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The reconstitution of the security apparatuses of ?failed states??especially the armed forces, but also other law-enforcement agencies such as the police and the internal security services?is a crucial element of the process of their resuscitation. This paper addresses the question of how to put together security agencies of ?failed states? as part of the restoration of their authority, and provides fresh empirical data on the case of Lebanon, a state that ?failed,? ?collapsed,? and was successfully ?resuscitated? in recent years. The paper will also make references to other cases of ?failed states,? and especially Afghanistan and Iraq since 2003.The paper argues that since the process whereby a ?failed state? is created involves the weakening?or, in extreme cases, the ?hollowing out??of its authority, its successful resuscitation must include the restoration of this authority and its various components. In particular, it ought to involve the reconstitution of the state?s security apparatuses, but in a way that would prevent a renewed slide into anarchy. The first part of the paper will discuss several theoretical issues related to the reconstitution of security apparatuses in ?failed states?. In particular, I will address the question of whether reforms in these institutions should precede or follow reforms introduced the state?s other institutions, and especially reforms in its ?political society? (the executive, the legislature, and the constitution). I will also discuss the relationship between the state?s reconstructed security apparatuses and various non-state actors (e.g., militias) and foreign players who operate in the state.Within the framework of this discussion, I will deal with several areas, or dimensions, where reform in the security apparatuses is warranted in order for these institutions to be more effective and legitimate in the eyes of the local population. These areas are: - Various readjustments in the ways the security apparatuses are controlled and commanded, including the installment of power-sharing mechanisms among the civilians that control them and, if needed, also within their command; - Changes in the internal composition of the security apparatuses (along the lines of religion, ethnicity, regions, clans, tribes, etc.) so as to make them more representative of the society in which they operate;- Efforts to redefine the identity, mission, and tasks of these forces in order to make them more acceptable to society at large.In the second part of the paper, I will present fresh qualitative and quantitative data gathered on the case of Lebanon from 1975 to the present. As I will show, some of the reforms that were initiated in this state?s security apparatuses during and in the wake of its ?failure? and ?collapse? included power-sharing mechanisms in the control and command of its armed forces, attempts to create a more ethnically balanced officer corps, and, to a certain extent, a redefinition of the identity and mission of the armed forces. It is of interest that these reforms, which were initiated in the late 1970s, preceded the significant reforms introduced in the country?s ?political society? in the late 1980s and early 1990s.The third part of the paper will show how the above discussion can inform the debate regarding other cases of ?weak? or ?failed? states that grapple with the problem of how to restore legitimate authority. In particular, I will discuss the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq since 2003. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]