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Cross-border trade in services is growing rapidly, with both industrial and developing countries among the most dynamic exporters. Despite the substantial global benefits from such trade, the adjustment pressures created in importing countries could provoke a protectionist backlash-some signs of which are already visible in procurement and regulatory restrictions. The current negotiations under the Doha Development Agenda offer an opportunity to lock in current openness and preempt protectionism. This paper describes how a bold initiative under the General Agreement on Trade in Services can help secure openness.

Foreign direct investment (FDI) can take place either through the direct entry of foreign firms or the acquisition of existing domestic firms. The preferences of a foreign firm and a welfare-maximizing host country government over these two modes of FDI are examined in the presence of costly technology transfer. The trade-off between technology transfer and market competition emerges as a key determinant of preferences. The clash between the foreign firm's equilibrium choice and the local government's ranking of the two modes of entry can provide a rationale for some frequently observed FDI restrictions.

The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), created under the auspices of the World Trade Organization, aims to regulate measures affecting international trade in services-including health services such as health insurance, hospital services, telemedicine, and acquisition of medical treatment abroad. The agreement has been the subject of great controversy, for it may affect the freedom with which countries can change the shape of their domestic health care systems. We explain the rationale behind the agreement and discuss its scope. We also address the major controversies surrounding the GATS and their implications for the U.S. health care system.

The negotiations on trade in services at the WTO have so far produced little liberalization beyond levels unilaterally undertaken by countries. One reason is the neglect of the traditional negotiating principle of reciprocity. In particular, there has been a failure to exploit the scope built into the services agreement (GATS) for exchange of market access 'concessions' across the different modes of supply - cross-border delivery, and the movement of capital and individuals. Using the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek framework, this paper proposes a negotiating formula that generalizes the fundamental WTO principle of reciprocity to include alternative modes of delivery. Adoption of this formula as a basis for negotiations could help deliver greater liberalization commitments on all modes - producing substantial gains in global welfare and more balanced outcomes.

China's GATS commitments represent the most radical services reform program negotiated in the WTO. China has promised to eliminate over the next few years most restrictions on foreign entry and ownership, as well as most forms of discrimination against foreign firms. In general, these commitments promote good policy. But the persistence of restrictions on foreign ownership (temporary in most sectors but more durable in telecommunications and life insurance) may dampen the incentives for foreign investors to improve firm performance. And initial restrictions on the geographical scope of services liberalization could encourage the further agglomeration of economic activity in certain regions -- to an extent that is unlikely to be reversed completely by subsequent country-wide liberalization. Finally, realizing the gains from, and perhaps even the sustainability of, liberalization will require significant improvements in the regulatory framework and the appropriate sequencing of reforms. Copyright Oxford University Press 2003, Oxford University Press.

Singapore has been a powerful magnet for foreign direct investment and in recent years has also made significant investments abroad, especially in developing countries and increasingly in services. This paper analyzes the determinants of Singapore's investment using the Knowledge-Capital Model and compares the impact of skill endowments on manufacturing and service sector investments. The results suggest that inward and outward investment with respect to industrialized countries in manufacturing and services was skill-seeking. A 10 percent decline in skill differences with industrialized countries resulted in a 19 percent rise in inbound manufacturing investment stocks, but only a 7 percent rise in inbound services stocks. Inward investment from developing countries in services was also skill-seeking, but outward investment to developing countries in both sectors was labor-seeking. A 10 percent increase in skill differences with developing countries resulted in a 23 percent rise in outbound manufacturing investment stocks and a 13 percent rise in outbound services stocks. Furthermore, when the analysis distinguishes between services on the basis of skill intensity, there is a significant difference between the determinants of foreign direct investment in skill-intensive services and foreign direct investment in other services and goods. However, when services are disaggregated on the basis of "proximity" needs, there is no significant difference in the determinants of foreign direct investment in proximity services compared with foreign direct investment in non-proximity services.

