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Nowhere has financial technology or "fintech" become larger or as transformative as in China. Fintech, largely developed by technology companies, rapidly turned China from a largely cash‐based, backward financial system to a fintech leader globally. At the same time, China's government created an environment conducive to innovation. China's experience with fintech is a rich repository of lessons for other countries aiming to modernize their financial service industries and "leapfrog" up to advanced economies in some respects. It shows how clever reforms can overcome the lack of competition for financial incumbents, but also the mechanisms necessary to ensure regulation and supervision are sufficient for the risks of financial innovation. Finally, policy debates and solutions in China around the power of big tech, including in finance, have relevance to a world increasingly forced to grapple with these issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although experimentalist governance – presented as a novel alternative to conventional hierarchical governance – has attracted attention over the past 15 years, we still know little about its real spread and scope conditions. Examining the application of competition policy to the digital sector, the article reveals that the European Competition Network and the procedures modernized in the early 2000s actually host a variety of governance processes, ranging from hierarchical development and enforcement of stable solutions at one extreme to experimentalist discretion of local actors, review of their implementation experiences, and central revisions in their light at the other. Futher, shifts from hierarchy to experimentalism might reverse. As for explanations, variation in governance processes cannot be explained by formal distributions of power, which were the same. Instead, the greater the uncertainty about solutions and the weaker the readily available coalitions in their support, the more actors favored experimentalist governance, and vice versa. The broader implications thus caution against general claims, challenge the influence of legal factors, and suggest that far from being necessarily antitethical, functional and political factors may bear together on the spread of distinct forms of governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The relevance of studying the harmonization of industrial policy with other types of economic policy is determined, the structure of industrial policy is presented, the main directions of harmonization are noted. The external harmonization of industrial policy is analysed in detail on the example of competition policy. The main aspects of each of the policies are considered, their main differences are noted. Attention is focused on their possible mutual complementarity in order to achieve a higher positive effect from the implementation of each. The current state of harmonization in Russia is considered, in particular, the conclusion is made about the dominance of industrial policy over competition. The main problems of harmonization are highlighted, including the discrepancy between pre-set goals in industrial policy and the final results. The problem of small and medium-sized businesses in industry is identified, the factors hindering the development of subjects of these categories are formulated.

The scientific thesis aims at theoretical definition and analysis of provisions on competition policy in selected international agreements, which affects the development of fair international business. Fair competition works effectively if entrepreneurs at the market can make their business decisions independently, while there has to be a legal framework applicable to protect the rights of competitors. At the international level there are several legal instruments applicable, which have a positive effect on fair competition among competitors in the market. International agreements concluded at the level of the European Union with non-member countries contain provisions on healthy competition. Our intention is to identify those international agreements containing competition provisions that affect the behavior of entrepreneurs operating in international markets and obliged to respect competition rules, as they aim to achieve economic benefits. The European Union is undoubtedly involved in the process of global competition protection.

