Search

Introduction: Clinical and laboratory studies demonstrate that placebo and nocebo effects influence various symptoms and conditions after the administration of both inert and active treatments., Objective: There is an increasing need for up-to-date recommendations on how to inform patients about placebo and nocebo effects in clinical practice and train clinicians how to disclose this information., Methods: Based on previous clinical recommendations concerning placebo and nocebo effects, a 3-step, invitation-only Delphi study was conducted among an interdisciplinary group of internationally recognized experts. The study consisted of open- and closed-ended survey questions followed by a final expert meeting. The surveys were subdivided into 3 parts: (1) informing patients about placebo effects, (2) informing patients about nocebo effects, and (3) training clinicians how to communicate this information to the patients., Results: There was consensus that communicating general information about placebo and nocebo effects to patients (e.g., explaining their role in treatment) could be beneficial, but that such information needs to be adjusted to match the specific clinical context (e.g., condition and treatment). Experts also agreed that training clinicians to communicate about placebo and nocebo effects should be a regular and integrated part of medical education that makes use of multiple formats, including face-to-face and online modalities., Conclusions: The current 3-step Delphi study provides consensus-based recommendations and practical considerations for disclosures about placebo and nocebo effects in clinical practice. Future research is needed on how to optimally tailor information to specific clinical conditions and patients' needs, and on developing standardized disclosure training modules for clinicians., (© 2020 The Author(s) Published by S. Karger AG, Basel.)

Competing Interests: The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

Patient portals are used as a means to facilitate communication, performing administrative tasks, or accessing one's health record. In a retrospective analysis of real-world data from the Swedish National Patient Portal 1177.se, we describe the rate of adoption over time, as well as how patterns of device usage have changed over time. In Jan 2013, 53% of all visits were made from a computer, and 38% from a mobile phone. By June 2020, 77% of all visits were made from a mobile phone and only 20% from a computer. These results underline the importance of designing responsive patient portals that allow patients to use any device without losing functionality or usability.

Objective: To solicit leading health informaticians' predictions about the impact of AI/ML on primary care in the US in 2029., Design: A three-round online modified Delphi poll., Participants: Twenty-nine leading health informaticians., Methods: In September 2019, health informatics experts were selected by the research team, and invited to participate the Delphi poll. Participation in each round was anonymous, and panelists were given between 4-8 weeks to respond to each round. In Round 1 open-ended questions solicited forecasts on the impact of AI/ML on: (1) patient care, (2) access to care, (3) the primary care workforce, (4) technological breakthroughs, and (5) the long-future for primary care physicians. Responses were coded to produce itemized statements. In Round 2, participants were invited to rate their agreement with each item along 7-point Likert scales. Responses were analyzed for consensus which was set at a predetermined interquartile range of ≤ 1. In Round 3 items that did not reach consensus were redistributed., Results: A total of 16 experts participated in Round 1 (16/29, 55%). Of these experts 13/16 (response rate, 81%), and 13/13 (response rate, 100%), responded to Rounds 2 and 3, respectively. As a result of developments in AI/ML by 2029 experts anticipated workplace changes including incursions into the disintermediation of physician expertise, and increased AI/ML training requirements for medical students. Informaticians also forecast that by 2029 AI/ML will increase diagnostic accuracy especially among those with limited access to experts, minorities and those with rare diseases. Expert panelists also predicted that AI/ML-tools would improve access to expert doctor knowledge., Conclusions: This study presents timely information on informaticians' consensus views about the impact of AI/ML on US primary care in 2029. Preparation for the near-future of primary care will require improved levels of digital health literacy among patients and physicians., Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.

Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared.

