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Copyright of Romanian Journal for Baltic & Nordic Studies/Revista Romana de Studii Baltice si Nordice is the property of Sciendo and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Abstract: ‘Carbon footprints’ represent the amount of carbon (or carbon dioxide equivalent) emissions associated with a given activity or community, and are closely related to ecological or environmental footprints. But, unlike the latter, they are generally presented in terms of units of mass or weight (kilograms per functional unit), rather than in spatial units (such as global hectares). These carbon footprints have become the ‘currency’ of debate in a climate-constrained world. They are increasingly popular ecological indicators, adopted by individuals, businesses, governments, and the media alike. The influence of economic wealth, population density, and pollutant emission intensity upon national carbon footprints has been correlated using a ‘power–law’ equation. This analysis provides a greater understanding of the carbon footprint concept and its national determinants in a bipolar world: one embracing the countries of the prosperous or industrialised North of the planet and the other covering the developing, ‘Majority’ South, where some 80% of the global population resides. Such a bipolar world is depicted by highlighting the countries that make up some of the largest economies in the form of the G-20 nations. This international grouping encompasses nation states from both the North and South. Emerging countries from the South with large populations (such as China and India) now have economies whose overall size rivals those of the North. Here the factors that are principally responsible for driving national carbon footprints are illustrated in the context of their potential consequences for global warming. An insight into these parameters is important in a period when the international community is seeking to agree a successor regime to the Kyoto Protocol on climate change mitigation. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

The author discusses the status of the international security. He asserts that there is an undivided security in the international system and that the new principles for conflict prevention in the international community ave not yet developed. He notes that localized or regional instability is rising in a bi-polar world. He cites various factors for the effectiveness of international regimes including shared interests of every region, trust among regimes, and security cooperation.

Copyright of Oceánide is the property of Spanish Society for the Study of Popular Culture (SELICUP) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Stability in the international system is the key to security. This paper will discuss the four possible distributions of power - multipolarity, bipolarity, unipolarity, nonpolarity, - and explain why the stability that each distribution provides is decreasing in the order given. Bipolarity was more stable than multipolarity. However, cybertechnology may destabilize a bipolar order. Cybertechnology influences stability in various ways. In a cyber-based environment, advantages lie with the attacker: stealth, anonymity and unpredictability, and this poses incentives to strike preemptively. Cyberwarfare is also economically cheap; all that may be needed are talented hackers, intelligence on target, and viable computer and network connections. Hence it is also an easy way to amass credible force and wield power. The virus Stuxnet showed that simply cutting an internet connection or establishing computer systems that are not connected to any others in a local area network does not prevent assets from being assailed. False-flag operations to trick a third state into attacking one's enemy are frighteningly easy. Thus, it is argued herein that multipolarity is the only scenario in which cybertechnology might mitigate forces leading to instability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The argument that multipolar international systems are less stable because certain states have an incentive to externalize the costs of defense to other states has been built on interpretations of the behavior of France, Russia, and especially Great Britain between the two World Wars. This article addresses flaws in both the use of the French and Russian cases, but is most tightly focused on the British case, which was the strongest, prima facie, of the three. This article demonstrates how the British scheme for defense against Germany was not a policy of attempted externalization on either the political or military level. Consequently, the long debate over the relationship between systemic structure and systemic stability, which has been heavily influenced by the belief in the existence of an incentive to externalize defense costs under multipolarity, must be re-examined, with new tests run and new conclusions explored. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This short comment seeks to clarify what unipolar politics as usual is, and how it differs from politics as usual under alternative systemic conditions, especially bipolarity. This is an assessment 'from within', accepting Brooks and Wohlforth's description of unipolar politics as well as their central premises that America's lonely superpower status faces no immediate threat and that there is little evidence that powerful states are actively seeking to overthrow the current unipolar system. I suggest that a comparative assessment of how alternative distributions of power create different incentive structures for states yields different conclusions and policy prescriptions than those advanced by Brooks and Wohlforth. Most notably, Brooks and Wohlforth do not fully appreciate how the 'unipolar politics as usual' that they describe provides states with few incentives to cooperate with their policy prescription that the US reshape the world's institutional architecture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the degree of polarization in African countries' per capita GDP distribution between 1966 to 2004. We first use a nonparametric analysis and find that the countries tend to cluster in two classes of per capita GDP. Secondly, by using the Wolfson's bipolarization measure, the results reveal that bipolarization has been accelerating during the two first decades and is still growing. We relate the evolution of polarization during the period to the business sectors. We find that the specialization of the countries is the main factor explaining its evolution, namely, in agriculture and industry sectors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At the heart of Buzan & Hansen’s (2009) narrative is a conflict dynamic that pits traditional strategic studies, narrow and overly militarized but dominant, against a diverse set of challengers who aim to widen and deepen the field. Gradually, the challengers erode the hegemonic position of the traditionalists. This analysis reflects the assumptions, premises, and perceptions that Buzan & Hansen bring to this project as protagonists in the camp of the challengers. The present article offers a traditionalist response to this narrative, suggesting that the evolution of the field looks very different when viewed through the lens of traditional strategic studies. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The present paper explores different dimensions of regional security and its implications from a NATO perspective oriented on the cooperative security approach. A main feature of regional security covered by NATO and the interests of the member states is the convergence of patterns in approaching common security within the international context after the End of Cold War. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the Soviet-American summit meeting in Malta in December 1989 to end the Cold War and the collapse of the bipolar world. It mentions that U.S. President George Bush has promised to support the Soviet perestroika, to suspend the Jackson-Vanik amendment, and an agreement on investment guarantees during the meeting. However, Soviet Union General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev has launched his general philosophical reflections on the promises made by President Bush. Meanwhile, the problems of arms control are not conferred by President Bush believing it was President Gorbachev that should make the concessions. Furthermore, the members of the summit have devoted their time discussing the socio-economic situation in Eastern Europe and the state of Soviet economy.