• This article explores how an intensified competitive environment impacts the expansion of private businesses. • Enforcing the Anti-trust law can enhance the growth of private firms. • This enhancement is mainly accomplished by reducing financial restrictions and raising the financing expenses. This study examines the impact of the Chinese antimonopoly law on the growth of private enterprises, addressing the broader economic context where fair competition is essential for fostering private sector expansion. Employing a difference-in-differences (DID) methodology and analyzing data from 2006 to 2019, this study reveals that the enforcement of the law has enhanced the growth of private firms primarily by reducing financial constraints and increasing the financing costs for highly monopolistic corporations. The results suggest that stringent enforcement of the antimonopoly law will significantly alleviate financial difficulties and stimulate the growth of private firms, thereby achieving high-quality economic development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Competition policy has been a central forum for contesting the uneasy relationship between capitalism and democracy since the late nineteenth century. From the earliest policy debates, concerns that robust competition policies aimed at limiting economic concentration would disadvantage domestic producers featured prominently. This dynamic creates an international cooperation problem over competition policy that has intensified with the dramatic increases in globalization over the last several decades. Understanding the causes and consequences of this cooperation problem is central to understanding global governance of the world economy, including the ability of democratic states to manage global capitalism in a manner that sustains democracy. This essay frames the challenge that global competition policy has posed over the last hundred years and argues that democratic major powers have played a critical role in shaping the limited cooperation that has been achieved. A research agenda that develops integrated theories of domestic and international competition policymaking as well as a multi-method empirical agenda for describing and explaining policy outcomes and their consequences for economic inequality, growth, and democracy is an essential task for international relations scholars. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We analyze public points of interconnection of Google, Amazon, Facebook, and Apple (GAFA) in the global North versus the global South to determine the degree to which their location preferences differ, if at all. We find that there is a statistically significant difference in GAFA locating in the global North versus the global South—a difference based on a country's wealth, specifically as given by per capita GNI. Approximately 38% of countries classified as global North have a GAFA public point of interconnection, while 16% of those classified as global South do. Apple has approximately 92% of its presence in the global North, followed by Amazon (82.5%), Facebook (73%), and Google (72%). Our findings suggest that competition and antitrust policy discussions of digital platforms should include information on the dynamics of interconnection infrastructure distribution, and for that, such information must be available. We also assert that a global consideration of the digital platforms market is necessary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores whether there is a risk that competition policy on both sides of the Atlantic could be distorted by cultural capture. This type of capture differs from traditional regulatory capture operating through self-interest of public officials. It instead arises when policy-relevant views of the officials are subject to disproportionate social influence exerted by representatives of the private sector. The question here is hence whether social interactions enabling this influence take place between competition officials and practitioners. The article answers in the affirmative, finding that many competition officials seem to self-identify with a community dominated by competition practitioners, hold the practitioners in high regard, and have interpersonal relationships with the practitioners. These risk factors are especially pronounced in the United States. There is thus a possibility that competition policy could be designed and enforced in a way that furthers interests of big business to the detriment of consumers and small businesses. The article also discusses preventive measures to limit cultural capture of competition policy such as promotion of diversity and reduction of revolving door, cautioning nevertheless that difficult trade-offs may need to be made in their implementation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conceived in the 1930s as a way to renew free market liberalism, neoliberal doctrines aim to institute a competitive order that would regulate the market as well as society. Yet, interpretations of how competition should be enforced have varied throughout history. The European Union, with its ordoliberal origins, tends to follow an interventionist approach while the United States, where the Chicago School has gained influence, fears that inadequate public interventions may diminish global efficiency. The digital revolution and the appearance of the Tech Giants introduces a new challenge. Faced with massive increasing returns to scale, the competition authorities initially reduced their interventionism to enjoy more market efficiency. But the emergence of digital platforms and the will to protect personal data from abusive uses pushes them now to adopt a new strategy for more interventions that goes beyond the economic and efficiency issues. This article argues that the neoliberal vision is no longer accurate to regulate the digital economy. It shows that the platform economy is not an alternative way to manage the market, but an alternative to the market itself. To face these issues, a completely new conception of public regulation is therefore needed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• Classification of the 28 National WEEE EPR systems in Europe in four main models. • Econometric model applied to a dataset covering economic performance and regulation. • Assessment of the degree of competition/regulation in the EU WEEE recycling industry. • The estimated impact of competition on the economic performance is positive. • Policy implications: design EPR scheme allowing many competing PRO schemes. The application of extended producer responsibility (EPR) in Europe has followed different patterns, with varying intensity of competition among producer organisations responsible for meeting take-back and recycling obligations. The literature has suggested possible reasons in favour or against the creation of dedicated compliance organisations, and arguments in support or against having many alternative recycling schemes competing on the market. However, little has been done on the empirical side to test these hypotheses. Our study contributes to filling this gap in the empirical literature by analysing the effect of competition and regulation in the field of waste from electric and electronic equipment (WEEE). We exploit an original database to provide an econometric assessment of the effects of competition and regulation on the cost of dealing with WEEE. The European case is interesting since all member country are subject to the same policy targets imposed by EU directives but enjoy significant degrees of freedom in choosing the policy mix and the industrial structure to which the achievement of policy targets is devoted. Our results are several. First, we provide valuable details on EPR models. Second, we present collection and economic results achieved by compliance organisations. Third, with a statistical analysis based on the panel data structure, we provide significant evidence that a more competitive market structure allows achieving the same collection outcomes at a lower cost. This result is potentially relevant for waste management policies since it encourages the search for a more articulated market architecture for the design of EPR systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Informacion Comercial Espanola Revista de Economia is the property of S.G.E.E.I.P.C., Secretaria de Estado de Comercio, Ministerio de Industria, Comercio y Turismo and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

We analyze the competition issues in mobile money in Kenya–where Safaricom is the market leader–and in Uganda: where the market is duopolistic. We evaluate the multi-sided platform characteristics that have underpinned the rapid growth of the lead mobile money platforms and that also imply that the market leaders have substantial market power and can act as gatekeepers. The conduct of the lead firms is assessed along with competition measures and regulatory interventions made in each country. The analysis highlights the importance of–and challenges for–competition enforcement in developing countries to ensure effective rivalry while realizing the gains from innovation in digital platforms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides a comprehensive and detailed quantitative characterisation of 118 detected cartels and the underlying enforcement process in South Africa for the period 1998 to 2019. The paper also employs survival analysis to investigate the effect of different cartel and enforcement characteristics on the probability of cartel breakdown. The analysis reveals that South African cartels are mostly similar to international cartels, with an average duration of 6.2 years, which is comparable to European and American cartels; however, South African cartels are on average smaller: They involve fewer participants. Furthermore, the data support a hypothesis of increased activity in the anti-cartel sphere over the sample period. We find that the corporate leniency policy has contributed to the prosecution of about 30% of the cartels that were prosecuted in our sample, while penalties are on average below 5% of total revenue—which is below the statutory limit of 10%. Moreover, the survival analysis suggests that the corporate leniency policy may have shortened the expected duration of detected cartels—at least when we consider cartels that came into existence after the introduction of the policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Passive partial ownership (PPO) is commonly practised in many industries. When operating profits of stock-owned firms decrease, stock-holding firms will increase output to reduce capital gain through owned firms' stocks. In a vertically related market with downstream PPO, consumer and total surpluses when input price discrimination is allowed may be larger than when it is banned because PPO mitigates effects of reduction in output caused by higher input price. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Competition policy (antitrust policy in the United States) engages the subfields of microeconomics (price theory), industrial organization, law and economics, and public choice. The last was a latecomer to the list because of the persistence of naïve "public interest" explanations for competition policy's origins, purposes, and effects. Even after a half-century of policy analyses in general and of public regulation of prices and conditions of entry into myriad industries around the world—showing that such interventions almost always benefit politically powerful special interests rather than society at large—most scholars still carelessly and mistakenly assume that private plaintiffs, attorneys called to the antitrust bar, the public law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, judges and other parties involved in antitrust proceedings have no motivations beyond preserving competitive marketplaces. My aim here is to bring antitrust policy more firmly within the ambit of public choice reasoning, which helps explain why antitrust intervention often either is ineffective or perverse. Competition law enforcement is a first cousin of economic regulation and, hence, should be evaluated as such. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Implementation of the import substitution strategy in Russia in some cases is associated with the risk of the state supporting technologically ineffective domestic producers, whose interests are taken into account in the course of industry regulation and antitrust. The article examines the problems of using the tools of antimonopoly policy (and its relationship with industrial policy) in the context of launching single-mode optical fiber by a Russian company with limited technological production competencies in the short term. While analyzing the results of optical fiber antitrust case, the authors identify the distortion of the Russian competition policy objectives and the misuse of its tools. Methodologically, the study rests on industrial organization theory, antitrust economics and new institutional economic theory (in particular, institutional design). Data from the analytical agency CRU Monitor and customs statistics are used as the information base for quantitative (economic-statistical) analysis. The article identifies the factors that determine the dynamics of the optical fiber market: demand for optical fiber cable (product of the related market); production capacities of preforms as the main raw material for optical fiber; integration of the stages of the optical fiber production process; and investments in R&D. The Elzinga-Hogarty test was performed to delimit the geographical boundaries of the single-mode fiber market. The results shows that the Federal Antimonopoly Service of Russia drew false conclusions about narrow geographical boundaries within the Russian Federation. This conclusion is important in terms of complying with the procedure for analyzing the competition in commodity markets, since incorrect delimitation of the market’s geographical boundaries can lead to erroneous estimates of market concentration and the mistaken detection of a company’s market dominance as a potential competitor of a domestic manufacturer. Lobbying the interests of national manufacturers not only contradicts the principles of competition protection, but also reduces the incentives of new market players to innovate and accumulate knowledge specific to the industry, which is one of the key factors of competitiveness in the optical communication markets.