Background and Aim: Despite recent publications, practitioners remain unfamiliar with the current terminology related to the placebo and nocebo phenomena observed in clinical trials and practice, nor with the factors that modulate them. To cover the gap, the European Headache Federation appointed a panel of experts to clarify the terms associated with the use of placebo in clinical trials., Methods: The working group identified relevant questions and agreed upon recommendations. Because no data were required to answer the questions, the GRADE approach was not applicable, and thus only expert opinion was provided according to an amended Delphi method. The initial 12 topics for discussion were revised in the opinion of the majority of the panelists, and after a total of 6 rounds of negotiations, the final agreement is presented., Results/recommendations: Two primary and mechanism-based recommendations are provided for the results of clinical trials: [1] to distinguish the placebo or nocebo response from the placebo or nocebo effect; and [2] for any favorable outcome observed after placebo administration, the term "placebo response" should be used, and for any unfavorable outcome recorded after placebo administration, the term "nocebo response" should be used (12 out of 17 panelists agreed, 70.6% agreement). The placebo or nocebo responses are attributed to a set of factors including those that are related to the medical condition (e.g. natural history, random comorbidities, etc.), along with idiosyncratic ones, in which the placebo or nocebo effects are attributed to idiosyncratic, or nonspecific mechanisms, exclusively (e.g. expectation, conditioning, observational learning etc.). To help investigators and practitioners, the panel summarized a list of environmental factors and idiosyncratic dynamics modulating placebo and nocebo effects. Some of them are modifiable, and investigators or physicians need to know about them in order to modify these factors appropriately to improve treatment. One secondary recommendation addresses the use of the terms "placebo" and "nocebo" ("placebos" and "nocebos" in plural), which refer to the triggers of the placebo/nocebo effects or responses, respectively, and which are inert agents or interventions that should not be confused with the placebo/nocebo responses or effects themselves (all panelists agreed, 100% agreement)., Conclusion: The working group recommends distinguishing the term response from effect to describe health changes from before to after placebo application and to distinguish the terms placebo(s) or nocebo(s) from the health consequences that they cause (placebo/nocebo responses or effects).

Compared with mainstream medicine and complementary and alternative therapies, the practice of psychotherapy has enjoyed a relative pass when it comes to ethical evaluation. Therefore, contributions to the, although slowly growing, body of literature on psychotherapy ethics are to be welcomed. In his paper 'Psychotherapy, placebos, and informed consent', Garson Leder takes issue with what he calls the 'go open' project in psychotherapy ethics-the idea that the so-called 'common factors' in therapy should be disclosed to prospective patients. Although Leder does not give a detailed list, the common factors include therapist characteristics (empathy, positive regard, positive expectations that therapy will succeed), patient characteristics (expectations about therapy including its plausibility, confidence in the therapist), and the working alliance (how well both therapist and patient work well together during sessions). He argues that the project advocating disclosure of these factors is flawed on two grounds: (1) that information about common factors is not necessary for informed consent; and (2) clarity about specific mechanisms of change in therapy is consistent with 'many theory-specific forms of psychotherapy'. There are multiple serious problems with Leder's critique of the recent literature, including how he represents the contours of the debate, which I list, and address in this response., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2020. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.)

Research in social psychology demonstrates that physical environmental factors - or "artifacts" such as provider clothing and office décor - can influence health outcomes. However, the role of artifacts in augmenting or diminishing health outcomes is under-explored in the burgeoning discipline of placebo studies. In this paper, we argue that a careful consideration of artifacts may carry significant potential in informing how placebo effects can be maximized, and nocebo effects minimized in clinical settings. We discuss the potential mechanisms, including classical conditioning, response expectancy, and mindsets, by which artifacts might enhance or diminish these effects. Next, we propose testable hypotheses to investigate how placebo and nocebo effects might be elicited by artifacts in care settings, and conclude by providing innovative research designs to advance this novel research agendum., (Copyright © 2020 Bernstein, Locher, Kube, Buergler, Stewart-Ferrer and Blease.)

