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Descrive the recent evolution of contracting-out in social services

The objective of this chapter is to identify institutional solutions to the interrelated issues of social degradation and inequality. We build on the idea that the richness and poverty of social relations, and the outcomes that originate from this are in part caused by the unequal distribution of income and wealth, but also by the type of socio-economic institutions that a society gives itself and the behavioural attitudes associated with them. We discuss how, by reinstating cooperation and inclusion strategies within economic institutions, it becomes possible to deal with and balance at the same time individual behaviours and distributional issues. The paper builds on Ostrom's theory of commons and offers a framework that links institutional choices and reduction of social poverty.

The study of private non-profit enterprises that offer general interest services is only at the start. The understanding of existing organisations resists an inclusive, public interest view of governance. This contribution aims at providing a reflection on specific features that non-profit enterprises should have, and outlines four main justifications for including stakeholders in production governance: 1) access to knowledge and other resources, 2) trust creation, 3) internal efficiency, 4) external efficiency. Conclusions elaborate on Hansmann’s classic theory of the firm to suggest that governance solutions need to be assessed on the basis of total costs, considering also the lower level of social costs that is created when governance includes relevant stakeholders. Our model highlights that when social costs are high, even an enterprise with costly decisional processes, such as the multi-stakeholder, can be the most efficient solution amongst other possible alternatives.

The study of multi-stakeholdership (and multi-stakeholder social enterprises in particular) is only at the start. Entrepreneurial choices which have emerged spontaneously, as well as the first legal frameworks approved in this direction, lack an adequate theoretical support. The debate itself is underdeveloped, as the existing understanding of organisations and their aims resist an inclusive, public interest view of enterprise. Our contribution aims at enriching the thin theoretical reflections on multi-stakeholdership, in a context where they are already established, i.e. that of social and personal services. The aim is to provide an economic justification on why the governance structure and decision-making praxis of the firm needs to account for multiple stakeholders. In particular with our analysis we want: a) to consider production and the role of firms in the context of the “public interest” which may or may not coincide with the non-profit objective; b) to ground the explanation of firm governance and processes upon the nature of production and the interconnections between demand and supply side; c) to explain that the costs associated with multi-stakeholder governance and deliberation in decision-making can increase internal efficiency and be “productive” since they lower internal costs and utilise resources that otherwise would go astray. The key insight of this work is that, differently from major interpretations, property costs should be compared with a more comprehensive range of costs, such as the social costs that emerge when the supply of social and personal services is insufficient or when the identification of aims and means is not shared amongst stakeholders. Our model highlights that when social costs derived from exclusion are high, even an enterprise with costly decisional processes, such as the multistakeholder, can be the most efficient solution amongst other possible alternatives.

Henry Hansmann has argued that ownership is best allocated to the group of patrons for which the total of cost of governance and contracting for all the firm’s patrons combined is minimized. This paper re-founds Hansmann’s model by considering an additional set of costs, the costs of excluding certain groups of patrons from the firm’s decision-making or governance process. The objective, which is Coasean in both spirit and formulation, is to show (1) that firms with “multi-stakeholder governance” emerge to economize on exclusion costs, and (2) that the efficient governance structure minimizes the total cost of membership, contracting and exclusion costs for all the firm’s patrons combined. The paper argues that this setup helps explain so-called “public organisation,” defined as organisations with public interest objectives, and further claims that this model helps explaining the recent emergence of multi-stakeholder enterprises within the third sector.

The study of private non-profit enterprises that offer general interest services is only at the start. The understanding of existing organisations resists an inclusive, public interest view of governance. This contribution aims at providing a reflection on specific features that non-profit enterprises should have, and outlines four main justifications for including stakeholders in production governance: 1) access to knowledge and other resources, 2) trust creation, 3) internal efficiency, 4) external efficiency. Conclusions elaborate on Hansmann’s classic theory of the firm to suggest that governance solutions need to be assessed on the basis of total costs, considering also the lower level of social costs that is created when governance includes relevant stakeholders. Our model highlights that when social costs are high, even an enterprise with costly decisional processes, such as the multi-stakeholder, can be the most efficient solution amongst other possible alternatives.

The study of multi-stakeholdership (and multi-stakeholder social enterprises in particular) is only at the start. Entrepreneurial choices which have emerged spontaneously, as well as the first legal frameworks approved in this direction, lack an adequate theoretical support. The debate itself is underdeveloped, as the existing understanding of organisations and their aims resist an inclusive, public interest view of enterprise. Our contribution aims at enriching the thin theoretical reflections on multi-stakeholdership, in a context where they are already established, i.e. that of social and personal services. The aim is to provide an economic justification on why the governance structure and decision-making praxis of the firm needs to account for multiple stakeholders. In particular with our analysis we want: a) to consider production and the role of firms in the context of the “public interest” which may or may not coincide with the non-profit objective; b) to ground the explanation of firm governance and processes upon the nature of production and the interconnections between demand and supply side; c) to explain that the costs associated with multi-stakeholder governance and deliberation in decision-making can increase internal efficiency and be “productive” since they lower internal costs and utilise resources that otherwise would go astray. The key insight of this work is that, differently from major interpretations, property costs should be compared with a more comprehensive range of costs, such as the social costs that emerge when the supply of social and personal services is insufficient or when the identification of aims and means is not shared amongst stakeholders. Our model highlights that when social costs derived from exclusion are high, even an enterprise with costly decisional processes, such as the multistakeholder, can be the most efficient solution amongst other possible alternatives.

