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The highest administrative court in France has ruled that guidelines issued by the French Health Authority must be withdrawn immediately because of potential bias and undeclared conflicts of interest among the authors. Other guidelines are also being reviewed and will be withdrawn if similar problems emerge, the authority has said. The French Council of State (Conseil d’Etat) made the ruling on 27 April, two years after doctors with the non-profit organisation Formindep (Formation Independante) charged that the guideline development process for the authority’s guidelines on type 2 diabetes and Alzheimer’s disease “contravened national law on conflicts of interests and the agency’s own internal rules.” In a news release issued on 20 June Formindep stated …

THE CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE Court of Thailand has cleared 74 of 76 projects that had been suspended at the Map Ta Phut industrial estate, one of Asia’s largest chemical industry zones. Although environmental activists are contesting the court’s decision, the construction of dozens of chemical plants worth billions of dollars is now set to resume. In September 2009, the same court froze the 76 projects because their licenses were granted before an assessment by an independent committee of environmental and safety experts. Evaluation of all industrial activities that are potentially harmful to the environment is mandated by the Thai constitution of 2007. The ruling threw the projects into limbo because the Thai cabinet had not yet issued regulations on how to appoint and run the committee of experts (C&EN, March 22, page 26). The two projects that are still suspended are an ethylene glycol/oxide plant backed by PTT Chemical and a vinyl facility owned by ...

Western democracies have evolved systems which balance political direction and control against the need for effective and efficient management of the administrative functions which complex modern societies require. It is impossible to understand French public and political life without some understanding of the role which the French administration plays within society. This chapter considers first a number of ways in which the French administrative system is distinctive and secondly some of the consequences of this distinctive-ness and the explanations that have been offered for these consequences.

Forced money as aform offorced effort providedfor in Law No.9 Year 2004concerning Amendment to Law No. 5 Year 1986 regarding StateAdministrative Court is not a punishment but plaintiff's efforts to protect therights of compliance enforcement of the State Administrative Court (TUN)decision who already have permanent legal force and tool behaviormodifiers TUN official or agency (including government) in implementingdecision. Then the burden of forced payments must be in concurrent with theburden of these enforcement responsibilities, namely conveyed by the Stateor by officials (or body TUN). Thus the state will use the money effectivelyand in accordance with the purpose of conducting government in order torealize a just and prosperous society, physical and spiritual prosperity. Notfor anything else

A Croatian court’s indictment of the attempt by a medical school to undermine the authority of one of its professors, after he spoke out about corruption in academia, was upheld last month by the Croatian office of the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights. The Administrative Court of the Republic of Croatia had ruled last October that the Zagreb School of Medicine’s decision to seek a psychiatric opinion of the work of the scientist Matko Marusic set a “dangerous precedent according to which anyone making critical statements about specific interest groups, communities, or individuals could be subjected to a review of their mental soundness.” Last month’s decision by the Croatian office of the Helsinki federation to uphold the court’s ruling has been welcomed by the academics and scientists who have been campaigning for almost three years on behalf of Professor Marusic, founding coeditor of the Croatian Medical Journal . Iain Chalmers, editor of the James Lind Library, welcomed the office’s decision and said: “Nada Cikes [dean of the Zagreb School of Medicine] and other officials at the medical school . . . have behaved outrageously to both editors in chief of the Croatian Medical Journal . “Their character assassinations appear to have been attempts …

LAW-BASED PROFESSIONS As we saw in Chapter 9, the market situation of attorneys by World War I was becoming sufficiently worrisome that some lawyers, although not the DAV, had begun to call for restrictions on admission to the profession. Having almost doubled (from 6,600 to 13,000) between 1899 and 1915, the number of attorneys in Germany remained relatively stable (under 13,000) until 1925, when it began to grow. By 1928 it had reached 15,500, and law enrollments were also rising, producing a pool of attorneys approaching 19,000 by 1935. Despite some population growth, this meant an increase from 19 attorneys per 100,000 in 1919 to 24 per 100,000 in 1928. At the same time, the field of activity for lawyers was being reduced by various measures, for example, by raising the income ceilings for those eligible to use the (lawyer-free) Gewerbe- und Kaufmanngerichte , special courts set up to settle disputes between employers and their employees. Similarly, new or reorganized courts such as the national Financial Court, Economic Court, and Administrative Court limited or excluded representation of parties by lawyers. The tendency in Weimar was away from the older principle of Anwaltszwang . The bureaucrats claimed such streamlined justice was cheaper and faster for the people; attorneys claimed it weakened the rights of the parties. One compulsory aspect of legal practice that remained from the old Reich was the fee schedules.