Abstract: Structural balance is a simple equilibrium model of positive and negative relationships, such as friendship and enmity. Some relational patterns (e.g. friends sharing an enemy) are balanced; others (e.g. enemies sharing a friend) are not. The model has tested well in a variety of applications, from the social psychology of small groups to the politics of international conflict. Several versions are at least implicit in the literature but had not previously been identified. Here I frame each as an axiom system and prove its equivalence to a version of bi-polarity, the idea that interactive subjects can always be partitioned into two opposing sides. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

China's approach towards regionalism and multilateralism is essentially driven by realpolitik paradigm. More specifically, China's tilt towards regionalism has been propelled by three reasons: one its own rise, two its domestic concerns and three change in the world-order in the aftermath of the collapse of bipolarism and the resultant emergence of new threats and insecurities. Regionalism in Chinese discourse is rooted primarily in the quest for building a China-led regional order, supporting China's peripheral diplomacy and grand strategy, than on mere rationale of economic gains. Therefore, in Chinese conceptualization realpolitik issues hold primacy over normative and liberal notions of interdependence. The web of regional security architecture, thus, evolved serves essentially China's security needs and grand strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents information on private law, its relation to instrumentalism and the emergence of the field of tort law in legal system. The concept of centrality of causation, liability in tort law and duty of reasonable care is considered. The relations between plaintiffs and defendants based on breach of duty and damages remedy commonly known as bipolar relationship is discussed. The claims related to negligent infliction of emotional distress, interpretation of negligence based on the recent works of law professor Gregory C. Keating is also discussed.

Copyright of Relaciones Internacionales is the property of Facultad de Ciencias Politicas y Sociales and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article discusses a 2008 report from the U.S. National Intelligence Council indicating the gradual emergence of a multi-polar world, brought about by the rise of emerging powers, economic globalization, transfer of relative wealth from west to east, and growing influence of non-state actors. It notes that with states fending more for themselves, diplomacy becomes more important. It is suggested that coalitions become highly influential in the balance of capabilities, particularly military. According to the author, military power of individual states becomes less important as coalitions increase. States will strive to avoid isolation, which the article indicates is the most dangerous situation under multipolarity.