Background: Futurists have predicted that new autonomous technologies, embedded with artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML), will lead to substantial job losses in many sectors disrupting many aspects of healthcare. Mental health appears ripe for such disruption given the global illness burden, stigma, and shortage of care providers., Objective: To characterize the global psychiatrist community's opinion regarding the potential of future autonomous technology (referred to here as AI/ML) to replace key tasks carried out in mental health practice., Design: Cross sectional, random stratified sample of psychiatrists registered with Sermo, a global networking platform open to verified and licensed physicians., Main Outcome Measures: We measured opinions about the likelihood that AI/ML tools would be able to fully replace - not just assist - the average psychiatrist in performing 10 key psychiatric tasks. Among those who considered replacement likely, we measured opinions about how many years from now such a capacity might emerge. We also measured psychiatrist's perceptions about whether benefits of AI/ML would outweigh the risks., Results: Survey respondents were 791 psychiatrists from 22 countries representing North America, South America, Europe and Asia-Pacific. Only 3.8 % of respondents felt it was likely that future technology would make their jobs obsolete and only 17 % felt that future AI/ML was likely to replace a human clinician for providing empathetic care. Documenting and updating medical records (75 %) and synthesizing information (54 %) were the two tasks where a majority predicted that AI/ML could fully replace human psychiatrists. Female- and US-based doctors were more uncertain that the benefits of AI would outweigh risks than male- and non-US doctors, respectively. Around one in 2 psychiatrists did however predict that their jobs would be substantially changed by AI/ML., Conclusions: Our findings provide compelling insights into how physicians think about AI/ML which in turn may help us better integrate technology and reskill doctors to enhance mental health care., Competing Interests: Declaration of Competing Interest The study was done in collaboration with the global physician survey platform Sermo; the study authors received no personal funding from and have no financial ties to the platform. A detailed competing interest statement is listed at the end of the manuscript., (Copyright © 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

Objective: Despite the growing evidence of physiological and cellular abnormalities in myalgic encephalomyelitis (ME)/chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS), there has been a strong impetus to tackle the illness utilizing a biopsychosocial model. However, many sufferers of this disabling condition report distress and dissatisfaction following medical encounters. This review seeks to account for this discord. Methods: A narrative review methodology is employed to synthesize the evidence for potential iatrogenesis. Results: We identify seven potential modalities of iatrogenesis or harm reported by patients:difficulties in reaching an acceptable diagnosis;misdiagnosis, including of other medical and psychological conditions;difficulties in accessing the sick role, medical care and social support;high levels of patient dissatisfaction with the quality of medical care;negative responses to controversial therapies (cognitive behavioral therapy and graded exercise therapy);challenges to the patient narrative and experience;psychological harm (individual and collective distress). Conclusion: The biopsychosocial framework currently applied to ME/CFS is too narrow in focus and fails to adequately incorporate the patient narrative. Misdiagnosis, conflict, and harm are observable outcomes where doctors' and patients' perspectives remain incongruent. Biopsychosocial practices should be scrutinized for potential harms. Clinicians should consider adopting alternative patient-centred approaches.Implications for rehabilitationPatients with ME/CFS may report or experience one or more of the modalities of harms and distress identified in this review.It is important health and rehabilitation professionals seek to avoid and minimize harms when treating or assisting ME/CFS patients.There are conflicting models of ME/CFS; we highlight two divergent models, a biopsychosocial model and a biomedical model that is preferred by patients.The 'biopsychosocial framework' applied in clinical practice promotes treatments such as cognitive behavioral therapy and exercise therapy, however, the evidence for their success is contested and many patients reject the notion their illness is perpetuated by dysfunctional beliefs, personality traits, or behaviors.Health professionals may avoid conflict and harm causation in ME/CFS by adopting more concordant 'patient-centred' approaches that give greater prominence to the patient narrative and experience of illness.