Henry Hansmann has argued that ownership is best allocated to the group of patrons for which the total of cost of governance and contracting for all the firm’s patrons combined is minimized. This paper re-founds Hansmann’s model by considering an additional set of costs, the costs of excluding certain groups of patrons from the firm’s decision-making or governance process. The objective, which is Coasean in both spirit and formulation, is to show (1) that firms with “multi-stakeholder governance” emerge to economize on exclusion costs, and (2) that the efficient governance structure minimizes the total cost of membership, contracting and exclusion costs for all the firm’s patrons combined. The paper argues that this setup helps explain so-called “public organisation,” defined as organisations with public interest objectives, and further claims that this model helps explaining the recent emergence of multi-stakeholder enterprises within the third sector.

The objective of this chapter is to identify institutional solutions to the interrelated issues of social degradation and inequality. We build on the idea that the richness and poverty of social relations, and the outcomes that originate from this are in part caused by the unequal distribution of income and wealth, but also by the type of socio-economic institutions that a society gives itself and the behavioural attitudes associated with them. We discuss how, by reinstating cooperation and inclusion strategies within economic institutions, it becomes possible to deal with and balance at the same time individual behaviours and distributional issues. The paper builds on Ostrom's theory of commons and offers a framework that links institutional choices and reduction of social poverty.

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The paper is mainly divided into three parts. The first part is devoted to understanding the Italian third sector, with particular reference to the principal organisational and legal forms that define it and to some quantitative relevant data. The second part is largely focussed on social co-operatives, which are herewith regarded as the best paradigm to comprehend the evolution of the Italian nonprofit sector towards a more productive role with respect to the traditionally advocacy one. Finally, the third part underlines the relations existing between social enterprises and employment policies so as to grasp the potential for new developments in this field.

Il paper sintetizza alcuni lavori di ricerca e alcuni interventi a convegni realizzati negli ultimi anni da parte degli autori. In particolare, il paper riprende i risultati di una ricerca sulla formazione superiore in campo non profit, realizata in Italia, Francia, Belgio e Paesi Scandinavi nell'ambito di un progetto finanziato dalla Commissione Europea attraverso il "Programma Leonardo 1998".

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Exploiting a unique data set created in 1998 on a sample of 228 public, nonprofit and for-profit organizations working in the social service sector, and on 2066 workers, the paper seeks to demonstrate that workers’ satisfaction and loyalty to the organization is influenced by the incentive mixes offered by different organizational forms. Nonprofit organizations are found to give more weight to intrinsic and relational aspects of the work than to monetary aspects. They tend to pay lower wages and to produce a mix of incentives based on non-monetary rewards compared to public bodies and for-profit enterprises. The role of distributive and procedural fairness will be investigated as well. Fairness emerges as a crucial factor which influences both satisfaction and loyalty. Besides this general result, procedural justice is found to be the most important determinant of workers’ general satisfaction with their jobs.

Il paper sintetizza alcuni lavori di ricerca e alcuni interventi a convegni realizzati negli ultimi anni da parte degli autori. In particolare, il paper riprende i risultati di una ricerca sulla formazione superiore in campo non profit, realizata in Italia, Francia, Belgio e Paesi Scandinavi nell'ambito di un progetto finanziato dalla Commissione Europea attraverso il "Programma Leonardo 1998".

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In the dynamic model presented in the paper, manufacturing and service firms coexist. Two general equilibrium frameworks are compared, in which the service-providing firms are for profit enterprises or, alternatively, nonprofit organizations. Unlike in the related literature, a non-profit firm has no comparative advantage in dealing with the asymmetry arising from the fact that customers do not know ex ante the quality of the service. The paper shows that steady-state employment is higher when the service-providing firms are non-profit organizations. Moreover, the steady state associated with the presence of non-profit organizations is Pareto-superior if they enjoy a significant advantage at motivating their employees.

Il paper sintetizza alcuni lavori di ricerca e alcuni interventi a convegni realizzati negli ultimi anni da parte degli autori. In particolare, il paper riprende i risultati di una ricerca sulla formazione superiore in campo non profit, realizata in Italia, Francia, Belgio e Paesi Scandinavi nell'ambito di un progetto finanziato dalla Commissione Europea attraverso il "Programma Leonardo 1998".

Non disponibile

Non disponibile

Non disponibile

The paper is mainly divided into three parts. The first part is devoted to understanding the Italian third sector, with particular reference to the principal organisational and legal forms that define it and to some quantitative relevant data. The second part is largely focussed on social co-operatives, which are herewith regarded as the best paradigm to comprehend the evolution of the Italian nonprofit sector towards a more productive role with respect to the traditionally advocacy one. Finally, the third part underlines the relations existing between social enterprises and employment policies so as to grasp the potential for new developments in this field.

Exploiting a unique data set created in 1998 on a sample of 228 public, nonprofit and for-profit organizations working in the social service sector, and on 2066 workers, the paper seeks to demonstrate that workers’ satisfaction and loyalty to the organization is influenced by the incentive mixes offered by different organizational forms. Nonprofit organizations are found to give more weight to intrinsic and relational aspects of the work than to monetary aspects. They tend to pay lower wages and to produce a mix of incentives based on non-monetary rewards compared to public bodies and for-profit enterprises. The role of distributive and procedural fairness will be investigated as well. Fairness emerges as a crucial factor which influences both satisfaction and loyalty. Besides this general result, procedural justice is found to be the most important determinant of workers’ general satisfaction with their jobs.

Non disponibile

not available

Il paper sintetizza alcuni lavori di ricerca e alcuni interventi a convegni realizzati negli ultimi anni da parte degli autori. In particolare, il paper riprende i risultati di una ricerca sulla formazione superiore in campo non profit, realizata in Italia, Francia, Belgio e Paesi Scandinavi nell'ambito di un progetto finanziato dalla Commissione Europea attraverso il "Programma Leonardo 1998".