NAM (Non-Aligned Movement), as the movement of the newly independent states came into existence after the Second World War during the bi-polar world order. It was the outcome of the historical struggle of the Asian, African and Latin American countries against the imperial and colonial Powers. At the initial stage the policy of non-alignment was criticized by the then Superpowers. The concept of non-alignment was misunderstood and confused due to various interpretations by the academicians and statesmen. After the end of the cold war and other changes in 1990's in the international arena, it is being argued that the movement is not relevant. Even some of the non-aligned countries raised the same question about the relevance of the movement. In fact the movement is still continue and working for the protection of the national interests of the developing countries in the contemporary world.. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Review of International Affairs (04866096) is the property of Institute of International Politics & Economics and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Schmitt's theologisation of sovereignty has been subjected, 50 years later, to a 'quarter turn' by Foucault's move from issues of domination to issues of government. After a further 30 years, radicalising Foucault, Agamben's archaeology of economy adds another 'quarter turn': the structure that emerges once the old European conjugality of facticity and validity, of praxis and being, emptied of all bonds, links, and loops, gives way to the bare opposition 'bipolarity'. The new constellation provides the old legal-theoretical (kelsenian) problem of rules unsuspended from a ruler who would authorise them, with a new, unexpected, political content and with a change of epistemic paradigm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Increasing data support an association of cyclothymic temperament with bipolarity, but our knowledge about the relationship of affective temperaments (ATs) to depressive symptoms based on inheritance in a non-clinical population is limited. The aim of this article was to demonstrate how ATs and affective family history relate to the depressive symptoms in a general population. Subjects comprised 501 Hungarian adults who completed a background questionnaire, the TEMPS-A, the Zung Self-Rating Depression Scale (ZSDS) and the depression subscale of the Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI-D). Stepwise linear regression was performed to analyse the role of ATs and affective family history (AFH0 and AFH1) in the variance of ZSDS and BSI-D scores. Cyclothymic, depressive and anxious temperaments have a significant role in the explained variance of depression scores, and they are all significantly related to AFH1. Significant differences were found between AFH1 and AFH0 groups in ZSDS and BSI-D scores, and these effects were eliminated if ATs were entered as covariates. The probability of having any dominant temperament was more than two-fold in group AFH1 compared with AFH0 (OR=2.33). Our results suggest that a crucial part of inherited factors of depression is mediated by affective temperaments. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