Chronic fatigue syndrome/myalgic encephalomyelitis is a debilitating illness that greatly impacts the lives of sufferers. A cognitive behavioural model attempts to explain illness onset and continuance with a hypothesis that the illness is perpetuated by patients' irrational beliefs and avoidance behaviours. This theory underpins the promotion of cognitive behavioural therapy, a treatment that aims to change beliefs and behaviours. This article reports on a detailed review of the cognitive behavioural model. Our review finds that the model lacks high-quality evidential support, conflicts with accounts given by most patients and fails to account for accumulating biological evidence of pathological and physiological abnormalities found in patients. There is little scientific credibility in the claim that psycho-behavioural therapies are a primary treatment for this illness., Competing Interests: Declaration of conflicting interests: The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Background: The potential for machine learning to disrupt the medical profession is the subject of ongoing debate within biomedical informatics and related fields., Objective: This study aimed to explore general practitioners' (GPs') opinions about the potential impact of future technology on key tasks in primary care., Methods: In June 2018, we conducted a Web-based survey of 720 UK GPs' opinions about the likelihood of future technology to fully replace GPs in performing 6 key primary care tasks, and, if respondents considered replacement for a particular task likely, to estimate how soon the technological capacity might emerge. This study involved qualitative descriptive analysis of written responses ("comments") to an open-ended question in the survey., Results: Comments were classified into 3 major categories in relation to primary care: (1) limitations of future technology, (2) potential benefits of future technology, and (3) social and ethical concerns. Perceived limitations included the beliefs that communication and empathy are exclusively human competencies; many GPs also considered clinical reasoning and the ability to provide value-based care as necessitating physicians' judgments. Perceived benefits of technology included expectations about improved efficiencies, in particular with respect to the reduction of administrative burdens on physicians. Social and ethical concerns encompassed multiple, divergent themes including the need to train more doctors to overcome workforce shortfalls and misgivings about the acceptability of future technology to patients. However, some GPs believed that the failure to adopt technological innovations could incur harms to both patients and physicians., Conclusions: This study presents timely information on physicians' views about the scope of artificial intelligence (AI) in primary care. Overwhelmingly, GPs considered the potential of AI to be limited. These views differ from the predictions of biomedical informaticians. More extensive, stand-alone qualitative work would provide a more in-depth understanding of GPs' views., (©Charlotte Blease, Ted J Kaptchuk, Michael H Bernstein, Kenneth D Mandl, John D Halamka, Catherine M DesRoches. Originally published in the Journal of Medical Internet Research (http://www.jmir.org), 20.03.2019.)

Hope is a crucial aspect of human life and has been a topic of interest in many scholarly disciplines. The medical literature, however, has-with a few exceptions-failed to take account of conceptions of hope across other scholarly disciplines. Before exploring what makes hope a distinctive and important phenomenon in medical contexts, this article reviews prominent views on hope from philosophy, anthropology, theology, and psychology. To synthesize these different conceptions, the authors propose an integrative approach aimed at improving the understanding of hope in medicine. The authors use a modes-of-hoping framework to explain different phenomena related to hope in medicine, such as hope in the face of a dismal prognosis, in the disclosure of diagnostic information, and in the initiation of new treatments. Based on this tentative framework, possible directions for future empirical research are discussed. Beside further qualitative research into the patients' and physicians' understanding and experiences of hope, the authors urge a quantitative examination of the impact of hope (while recognizing that a quantitative approach might not able to capture hope's many intricacies). Finally, they discuss clinical and ethical implications with respect to a balance between physicians being honest and acknowledging patients' hope.

Objective: To describe the opinions of British general practitioners regarding the potential of future technology to replace key tasks carried out in primary care., Design: Cross sectional online survey., Participants: 1,474 registered GPs in the United Kingdom., Main Outcome Measures: Investigators measured GPs' opinions about the likelihood that future technology will be able to fully replace-not merely aid-the average GP in performing six primary care tasks; in addition, if GPs considered replacement for a particular task likely, the survey measured opinions about how many years from now this technological capacity might emerge., Results: A total of 720 (49%) responded to the survey. Most GPs believed it unlikely that technology will ever be able to fully replace physicians when it comes to diagnosing patients (489, 68%), referring patients to other specialists (444, 61%), formulating personalized treatment plans (441, 61%), and delivering empathic care (680, 94%). GPs were not in agreement about prognostics: one in two participants (380, 53%) considered it likely that technology will be fully capable of replacing physicians in performing this task, nearly half (187, 49%) of whom believed that the technological capacity will arise in the next ten years. Against these findings, the majority of GPs (578, 80%) believed it likely that future technology will be able to fully replace humans to undertake documentation; among them 261 (79%) estimated that the technological wherewithal would emerge during the next ten years. In general, age and gender were not correlated with opinions; nor was reported burnout and job satisfaction or whether GPs worked full time or part time., Conclusions: The majority of UK GPs in this survey were skeptical about the potential for future technology to perform most primary care tasks as well as or better than humans. However, respondents were optimistic that in the near future technology would have the capacity to fully replace GPs' in undertaking administrative duties related to patient documentation., Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.

