OPEC, and the strategic context of the reactivation in the current global oil market. In answering these questions, this article draws the dynamics of the relation of Indonesia and OPEC through the history in the first part and explores Indonesia's interests in rejoining OPEC in the second one. In the third part, this essay will explore the possible benefit for OPEC as an organization as well as for its member countries could achieve by approving Indonesia's request to reactivate its membership, despite its status as a net oil importer.

"Big Data is the oil of the new economy" is the most famous citation during the three last years. It has even been adopted by the World Economic Forum in 2011. In fact, Big Data is like crude! It's valuable, but if unrefined it cannot be used. It must be broken down, analyzed for it to have value. But what about Big Data generated by the Petroleum Industry and particularly its upstream segment? Upstream is no stranger to Big Data. Understanding and leveraging data in the upstream segment enables firms to remain competitive throughout planning, exploration, delineation, and field development. Oil & Gas Companies conduct advanced geophysics modeling and simulation to support operations where 2D, 3D & 4D Seismic generate significant data during exploration phases. They closely monitor the performance of their operational assets. To do this, they use tens of thousands of data-collecting sensors in subsurface wells and surface facilities to provide continuous and real-time monitoring of assets and environmental conditions. Unfortunately, this information comes in various and increasingly complex forms, making it a challenge to collect, interpret, and leverage the disparate data. As an example, Chevron's internal IT traffic alone exceeds 1.5 terabytes a day. Big Data technologies integrate common and disparate data sets to deliver the right information at the appropriate time to the correct decision-maker. These capabilities help firms act on large volumes of data, transforming decision-making from reactive to proactive and optimizing all phases of exploration, development and production. Furthermore, Big Data offers multiple opportunities to ensure safer, more responsible operations. Another invaluable effect of that would be shared learning. The aim of this paper is to explain how to use Big Data technologies to optimize operations. How can Big Data help experts to decision-making leading the desired outcomes?

Thus far, researchers working on ethnicity and resources as determinants of civil conflict have operated largely independently of each other. While there is plenty of evidence that natural resources may spur armed conflict, empirical evidence for the nexus between ethnic fractionalization and conflict remains inconclusive. Some authors conclude that ethnically fractionalized societies are actually spared from intrastate violence. Others find either a positive relationship or none at all between ethnic fragmentation and internal conflict. In this context, this paper serves two purposes: first, it shows that salience-based fractionalization indices are associated with a higher risk of ethnic conflict onset; second, it finds evidence that oil further increases the conflict potential within fractionalized countries. The combination of oil and a shared identity seems to help overcome the collective action problems associated with rebellion, by providing recruitment pools, strong motives and the necessary financial means for insurgency. Employing logit models for pooled time-series cross-sectional data, our quantitative analysis shows that various ethnic fractionalization indicators are robustly linked to a substantially increased risk of ethnic armed conflict onset in a subset of oil-abundant countries.

Inhaltsverzeichnis: Heiko Pleines: Einleitung: Die Jukos-Affäre im Überblick (4-7). I. Das staatliche Vorgehen gegen Jukos - Heiko Pleines: Die Steuerschulden von Jukos (8-10); Julia Kusznir, Heiko Pleines: Der Streit um Förderlizenzen. Fallbeispiel Talakanskoe-Feld (11-12); Europarat: "Rechtliche Unzulänglichkeiten". Resolution vom 25. Januar 2005 (13-15); Ann-Kathrin Reichardt, Hans-Henning Schröder: Chronik der Jukos-Affäre von Mai 2003 bis Februar 2005 (16-23). II. Die Jukos-Affäre in der russischen Öffentlichkeit - Josephine Bollinger-Kanne: Die russische Debatte zur Jukos-Affäre. Rechtsstaatlichkeit contra Staatsinterventionismus (24-26); Der Jukos-Prozess und die öffentliche Meinung 2003 2005. Umfrageergebnisse (27-35). III. Staat und Wirtschaft im Zuge der Jukos-Affäre - Valery Kryukov: "Lenkbarkeit" statt Effizienz. Die Rolle des Staates in der russischen Erdöl- und Erdgaswirtschaft (36-38); Maria Ordzhonikidze: Michail Chodorkowskij und die Jukos-Affäre. Ein Kommentar (39-40); Heiko Pleines: Der Anteil des Staates an der Erdölwirtschaft (41-43); Heiko Pleines, Hans-Henning Schröder: Die Verwaltung staatlicher Unternehmen (44-47); Julia Kusznir, Heiko Pleines: Die Besteuerung der Erdölwirtschaft (48-51). IV. Ausländische Investitionen - Julia Kusznir, Heiko Pleines: Ausländische Investoren in der Erdölwirtschaft (52-53).