In analyzing the current unipolar system, it is useful to begin with Structure. No other state or plausible coalition can challenge the unipole's core security, but this does not mean that all its values are safe or that it can get everything that it wants. Contrary to what is often claimed, standard balance of power arguments do not imply that a coalition will form to challenge the unipole. Realism also indicates that rather than seeking to maintain the system, the unipole may seek further expansion. To understand the current system requires combining structural analysis with an appreciation of the particular characteristics of the current era, the United States, and its leaders. Doing so shows further incentives to change the system and highlights the role of nuclear proliferation in modifying existing arrangements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most scholars hold that the consequences of unipolarity for great power conflict are indeterminate and that a power shift resulting in a return to bipolarity or multipolarity will not raise the specter of great power war. This article calls into question the core assumptions underlying the consensus: (1) that people are mainly motivated by the instrumental pursuit of tangible ends such as physical security and material prosperity and (2) that major powers' satisfaction with the status quo is relatively independent of the distribution of capabilities. In fact, it is known that people are motivated powerfully by a noninstrumental concern for relative status, and there is strong empirical evidence linking the salience of those concerns to distributions of resources. If the status of states depends in some measure on their relative capabilities and if states derive utility from status, then different distributions of capabilities may affect levels of satisfaction, just as different income distributions may affect levels of Status competition in domestic settings. Building on research in psychology and sociology, the author argues that even capabilities distributions among major powers foster ambiguous status hierarchies, which generate more dissatisfaction and clashes over the status quo. And the more stratified the distribution of capabilities, the less likely such status competition is. Unipolarity thus augurs for great power peace, and a shift back to bipolarity or multipolarity raises the probability of war even among great powers with little material cause to fight. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Looking at inference as a way of transforming information so as to make it more easily usable (or interpretable) allows to consider accepted and rejected propositions as equally relevant and naturally gives a bipolar view of reasoning. The four possibilities of transforming information from accepted or rejected propositions into accepted or rejected ones are analyzed and examples illustrating them are given. This analysis is not only interesting per se but can also be useful in increasing capabilities of existing theorem provers. A unified framework based on former work by the authors is extended by incorporating the idea of theory-anti-subsumption related to Plotkin's generalization. Working on some technical details of this framework should allow automated reasoning tools to deal with different ways of connecting accepted and rejected propositions. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is centered on a family of propositional multivalued logics, based on bilattices. The semantics of such logics relies on a set of “truth values,” with two orderings that give the set a bilattice structure. Many interesting inference relations can be defined on these grounds, especially paraconsistent ones and/or nonmonotonic ones. The focus is laid on Belnap's fundamental bilattice logic FOUR, with four “epistemic truth values,” which proves sufficient for the purpose of inference. We show how the bilattice can be associated with a second biordinal structure, which no longer is bilatticial but bipolar. We show how additional inference relations in the logic FOUR can be obtained by exploiting the two preorders associated with this structure. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bipolarity seems to pervade human understanding of information and preference, and bipolar representations look very useful in the development of intelligent technologies. Bipolarity refers to an explicit handling of positive and negative sides of information. Basic notions and background on bipolar representations are provided. Three forms of bipolarity are laid bare: symmetric univariate, dual bivariate, and asymmetric (or heterogeneous) bipolarity. They can be instrumental in the logical handling of incompleteness and inconsistency, rule representation and extraction, argumentation, learning, and decision analysis. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the psychological plausibility of the bipolarity concept, i.e., that positive and negative kinds of information are treated differently. Sections 2 and 3 review relevant investigations of the representational and affective systems in the experimental psychology literature. Section 4 provides new data supporting the idea that even when considering how affective changes occur, a certain level of independence exists between the positive and negative sides of affect. Together the studies reported here strongly support the psychological plausibility of bipolarity: Positive and negative kinds of information are not processed in the same way whichever domain is considered, preferences (affect) or beliefs (mental categories). © 2008 Wiley Periodicals Inc. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores several facets of bipolarity in human reasoning and affective decision making. First, it examines how positive and negative pieces of information help to discriminate between classical forms of reasoning (deduction, induction, and abduction). It is shown that (1) both positive and negative information can independently account for these distinctions and (2) these same distinctions can be accounted for by a possibilistic analysis of the plausibility of the states of the world ruled out by the premises and the ones compatible with these premises. Second, it is shown that an analysis of the plausibility (“impossible,” “guaranteed possible,” “nonimpossible”) of the states of the world ruled out or allowed by positive or negative pieces of information in human hypothesis testing allows us to explain some puzzling psychological results. Next, bipolarity is explored in the domain of affective decision making. It is proposed notably that the combination of the bivariate bipolarity of emotions (negative, neutral, positive) and the multivariate bipolarity of emotions of comparison provide the tools for an emotional reasoning and decision making which might be the way by which we actually evaluate possible situations and take our decisions, instead of maximizing our expected utility. © 2008 Wiley Periodcals, Inc. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Undermatching and overmatching in concurrent schedules of reinforcement have been traditionally described as changes in the slope of the Generalized Matching Law function. More recently, it has been suggested that deviations from strict matching may be better described as following a policy of mostly fixing on the preferred schedule, and occasionally sampling the alternative schedule. So far, no model of local performance predicts the global outcome of this policy. We describe one such model; it assumes immediate and long-term effects of reinforcement on local performance. The model assumes long-term effects as changes in the internal state of the organism. Formally, the model is analogous to the Axiom of Repeated Choice [Lefebvre, V.A., 2004. Bipolarity, choice, and entro-field. In: Proceedings of the Eighth World Multi-Conference on Systemics, Cybernetics and Informatics, vol. IV, pp. 95–99]. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