While a significant body of bioethical literature considers how the placebo effect might introduce a conflict between autonomy and beneficence, the link between justice and the placebo effect has been neglected. Here, we bring together disparate evidence from the field of placebo studies and research on health inequalities related to race and ethnicity, and argue that, collectively, this evidence may provide the basis for an unacknowledged route by which health disparities are exacerbated. This route is constituted by an uneven distribution of placebo effects, resulting from differences in expressions of physician warmth and empathy, as well as support and patient engagement, across racial and ethnic lines. In a discussion of the ethical implications of this connection, we argue that this contribution to health disparities is a source of injustice, consider ways in which these disparities might be ameliorated and suggest that this conclusion is likely to extend to other realms of inequality as well., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (© Article author(s) (or their employer(s) unless otherwise stated in the text of the article) 2018. All rights reserved. No commercial use is permitted unless otherwise expressly granted.)

Myalgic encephalomyelitis or chronic fatigue syndrome (ME/CFS) is a contested illness category. This paper investigates the common claim that patients with ME/CFS-and by extension, ME/CFS patient organizations (POs)-exhibit "militant" social and political tendencies. The paper opens with a history of the protracted scientific disagreement over ME/CFS. We observe that ME/CFS POs, medical doctors, and medical researchers exhibit clear differences in opinion over how to conceptualize this illness. However, we identify a common trope in the discourse over ME/CFS: the claim of "militant" patient activism. Scrutinizing this charge, we find no compelling evidence that the vast majority of patients with ME/CFS, or the POs representing them, have adopted any such militant political policies or behaviours. Instead, we observe key strategic similarities between ME/CFS POs in the United Kingdom and the AIDs activist organizations of the mid-1980s in the United States which sought to engage scientists using the platform of public activism and via scientific publications. Finally, we explore the contours of disagreement between POs and the medical community by drawing on the concept of epistemic injustice. We find that widespread negative stereotyping of patients and the marginalization and exclusion of patient voices by medical authorities provides a better explanation for expressions of frustration among patients with ME/CFS.

In the relatively nascent field of placebo studies, empirical studies have burgeoned. Yet debate about how to define the terms placebo and "placebo effect" has not abated. A number of prominent scholars (drawn from medical practice, as well as philosophy, psychology, and anthropology) continue to propose and defend different conceptual models for these terms, and the perception that conceptual debate persists is often given as one justification for new definitions. Paradoxically-in spite of this lively debate-this article finds considerable underlying agreement about definitional matters within placebo studies. Drawing on key insights from philosophy of science, and by exploring the nature of scientific consensus and normal scientific research, this paper argues that well-developed placebo concepts form the basis for a placebo paradigm and that conceptual disagreement is overstated.