The Japanese judiciary under the Meiji Constitution did not play any meaningful political role at all. That basic law did not confer upon the courts the power to declare laws invalid on the ground of unconstitutionality. The judiciary, headed by the Great Court of Cassation, was confined to the resolution of criminal and civil disputes and did not have any power over the Administrative Court. Thus, in a few instances the Great Court of Cassation in a civil case and the Administrative Court in an administrative case handed down conflicting decisions on a virtually identical legal issue.1 The courts in pre-1945 Japan were very much limited to settlement of private disputes, with their decisions having dubious value as precedent for similar cases in the future. The judiciary did not enjoy coequal status in relation to the Cabinet and the Imperial Diet.

A change in the political make-up of a German state has resulted in a leading neuroscientist being denied the right to renew his licence to conduct research on primates. Andreas Kreiter, professor of animal physiology at the University of Bremen, whose research includes the use of monkeys, was told in October that his licence would not be renewed. Since May 2007 the state of Bremen has been run by a coalition of the centre left Social Democratic party of Germany (SPD) and the Greens, who during the election campaign called for an end to the monkey research. Professor Kreiter is preparing for a court battle to try to reverse the politicians’ decision. In preliminary legal wrangling, an administrative court in Bremen ruled that he could continue his research on 24 macaques, a …

A long running dispute over working practices between the Dutch medical authorities and a septuagenarian general practitioner, portrayed as a cause celebre for older people's rights, is to go before the Netherlands' highest administrative court. The Council of State, which advises on legislation and governance, will judge whether a 74 year old can be stopped from working as a GP if she refuses to join colleagues in out of hours deputising services. Dr Tonny Bakhoven from Driebergen near Utrecht says she prefers to see her patients herself during nights, weekends, and holidays. But the …

The available scientific field data of the marine and the coastal enviroment, (wind and wave field data, shallow area bathymetry, coastal area geomorphology and topography, etc.), in addition to deep and shallow wave prediction numerical modelling (by means of wind and bathymetry measurements), calculation of the nearshore wave height and maximum wave run up, were used to support the mapping of the innermost limit of the foreshore zone according to Greek legislation which defi nes that ‘the foreshore is the zone of land wetted by the highest however unexceptional sea wave run up’ and the Supreme Administrative Court standard case law. These methods were applied for two areas, which completely differ as regards the wind and the wave field, the geomorphological and topographical characteristics of the coastal area, suggesting different procedures for the determination of the innermost limit of the foreshore zone. The limits of the foreshore zones for both areas, resulting from the study, are compared to the limits set out by the authorised Administrative Commissions, which were published in the Official Gazette and also were applied by the local authorities for the management of the coastal area.

The December 28 1997 ruling by Egypts supreme administrative court upholding a ban on female genital mutilation represented a significant step in a long-standing debate between government officials and Islamic conservatives. Islamic leaders had maintained that female genital mutilation is a cultural and religious issue out of the domain of the government or the courts. In Egypt where 97% of ever-married women 15-49 years of age have undergone female genital mutilation government clinics and private practitioners have been teaching staff and patients about the reproductive health-related dangers of this procedure. The ban cannot be appealed. However since many women in Egypt still support female genital mutilation a sustained educational effort at the grass-roots level will be necessary to enact the new court ruling.