The relevance of the Non-Aligned Movement has been in question since the end of Cold War bipolarity. In the post-Cold War order, whether interpreted as cosmopolitan, unipolar, multipolar or globalised in nature, there are still challenges to the main purpose of the Non-Aligned Movement, which can be defined as the pursuit of self-determination and development for so-called Third World states. The rise of China is impacting on the current world order, possibly returning it to a kind of bipolarity, which the Non-Aligned Movement members can exploit. In addition, the 'Beijing Consensus' may provide new terms on which developing countries can be integrated into the global economy in a way that would accommodate and encourage their development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Growth chamber experiments were conducted to examine environmental parameters affecting disease development by the indigenous pathogen Bipolaris sacchari isolate LJB-1L on the invasive weed Lygodium microphyllum (Old World climbing fern). An initial experiment examined three different temperature regimes (20/15, 25/20, 30/25°C; light/dark cycle) and three different periods of leaf wetness (12, 24, 48h). Disease incidence was significantly reduced by incubation of plants at the highest temperature regime (30/25°C) and with the shortest period of leaf wetness (12h). Subsequent experiments concentrated on the effect of temperature, as determination of an optimal temperature for disease development might determine the best time of year for field inoculations with this fungus. When the light cycle temperature was kept constant at 30°C, a dark cycle temperature of 15°C was more conducive for disease development than 25°C based on disease incidence and area under the disease progress curve (AUDPC). A qualitative examination of conidia germination and appressorial formation in vivo indicated that these initial steps toward infection were probably not influenced by the dark cycle temperature. In vitro, temperature (range of 15–35°C) did not significantly affect conidia germination, but hyphal growth was significantly affected, with optimal growth between 25 and 30°C. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Copyright of International Relations / Uluslararasi Iliskiler is the property of International Relations Council and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The argument that any exchange rate regimes other than firmly fixed and freely floating rates were infeasible — the so-called bipolarity thesis — acquired great popularity in the wake of the Asian crisis of a decade ago, but it has almost vanished today. One reason is surely the unkind empirical evidence, which shows that intermediate regimes — measured as those where both reserve and exchange rate changes lie in an intermediate range — are not in fact tending to disappear (Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2002). Another reason is the recognition that exchange rate policy should have other objectives besides avoiding crises, and that in the world we live in today it is reasonable to give these other objectives a significant priority. And perhaps a third factor is growing recognition that it is possible to design or operate intermediate regimes in ways that avoid exposing them to the dangers that were focused on by the disciples of bipolarity. This article starts by distinguishing the options that countries face in choosing an exchange rate regime. It examines the advantages and disadvantages of each of them, finally suggesting that for most countries the real choice lies between freely floating rates, floating rates disciplined by a reference rate system, and an ill-defined managed floating with the management undefined. Three issues may influence the choice between those alternatives: transparency; perceived consistency with that pillar of current macroeconomic thinking, inflation targeting; and the theory of what determines exchange rates. In the latter context, it is argued that the current conventional wisdom of the economics profession is wrong, and that a more convincing diagnosis of the process of exchange rate determination lends support to the proposal for a reference rate system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). It was founded as a security alliance in the 1960s. The organization developed into a genuine Southeast Asian institution after the end of systemic bipolarity. The ASEAN is often criticized for its lack of effective means to solve cooperation problems between states in southeast Asia.

During the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was trying to locate itself culturally within the frame of the post-Enlightenment European policies. Ethnocultural factors led to political changes in the territorial structure of the Empire. In this era, the Ottoman Empire created a promising milieu for the introduction of grandiose design projects, and such buildings formed part of a modernization process, which defined a new relationship to Europe. This article investigates the bipolarity of the architectural design discourse between the existing traditions and the new approaches introduced by this modernization process, including its consequences into the post-Empire period. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of UNISCI Discussion Papers is the property of Unidad de Investigaciones Sobre Seguridad y Cooperacion International (UNISCI) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

