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This book summarizes recent advances in the work on agenda-setting in a comparative perspective. The book first presents and explains the data-gathering effort undertaken within the Comparative Agendas Project over the past ten years. Individual country chapters then present the research undertaken within the many national projects. The third section illustrates the possibilities and directions for new research in comparative public policy using the data presented in this book. All the data used and discussed in the book is moreover publicly available. The book represents a significant contribution to the study of comparative public policy. By introducing a unified research infrastructure it opens up new possibilities for both empirical and theoretical research in this area.

This book summarizes recent advances in the work on agenda-setting in a comparative perspective. The book first presents and explains the data-gathering effort undertaken within the Comparative Agendas Project over the past ten years. Individual country chapters then present the research undertaken within the many national projects. The third section illustrates the possibilities and directions for new research in comparative public policy using the data presented in this book. All the data used and discussed in the book is moreover publicly available. The book represents a significant contribution to the study of comparative public policy. By introducing a unified research infrastructure it opens up new possibilities for both empirical and theoretical research in this area.

A growing body of work has examined the relationship between media and politics from an agenda-setting perspective: Is attention for issues initiated by political elites with the media following suit, or is the reverse relation stronger? A long series of single-country studies has suggested a number of general agenda-setting patterns but these have never been confirmed in a comparative approach. In a comparative, longitudinal design including comparable media and politics evidence for seven European countries (Belgium, Denmark, France, Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom), this study highlights a number of generic patterns. Additionally, it shows how the political system matters. Overall, the media are a stronger inspirer of political action in countries with single-party governments compared to those with multiple-party governments for opposition parties. But, government parties are more reactive to media under multiparty governments.

A growing body of work has examined the relationship between media and politics from an agenda‐setting perspective: Is attention for issues initiated by political elites with the media following suit, or is the reverse relation stronger? A long series of single‐country studies has suggested a number of general agenda‐setting patterns but these have never been confirmed in a comparative approach. In a comparative, longitudinal design including comparable media and politics evidence for seven European countries (Belgium, Denmark, France, Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom), this study highlights a number of generic patterns. Additionally, it shows how the political system matters. Overall, the media are a stronger inspirer of political action in countries with single‐party governments compared to those with multiple‐party governments for opposition parties. But, government parties are more reactive to media under multiparty governments.

Spain has a highly partisan media system, with newspapers reaching self-selected partisan audiences and espousing explicitly partisan editorial preferences. Do the newspapers of the left and right differ in how they cover politics in ways that can be predicted by their partisan leanings? We review theories of issue-ownership, journalistic standards, and information scarcity and test hypotheses derived from each. We find that the parties converge substantially in virtually every aspect of their coverage. Few differences emerge when we look at what topics are covered or in the dynamics of which topics gain attention over time. However, we confirm important differences across the papers when they make explicit reference to individual political parties. Journalistic norms result in a surprising focus on the faults of one’s enemies, however, rather than the virtues of one’s allies. Our assessment is based on a comprehensive database of all front-page stories in El País and El Mundo, Spain’s largest daily newspapers, from 1996 through 2011.

The concept of "divided government" is more complicated than scholars have allowed. In the USA, truly unified government, where the president enjoys a filibuster-proof majority in the Senate as well as a majority in the House, is rare. In France, truly unified government has been more common, but divided government has also occurred several times. Democratic governance requires that parties address important issues and they do so regardless of the patterns of institutional control. Nevertheless, policy changes or important laws are affected by the higher level of institutional friction associated with divided government. Looking at both the USA and France, we find that periods of unified government show higher levels of production of important laws in the USA, but we find no difference for overall legislative productivity.

Spain"s newspapers are characterised by strong partisan identities. We demonstrate that the two leading newspapers nonetheless show powerful similarities in the topics of their coverage over time. The media system is strongly related to the policy process and it shows similar levels of skew (attention focuses on just a few topics) and friction (attention lurches rapidly from topic to topic) as others have shown for policy processes more generally. Further, media attention is significantly related to parliamentary activities. Oral questions in parliament track closely with media attention over time. Our assessment is based on a comprehensive database of all front-page stories (over 95,000 stories) in El Paı´s and El Mundo, Spain"s largest daily newspapers, and all 7,446 oral questions from 1996 to 2009. The paper shows that explanations of friction and skew in governmental activities should incorporate media dynamics as well. Political leaders are clearly sensitive to media salience.

We test a punctuated equilibrium model of budgeting in the context of the European Union. Compared either to the US or to the national systems of its member states, we know little about the impact of the institutional design of the EU on its internal budgeting processes. For one, we do not know whether the heterogeneous preferences of each member-state are likely to create friction or venue-shopping towards the EU Commission. This paper first describes European budgeting processes since the inception of the EU, taking into consideration the enlargement process. In a second section, we present European budgeting data to test models of friction, incrementalism, and punctuated equilibrium, drawing from a developing literature with US and European applications. The findings make clear that EU budgeting processes correspond to a punctuated equilibrium model of budgetary choice, as previous studies have recently shown for the US and many European member states.

Ce chapitre applique la théorie des ponctuations budgétaires aux finances publiques françaises, en comparant les évolutions des dépenses publiques de l’administration centrale et des collectivités territoriales. Après un rappel des principaux tenants et aboutissants de cette théorie, on verra que les évolutions budgétaires françaises sont marquées par de l’incrémentalisme, mais surtout par des évolutions importantes à la hausse ou à la baisse, mettant ainsi en évidence des sur-réactions et des sous-réactions des décideurs publics par rapport à leur environnement, et ce quel que soit l’échelon administratif. On observera également que ces phénomènes varient selon la taille de la collectivité, indépendamment du cadre institutionnel. Ces résultats tendent à valider l’idée selon laquelle plus la distance entre le décideur public et l’administré est grande, plus les décisions sont susceptibles de sur- ou de sous-réactions aux exigences conjoncturelles, et donc plus les distributions budgétaires sont entachées de frictions.