The placebo and psychotherapy are both effective psychological interventions. Next to being characterized by their own and specific controversies and debates, there is a persistent-and least for psychotherapy-looming notion that these two interventions share more than just the first letter. Based on Grünbaum's influential conceptualization of placebo, this chapter critically reviews both the time-honored claim that psychotherapy is a placebo as well as the argument that the placebo concept does not translate to psychotherapy. We conclude that there is an unwanted proximity between these two interventions and that empirical attempts to separate the "wheat from the chaff" in psychotherapy research face several distinctive challenges and thus are often methodologically comprised by the integrity of the placebo. However, drawing on recent, innovative research, we conclude that psychotherapy can be saved, i.e., shown to be distinct from the placebo, by employing study designs derived from the placebo research. We conclude that the placebo concept has profound implications for psychotherapy, psychotherapy research, and last but not least its ethical practice., (© 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

Background: Placebo and nocebo effects occur in clinical or laboratory medical contexts after administration of an inert treatment or as part of active treatments and are due to psychobiological mechanisms such as expectancies of the patient. Placebo and nocebo studies have evolved from predominantly methodological research into a far-reaching interdisciplinary field that is unravelling the neurobiological, behavioural and clinical underpinnings of these phenomena in a broad variety of medical conditions. As a consequence, there is an increasing demand from health professionals to develop expert recommendations about evidence-based and ethical use of placebo and nocebo effects for clinical practice., Methods: A survey and interdisciplinary expert meeting by invitation was organized as part of the 1st Society for Interdisciplinary Placebo Studies (SIPS) conference in 2017. Twenty-nine internationally recognized placebo researchers participated., Results: There was consensus that maximizing placebo effects and minimizing nocebo effects should lead to better treatment outcomes with fewer side effects. Experts particularly agreed on the importance of informing patients about placebo and nocebo effects and training health professionals in patient-clinician communication to maximize placebo and minimize nocebo effects., Conclusions: The current paper forms a first step towards developing evidence-based and ethical recommendations about the implications of placebo and nocebo research for medical practice, based on the current state of evidence and the consensus of experts. Future research might focus on how to implement these recommendations, including how to optimize conditions for educating patients about placebo and nocebo effects and providing training for the implementation in clinical practice., (© 2018 S. Karger AG, Basel.)

Cognitive behavioural therapy is increasingly promoted as a treatment for chronic fatigue syndrome. There is limited research on informed consent using cognitive behavioural therapy in chronic fatigue syndrome. We undertook a narrative review to explore efficacy and to identify the salient information that should be disclosed to patients. We found a complex theoretical model underlying the rationale for psychotherapy in chronic fatigue syndrome. Cognitive behavioural therapy may bring about changes in self-reported fatigue for some patients in the short term, however there is a lack of evidence for long-term benefit or for improving physical function and cognitive behavioural therapy may cause distress if inappropriately prescribed. Therapist effects and placebo effects are important outcome factors.

In this article we propose a critical reassessment of Daniel Moerman's "meaning response." First, we reconstruct and criticize Moerman's original proposal of introducing the "meaning response" as a way of clarifying some terminological and conceptual issues in the placebo debate. Next we evaluate the criticisms that Moerman's proposal is epistemically moot since other existing and more empirically grounded models already account for all the phenomena that fall under the concept of the "meaning response." We conclude that Moerman's original proposal is inherently problematic and that, in order to be instrumentally useful in the future, the meaning response must be reconceived so that it may finally support, rather than oppose, other theoretical and empirical lines of research currently ongoing in the field of placebo studies.

Chronic fatigue syndrome or myalgic encephalomyelitis (CFS/ME) remains a controversial illness category. This paper surveys the state of knowledge and attitudes about this illness and proposes that epistemic concerns about the testimonial credibility of patients can be articulated using Miranda Fricker's concept of epistemic injustice. While there is consensus within mainstream medical guidelines that there is no known cause of CFS/ME, there is continued debate about how best to conceive of CFS/ME, including disagreement about how to interpret clinical studies of treatments. Against this background, robust qualitative and quantitative research from a range of countries has found that many doctors (and medical students) display uncertainty about whether CFS/ME is real, which may result in delays in diagnosis and treatment for patients. Strikingly, qualitative research evinces that patients with CFS/ME often experience suspicion by healthcare professionals, and many patients vocally oppose the effectiveness, and the conceptualisation, of their illness as psychologically treatable. We address the intersection of these issues and healthcare ethics, and claim that this state of affairs can be explained as a case of epistemic injustice (2007). We find evidence that healthcare consultations are fora where patients with CFS/ME may be particularly vulnerable to epistemic injustice. We argue that the (often unintentional) marginalisation of many patients is a professional failure that may lead to further ethical and practical consequences both for progressive research into CFS/ME, and for ethical care and delivery of current treatments among individuals suffering from this debilitating illness., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None., (Published by the BMJ Publishing Group Limited. For permission to use (where not already granted under a licence) please go to http://www.bmj.com/company/products-services/rights-and-licensing/.)