This paper focuses on the sluggish growth of world trade relative to income growth in recent years. The analysis uses an empirical strategy based on an error correction model to assess whether the global trade slowdown is structural or cyclical. An estimate of the relationship between trade and income in the past four decades reveals that the long-term trade elasticity rose sharply in the 1990s, but declined significantly in the 2000s even before the global financial crisis. These results suggest that trade is growing slowly not only because of slow growth of gross domestic product, but also because of a structural change in the trade-gross domestic product relationship in recent years. The available evidence suggests that the explanation may lie in the slowing pace of international vertical specialization rather than increasing protection or the changing composition of trade and gross domestic product.

This paper assesses the quantitative importance of electronic commerce in trade and tariff revenue, in light of the WTO decision on ‘duty-free cyberspace’. Electronic commerce is likely to boost international trade in software, digitizable media products (music, books) and many services sectors significantly. However, despite the growing importance of electronic commerce for trade, tariff revenue loss from duty-free electronic commerce is unlikely to be significant.

This paper shows that environmental, labour and other standards can be effective strategic policy instruments even when they are strictly non-discriminatory. This is because standards can be set which the low cost producer optimally chooses not to meet, allowing the high cost producer to monopolize the standardized segment of the market. Thus, it is important for policy to consider how much scope there should be for the imposition of unilaterally determined standards - which could impact negatively on trading partners even when they are non-discriminatory - rather than internationally negotiated standards.

This paper examines how the market structure is likely to evolve in a situation of multi-stage oligopolistic production. The decision to merge across or within stages of production is treated as endogenous. It is shown that when firms at a particular stage of production are relatively dominant, simultaneous merger decisions are conducive to competitive vertically integrated outcomes while sequential decisions are not. The persistence of non-integrated market structures may be explained by the existence of equally dominant firms which make merger decisions sequentially. The credible threat of retaliatory merger may deter both socially desirable and undesirable forms of merger. Inferences are drawn for the design of competition policy.

Developing countries need to ensure that multilateral rules and commitments on trade in services contribute to economically rational policy-making. This paper shows that their reluctant participation in past negotiations, and assumption of defensive positions, have not been conducive to the achievement of this goal. The next round of services negotiations requires a change in negotiating strategies. Rather than resist the liberalisation of domestic markets and seek a dilution of multilateral rules, they need to push aggressively for (i) liberalisation of domestic services markets, emphasising competition more than a change of ownership, (ii) development of improved rules for domestic regulations that encourage economic efficiency in remedying market failures and pursuing social goals, and (iii) effective liberalisation of foreign services markets by the elimination of both explicit restrictions and implicit regulatory barriers. At the same time, developed countries need to rise to the challenge of eliminating the barriers they maintain to exports from developing countries, so that we may witness not a bitter round of grudging concessions, but a virtuous cycle of mutually beneficial liberalisation. * This paper is a condensed version of Mattoo (1999), which has a more comprehensive discussion of developing country interests and references to the literature. Thanks go to Carsten Fink, Randeep Rathindran, and Arvind Subramanian for contributions to this paper, to Bernard Hoekman, Marcelo Olarreaga, Arvind Panagariya for insightful comments, and to Malina Savova for valuable research assistance. The views expressed are personal and should not be attributed to the World Bank.

World trade in services amounted to $2170 billion in 1997, of which 40 per cent was cross-border consumption. Though service trade liberalization is hard to model, sectoral and general equilibrium analyses indicate the scope for major welfare gains. Reforms in services will be driven by domestic agendas, but they can be supported and complemented by commitments to GATS disciplines. Developing country commitments in the GATS, as well as commitments in their areas of interest, are limited. Incentives are needed in the next WTO trade round to encourage commitment to a more balanced and comprehensive coverage. The trade inhibiting effect of domestic regulation requires particular attention. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

A major challenge for the multilateral trading system is to secure the benefits of trade liberalization without infringing on the freedom of governments to pursue legitimate domestic objectives. The difficulty lies in distinguishing between two types of situations. In one, a non-protectionist government cannot prevent certain domestic policies from incidentally discriminating against foreign competitors. In the other, a protectionist government uses a legitimate objective as an excuse to design domestic policies which inhibit foreign competition. The challenge is to devise rules which are sensitive to the difference between these two situations, exonerating the former while preventing the latter. The approach suggested in this paper is to create a presumption in favour of the economically efficient policy measure, with departures inviting justification. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

