Search

Aiming to shed light on the interplay of board‐related mechanisms and their influence on sustainable development, this study examines configurations of corporate governance conditions that are associated with high and low ESG performance. Fuzzy‐set qualitative comparative analysis was used, resorting to a sample of S&P 500 manufacturing companies that are committed to contributing to solve the climate change societal challenge (i.e., SDG13). The configurational analysis was also extended to the all sample of S&P 500 companies to assure the generalizability of the findings and provide additional insights. The findings support the functional view of the role of the board, emphasising the notion that configurations (i.e., combinations of conditions) are more important to sustainable development than any single condition. Different from past research, this study emphasises the importance of defining and implementing a CSR strategy to achieve high ESG performance, which is always present in configurations leading to the outcome of interest. Furthermore, the results also suggest that a monitoring mechanism should always be present, while an incentive alignment mechanism is only required in some circumstances. Moreover, the results show that ESG‐related executive compensation should be complemented with other mechanisms, such as board monitoring, to be effective. This study contributes to the debate on whether sustainability‐related performance alignment incentives and monitoring mechanisms act as complements or substitutes. The findings show that linear approaches might not capture the all picture, suggesting that a more nuanced view should be used in future studies, and can inform companies' strategic decisions regarding sustainability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prior research has argued that companies in transition economies engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities to achieve political goals, such as building connections with the government. However, it is unclear why chief executive officers (CEOs) agree to make these politically driven CSR decisions that mainly benefit the controlling shareholders. We show that controlling shareholders may "bribe" the CEOs with greater compensation or perks—a form of economic rents extracted by the CEOs—to make CSR decisions, and such a pattern is more salient in local government-owned companies. We reason that these CSR activities reflect implicit contracting between the controlling shareholders and the CEOs. Through cross-section analyses, we find that the CEO's economic rents vary with local government fiscal needs, the firm's governance structure, and CEO power. Furthermore, we demonstrate that increases in CSR-linked compensation lead to a decline in shareholder value. Data Availability: All data are available from public databases identified in the paper. JEL Classifications: D72; M12; P26. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The widespread critical evidence surrounding executive compensation of listed corporations has boosted shareholder activism in recent decades. The say‐on‐pay (SOP) mechanism—a vote in which shareholders express their (dis)agreement with executive pay designs—is one of the corporate governance mechanisms that has led to this activism among listed firms. Merging agency and socioemotional wealth (SEW) arguments, this paper analyzes how effective SOP voting results are among listed family firms in terms of CEO compensation efficiency and equity. Using a sample of UK listed firms from 2011 to 2018, our results show that SOP effectiveness is positively influenced by family ownership and is strongly moderated by family involvement in management and in governance as well as by family generation. Our findings stress the strong family effect and the ethical perceptions of family shareholders on SOP voting, showing how family participation in the firm encourages fairer and more aligned CEO compensation packages. SOP institutional and practical implications oriented to preserve shareholder value and family wealth are finally outlined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Extant literature highlights the significance of the corporate governance (CG) mechanism in mitigating agency conflict. Literature also confirms the instrumentality of the board structure (measured as size, diversity, independence and CEO duality) in overcoming the agency problem. In this context, the present study examines the impact of board structure on a firm's cash holding (CH) levels. Likewise, the study tests the role of cash‐holding (CH) in the association between board structure and a firm's performance. Secondary data from 262 PSX‐listed manufacturing and servicing sector firms have been taken for analysis. Panel regression and Generalized Methods of Movement (GMM) were employed to test the modelled relationships. Results show that most of the CG variables, that is, CEO duality, board size, executive compensation, and diversity, do not affect a firm's CH levels in the service and manufacturing sectors. However, the results display a negative and significant impact of block holders (BH), measured as the ratio of the top five shareholders, on cash holding in manufacturing. Likewise, the sector‐wise analysis shows that cash holding significantly mediates between board size and ROA. In contrast, its role between other dimensions of CG and RoA was insignificant. The findings also revealed that firms with frailer CG structures tend to have less CH and can be prone to external environmental risk. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Large Japanese corporations which have accumulated substantial reserves are now under pressure to spend them, but on what, or on whom? Should they increase their (domestic) capital and R&D expenditure, which languished between 2000 and 2020; or invest more in their employees, whose wages have stagnated; or increase their shareholder returns, which have already surged; or raise executive remuneration closer to overseas counterparts? This article examines tensions in recent developments in Japan's political economy, from Society 5.0 to Kishida's 'new form of capitalism' and Keidanren's 'rebuilding the middle class', from the perspective of these dilemmas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on the cognitive and upper echelons theories, this study investigated the impact of executives' green cognition on corporate green innovation using panel data on Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2021. The findings revealed that companies with executives who possess green cognition demonstrated a minimum increase of 12.5% in green innovation compared with companies without such cognition. The mechanism analysis suggested that executives' green cognition promotes green innovation by alleviating managerial myopia and attracting green investors. The heterogeneous effects analysis indicated that a positive effect is predominantly observed among non-heavy-polluting industries and regions with a lower intensity of environmental regulations. This study identified the positive role of executives' green psychological cognition, thereby providing insights into incorporating psychological cognitive factors in executive selection to enhance the level of corporate green innovation and promote the construction of corporate quality management. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to find an answer to the questions of "whether chief executive officers (CEOs) are compensated for market risk", and "how the combined interaction of board size and CEO duality moderates this relationship" from the tenets of agency theory and managerial power theory. Even though the contracting view of agency theory posits that agents are neither to be punished nor rewarded for events that go beyond their direct control (market risk), the research findings in the corporate governance domain are contradictory. It was found that Chinese and American executives were paid for market risk, including oil prices and exchange rates, which was explained by retention risk and weaker corporate governance systems. To shed light on previous inconclusive research, this paper investigates the topic further in a new country setting, that of Switzerland, because the previous results were mostly related to Anglo-Saxon countries. Switzerland is also one of the exemplary countries for executive compensation. Furthermore, it investigates the combined (cascaded) interaction effects of the board size and CEO duality on CEO compensation and market risk from the perspective of managerial power theory, which has not been previously analyzed in the literature to date. For the direct effect, in contrast to previous findings in Anglo-Saxon countries, it has been found that CEOs were not paid for market risk in Switzerland, which confirms agency theory's contracting prediction. This finding outlines the future comparative research area in this domain. For the combined interaction effect, it has been found that board size incorporated with CEO duality is the significant cascaded moderator, and large boards with CEO duality are significantly more effective in controlling asymmetric compensation, which confirms the efficacy of large boards with CEO duality in coping with asymmetric compensation and managerial entrenchment (managerial power theory). These results have both practical and academic implications for boards of directors, Human Resources and corporate governance literature, agency theory, and managerial power theory, by providing further evidence on previous inconclusive findings on board size, CEO duality, and the role of market risk in the CEO pay structure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Firms must allocate resources effectively to cope with uncertainty, which can manifest as a disruption and an opportunity. Although information technology (IT) is a means to cope with uncertainty, chief executive officers (CEOs) may not always support IT investments due to the risky nature of IT, especially when facing uncertain conditions. While prior research suggests that CEO long-term compensation positively incentivizes IT investments, little is known about how different loci of uncertainty impact this relationship. To address this research gap, we study how firm-specific uncertainty and competitive uncertainty shape the influence of CEO long-term compensation on a firm's IT capital investment. Drawing on agency theory and prospect theory, we develop two hypotheses. First, we hypothesize that firm-specific uncertainty and competitive uncertainty positively moderate the influence of CEO long-term compensation on firm IT capital investment. Second, we hypothesize that competitive uncertainty has a stronger positive moderating effect than firm-specific uncertainty on the influence of CEO long-term compensation on firm IT capital investment. Our analysis of