Because of American preoccupation with abortion worldwide reproductive health issues in 1991 received scant attention despite many important changes. With the fall of Communism Eastern European governments struggle in the legislatures and the courts to regulate abortion particularly Poland Czechoslovakia Hungary and the newly unified Federal Republic of Germany. Two international tribunals ruled narrowly on the restrictive Irish abortion law and international treaties ratified by Ireland protecting freedom of speech leaving the Irish law intact. Spains Supreme Court relaxed restrictions on abortion and for the 1st time allowed abortions for social reasons. Frances highest administrative court ruled that the French government exceeded its authority in ordering the distribution of RU 497 (mifepristone) but ruled that French abortion law allowing abortions in the 1st 10 weeks in "situations of distress" did not violate international treaties guaranteeing the "right to life." England approved use of RU 486 under English abortion law with medical restrictions. The Canadian Supreme Court agreed to review a provinces legislation that had the effect of limiting access to abortions via medical and hospital regulations. The Islamic developing countries of Pakistan and the Sudan replaced colonial laws with more liberal abortion rules tailored to Islamic law. Pakistan decriminalized early abortions when given to provide (undefined) "necessary treatment" the Sudan allows abortions during the 1st 90 days. Peru reduced the penalties for some abortions. In Latin America only Cuba allows abortions on request in early pregnancy. Iran China and the former USSR tightened and encouraged compliance with their family planning regulations. Fear of AIDS prompted several countries to tighten condom regulations. Artificial insemination embryo research and surrogate motherhood also received attention.

Judicial activism and judicial restraint describe the relationship between the judiciary and the political branches of government. In the context of Japan, they refer to the relationship between the Supreme Court and inferior courts, on the one hand, and the Diet, the Cabinet, the bureaucracy, and the analogous policymakers of prefectural and local governments, on the other. Judicial activism and restraint have been defined in more than one way. One such definition is that a court exhibits activism when it exercises the power of judicial review regardless of whether it declares a governmental action constitutional or unconstitutional. In this study, however, judicial activism is defined in terms of conflict between the courts and the political branches on constitutional policies.' A court is activist whenever it declares public policies unconstitutional. Conversely, a court is self-restrained whenever it upholds the constitutionality of public policies. The Meiji Constitution of 1889 did not provide for the power of judicial review. Moreover, it did not recognize the judiciary as independent from the Diet and the Cabinet. As part of the executive branch, the judiciary was not empowered to examine the constitutionality of actions of the Diet or the Cabinet. Furthermore, an administrative court, separate from the ordinary courts of law, maintained exclusive jurisdiction over any administrative disputes. Since this administrative court, the privy council, was for all practical purposes dysfunctional in reviewing whatever constitutional disputes might have been raised, there was no institution that effectively checked the legality or constitutionality of governmental policies and actions. Judicial review has been firmly established since 1947. The administrative court, the privy council, and all other forms of special tribunals have been abolished. The judiciary, headed by the Supreme Court, now has the final say as to what the law is in any legal dispute. With the power of judicial review and the working principle of stare decisis, the courts have come to make case law and to delineate through litigants the constitutional boundaries of each branch of the national and local governments.

The 1132 administrative law judges now serving in twenty-nine of the most important agencies of the national government are among the least understood and least studied authorities in the American political system, yet they are among the most powerful authorities in the modern policy process. ALJs have undergone a repid development from the creation of the office of “hearing examiner” in the Hepburn Act of 1906 to the rpesent djay, when they hear cases cfomparable in importance to those heard by federal district judges. ALHs are selected through a merit procedure almost wholly controlled by the agencies in which they are employed and are subject to constant cross-pressures from their judicial role and their administrative masters. Perceived problems of biased selection procedures, conflicts of interest, and lack of public accountability have led critics in Congress and elsewhere to propose a variety of marginal reforms. The policy proposal that probably gets to the heart of the problem, however, is the creation of an Administrative Court of the United States.

West Germany's controversial methods for dealing with those civil servants who are considered subversive have again been making headlines. In a test case the Federal Administrative Court has effectively extended the law by ruling that civil servants should be dismissed if they have been active — beyond mere membership — in a political party deemed subversive by the Federal Constitutional Court, the country's highest court.

The establishment of German administrative courts does not exclude the institution of an Ombudsman, but the German tradition of executive predominance works against it. The law of the German Federal Republic provides for a Verfassungbeschwerde, which places rights under the protection of a Constitutional Court. Creation of the armed forces led to the establishment of a Defense Commissioner of the Bundestag—an office modeled after the Swedish Military Ombudsman—which is now generally accepted. There appears to be little interest in a Civilian Ombudsman. Austria has a long tradition of effective control by the Federal Administrative Court. Introduction of an Ombudsman is not, at present, under consideration there. In the Soviet Union, control over public administration is exercised by a branch of the Executive—the Prokuratura. However, unlike Scandinavian Ombudsmen, Procurators are subordinated to party guidance and discipline. Moreover, Soviet law provides scant access to courts for citizens seeking redress of administrative abuses. East European regimes have abolished review by administrative courts and adopted the Soviet Procuracy. In Yugoslavia, public prosecutors retain their role of guardians of legality, but supervision of administration has, largely, been transferred to the courts. Other East European countries, to date, have not followed the Yugoslav example. A debate on this issue is now in progress.