The demand for accountability in aid-for-trade is increasing but monitoring has focused on case studies and impressionistic narratives. The paper reviews recent evidence from a wide range of studies, recognizing that a multiplicity of approaches is needed to learn what works and what does not. The review concludes that there is some support for the emphasis on reducing trade costs through investments in hard infrastructure (like ports and roads) and soft infrastructure (like customs). But failure to implement complementary reform -- especially the introduction of competition in transport services -- may erode the benefits of these investments. Direct support to exporters does seem to lead to diversification across products and destinations, but it is not yet clear that these benefits are durable. In general, it is difficult to rely on cross-country studies to direct aid-for-trade. More rigorous impact evaluation is an underutilized alternative, but situations of clinical interventions in trade are rare and adverse incentives (because of agency problems) and costs (because of the small size of project) are a hurdle in implementation.

This paper evaluates the effects of the FAMEX export promotion program in Tunisia on the performance of beneficiary firms. While most studies assess only the short-term impact of such programs, we consider also the longer-term impact. Our estimates suggest that the average beneficiary initially saw both higher overall export levels and greater diversification across destinations and products. However, three years after the intervention, beneficiaries' export levels and diversification were no longer significantly different from those of a control group. Furthermore, the effects were heterogeneous across firms: small and large firms saw no positive impact on export levels, and even the positive impact on medium sized firms was temporary. The temporariness of the impact was not due to spillovers to non-beneficiary firms which helped them to catch up, or to greater exposure of beneficiaries to crisis-affected economies. Rather, the impact may be transient because the program did not lead to the enhancements in product quality or sophistication which could have strengthened competitiveness durably. Notwithstanding its transient effect, the relatively low-cost FAMEX still generated two Tunisian Dinars of private profits per Dinar of program expenditure, and the additional corporate tax revenue just covered the public cost of the program.

The current perspective on the flow of people is almost exclusively focused on permanent migration from poorer to richer countries and on immigration policies in industrial countries. But international mobility of people should no longer be seen as a one-time event or one-way flow from South to North. The economic crisis has accentuated the longer-term shift in location incentives for people in industrial countries. As consumers, they could obtain better and cheaper access to key services -- such as care for the elderly, health, and education -- whose costs at home are projected to increase in the future, threatening standards of living. As workers, they could benefit from new opportunities created by the shift in economic dynamism from industrial to emerging countries. But subtle incentives to stay at home, such as lack of portability of health insurance and non-recognition of qualifications obtained abroad, inhibit North-South mobility and need to be addressed. Furthermore, if beneficiaries of movement abroad exert countervailing power against those who support immigration barriers at home, then that could lead to greater inflows of people, boosting innovation and growth in the North. Eventually, growing two-way flows of people could create the possibility of a grand bargain to reduce impediments to the movement of people at every stage in all countries and help realize the full benefits of globalization.

Abstract Liberalization of trade and investment in services through trade agreements has progressed less than trade in goods. We review the limited progress achieved to date in the WTO and major regional agreements on services and possible explanations why trade agreements have not been more effective at integrating the services markets of participating countries. We argue that the prospects for both services liberalization and welfare-enhancing regulatory reform in the context of trade agreements can be enhanced through mechanisms that enhance transparency, dialogue and cooperation between regulators, trade officials and stakeholders.

International negotiations on climate change have been dogged by mutual recriminations between rich and poor countries, constricted by the zero-sum arithmetic of a shrinking global carbon budget, and overtaken by shifts in economic power between industrialized and developing countries. To overcome these"narrative,""adding-up,"and"new world"problems, respectively, this paper proposes a new Greenprint for cooperation. First, the large dynamic emerging economies -- China, India, Brazil, and Indonesia -- must assume the mantle of leadership, offering contributions of their own and prodding the reluctant industrial countries into action. This role reversal would be consistent with the greater stakes for the dynamic emerging economies. Second, the emphasis must be on technology generation. This would allow greater consumption and production possibilities for all countries while respecting the global emissions budget that is dictated by the climate change goal of keeping average temperature rise below 2 degrees centigrade. Third, instead of the old cash-for-cuts approach -- which relies on the industrial countries offering cash (which they do not have) to the dynamic emerging economies for cuts (that they are unwilling to make) -- all major emitters must make contributions. With a view to galvanizing a technology revolution, industrial countries would take early action to raise carbon prices. The dynamic emerging economies would in turn eliminate fossil fuel subsidies, commit to matching carbon price increases in the future, allow limited border taxes against their own exports, and strengthen protection of intellectual property for green technologies. This would directly and indirectly facilitate such a technological revolution.