secondary longitudinal data from 2000 to 2007 of 357 public firms in the United States supports our hypotheses. In exploratory analyses, we found that CEO long-term compensation results in a higher riskoriented dominant logic in the firm, particularly in conditions of firm-specific uncertainty and competitive uncertainty, with competitive uncertainty having a stronger positive moderating effect. These findings uncover risk-oriented dominant logic as a theoretical mechanism that explains how CEO long-term compensation positively influences firm IT capital investment in uncertain conditions. We also conducted exploratory analyses using a different secondary dataset of 286 U.S. public firms from 2004 to 2019 to consider firm investments in transformative IT applications and found support for our theory. This finding triangulates our results across different time periods and different types of IT investments. This study contributes to theory and practice by providing a nuanced understanding of boundary conditions surrounding CEO long-term compensation, and decisions CEOs make vis-à-vis IT capital investments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

CEO pay structure critically impacts a wide range of strategic choices, including corporate social irresponsibility (CSI), a pervasive and seriously damaging behavior. While the impact of CEO pay structure on CSI has received attention and focus, existing studies need to pay more attention to the potential role of CEO relative pay structure. Based on the behavioral agency theory, this study examines the impact of CEO underpayment and overpayment on CSI. Using panel data on listed companies in China from 2008 to 2019, we find that relative CEO underpayment is significantly positively correlated with CSI, and relative CEO overpayment is significantly negatively correlated with CSI. In addition, we find that industry-level managerial discretion strengthens the positive (negative) relationship between relative CEO underpayment (overpayment) and CSI. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many firms use relative stock performance to evaluate and incentivize their CEOs. We document that such firms routinely disclose information that harms their peers' stock prices, and sometimes explicitly mention the harmed peers, by name, in these disclosures. Consistent with deliberate sabotage, peer‐harming disclosures appear to be aimed at peers whose stock price depressions are most likely to benefit the disclosing firms' CEOs. The pricing effect of these disclosures does not reverse, suggesting that the disclosures contain legitimate information regarding peers' prospects. In sum, our results suggest that relative performance evaluation in CEO pay motivates CEOs to internalize the externalities of their disclosures, and strategically disclose information that harms peers' stock prices, in order to improve their firms' relative standing within their peer group. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines how chief executive officers' (CEOs') prosocial tendency influences corporate policies and firm value. We use individuals' involvement with charitable organizations as a proxy for prosocial tendency. We find that, compared to firms with non-prosocial CEOs, firms with prosocial CEOs have lower executive subordinate turnover, implement more employee-friendly policies, experience higher customer satisfaction, and engage in more socially responsible activities. We also find that firms with prosocial CEOs have higher value and lower risk, partly due to the corporate policies adopted by prosocial CEOs. These results are corroborated when we compare changes in corporate policies and firm value around different types of CEO turnovers: a prosocial CEO replacing a non-prosocial CEO versus other types. Our results thus suggest that prosocial CEOs are more likely to make corporate decisions that benefit others and increase firm value. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Executive compensation is an important part of the internal governance of commercial banks, and the rationality of the compensation mechanism directly affects the bank’s risk-taking. Based on the panel data of 34 listed small- and medium-sized banks in China from 2012 to 2020, this paper empirically examines the impact and mechanism between executive compensation and the risk-taking level of small- and medium-sized banks. We find that executives’ short-term executive compensation significantly and positively affects the risk-taking level of small- and medium-sized banks, while executives’ long-term executive compensation significantly and negatively affects the risk-taking. Furthermore, considering the specificity of the capital structure of small- and medium-sized banks, we analyse the moderating effect of the capital structure on the above roles and find that there is a partial moderating effect of the capital structure on the relationship between executive short-term compensation and risk-taking in small- and medium-sized banks. This study provides theoretical foundations and countermeasures for improving the executive compensation mechanism and optimising the equity structure to reduce the risk-taking of small- and medium-sized banks and maintain the stability of the financial system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does the complexity of executive compensation contracts affect firm performance? With unknown consequences, the compensation