HE UNIQUENESS of "administrative" courts lies in their special jurisdiction over civil controversies involving the government. At present there are no administrative courts of general jurisdiction in the United States; that is, there are none which take all or even a variety of such cases. Nor are there any administrative courts of limited jurisdiction going under the label "administrative court," although the U.S. Court of Claims, the U.S. Customs Court, the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, and the U.S. Tax Court are in truth administrative courts of limited jurisdiction. So also in some ways perhaps is the U.S. Court of Military Appeals. This dearth of special courts to handle civil cases involving the government is in contrast with the wide use of such courts elsewhere in the world, and also in contrast with the large and rapidly increasing volume of such controversies. Steadily increasing business regulation and welfare programs, especially since the New Deal, have brought citizens ever more frequently into contact and into controversy with government. Since the 1930's certain segments of the bar have called for special administrative courts possessing special skill to settle fairly civil controversies between citizen and government. Eighteen bills have been introduced into Congress since 1929 to create an administrative court. They, and certain developments relating to them, are analyzed in this article. As lawyers very well know, most civil controversies between citizen and government involve differences of opinion between administrators and people subject to their rules and decisions. Most are presently adjudicated by the administrators themselves. If, for example, the Federal Trade Commission thinks a tobacco company is being deceptive when it advertises "there's not a cough in a carload" the Commission (after issuing a complaint) will hold a hearing (trial) and then issue a cease and desist order if the record of the hearing shows there is deception. Ultimately, of course, the tobacco company may appeal to a regular court if there is some question of legality it wishes to press (perhaps fairness of the hearing or the authority of the agency, et cetera). Thus, in the United States controversies involving the government are likely to land in the regular courts if they reach any court at all. However, most cases never reach a court because the amount involved isn't worth the expense of litigation. Furthermore, the courts will not enter unless there is a "legal" question. Courts also generally accept as final the administrators' finding of fact. Whether there is a "cough in a carload" might be viewed as a question of fact, not of law. Our way of settling such controversies is very like that of the British, although it is quite different from that prevailing over most of the rest of civilization. Continental Europe tends to follow the French pattern which gives to administrative

The urgency of judicial control in Ukraine is increasing year by year, since effective protection of human and citizen's rights and interests is a primary task of the judicial branch and requires appropriate control, in particular, of the enforcement of administrative decisions. Judicial control over the enforcement of decisions is of the utmost importance in administrative proceedings, since one of the parties to a public-legal dispute is a subject of power. Therefore, in order to protect and restore the violated rights and interests of individuals and legal entities in disputes with public authorities, it is necessary to create an effective mechanism for judicial control over the enforcement of court decisions. This article describes the main approaches to understanding the concept of judicial control in domestic doctrine, including the concept of judicial control over the enforcement of decisions in administrative law. Own definitions are given based on the analysis of different approaches of scientists. The basic forms of judicial control over the execution of decisions of the administrative court are analyzed, in particular, the obligation of the subject of power, not in favor of which the court decision was adopted and the imposition of a fine; appeal against decisions, actions or inaction of executors and officials of state executive service bodies; the recognition of decisions, actions or omissions made by a subject of authority as a defendant in enforcing a court decision. On the basis of the conducted research, proposals for improvement of domestic court practice on the enforcement of court decisions in administrative cases were submitted, namely to supplement the existing legislation with articles that would regulate the mechanism of judicial control.

by Andre Cocâtre-Tilgien, LL.D.,Assistant at the Paris Faculty of LawFrom a definition of contracts as concluded between public authorities and private persons or enterprises, the author derives two reasons why, in French law, it should technically be impossible to appeal before an administrative court: first of all, the very name « contract » implies the competence of the « judges of contracts », i.e. Civil Courts; furthermore, this competence should exclude the possibility of a « parallel recourse » before another jurisdiction.In fact, however, the supreme administrative court, viz. the « Conseil d'Etat », has acknowledged the « receivability » of a number of appeals relating to public contracts and made on grounds of excess of power (*). This was justified by the emergence of a new juridical concept, that of « detachable acts », i.e. decisions, approvals, rejections, preliminaries, etc., which accompany a contract but are not essential parts of it as such. These acts may then fall within the province o...