A brief analysis on some current tendencies and about the advancement of the ideology that has gone along with the crisis of the Social State and its reduction to Minimum State is made herein. In the fist part, a set of events of historic and political nature given as reference to locate the departure point of a series of political changes that modified the world scenery are analyzed. In addition, some tendencies of ideological nature that made their way in the world while the dominant conceptions grew weak are considered in detail—from the end of the Cold War, bipolar conflict, to the disappearance of socialism and dismantlingof military dictatorships in Latin America. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recent Italian elections have taken place under a new proportional system, but have confirmed and even strengthened the main trends already at work since the beginning of Italy's political transition. The center-left coalition has won by the slightest margin, thus ensuring the third alternation in power since 1994. The system's extreme competitiveness underscores its full-fledged bipolar format, the eclipse of center parties, and the continuing electoral stagnation and political integration of extreme left and right. These trends coexist with a party system fragmentation whose level is within the standard of other European systems of moderate pluralism and this fragmentation is, moreover, kept at bay by the coordination ensured by the majority bonus seats provided through the electoral law. At the same time, the main parties show persistently low levels of structural consolidation, that tend to hinder the stability and effectiveness of coalition cabinets. This problem might paradoxically have been sharpened by systemic competitiveness through a negative impact on coalitional discipline and the maximization of destabilizing effects of the smallest changes in electoral and parliamentary behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After the demise of bipolarity there are at least two significant impediments in creating a more secure, cooperative and prosperous global system. One involves miscalculations in the West, while the other rests with a fundamental misunderstanding in Moscow and Beijing regarding the nature of success inherent in liberal democracies and market economics. Development is a long-term process and Western attempts at achieving overnight results require near political suicide from entrenched elites. A policy that requires irrationality on the part of decision makers in the developing world is prone to suboptimal outcomes. Moreover, leaders in the former Soviet Union and Beijing misunderstand two of the most important aspects of long-term Western success: secure intellectual property rights creating the incentives for innovation, creativity and technical change, and the mitigation of the effects of the security dilemma by creating security structures that complement rather than compete with one another. The article analyzes these issues from a geopolitical perspective and assesses their impact on potential policy options. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focus on how relevant, and under what conditions, multilateral relationships are in unipolar systems and, more specifically, if those can change the behavior of the sole pole of the system. First, we distinguish unipolar from strictly hegemonic systems. Then, the behavior of that single pole is established as the crucial parameter of international politics in any unipolar system. After that, the article establishes: the theoretical Grand-Strategic Goals of a Unipolar Power; the theoretical Grand Strategy of any Unipolar Power - which would enable it to achieve those Grand-Strategic Goals; and the theoretical Policy of Grand-Strategic Support - that addresses the means by which to carry that Grand Strategy. This will enable us to address four questions: (a) what is the utility (in the economist's sense) of multilateral relationships from the point-of-view of a Unipolar Power; (b) what is the bargaining power vis-à-vis the Unipolar Power of the many international actors that are part of those relationships; (c) what is the utility of critical allies to a Unipolar Power; (d) the bargaining power of those critical allies vis-à-vis a Unipolar Power. Knowing this, not only a unipolar power might better assess its own behavior and options, but other international actors might better calibrate if, when and how they might resist some policy options by a unipolar power, should they want to. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay begins with a methodological discussion about the fundamental outlines of the post-1989 international system. Influential scholars have defined the new system according to traditional variables, dependent upon the polarities scheme inherited from Cold War times and on realist methodological premises. The emergence of a ''new phase'' of the globalization process showed that to consider state power as a structural axis of the system - in which the United States play a prominent role - is misleading and blurs the ''real'' configuration of power in this new system. The invasion of Irak by U. S. forces in march 2003 consisted in a privileged laboratory to determine this "real" configuration of power. Following the persistence of a pattern of power and language tone characteristic of the Cold War times (e. g., "who is not with us is in favor of terrorism"), the absence of a competitor or state competitors that could rival American power made the invasion more than a violation of principles of Law and Ethics. It can also be considered misleading and counterproductive in the light of American interests themselves, given its misperceptions and misconceptions of the new international realities. Two further components of this scenario are probed deeper in the essay: a) the redundancy and, to a certain extent, uselessness of military weapons for the promotion of the national interest; and b) the formation of a ''new bipolarism'', which opposes United States republican foreign policy and the rising bloc of global civil society. This bloc has amassed impressive power resources, which make it the focus of an emergent international system, characterized by a new and atypical modality of conflict. The many empirical evidences gathered in the essay will hopefully sustain this argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Reviews the modalities of social dialogue in Zimbabwe to further the understanding of social dialogue in a turbulent political environment and to add to the literature on social dialogue. While trust, commitment and good faith are key ingredients for social dialogue, the author argues that political specificities also matter. In this study qualitative data were collected from key informants (labour practitioners, economists, government officials) who participate in the social dialogue process in Zimbabwe. The survey data point to the fact that social dialogue is a power game, in which partners engage in fights and re-fights for democratic and political space. While social dialogue needs to be institutionalised including the mechanisms of conflict resolution, the project is susceptible to appropriation by the elites, opportunists as well as external forces making détente a distant dream. The paper posits that social dialogue can best be attuned to multiparty democratic environments rather than in bipolar (two party) democracies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