complexity of executives has been rising. We define and measure executive compensation complexity and relate it to accounting; market; and environmental, social, and governance metrics of firm performance. Chief executive officer (CEO) compensation complexity negatively affects all three types of firm performance. We explore theoretical explanations for this relationship and find that cognitively complex CEOs can better deal with complex contracts. The negative complexity effects disappear if firms use only financial goals. Complexity is more harmful in unstable and munificent industries. Complexity also mitigates the negative effect of CEO tenure on long-term performance. In addition, firm performance suffers if the top management team members have heterogeneously complex contracts. Robustness checks support these findings. We conclude that the trend of adding more metrics to executive compensation contracts is not a generally preferable solution to the new and more intense agency problems that firms encounter. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines the association between dispersion in pay‐performance sensitivities (PPS) among top management team (TMT) members and managerial efficiency. While prior research has focused on managerial efficiency as an innate characteristic of managers, this study explores how managerial incentive dispersion shapes managerial efficiency. Using a sample of US firms from 1993 to 2019, we find a negative relationship between TMT incentive dispersion and managerial efficiency, suggesting that higher levels of incentive dispersion can potentially affect managerial efficiency by reducing coordination and cooperation among TMT members. We employ a range of robustness tests and find consistent and robust results. Overall, this study contributes to the literature on executive compensation by providing novel insights into the implications of incentive dispersion among executives for managerial efficiency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Building on prior research showing a positive link between internally generated cash flows and innovation output, we hypothesize and find that the inclusion of cash-flow performance metrics in CEOs' compensation contracts positively impacts firm innovation. Our findings are consistent with the theory that cash-flow metrics incentivize CEOs to make prudent investment decisions, thereby addressing both the overinvestment and the underinvestment challenges for firm innovation. As a result, firms utilizing cash-flow metrics exhibit lower innovation input and higher innovation output compared to firms not employing such metrics. Furthermore, our research indicates that the incentive effect of cash-flow metrics on firm innovation is more pronounced when cash flows convey unique information not reflected in earnings and when CEOs have longer expected employment horizons. This study underscores the effectiveness of cash-flow metrics in motivating management to promote firm innovation. Data Availability: Subscription-based data are obtained from Wharton Research Data Services; public data are obtained from public sources specified in the paper. JEL Classifications: D81, G30, J33, M52. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research examines how corporate governance moderates the impact of financial derivatives, executive pay, executive traits, and family ownership on tax aggressiveness in manufacturing firms listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange between 2021 and 2023. Independent commissioners are used as a proxy for corporate governance. A total of 86 companies were included in the study using purposive sampling. The data analysis method employed was moderated regression analysis (MRA). The findings indicated that tax aggressiveness was impacted by financial derivatives, executive compensation, and executive behaviour but not by family ownership. These findings suggest that the level of family ownership does not dictate the degree of tax avoidance. Corporate governance as a moderating factor can influence executive compensation and executive behaviour but does not influence financial derivatives and family ownership concerning tax aggressiveness.

This research aims to empirically test the influence of corporate social responsibility, capital intensity, and executive compensation on tax avoidance in manufacturing companies in the consumer goods sector listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2016-2020. This research was conducted using associative quantitative methods. The research population was 54 companies, and a sample of 18 companies was taken using purposive sampling. The research was conducted at consumer goods sector companies on the IDX for 2016-2020. The type of data used is secondary data obtained from www.idx.co.id. Data was collected with the 2016-2020 annual report and analyzed with SPSS version 26. Tax avoidance in this research uses the Effective Tax Ratio (ETR) measurement. The results of hypothesis testing using t statistics show that corporate social responsibility affects tax avoidance. In contrast, capital intensity does not affect tax avoidance, and executive compensation affects tax avoidance. The test results show that corporate social responsibility, capital intensity, and executive compensation affect tax avoidance in manufacturing companies in the consumer goods sector listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2016-2020.