Before starting our analysis we wish to point out that our work will refer mainly to the ordinary courts. Indeed, it is in this field that we have concentrated our efforts of research, so that our statements can be supported by a great amount of empirical knowledge. In fact, as regards the administrative courts and the Constitutional Court, our work will rest more on formal data. However, this qualification by no means reduces, we believe, the general value of our study. Indeed, we have to take into account that the ordinary magistrates are by far the largest corps: in 1983 they were 6682 against 842 administrative court judges.1 Thus, at least from a quantitative point of view the decisions made by the ordinary judiciary possess obviously a greater impact. But also from a qualitative point of view the political impact of our ordinary courts is not to be underrated: ordinary magistrates completely control the criminal process, since, as we shall see, in Italy the prosecution of criminal cases is monopolised by the ordinary judiciary, besides which the highest ordinary court, the Court of Cassation, plays a major role in the overall judicial system. It is then clear that, even though we must not neglect the role of other institutions, like the Constitutional Court, our ordinary judiciary shows, especially in the day-to-day functioning of the judicial system, a higher degree of political significance.

Publisher Summary This chapter focuses on the politics of informal justice in Japan. At the end of World War I, Japan had concluded nearly three decades of experience with its Western-derived legal system. The institutional framework had been completed with the promulgation of the Meiji Constitution in 1889 and the enactment of the Court Organization Law and Administrative Court Law in 1890. By 1898 the long process of drafting and legislating a comprehensive set of substantive and procedural codes had all ended with the adoption of the last two books of the Civil Code on relatives and succession. Japan had a well-trained career judiciary and procuracy, and a rapidly growing practicing bar. Law faculties, especially that of the Tokyo Imperial University, had become Japan's most prestigious educational establishments. Therefore, Japan's leaders could justifiably boast of success in adopting a new Western-based legal system. The chapter further discusses conclusion in regard to Japan's prewar experience. Japan's prewar experience points to one conclusion that most litigants or practicing lawyers recognize as a matter of common sense. Litigation is primarily a means to enforce legal rights, not to resolve conflicts. People usually sue to compel others to meet legal obligations that they have refused to acknowledge or fulfill. In this respect, the critical characteristic of the legal order is the effectiveness of its sanctions and other means of coercion.

In considering the nature of judicial remedies in German law a common lawyer has to bear in mind some basic aspects of that law which are at variance with the common law. While for a common lawyer judicial remedy means remedy in the ordinary courts the German law assigns administrative matters to the administrative courts.1 Judicial remedy here means remedy in the administrative courts and not in the ordinary courts which except in few specified matters have no jurisdiction in administrative matters. Second, although common law does not exclude administrative matters from the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts, it fully recognizes the need for specialist tribunals to deal with such matters. The German law recognizes no administrative tribunals apart from the administrative courts. Therefore, a person can approach the courts directly except where the law requires exhaustion of the administrative remedy in the limited sense, to be mentioned below, before coming to the administrative courts. Thus, except when an appeal in the court is provided against a decision of an administrative tribunal the judicial remedy in common law is of supervisory nature while the remedy provided in the German administrative courts is the primary remedy.

In France, the courts which have to judge the anaesthetist’s liability look primarily for the relation between doctor and patient. They study the role of each of the partners: the operator (surgeon, obstetrician, etc.), the hospital (public or private) and the auxiliaries who take part in, or replace the doctor. In the case of law suits against an anaesthetist this relationship can be analysed as follows.