If an emerging Sino-Russian energy nexus becomes sufficiently robust, there could be profound geopolitical consequences, including most significantly the consolidation of a bipolar order (China versus the United States) in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan's competing pipeline initiative suddenly appeared to become the front-runner in 200 , partly as a consequence of the Kremlin campaign against Yukos. Nevertheless, Russia's current plan represents a cautious strategy to preserve its flexibility and delay the difficult decision. The West should vigorously campaign for a route that reaches the shores of the Pacific, in order to enhance multipolarity in the Asia-Pacific region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on the notions of bipolar lattices and L-sets, YinYang bipolar fuzzy sets and fuzzy equilibrium relations are presented for bipolar clustering, optimization, and global regulation. While a bipolar L-set is defined as a bipolar equilibrium function L that maps a bipolar object set X over an arbitrary bipolar lattice B as L:X ⇒ B, this work focuses on the unit square lattice BF = [-1, 0] × [0, 1]. A strong or weak bipolar fuzzy equilibrium relation in a bipolar set X is then defined as a reflexive, symmetric, and bipolar interactive (or transitive) fuzzy relation μR: X ⇒ BF. Three types of bipolar α-level sets are presented for bipolar defuzzification and depolarization. It is shown that a fuzzy equilibrium relation is a non-linear bipolar generalization and/or fusion of multiple similarity relations, which induces disjoint or joint bipolar fuzzy subsets including quasi-coalition, conflict, and harmony sets. Equilibrium energy and stability analysis can then be utilized on different clusters for optimization and global regulation purposes. Thus, this work provides a unified approach to truth, fuzziness, and polarity and leads to a holistic theory for cognitive-map-based visualization, optimization, decision, global regulation, and coordination. Basic concepts are illustrated with a simulation in macroeconomics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The election of the second Berlusconi government in 2001 can be seen as a consequence of disunity on the left; this sprang from Italy's incomplete transition from the ‘First Republic’ of 1948–1992, which aroused potentially incompatible demands for political normalization, openness to the radical left and ethical renovation. While the Berlusconi government's record has been confused and ineffectual, dominated by the shifting relations between coalition partners Forza Italia, Alleanza Nazionale and Lega Nord, the government has made sustained efforts to secure the anomalous position of Berlusconi himself. Berlusconi has resisted widespread political and legal opposition by orchestrating a combination of populism and patrimonialism; in the process he has blocked or reversed all three of the reforming drives of the 1990s. The Berlusconi government presents a challenge to Italy's continuing transition, and to the country's democratic institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on issues related to transatlantic bipolarity and the end of multilateralism. Since the early 1950s, the U.S. and its European partners have been part of what might be called an Atlantic multilateral system, anchored in and in turn reinforced by an Atlantic community. However, two long-term trends increasingly are impinging upon this system. The first, within Europe, is the successful widening and deepening of the European Union. The second is the globalization of international politics and economics associated with the end of the Cold War, the rise of Asia, and the emergence of new threats such as Islamic terrorism.

Focuses on the economic and political aspects of the doctrine of U.S. President George W. Bush called the "Bush Doctrine," based on the revised foreign policies of the U.S. Proposal by the Bush administration through the doctrine to exceed the inherent limitations of the post-bipolarism in order to catch up the program of former President Bill Clinton of total economic hegemony; Citation of the structural limit for the U.S. government in the performance of the "Bush Doctrine"; Discussion of the ideology associated with neoclassical conception of the market from the doctrine.

This article focuses on the association between the Commonwealth countries and global governance. The Commonwealth as an inter-governmental organization has not been studied with any reference to the growing literature on multilateralism. Although myriad Commonwealth agencies are engaged in such governance at all levels, from local to global, their contribution to date has been largely overlooked. Yet, notwithstanding the Commonwealth's successes in the two-decade antiapartheid struggle, that then preoccupied it, the grouping was in decline by the mid-1990s despite the end of bipolarity.

The fall of the Berlin Wall inspired speculation about why the Cold War came to such an abrupt and shocking end, why no school of thought anticipated its demise, and what the event meant for international relations theory ( ). A set of articles simultaneously emerged purporting to identify the most salient aspects of the new system—structural and otherwise—and to anticipate the direction in which it was heading. This essay begins a reexamination of some of those predictions, using the evidence that has accumulated over the decade and a half since the collapse of bipolarity to evaluate how early visions of the post-Cold War international system have matched the events that followed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay argues that the field of international relations has exhibited “progress” of the sort found in the natural sciences. Several well-known accounts of “science” and “progress” are adumbrated; four offer positive accounts of progress (those of Peirce, Duhem, Popper, and Lakatos) and one evidences a negative assessment (Kuhn). Recent studies of the democratic peace—both supporting and opposing—are analyzed to show that they satisfy the terms of each of the definitions of scientific progress. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

El artículo explora las imágenes del orden internacional que pertenecen a la teoría realista de las relaciones internacionales. Se analiza esta teoría y su relación con las doctrinas neoconservadores del orden imperial de los Estados Unidos. El artículo enfoca en la imagen unipolar-imperial del orden internacional de la administración republicana estadounidense y si es una forma de realismo político.