The doctor-patient relationship is built on an implicit covenant of trust, yet it was not until the post-World War Two era that respect for patient autonomy emerged as an article of mainstream medical ethics. Unlike their medical forebears, physicians today are expected to furnish patients with adequate information about diagnoses, prognoses and treatments. Against these dicta there has been ongoing debate over whether placebos pose a threat to patient autonomy. A key premise underlying medical ethics discussion is the notion that the placebo effect necessitates patient deception. Indeed, the American Medical Association guidelines imply that placebo treatment necessary entails a form of deception. As a consequence of this assumption, the fulcrum of debate on the use of placebo treatment has hinged on whether that deception is ever justified. Recently performed experiments with open-label transparently prescribed placebos have begun to challenge the notion that deception is necessary in eliciting the placebo effect and such effects necessarily involve a binary distinction between autonomy and beneficence. In this article we focus on the content of disclosures in distinctive open-label, transparently disclosed placebo studies and inquire whether they might be said to invoke deception in clinical contexts, and if so, whether the deception is unethical. We find that open placebos may be said to involve equivocation over how placebos work. However, drawing on surveys of patient attitudes we suggest that this equivocation appears to be acceptable to patients. We conclude that open placebos fulfil current American Medical Association guidelines for placebo use, and propose future research directions for harnessing the placebo effect ethically., (© 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.)

The idea that a study of the humanities helps to humanise doctors has become a leitmotif within the field. It is argued that the humanities (especially, literature) help to foster insights beyond those provided by biomedical training. Healthy young medics, it is claimed, can thereby gain significant insights into patienthood, and obtain important skills that may be valuable for their professional life. But the instrumentality of the humanities is not the only justification proffered for its inclusion in medical curricula. In this paper I critically examine the two overarching justifications recurrently cited in the mainstream literature-namely, (1) the instrumental worth and (2) the intrinsic value of the medical humanities in educating doctors. Examining these theses (and focusing on the views of a leading medical humanities scholar) I show that the bifurcation into instrumental versus non-instrumental justifications is not supported by the argumentation. Instead, I find that the particulars of the supposedly intrinsic justifications amount to an unambiguously instrumental defence of the humanities. Contextualizing the present investigation to probe further, I describe a long history of debate about the role of the humanities in British education and find that it rests on unsupported dichotomies (utility vs non-utility, theoretical vs applied, educated vs trained). I conclude that the medical humanities' manifesto would be more intellectually honest and coherent, and provide a more robust defence of its value in medical education, if it chose to embrace a wholly instrumental rationale for its role., (Published by the BMJ Publishing Group Limited. For permission to use (where not already granted under a licence) please go to http://www.bmj.com/company/products-services/rights-and-licensing/)

It is now an ethical dictum that patients should be informed by physicians about their diagnosis, prognosis and treatment options. In this paper, I ask: 'How informed are the 'informers' in clinical practice?' Physicians have a duty to be 'well-informed': patient well-being depends not just in conveying adequate information to patients, it also depends on physicians keeping up-to-date about: (1) popular misunderstandings of illnesses and treatments; and (2) the importance of patient psychology in affecting prognosis. Taking the case of depression as an entry point, this paper argues that medical researchers and physicians need to pay serious attention to the explanations given to patients regarding their diagnosis. Studies on lay understanding of depression show that there is a common belief that depression is wholly caused by a 'chemical imbalance' (such as 'low serotonin') that can be restored by chemically restorative antidepresssants, a claim that has entered 'folk wisdom'. However, these beliefs oversimplify and misrepresent the current scientific understanding of the causes of depression: first, there is consensus in the scientific community that the causes of depression include social as well as psychological triggers (and not just biochemical ones); second, there is significant dissensus in the scientific community over exactly what lower level, biological or biochemical processes are involved in causing depression; third, there is no established consensus about how antidepressants work at a biochemical level; fourth, there is evidence that patients are negatively affected if they believe their depression is wholly explained by (the vague descriptor) of 'biochemical imbalance'. I argue that the medical community has a duty, to provide patients with adequate information and to be aware of the negative health impact of prevalent oversimplifications-whatever their origins.