“Die Genehmigung von Kraftwerken bedarf der richterlichen Bestatigung”. Dieser scheinbar empirische Befund eines Rechtspraktikers gilt als Beleg fur die Verrechtlichung politischer Kontroversen im Umweltschutz und die “Vergerichtl ichung” ihrer Konfliktaustragung. In diesem Zusammenhang wird manchmal noch plakativer die rechtspolitische Phobie kolportiert, die Gerichte hatten die Rolle einer “technisch-physikalisch-biologisch-okonomischen Superinstanz” in einem “totalen Rechtsmittelstaat” usurpiert. Und in der Tat scheint die Klage vor den Verwaltungsgerichten gegen Flughafen, Autobahnen, industrielle Anlagen und Kraftwerke die ultima ratio fur Burgerinitiativen nach der enttauschend verlaufenen Teilnahme an den administrativen Genehmigungsverfahren zu sein.

IN many continental countries, and notably in France, there exists a scheme of administrative law 3 —known to Frenchmen as droit administratif—which rests on ideas foreign to the fundamental assumptions of our English common law, and especially to what we have termed the rule of law. This opposition is specially apparent in the protection given in foreign countries to servants of the State, or, as we say in England, of the Crown, who, whilst acting in pursuance of official orders, or in the bona fide attempt to discharge official duties, are guilty of acts which in themselves are wrongful or unlawful. The extent of this protection has in France—with which country we are for the most part concerned—varied from time to time. It was once all but complete; it is now far less extensive than it was thirty-six years ago.1 It forms only one portion of the whole system of droit administratif.2 but it is the part of French law to which in this chapter I wish to direct particularly the attention of students.

The revolution in Wuchang had inflamed many provinces. A need to discuss matters of vital importance and common interest created an increasing demand for a temporary organization to be set up in a centrally located place such as Shanghai. On November n, 1911, Ch’eng Teh-chuan and Tong Shou-ch’ien, military governors of Kiangsu and Chekiang respectively, made a joint suggestion to that effect to Ch’en Chi-mei, the military governor of Shanghai. According to their proposal, the military governors of the provincial governments and the provincial assemblies would send one representative each to Shanghai for a conference. Prompt action was taken the following day by the representatives of Kiangsu and Chekiang through a circular telegram to the various provincial authorities. On November 15, the Representative Conference of the Military Governors held its first meeting; and, five days later, it reached a decision to recognize Wuchang as the seat of the Central Military Government of the Republic, headed by the military governor of Hupei province.

The judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 8 May 2018 concerns the issue of relations of property rights to public interest, in connection with the resolution of the commune council, regarding the creation of a culture park. The resolution introduces a specific public-law regime in a given area, taking into account the general needs, which simultaneously causes interference in the sphere of subjective rights, in particular through a system of prohibitions and restrictions. The judgment is based on the conviction that there is a need in the public space to protect cultural values. In the aspect of the constitutional principle of proportionality, it is also important to consider the private interest in the area covered by protection in the form of a culture park.

The commentary contains arguments that challenge a judgement of the Polish Supreme Administrative Court (NSA) issued on 8th October 2019, II FSK 872/19 regarding the apparent legal transactions and tax consequences resulting from the concluded donation agreement. NSA referring to the monistic concept of the appearance of a legal act, concluded that, in this case the appearance of a legal act occurred, and simultaneously the parties did not conclude a donation agreement, but perform a complex legal act of a pecuniary nature, which was associated with the tax obligations. In the author’s assessment, the essence of the NSA argumentation concerning the tax consequences of the agreement concluded in May 2012 in effect approach to apply a civil law structure to create an effect that became possible after the introduction of a tax evasion clause into the Polish legal system. Glosa zawiera argumentację negującą stanowisko Naczelnego Sądu Administracyjnego sformułowane na gruncie wyroku z dnia 8 października 2019 r., sygn. II FSK 872/19, w przedmiocie pozorności czynności prawnych oraz skutków podatkowych wynikających z zawartej przez strony umowy. NSA, odwołując się do monistycznej koncepcji pozorności czynności prawnej, uznał, że w rozpatrywanym stanie faktycznym zaistniała pozorność czynności prawnej, a tym samym strony nie zawarły umowy darowizny, lecz dokonały złożonej czynności prawnej o odpłatnym charakterze, wiążącej się z powstaniem obowiązku podatkowego w podatku dochodowym od osób fizycznych. W ocenie autora istota argumentacji NSA w glosowanym orzeczeniu, dotycząca podatkowych skutków wynikających z zawartej w maju 2012 r. umowy, w istocie zmierza do zastosowania konstrukcji o cywilistycznym rodowodzie dla wykreowania efektu, który stał się możliwy dopiero po wprowadzeniu do polskiego systemu prawnego klauzuli obejścia prawa podatkowego.