The initial occupational placements of male immigrants in the United States labor market vary significantly by country of origin even when education and other individual factors are taken into account. Does the heterogeneity persist over time? Using data from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 Censuses, this paper finds that the performance of migrants from countries with lower initial occupational placement levels improves at a higher rate compared with that of migrants originating from countries with higher initial performance levels. Nevertheless, the magnitude of convergence suggests that full catch-up is unlikely. The impact of country specific attributes on the immigrants' occupational placement occurs mainly through their effect on initial performance and they lose significance when initial occupational levels are controlled for in the estimation.

A new Services Trade Restrictions Database collects and makes publicly available information on services trade policy assembled in a comparable manner across 103 countries, five sectors (telecommunications, finance, transportation, retail and professional services) and the key modes of service supply. It contains richly textured policy information as well as a preliminary quantification of policy measures. This paper is a guide to the database, and provides a description of the data, how it was collected, how policy information was quantified, and how the data are presented in the publicly available, interactive Web database. The database is best seen as a first response to the strong demand for better information from policy-makers, negotiators, researchers and the private sector. Even in its present version, the database can play an important role in advancing policy reform by facilitating the analysis of services policies, informing international negotiations by providing data on actual policies, and provoking dialogue and refinements by making information on policies publicly available. Through feedback from various interested parties, the database may evolve into a collectively created public good.

This paper estimates how changes in China's exchange rates would affect exports from competitor countries in third-country markets -- in other words, the"spillover effect."The authors use recent theory to develop an identification strategy, with a key role for the competition between China and its developing country competitors in specific products and export destinations. Using disaggregated trade data, they estimate the spillover effect by exploiting the variation across different exporters, importers, products, and time periods. They find a spillover effect that is statistically and quantitatively significant. Their estimates suggest that a 10-percent appreciation of China's real exchange rate boosts a developing country's exports of a typical four-digit Harmonized System product category to third markets by about 1.5 to 2 percent on average. The magnitude of the spillover effect varies systematically with the characteristics of products, such as the extent to which they are differentiated.

This paper estimates the impact of China’s exchange rate changes on exports of competitor countries in third markets, which we call the “spillover effect.” We use recent theory to develop an identification strategy in which competition between China and its developing country competitors in specific products and destinations plays a key role. We exploit the variation—afforded by disaggregated trade data—across exporters, importers, product, and time to estimate this spillover effect. We find robust evidence of a statistically and quantitatively significant spillover effect. Our estimates suggest that, on average, a 10 percent appreciation of China’s real exchange rate boosts a developing country’s exports of a typical 4-digit Harmonized System (HS) product category to third markets by about 1.5 to 2 percent. The magnitude of the spillover effect varies systematically with product characteristics as implied by theory.

A new cross-country database on services policy reveals a perverse pattern: many landlocked countries restrict trade in the very services that connect them with the rest of the world. On average, telecommunications and air-transport policies are significantly more restrictive in landlocked countries than elsewhere. The phenomenon is most starkly visible in Sub-Saharan Africa and is associated with lower levels of political accountability. This paper finds evidence that these policies lead to more concentrated market structures and more limited access to services than these countries would otherwise have, even after taking into account the influence of geography and incomes, and the possibility that policy is endogenous. Even moderate liberalization in these sectors could lead to an increase of cellular subscriptions by 7 percentage points and a 20-percent increase in the number of flights. Policies in other countries, industrial and developing alike, also limit competition in international transport services. Hence, “tradefacilitating” investments under various “aid-for-trade” initiatives are likely to earn a low return unless they are accompanied by meaningful reform in these services sectors.