This paper aims to analyze the relationship between reverse globalization, the digital markets, and competition policy within the EU. Based on the review of contemporary literature, this paper provides an insight into the EU adaptation to the changes caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Reverse globalization is identified through the trends in the international trade and FDI flows, while the digital markets' development is evaluated through the Number of individuals using the Internet to order goods and services and ECommerce sales. While this paper uses secondary data sources, it uniquely connects the identified reverse globalization and digital markets expansion with necessary changes in the competition policy pre and during the COVID19 pandemic. Additionally, this paper provides policymakers and business owners with relevant information and possible avenues to improve the competition policy and business strategy.

Copyright of Policy & Internet is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Informacion Comercial Espanola Revista de Economia is the property of S.G.E.E.I.P.C., Secretaria de Estado de Comercio, Ministerio de Industria, Comercio y Turismo and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The primary focus of this paper is to examine the link between environmental R&D formation and the strategic use or non‐use of a government's ability to precommit to an emissions tax rate. The existing literature implicitly omits this important matter. This paper comprehensively evaluates various regulatory contexts separated by the timing of emissions taxation and by environmental R&D formations in a Cournot duopoly. The following three points are revealed. First, an equilibrium occurs in which the government does not strategically use its emissions tax rate precommitment ability to enhance social efficiency. Second, if the efficiency of environmental R&D costs is high and if environmental damage is serious, then the government should precommit to an emissions tax rate and allow for the cartelization of the two firms' environmental R&D. However, if the environmental R&D cost efficiency and environmental damage are both low, then the government should adopt a time‐consistent emissions tax and allow for the cartelization of the two firms' environmental R&D. Third, when the two firms can form an environmental research joint venture (ERJV), ERJV cartelization should be invariably allowed, even if the government is a strategic non‐user of its precommitment ability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although the EU competition regime is well-established and highly effective, EU policy actors may still need to rethink their tried and tested approach to competition regulation. This is what happened in the context of the European Commission's planned regulation of online platforms, embodied (in part) within the Digital Markets Act. This article reviews the interplay of the EU's competition regime with its relatively new Digital Single Market strategy to ask how a traditional ex-post approach to competition regulation came to be supplemented by a (proposed) ex-ante regulatory approach. Informed by the literature on policy change, the article examines the policy context, the Commission's experience gained in dealing with competition cases, and the input of lobbyists, advocacy groups and experts, to explain this shift in Commission policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

So far, the notion of food sovereignty has not claimed a place at the table of competition law. Although competition law developments in the last four decades have promoted the exclusive dominance of ef- ficiency considerations, the next few years may bring a turning point through the recognition that in the long term economic efficiency also requires social and environmental sustainability, especially in a sector like agriculture. Although family farming has always been dominant in Europe, recent trends of concentration and consolidation in the agricultural and food supply chain as well as globalisation itself have shaken European agricultural producers who face several competition-related problems. This article aims to shed light on whether the theoretical framework of EU competition law and policy are appropriate for the notion of food sovereignty to join the discourse. In order to do so, the article presents the main tenets of ordoliberalism, the prevailing school of thought in EU competition policy, in particular the findings of those ordoliberal scholars who deal with the issues of agriculture. Moreover, the article aims to theorise sovereignty in food sovereignty, in parallel with bringing it into line with ordoliberalism, in order to explore whether the concept of social market economy, one of the key concepts of ordoliberalism explicitly followed by the EU, and in particular ordoliberal competition policy to be realised within the framework of the social market economy, is suitable to take into account food sovereignty's core elements at least at a theoretical level. If it is, it may bring to the fore a viewpoint of EU competition