Contents: Jeronim Perovic, Robert Orttung: Russia's energy policy: should Europe worry? Russian oil and gas production. Russia's oil and gas industry in an international context (7-26). Part I Russia's energy policy: economic challenges and political strategies - Daniel Simmons, Isabel Murray: Russian gas: will there be enough investment? (27-30); Julia Kusznir, Heiko Pleines: The Russian oil industry between foreign investment and domestic interests. FDI and state ownership in the oil and gas industry (31-35); Susanne Wengle: Power politics: electricity sector reforms in post-Soviet Russia. Attitudes of the Russian public towards the privatization of UES (41-44). Part II Russia's new energy frontiers - Indra Overland: Shtokman and Russia's Arctic petroleum frontier (45-49); Nina Poussenkova: All quiet on the eastern front... (50-55); Elana Wilson Rowe: Regional influence in oil and gas development: a case study of Sakhalin (56-62). Part III Energy and foreign policy - Jeronim Perovic: Russian energy power abroad (63-66); Andreas Heinrich: Gazprom's expansion strategy in Europe and the liberalization of EU energy markets. Gazprom joint ventures, EU gas imports (67-74); Matteo Fachinotti: Will Russia create a gas cartel? (75-78); Yoshinori Takeda: Russia's new political leadership and its implication for East Siberian development and energy cooperation with North East Asian states (79-84). Part IV Ecological challenges - Roland Götz: Russia and global warming - implications for the energy industry (85-88); Petra Opitz: Energy savings in Russia - political challenges and economic potential. Russian CO2 emissions and energy consumption in international perspective (89-96).

The US shale revolution is making a deep impact on the global energy markets, with the United States becoming self-sufficient in oil and gas and international flows shifting increasingly towards the Pacific region. But the Persian Gulf remains the backbone of the global oil markets, while its liquefied natural gas is of global strategic significance and a factor for energy supply diversification in Europe. Growing domestic energy security expands US policy options towards the Gulf states, whose regimes are already greatly unsettled by fears over an American pull-out. While there is as yet no sign of such a move, Europe must be prepared for greater burden-sharing with the United States, especially in relation to energy imports from the Gulf. Only in the long term and in interaction with political factors do developments in the energy markets have the potential to threaten the stability of the Arab Gulf states. In the short and medium term these countries will have to secure their own energy supplies while maintaining exports. They find themselves confronted with this challenge at a difficult juncture. Certainly, their existing socio-economic development model cannot simply be extrapolated into the future. The geopolitical imponderables in the Gulf region and the associated supply risks offer good grounds to push on with the German Energiewende (energy transition). At the same time the new energy map demands more international dialogue and closer cooperation. One starting point would be energy partnerships with the Gulf states. (Autorenreferat)

The present paper analyses Russia's relations with six former Soviet republics (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine), since the fall of the USSR until the launch of the Eastern Partnership (EaP). By using qualitative research methods: discourse analysis, document analysis and press coverage, the author focuses on three main factors that contributed to the alienation of these countries from Russia: "energodiplomacy", trade wars and support of secessionist conflicts, arguing that the rapprochement of this countries with the West, especially with the EU, came not only from the economic reasons but from the need of preserving the state core values.

This paper achieves two things: first, it establishes the existence of a certain pattern of analysis, which I will call an academic canon, of analyzing the problems caused by the oil crises of the 1970's on the economy of Communist Romania. The canon seems to hold that a series of economic decisions taken in the 1960’s and 70’s by the communist leadership concerning the vast expansion of the petroleum industry led to huge problems after the enormous increases in the price of oil at the end of the 1970's, which led to the virtual destruction of the economy and the huge deprivations of the 1980’s, thus helping to explain the popular rejection of the socialist regime. Secondly, it analyzes what the Romanian communist leadership thought of the oil industry and what was their general strategy related to it. The general conclusion of the paper is that a deeper research on the party documents and economic policies leads to a wider understanding not only of the worldview of the Romanian communist leaders, but also to nuances when describing the economic causes of political and social change.

According to quantitative studies, oil seems the only natural resource that is robustly linked to civil war onset. However, recent debates on the nexus of oil and internal conflict have neglected the fact that there are a number of peaceful rentier oil states in existence. Few efforts have been made to explain why some oil-exporting countries have experienced civil war while others have not. We thus address this puzzle, by arguing that civil war risks depend on the specific conditions of oil production and how they come to structure state–society relations. Specifically, we expect that states that are either highly dependent on oil or who have problematic relations with oil regions are prone to civil war. However, these risks will be mitigated either when democratic institutions can manage conflicts peacefully or when abundant oil revenues can be spent in such a way as to buy peace. We test this conditional argument by comparing 39 net oil exporters, using a (crisp-set) Qualitative Comparative Analysis – a methodology particularly suited to test conditional relationships in medium-N samples. Our results largely confirm our conditional hypotheses. Conditions of oil production are ambiguous, and particular combinations thus explain the onset of civil war. Specifically, we find that high abundance is sufficient to ensure peace, while two distinct pathways lead to civil war: the combination of high dependence and low abundance, as well as the overlap of ethnic exclusion and oil reserves in non-abundant and non-democratic oil states.