We examine the impact of organized labor on the debt-like components of CEO compensation. In initial findings, we demonstrate a positive association between unionization intensity with measures of debt-like compensation intensity used in the extant literature. This finding is robust to alternative measures of union-bargaining strength and empirical approaches. Consistent with the view that managers substitute cash for accrued compensation to improve their bargaining position over labor, this result is robustly driven by the deferred component of debt-like compensation. Our results collectively suggest that unions play an important role in the use of deferred compensation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We first compare several measures of import penetration and find that total imports, tariffs, and exchange rates are endogenous, while imports from China are largely exogenous. Then we examine the effects of Chinese import penetration on executive compensation of U.S. firms. We document that Chinese import penetration reduces executives' stock grants and wealth-performance sensitivity, suggesting that competition mitigates agency problems and the need for conventional alignment mechanisms. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix , which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"Bridge supervision" occurs when the connection between manager and boss is a network bridge between separate social worlds. Improved communication technology has facilitated the use of bridge supervision, so manager and boss can easily interact by audio or onscreen as a pair of people disconnected from surrounding colleagues—but at what cost to the manager, or to effective management? We argue that bridge supervision affects the way in which managers play their role, but not how well the role is played. We find clear support for the argument in a traditional corporate hierarchy. Managers operating under bridge supervision exclude the boss from their work discussions and are conservative in expressing emotion. Behavioral correlates notwithstanding, compensation and good ideas have their familiar association with network brokerage independent of bridge versus embedded supervision. In sum, bridge supervision affects manager style, but not performance. We conclude this paper by discussing the implications of our findings for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mandatory disclosure of CEO compensation peers signals potential outside opportunities for the cited CEOs by revealing which companies view them as viable executive candidates. CEOs cited often as compensation peers (especially by larger firms, which represent attractive employment opportunities) are more likely to leave for better positions or receive compensation increases. Equity-based awards following cites by larger firms have shorter vesting periods, suggesting these CEOs gain negotiating power relative to their boards. The disclosure requirement enhanced labor market transparency and led to higher compensation for highly cited CEOs without penalizing less cited CEOs, putting upward pressure on CEO compensation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Contemporary Accounting Research is the property of Canadian Academic Accounting Association and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Contemporary Accounting Research is the property of Canadian Academic Accounting Association and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Contemporary Accounting Research is the property of Canadian Academic Accounting Association and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

To defeat myopic brand management, we need to understand better what motivates executives to invest in brand building. Drawing from agency theory, we argue that a better alignment of executivesʻ and shareholdersʻ interests can help. Tests using longitudinal compensation data of chief executive officers (CEO) from 123 public firms suggest that decreasing the sensitivity of CEOʻs Equity-Based Compensation (EBC) to the firmʻs stock price and increasing its sensitivity to the firmʻs stock return volatility are associated with higher brand equity. Weak governance somewhat offsets these effects. Moreover, we find that the impact of EBC on brand equity is partially mediated through the firmʻs strategic emphasis. Our research highlights the importance of understanding managerial incentives as drivers of brand equity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines whether managers' political orientation, which reflects their risk preferences, is associated with firms' stock price crash risk. We find that stock price crash risk is lower when corporate managers have more conservative political ideologies, and the results are robust to controls for other determinants of crash risk. We use Heckman two-stage model and employ difference-in-differences research design around executive turnovers to show that our results are not simply driven by potential endogeneity. We also document that the relation between managerial political orientation and stock price crash risk is stronger when external monitoring is weaker. JEL Classifications : G12; G14; M41. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Contemporary Accounting Research is the property of Canadian Academic Accounting Association and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper investigates the effect of China's accelerated depreciation policy on within-firm pay gap. We exploit a firm-level panel data from China's A-share listed companies and estimate the policy effects by constructing a difference-in-differences model. Results show that the accelerated depreciation policy significantly increases the within-firm pay gap of firms of pilot industries than those of non-pilot industries, and this finding continues to hold after accounting for other contemporaneous shocks and is robust to a battery of robustness checks. Our mechanism tests demonstrate that, the rank-and-file employees replaced by the use of capital rather than executives, dominates the positive nexus between within-firm pay gap and accelerated depreciation policy. This effect is more pronounced for firms with higher tax burden, stronger financing constraint and higher capital intensity. We also find that China's accelerated depreciation policy improves overall capital allocation efficiency and labor allocation efficiency. Our findings provide a deep understanding of the link between tax incentives and within-firm pay gap, especially from the perspective of factor allocation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study analyzes if the compensation of executives and the board of directors influences the Real Earnings Management (REM) of firms in the IBRX50 index in the period 2017-2020. We used panel regression, considering the level of REM as the dependent variable measured from Roychowdhury (2006). As main results, we find that there is an inverse relationship between CEO compensation and REM and also an inverse relationship between board compensation and REM. Unlike previous studies that focus on the management of accounting results, this study focuses on the management of operating results, and we did not find in Brazil any study of this nature, which also crossed with the compensation of the manager/director, taking a new perspective at the earnings management and compensation practices for Brazilian firms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Against the background of increasingly severe environmental problems, green development has gained widespread attention, and green innovation has thus become crucial for enterprises. This study used 2007–2019 data from listed A-share companies in China to evaluate the effect of senior executives' overseas experience on corporate green innovation. The results showed that senior executives' overseas experience could promote green innovation in companies. This positive effect was more significant for private enterprises and high-tech enterprises, especially in eastern China. The CEO pay regulation have a significant negative moderating effect on this positive effect. This study enriches upper echelons theory and provides theoretical support for government agencies to accelerate innovative green development strategies. The results can also provide a decision-making basis for governments to formulate policies to promote enterprises' green development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a multi-agent contracting problem, agents are linked in performance through two channels, effort spillover, governed by spillover network, and risk correlation, governed by risk structure. Assigning compensation weights on peers' performances can not only filter out common risks but also alter agent's incentives. We study how the network and risk structure jointly determine the optimal linear contract. First, the relative compensation sensitivity is determined by ratio of the dot product, between spillover vector and pure hedge portfolio, to unhedgeable risk. We then propose an index named informativeness along the spillover direction and argue that this index measures how precisely the principal can infer the agent's effort. By showing that both the implemented effort and induced welfare are increasing in the informativeness index, we argue that this index captures how central each agent is in this economy. Finally, results regarding relative sensitivities still hold under optimal contract with bounded compensation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study uses machine learning to investigate the effects of firm and CEO characteristics on stock price crash risk by collecting massive data on publicly listed firms in China. The results show that eXtreme Gradient Boosting (XGBoost) is the most effective model for predicting stock price crash risk, with relatively satisfactory performance. Meanwhile, the SHapley Additive exPlanations (SHAP) method is used to interpret the importance of features. The results show that the average weekly return of a firm over a year (RET) contributes the most and is negatively associated with crash risk, followed by Sigma, IPO age, and firm size. We also found that, among CEO characteristics, CEO pay contributes substantially to crash risk at the firm level. Our findings have important implications for research into the impact of firm and CEO characteristics on stock price crash risk and provide a novel way for investors to plan their investment decisions and risk-taking behavior rationally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ambitious EU Green Deal project is linked to extensive regulations on sustainability reporting, sustainable finance, and sustainable corporate governance. With increasing awareness of the impact of sustainable board governance on corporate environmental performance, our paper includes an innovative sustainable board governance score, reflecting significant board attributes. The question arises whether the combined effect of sustainable board measures, based on (1) sustainability board committees, (2) a critical mass of female board members, and (3) sustainability‐related executive compensation, influences environmental performance and its main sub‐pillars according to the EU Taxonomy Regulation. Based on stakeholder and critical mass theories, our study empirically addresses the impact of sustainable board governance on environmental performance and five sub‐pillars (carbon, emissions, biodiversity, resource use, and water performance). Using a sample of 2630 firm‐year observations from 2014 to 21, we find that sustainable board governance significantly improves environmental performance and the related sub‐pillars, except for biodiversity and water performance. Our findings are robust to robustness analyses and endogeneity checks. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to rely on the combined effect of sustainable board attributes and its impact of environmental performance and its major sub‐pillars. Thus, this study provides new insight into the relationship between corporate governance and environmental performance in the EU capital market to guide researchers, business practice, and regulatory bodies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The US Securities and Exchange Commission's mandated CEO pay ratio is a simple, but salient, metric that could resonate with employees given it focuses on their compensation. Reporting a relatively or surprisingly high ratio reduces employee perceptions of their pay, views of the CEO, and hampers productivity growth. Employee pay satisfaction drops after disclosing a high ratio even if their wages were previously disclosed and when the pay ratio disclosure adds little new information. Disclosures by firms with a high ratio contain more discretionary language to explain the ratio or portray employee relations positively and are more likely to be covered by the media. However, neither information source substantially alters the employee response to a salient ratio. Our work illustrates that requiring firms to disclose a salient metric can have unintended consequences on employees and suggests caution in requiring firms to report simplified Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) metrics that are inherently multifaceted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using the pay restriction imposed on CEOs of centrally administered state‐owned enterprises (CSOEs) in China in 2009, we study the effects of limiting CEO pay. Compared with CEOs of firms not subject to the restriction, the CEOs of CSOEs experienced a significant pay cut. In response to the pay cut, CEOs increased the consumption of perks and siphoned off firm resources for their own benefit. Pay‐performance sensitivity for these firms also significantly decreases. The performance of these firms dropped following the pay restriction. Our findings suggest that restricting CEO pay distorts CEO incentives and brings unintended consequences. Our findings caution against limiting CEO pay. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We provide evidence that in certain contexts, firms set upward-striving goals and that this upward striving yields significant performance and visibility benefits. We develop a model of variable attention in which, as firms' performance levels approach cognitively salient round numbers, managers strategically shift their focus from easier-to-reach goals based on historical and social reference points to more challenging goals that provide external visibility and capital market benefits. As one specific yet important instance of an upward shift in attention, we document a significant increase in revenue growth rates as firms' annual revenue approaches $100 million. Firms achieving this goal obtain discontinuous increases in analyst and media coverage, investment by new institutional investors, and executive compensation. We find no evidence of decreased investment efficiency or profitability, suggesting that managers typically build slack into their goal levels. Our theory extends to goals based on other salient round numbers, such as revenue of $10 million, $500 million, and $1 billion. This study recasts behavioral theory of firm research in an open systems perspective, highlighting the externally directed aspects of firm goal setting. Supplemental Material: The online appendices are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2021.15148. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bayesian analysis offers strategy scholars numerous benefits. In addition to aligning empirical and theoretical endeavors by incorporating prior knowledge, the Bayesian approach allows researchers to estimate and visualize relationships that reflect the probability distributions many strategy researchers mistakenly interpret from conventional techniques. Yet, strategy scholars have proven hesitant to adopt Bayesian methods. We suggest that this is because there is no accessible template for employing the technique with the types of data strategy researchers tend to encounter. The central objective of our research is to synthesize disparate contributions from the Bayesian literature that are relevant for strategy scholarship, especially for nested data. We provide an intuitive overview of Bayesian thinking and illustrate how scholars can employ Bayesian techniques to analyze nested data using an example dataset involving CEO compensation. Our results show how using Bayesian models may lead to substantively different interpretations and conclusions compared to traditional approaches based on frequentist techniques. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]