policy which ensures appropriate protection for the agricultural sector to overcome the newly emerging anomalies faced by European agricultural producers as a consequence of globalising markets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I will analyze the state aid granted in the member countries for the recovery of accommodation and food services, severely affected by the pandemic, coming to the conclusion that in Romania the measures were applied later than in other countries. Thus, through the "HoReCa Scheme", the beneficiary companies in Romania have received state aid recently, after almost 2 years of deep crisis. In the meantime, more than a third of companies have gone bankrupt. Starting from the presentation of state aid in European legislation and the need for it to support economies, I will then draw attention to the major impact of the pandemic on the HORECA sector at European level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper introduces the concept of excessive pricing within the framework of the competition policy. Charging high prices by an undertaking is a natural freedom in the context of a market economy. Still, a company that detains an important market power has a special economic and social responsibility to ensure that its conduct does not distort competition or negatively affect the consumers’ welfare on that market. A company in such a position is deemed to poses a dominant position on the market. Specifically, in regard with the notion of excessive pricing, a dominant undertaking should not make use of the opportunities arising out of its special market power in such a way as to gain trading profits which it would not have benefit if there had been sufficiently competition. The paper briefly analyzes the method used when establishing dominance, as well as various forms of abuse of a dominant position on the market, finally focusing on the evaluation of excessive prices. Relevant excessive pricing cases are presented, covering 45 years of European experience, since 1975 to the present day. In regard with the evolution of the methodology for analyzing potential excessive prices by the competition authorities, the cost/tariff comparison as part of the United Brands test is a cornerstone in the European jurisprudence. The notion of ‘economic value’ is for the first time used in 1978 and criteria set in the United Brands case provide for a 2 steps approach to the assessment of excessive prices. Other ways of assessing excessive pricing are dealt with, as the European Court of Justice observed that economic theorists have not failed to think up several methods to deal with the issue. Yardstick competition and the elimination of the excessive costs from the evaluation are examples of such alternative methodologies used when analyzing excessive prices. The paper concludes with the presentation of the recent European Commission investigation into excessive pricing in the pharmaceutical sector, and proposes the idea that monopoly companies’ tariffs might be easier to evaluate in the context of excessive pricing.

The article considers the issues of competitiveness of Ukrainian products. The impact factors on the competitive advantages have been shown. The strategic imperatives in creating a comprehensive approach to competitiveness have been outlined. Studying of competitiveness determines the need of elaboration of effective, easy to use tools and methods that allow the enterprise to assess the level of competitiveness of their products on the market with the maximum degree of objectivity. The analysis of rates of the level of product competitiveness is a base of the differentiation of supply and creation of the unique set of interrelated competitive advantages attractive for consumers in the target segment. Above this, an enterprise is able to plan the improvement processes for product range more effective on the base of the specific results of research. The purpose of the article is the investigation of competitiveness of Ukrainian products on the world market under modern conditions. In the product competition policy it necessary to take into account, above all, functional purpose, reliability, durability, ease of use, aesthetic appearance, and other characteristics, i.e. the ability of the product to meet the customer needs better than products-competitors. The main condition of the market surviving is creation of product customer value that would includes all set of product features. When creating the product, manufacturer applies different strategies. Widespread competition under the influence of the international division of labour and scientific and technological progress pushes manufacturers to intensify the search for new competitive products and new markets. In solving the problem of increasing the competitiveness of products, every year the problem of selection and development of new markets is becoming increasingly important. In this regard, it is very important for the further development of the product competitiveness to try to enter it with a new market, if domestically its competitiveness has fallen sharply.

