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Includes the findings and recommendations of a board of officers appointed to study the present Army and Navy Systems of air support and to make recommendations for the establishment of a standardized systems in the fields of communications, liaison, air requests, operational terminology, and ground or surface control of aircraft in flight.

This document covers the special operations in Haiti, including details of Uphold Democracy, the psychological operations, civil affairs, support operations, redeployment and assessment of the military actions.

The ability of the Army Medical Service to react quickly in cases of extreme international emergencies was graphically illustrated during the Dominican Republic crisis of 1965. The sudden commitment of a large force to counter a threatened Communist takeover brought with it a number of medical problems. The solutions to these problems again demonstrated the need for continued emphasis on sound planning and constant readiness, in order that the Army Medical Service mission of conserving the fighting strength can be accomplished with a minimum of difficulty. The medical situation in the Dominican Republic was noteworthy in many respects, especially in the extensive and highly successful phase of civilian care, which offered immediate and effective treatment to more than 50,000 Dominicans in dire need of expert medical care. medical personnel, too, gained significantly from the realistic training opportunities created during this critical operation.

This is one of a series published by the U.S. Army Center of Military History. This monograph analyzes the problem areas of operational cooperation and coordination, conceived both as a command and control device to prosecute the common war effort and as a means to improve the combat effectiveness of the RVNAF. It also attempts to evaluate the successes and failures of this combined effort.

A history of airborne warfare and the development and training of airborne troops under the organization of Airborne Command in 1942.

Is America's counterinsurgency (COIN) effort being shortchanged? Does a one-dimensional doctrine fail to exploit America's full COIN potential? Would a genuinely joint approach provide better options to decision-makers confronted with the harsh realities of twenty-first century insurgencies? This study insists the answers are unequivocally "yes." It analyzes the pitfalls of accepting Army/Marine tactical doctrine as the joint solution. It also offers insights and ideas from an Airman's perspective for strengthening joint COIN doctrine development in order to deliver fresh alternatives to our national decision-makers and combatant commanders. Of central importance to this assessment is the Army's December 2006 Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency (designated by the Marine Corps as Warfighting Publication 3-33.5). This impressive and influential 282-page document skillfully addresses many difficult COIN issues, but regrettably reflects a one-dimensional, ground-centric perspective almost exclusively, as evidenced by the fact that considerations of airpower are confined to a short, five-page annex. By failing to reconcile the full potential of today's airpower capabilities and by focusing almost exclusively on the surface dimension, FM 3-24-despite its many virtues and remarkable insights-nevertheless falls short of offering US decision-makers a pragmatic, overall solution for the challenge of counterinsurgency. Yet, despite FM 3-24's limitations, it has become viewed as the overall plan for COIN operations in Iraq. Of further concern are reports that FM 3-24 appears poised to become the centerpiece of new joint COIN doctrine whose development has just begun. This paper argues that winning COIN fights requires exploiting the potential of the entire joint team.

This study is an examination of 1965 intervention into the Dominican Republic by US forces, primarily from the 82d Airborne Division. Although this study covers the actual armed intervention and subsequent fighting between Dominican rebels and American soldiers, it also delves into the political and strategic reasons behind President Johnson's ordering the military action. As part of this political overview, the report addresses the role of the Organization of American States, the Inter-American Peace Force, and of several Latin nations who participated in the 18 month long intervention. As a part of his presentation, the author highlights the importance of many non-military roles and functions performed by key players to speed the Dominican Civil War to a negotiated close and bring the nation back on the road toward democratic government.

This book discusses the training of the II ROK Corps, Task Force Paik, by members of the US IX Corps, during the Korean War, January 24 through April 5, 1952. Contains a complete resume of the actions taken by the headquarters involved as well as a transcript of a considerable portion of the instructions given during the training period.

"The primary purpose of this essay is to present a case study of the military staff system generally conceded to have most nearly approached perfection, in an effort to demonstrate the inherent shortcomings of a supreme, single-service general staff in the modern setting of multi-service warfare. The secondary purpose is to indicate how extremely difficult and unwise it would be to establish a single general staff system to serve the land, sea, and air forces as a group."

Details basic procedures for refugee relief assistance and social relief assistance, including reminders of correct procedures in various situations.

One of the most crucial joint combat operations in Afghanistan was Operation ANACONDA, designed and executed to remove the last remaining organized Taliban resistance. Operation ANACONDA generated lessons learned involving many aspects of the art of joint warfare.