This paper argues that eco-labeling could lead to an adverse effect on the environment. In every society there are some consumers who are concerned about environmental problems and others who are not. Labeling may stimulate concern for the environment and increase the demand for environment-friendly products. However, it is precisely this consequence of labeling that can lead to perverse results. In certain plausible cases, the differentiation of products due to labeling may lead to increased sales of products made by both environment-friendly and environment-unfriendly methods. An empirical test is suggested to establish when labeling can be usefully introduced. Copyright 1994 by WWZ and Helbing & Lichtenhahn Verlag AG

The World Trade Organization has been until recently an effective framework for cooperation because it has continually adapted to changing economic realities. The current Doha Agenda is an aberration because it does not reflect one of the largest shifts in the international economic and trading system: the rise of China. Although China will have a stake in maintaining trade openness, an initiative that builds on but redefines the Doha Agenda would anchor China more fully in the multilateral trading system. Such an initiative would have two pillars. The first is a new negotiating agenda that would include the major issues of interest to China and its trading partners, and thus unleash the powerful reciprocal liberalization mechanism that has driven the World Trade Organization process to previous successes. The second is new restraints on bilateralism and regionalism that would help preserve incentives for maintaining the current broadly non-discriminatory trading order.

The book builds on previous research, including that by the World Bank, on trade in services. Such research includes analyses of the effect of liberalizing services in developing countries and sectoral studies on financial, transportation, telecommunication, and professional services, as well as on international negotiations. The conceptual framework for this book is based on the existing literature on the service sector (Francois and Hoekman 2010; Hoekman and Mattoo 2008). Recognizing the heterogeneity in both, economic structure of developing countries and their service exports, this book takes an eclectic approach to identifying successful strategies. Chapter two surveys the literature on determinants of service exports and presents an illustrative empirical model that synthesizes the available models on trade in services. Because trade data on services are scarce and have a number of weaknesses, rigorous econometric analysis has serious limits. The subsequent chapters of the book examine the determinants of trade in services through case studies of the experiences of countries with varying degrees of success. The book analyzes service export performance for the following countries: Brazil, Chile, the Arab Republic of Egypt, India, Kenya, Malaysia, and the Philippines. The countries were selected on the basis of their performance in global trade (especially trade in services), their regional role, and the availability of data and because they have consciously pursued policies to promote service exports.

The focus of trade policy has shifted in recent years from economy-wide reductions in tariffs and trade restrictions towards targeted interventions to facilitate trade and promote exports. Most of these latter interventions are based on the new mantra of “aid-for-trade” rather than on hard evidence on what works and what doesn’t. On the one hand, rigorous impact-evaluation is needed to justify these interventions and to improve their design. On the other hand, rigorous evaluation is feasible because unlike traditional trade policy, these interventions tend to be targeted and so it is possible to construct treatment and control groups. When interventions are not targeted, such as in the case of customs reforms, some techniques, such as randomized control trials, may not be feasible but meaningful evaluation may still be possible. We discuss examples of impact evaluations using a range of methods (experimental and nonexperimental) highlighting the particular issues and caveats arising in a trade context, and the valuable lessons that are already being learnt. We argue that systematically building impact evaluation into trade projects could lead to better policy design and a more credible case for “aid-for-trade.”

Trade and investment in services are inhibited by a range of policy restrictions, but the best offers so far in the Doha negotiations are on average twice as restrictive as actual policy. They will generate no additional market opening. Regulatory concerns help explain the limited progress. This paper develops two proposals to enhance the prospects for both liberalization of services trade and regulatory reform. The first is for governments to create mechanisms ("services knowledge platforms") to bring together regulators, trade officials, and stakeholders to discuss services regulatory reform. Such mechanisms could identify reform priorities and opportunities for utilization of"aid for trade"resources, thereby putting in place the preconditions for future market opening. The second proposal is for a new approach to negotiations in the World Trade Organization, with a critical mass of countries that account for the bulk of services production agreeing to lock-in applied levels of protection and pre-committing to reform of policies affecting foreign direct investment and international movement for individual service providers -- two areas where current policy is most restrictive and potential benefits from liberalization are greatest. If these proposals cannot be fully implemented in the Doha time frame, then any Doha agreement could at least lay the basis for a forward-looking program of international cooperation along the proposed lines.