The current global crisis triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic has an even stronger negative impact on the EU economy than the previous international crisis from 2008, given that its repercussions are felt not only on the banking sector, but rather on all economic sectors. As highlighted by the international crisis of 2008, state aid policy is a flexible and effective tool for providing financial support to Member States' economic sectors. As a result, this article has as major objective to present how state aid has been used by Member States to mitigate the negative economic effects of the COVID-19 crisis, while highlighting what are the opportunities for Romania to use this type of financial instrument in order to support the national economy. This research focuses on the analysis of state aid schemes implemented by Member States, based on the legal basis created by the New Temporary Framework on State Aid (adopted in March 2020). The research methodology is primarily based on a comparative analysis between the types of state aid granted during the 2008 crisis and the current state aid implemented by Member States to deal with the difficulties created by the COVID-19 crisis. The research methodology also uses case studies, related to the experiences of old and new Member States, aiming to highlight how the state aid policy has been used to remedy economic distortions across the EU. The results of the research have as major goal to set out recommendations for the most efficient use of state aid policy to support the economic recovery while maintaining free competition and preventing market failures.

The timeliness and importance of identifying key sources of ensuring the competitiveness of the regional system, as well as analyzing the impact of competitive policy instruments on such competitiveness, is due to a lack of interest in implementing competitive approaches at the level of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation. This article discusses the interdependence and interdependence of the mechanism of competition policy, com-petitiveness and the socio-economic system of the region. The object of analysis is the socio-economic system, characterized by a combination of its constituent elements and related properties. Justification of the mechanism of state policy for the protection and development of competition in the constituent entities of the Russian Federation as one of the factors ensuring the competitiveness of the socio-economic system of the region. Based on the structural approach, the tools and methods of competition policy are presented in the form of a single mechanism of influence on the elements and properties of the socio-economic system of the region. The mechanism of the impact of competition policy on the competitiveness of the socio-economic system is presented. As the main independent parts of the mechanism of influence of the policy on the protection and development of competition at the regional level, special attention is paid to: competition, the competitive environment, competitiveness, competitive advantages, as well as competitive immunity. In relation to each of the elements represented, its essence is determined, as well as its importance for acquiring competitiveness properties by the socio-economic system. The presented mechanism of the influence of competition policy on the competitiveness of the socio-economic system can be applied both by federal executive bodies (FAS Russia, territorial bodies of the FAS Russia, the Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation, etc.) and regional government bodies in order to activate more unclaimed sources of competitiveness . According to the results of the study, it was found that to ensure the competitiveness of the socio-economic system in the long term (gaining a system of competitive immunity), a set of conditions is needed that will help transform internal potentials into competitive advantages.

Analyzing the impact of competition policy, the effects of anti-competitive practices and the decisions of competition authorities is a constant concern. Thus, public authorities, and especially competition authorities seek to justify the use of public resources to promote competition policy. Business representatives and international bodies seek to standardize competition rules so that they do not harm business development and others. In this regard, there are several methods and techniques applied to quantify the harm caused by anti-competitive practices, the economic effects of competition policy and the intervention of competition authorities proposed by the European Commission, the OECD, competition authorities in several countries, and the academic environment. The efficient analysis and quantification of the impact of anti-competitive practices are crucial in the regulatory process, being the premise of making the right decisions. The paper presents the classification and application of assessing methods for anti-competitive practices to determine the damage caused by them.