The book Infantry in battle by George Marshall was the inspiration for this book which has been written to reflect its own times, not Marshall's. The thirty-six chapters that follow have been chosen to reflect changes in the military art since Marshall's times. Each chapter deals with one case drawn from recent military history that illustrates and illuminates a problem with which a modern professional soldier may someday have to contend. Each case is set in its strategic and operational context, explained in detail, and briefly analyzed. The book is intentionally designed to be read piecemeal, a chapter at a time, in order to make it as broadly useful to professional soldiers no matter where or in what capacity they are serving-in the field, on the staff, or in the Army's institutions of higher military education. Recognizing that some readers may want to know more about a particular case, a bibliography following each is included.

This study of the logistical planning and in-country support of the U.S. military intervention in Lebanon in 1958 is of imminent value to the U.S. Army today. Many of the issues faced by the logisticians in Beirut in 1958 are identical to those facing force developers of the light division today, such as the questions of diverting line soldiers to support duties, securing materiel in a potentially hostile lodgment, synchronizing sealift with airlift, and establishing priorities for deliveries. The study has particular value as well for its analysis of tailoring logistical units for contingency operations and for investigation into the unique problems of the noncombat phase of operations. Not surprisingly, a good number of the logistical problems encountered in Lebanon in 1958 recurred in the U.S. intervention in Grenada twenty-five years later.

In November 2004, a combined USMC, US Army, and Iraqi Army offensive succeeded in eliminating the enemy in Fallujah in a destructive urban battle. This paper focuses on the ways in which Army and Marine forces operated together in the second Battle of Fallujah. Among the many Army units that participated, Task Force 2-2 Infantry and Task Force 2-7 Cavalry spearheaded the attacks of two Marine regimental combat teams into and through the city. With access to first-person accounts and unit histories from both task forces, narrative describes their role in the battle from notification, to planning, and through the fighting to the conclusion of their role in the battle. Army – Marine interoperability is the theme around which this account is based. Well-educated and professional Army and Marine leaders at the Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel levels overcame many ingrained cultural differences to synchronize operations. Areas in which the Army and Marines must continue to improve their ability to fight side by side is also addressed.

This document contains information on the development of plans and Army and Navy action (information applicable to both services, classification of landings, unit loading, naval assistance required to support Army landing against opposition, employment of the Army in an opposed landing, etc.).

This Basic Plan contains the statement of the problem presented for solution in the Army and Navy Joint Exercises of 1925, the first estimate of the situation by the Commanding General of the Blue Marine Corps Expeditionary Force, an outline of the Staff organiztion, actual and constructive, a general statement of the actual personnel taking part and the method of representation of the Constructive Force, and outline of the operations contemplated, and sections on supply, evacuation and hospitalization, and on intelligence and reconnaissance.

Vital to success in war is that the Army and Navy coordinate their actions to produce effective mutual support. It is essential that they have a understanding of their functions in national defense and of methods for attaining coordination in operations.

This study determines what beach-head would be suitable for launching an expedition to retake the Islands from an enemy force.

This paper discusses the Air Corps with respect to the securing and training of the necessary personnel; the idea, development, manufacture, and delivery of materiel; and a combination of the two elements in operations.

This study is a detailed narrative of the events of the German Baltic Island Expedition with concluding discussion of the effective principles and operational success.

This study covers the British naval attack on the Dardanelles by evaluating the estimate on the situation and the resulting actions which show there was lack of proper planning and support by the joint military.

This study examines the errors in these two campaigns, concluding that the lack of coordinated plans of operation between the Army and Navy caused numerous difiiculties.

This study determines what landing sites and follow through effort should be made if Oahu was in enemy hands and needed to be recaptured.

This study discusses the influence that military geography would have on operations in the defense of the Panama Canal Zone.

This study discusses the problem of evacuation which will confront any considerable force landing on a hostile shore in the face of an organized defense. Includes the planning of casualty evacuation.

This paper discusses the mistakes and problems encountered by the British Army in receiving supplies and the lack of administrative planning in the Dardanelles campaign.

This study asks why the Black Force (defending forces) failed to obtain information based on five decisive elements described in the paper. Military intelligence, lessons learned, joint maneuvers and communication of Army and Navy forces in Hawaii are all topics revealed.