The use of 'placebos' in clinical practice is a source of continued controversy for physicians and medical ethicists. There is rarely any extensive discussion on what 'placebos' are and how they work. In this paper, drawing on Louhiala and Puustinen's work, the author proposes that the term 'placebo effect' be replaced in clinical contexts with the term 'positive care effect'. Medical treatment always takes place in a 'context of care' that encompasses all the phenomena associated with medical intervention it includes the particular method of treatment, the interpersonal relationships between medical staff and the patient and other factors, including physicians' and patients' beliefs in the power of the treatment. Together, these phenomena can result in a full spectrum of therapeutic effects to the patient--from no effects, to small effects, to large effects. In cases where there are significant therapeutic benefits to the patient, 'positive care effects' may be spoken of. Since the ethical codes of the General Medical Council and the American Medical Association demand transparency with respect to patient treatment and insist on complete openness in 'placebo' usage, the author argues that, as a matter of conceptual rigour and consistency, if the term 'placebo effect' is replaced by 'positive care effect', these ethical codes appear to insist on transparency about all such beneficial components of treatment. Given that this appears to be a counterintuitive obligation, the author concludes the paper with some comments on the clinical consequences of this conceptual revision, including a brief discussion of how this important debate might develop.

Is it ever right to prescribe placebos to patients in clinical practice? The General Medical Council is ambivalent about the issue; the American Medical Association asserts that placebos can be administered only if the patient is (somehow) 'informed'. The potential problem with placebos is that they may involve deception: indeed, if this is the case, an ethical tension arises over the patient's autonomy and the physician's requirement to be open and honest, and the notion that medical care should be the primary concern. This paper examines the case of depression as an entry point for understanding the complexities of the prescription of placebos. Recent important meta-analyses of antidepressants claim that they are not significantly more effective in a clinical setting than placebos. Given that antidepressants have numerous adverse side effects and are hugely expensive, this provocative research has serious potential ethical and practical implications for patients and medical providers. Should placebos be prescribed in place of antidepressants? The case of depression highlights another important issue which medical ethical codes have hitherto overlooked: well-being is not synonymous with being realistic about oneself, one's circumstances and the future. While severely depressed individuals are unduly pessimistic about themselves and the world around them, treatment of depressed individuals can be deemed successful when patients have successfully attained those positive illusions that are indicative of psychological health. This is exactly what successful psychological treatments of depression seem to achieve. It is therefore possible that there may be a limited unavoidable role for deception in medicine.

This paper aims to show that the classification by the American Psychiatric Association (APA) in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) of a distinct listing of disorders known as Culture-Bound Syndromes (CBS) is misguided. I argue that the list of CBS (in Appendix I of the manual) comprises either (a) genuine disorders that should be included within the main body of the DSM; or (b) ersatz-disorders that serve a practical role for psychiatrists dealing with patients from certain cultures but will one day be eliminated or assimilated by bona fide DSM classifications. In support of these views I draw on claims from two key themes in the philosophy of science: (1) the claim that all folk (that is, non-scientific) explanations for phenomena are thoroughly theoretical and therefore fallible; and (2) the occurrence of theoretical elimination in the history of science. I contend that any ersatz-disorders located in the DSM that are judged to be radically false do not differ in kind from eliminated theories in the history of pre-science., (Copyright © 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)