Effective enforcement of competition laws on a global scale is a prerequisite for open economies, fair trading conditions, and level playing fields, and ultimately, inclusive economic development for improved and better lives. Improving enforcement co-operation between competition authorities has been a priority for the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, and International Competition Network for many years. This article argues that there is increased scope for competition authorities in Africa to effectively regulate cross-border cartel activities under the Africa Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). It is recognized that for the AfCFTA to meet its general objectives under Article 3 of the AfCFTA framework agreement, States Parties must develop a framework on competition policy which is part of the second phase of the negotiations that will culminate into a Protocol on Competition Policy. Following a review of competition policies and laws of selected African countries in Southern African Development Community, East African Community, Economic Community of West African States, and Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, this article suggests an appropriate competition law and policy for Africa, particularly one that will enhance capability to combat cross-border cartels. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Agreement will lead to liberalization of trade in Africa, thus expanding the market for African products and services. Expansion of markets necessitates development of a regulatory framework that will promote healthy competition among businesses and protect consumers' welfare. The Agreement recognizes this fact and has set out the Competition Protocol among the key enablers of its success. Since the regional economic communities (RECs) are the building blocks of the continental wide free trade area, the analysis of their regional competition regime is paramount for providing insight that will guide the development of the Competition Protocol. This article responds to this need by analyzing Africa's four largest RECs and providing policy proposals on how the continental competition policy should be fashioned. Specifically, this article looks at the RECs' institutional structure, principles, and carries out a legal, economic, and political analysis on the same. It examines how these laws relate to the three elements (abuse of dominance, anticompetitive mergers, and acquisitions) of competition policy and the challenges that they pose in achieving AfCFTA's goal. It also looks into the challenges that affect trade and fair competition in the region. Finally, it offers proposals on the competition framework that bridge the gap between the AfCFTA Agreement objectives and the African economic, political, and legal realities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most theoretical and empirical accounts of trade politics focus on political conflict among competing private interest groups and over policies between the dichotomy of trade liberalization and protectionism. This article challenges this conceptualization by arguing that issues of antitrust, market power, and competition are central to the politics over free trade, and that in this domain state actors are comparatively more important. Original archival evidence from the American New Deal and post-war foreign economic policy shows that post-war free-trade policies were heavily influenced by views, formed in the 1930s, about domestic industrial organization and antitrust. These preferences were then pushed into international economic policy during and after World War II through trade negotiations, extraterritorial application of American law, and pressure for domestic competition laws abroad. In one of the most prominent episodes of trade liberalization, an antitrust campaign and debate permeated trade issues, based in independent state learning and economic preferences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We discuss three important projects that economists at the Competition and Markets Authority have completed over the past year. First, our work on the Funerals Market Investigation provides an illustration of how demand-side problems can lead to a lack of competition, as well as demonstrating the CMA's willingness to consider price control and regulatory remedies where necessary. Second, on the Sabre/Farelogix merger case, we point to how our assessment dealt with uncertainty in innovative markets, the importance of preventing incumbents from acquiring start-ups, and the risks of following formalistic market definitions, especially in multi-sided platform sectors. Third, we set out the most notable developments in our revised Mergers Assessment Guidelines—including the assessment of future competition even when subject to significant uncertainty—and the assessment of the loss of dynamic competition and its effect on innovation incentives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Directorate General for Competition at the European Commission enforces competition law in the areas of antitrust, merger control, and State aid. After providing a general presentation of the role of the Chief Competition Economist's team, this article surveys some of the main developments at the Directorate General for Competition over 2020/2021. In particular, the article discusses the Commission proposal on the Digital Markets Act, the developments on the State aid response related to the COVID pandemic as well as the Danfoss/Eaton merger. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines and analyzes the main bills on the protection of economic competition, registered by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine during 2020-2021. Problematic aspects of legal regulation, obstacles to effective regulatory influence, shortcomings and inconsistencies in the submitted draft regulations have been identified. Ways to overcome the existing gaps in legal regulation, clarification of draft laws and directions for implementing measures to develop competitive relations and antitrust regulation are proposed. The main areas to be reformed in accordance with the submitted bills are the procedure of appointment and dismissal of the Chairman of the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine, his deputies and state commissioners. There are many different proposals for the number of state commissioners. Another important area of reform is the current public procurement appeal procedure. Immediate proposals to reform the appellate body in the field of public procurement have been implemented through the creation of a new body of the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine (AMCU) - the Commissioner for Complaints of Violations of Public Procurement Legislation in the amount of 10 people. Although, in our opinion, the most adequate would be the complete separation of the appeal function in the field of public procurement from the activities of the AMCU. Possibilities of introduction of new terminology on protection of economic competition, in particular "conglomerate horizontal integration", "horizontal integration", "vertical integration", "cross-financing" and the introduction of additional criteria for definition of a monopoly (dominant) position and additional restrictions on economic activity. Thus, the proposed amendments to the Law of Ukraine "On the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine" to improve the procedure, clarify and detail the content of the powers of the AMCU to inspect in order to gather evidence in the form of information are appropriate. At the same time, the proposals to consolidate the obligation of the AMCU to apply to the court for permission to take certain measures related to the collection of evidence in the case need to be finalized. We believe that inspections, seizures or seizures of documents may be carried out with the subsequent approval of the court, and not with the previous one. Because otherwise the suddenness of the inspection is lost, and accordingly, in many cases, the meaning of its conduct. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article informs a key aspect of the business-government interface; the evolution of competition policy and how firms adapt to it. Drawing on an extensive portfolio of inquiries, what constitutes 'the market' and the boundaries of the firm within it is described through the experience of the UK alcoholic beverages industry. In situating competition policy in its historical socio-economic context, this study traces three overlapping eras; family ownership and control, network and conglomerates organisation, and specialisation and financialisation. Issues emerge that inform wider debate, notably the nature of portfolio and network effects, a central and contested theme in contemporary competition policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The proliferation of 'behind-the-border' issues has become a major challenge for the global trading system. Why are some trade-related issues integrated in the strongly judicialized WTO with its dispute settlement system, while others are governed in isolation from the trade regime? Contributing to the literature on WTO issue boundaries, the paper highlights the role of uncertainty and demand for transgovernmental regulatory cooperation as drivers of regime outcomes. I argue that high technical and political uncertainty delays GATT/WTO integration of trade-related issues in favour of a soft-law trade pathway. A further-reaching separation from the trade regime occurs when uncertainty remains high and national regulatory authorities exhibit a demand for trade-separate cooperation with foreign counterparts. Case studies on government procurement and competition policy substantiate the argument. Government procurement has been integrated into the GATT/WTO trade regime under a market access agenda pursued by EU and US trade actors, but only after uncertainty had been reduced in technical soft-law trade talks at the OECD. Conversely, in competition policy – despite repeated efforts at GATT/WTO integration – cooperation has thrived in less judicialized transgovernmental networks such as the International Competition Network, driven by competition agencies eager to solve regulatory cooperation problems independently from the trade regime. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This article demonstrates that the market share of a dominant bank and hence, of the associated competitive fringe, namely of the smaller price‐taking banks in the same market, will be stable if fringe size is the same as under perfect competition. One interesting implication of this conclusion is that the empirical evidence about the stability of market shares implies the optimality of the number of small banks in the loan market; it points to what perfect competition entails in practice insofar as the banking system is concerned. It follows that if the fringe is to serve as a transmission channel of monetary policy, a prudential policy targeting the large bank(s) will also be necessary in order to preserve market structure. Analytically, market shares are determined endogenously within a theoretical framework that combines the textbook modelling of dominant firm oligopoly with an inter‐temporal utility for the bank depositor. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper aims to determine the strategic directions of forming the competition policy of Ukraine through analyzing the aspects of divergence between Ukraine and the EU in public regulation of the domestic market development. Materials and methods: historical-logical method, methods of theoretical generalization, system and historical-economic analysis, system approach, and methods of analysis and synthesis are used to substantiate the conceptual foundations of the domestic market development on the competition policy grounds. The paper substantiates that the factors of foreign economic cooperation and trade and implementation of public competition policy on goods and capital flows distribution have a decisive impact on the development of the Ukrainian domestic market in conditions of globalization and European integration. The paper proves that the competition policy is the system of optimal and innovative methods, tools, and measures initiated by authorities and implemented to develop and expand the socio-economic capacity of the domestic market of consumer goods that are equal to and better than the competition policies of other countries by quality and efficiency.