Within the last decade text mining, i.e., extracting sensitive information from text corpora, has become a major factor in business intelligence. The automated textual analysis of law corpora is highly valuable because of its impact on a company's legal options and the raw amount of available jurisdiction. The study of supreme court jurisdiction and international law corpora is equally important due to its effects on business sectors. In this paper we use text mining methods to investigate Austrian supreme administrative court jurisdictions concerning dues and taxes. We analyze the law corpora using R with the new text mining package tm. Applications include clustering the jurisdiction documents into groups modeling tax classes (like income or value-added tax) and identifying jurisdiction properties. The findings are compared to results obtained by law experts., Series: Research Report Series / Department of Statistics and Mathematics

Summary The Supreme Administrative Court judgement which is glossed in this article concerns reimbursement due to a patient for medications not normally available in Poland on a reimbursed prescription but admitted in special cases as an individual (targeted) import on the grounds of a central permit. In this judgement the Court ruled that contrary to the literal interpretation of Art. 39 of the Reimbursement for Medications, Special-Purpose Foodstuffs, and Medical Products of 12 May 2011 (Ustawa z dnia 12 maja 2011 r. o refundacji lekow, środkow spozywczych specjalnego przeznaczenia zywieniowego oraz wyrobow medycznych; Dziennik Ustaw 2016, Item 1536), patients who have a central permit admitting a medication they are taking for individual (targeted) import can claim a reimbursement for their expenses incurred due to the import of the medication. I fully agree with this ruling, especially as it takes a pro-constitutional approach to the interpretation of the provisions on reimbursed medications.

Przedmiotem niniejszej pracy jest zagadnienie przedawnienia straty podatkowej. Podstawę rozważań stanowi treść wyroku Wojewódzkiego Sądu Administracyjnego we Wrocławiu z dnia 15 lutego 2018 roku, I SA/Wr 462/17, w którym przyjęto, że art. 70 § 1 Ordynacji podatkowej należy stosować nie tylko w odniesieniu do przedawnienia zobowiązania podatkowego, lecz także przedawnienia straty podatkowej. W tekście przeprowadzono szczegółową analizę przywołanego orzeczenia, przedstawiono dalsze argumenty na rzecz stanowiska zaprezentowanego w jego uzasadnieniu oraz sformułowano stosowne wnioski de lege ferenda.

THE Virginia Law Review celebrates the fortieth anniversary of the birth of the federal Administrative Procedure Act. For myself, I would prefer to celebrate the anniversary of the death of the legislative proposals that preceded it. The story begins in May 1933, when the American Bar Association created a Special Committee on Administrative Law under the chairmanship of Louis G. Caldwell, a highly respected Washington lawyer who had practiced ably in the telecommunications field. Within four months, scarcely enough time to allow the committee's membership to do more than contemplate their own navels, the committee was reportedly convinced that the "judicial function" then lodged in administrators' hands should be transferred to an independent tribunal or, alternatively, that officials' decisions should be completely reviewable on the facts as well as on the law by a tribunal marked by judicial independence.' The Special Committee's first formal report and proposal of legislation came in 1934. It was aimed at coping with "the evils notoriously prevalent" among administrative tribunals, which the committee thought would be achieved by creating a federal administrative court with branches and an appellate division, or, failing that, "an appropriate number of independent tribunals" unencumbered by "legislative and executive functions."2 Thus began a continuing practice of prescribing a cure-all for the shortcomings, real or imagined, of administrative agencies. That shortcomings did exist is incontrovertible, and some of them were amenable to statutory correction-as occurred, for example, when the Federal Register Act of 1935 required that documents having "general applicability and legal effect" or prescribing a penalty be

During the past year the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in the "hot oil" 1 and the "sick chicken" 2 cases have been cited so frequently and for so many different propositions, that both the possibilities of the cases and the patience of the listening public might justly be regarded as exhausted. The proposal of the Special Committee on Administrative Law of the American Bar Association for the establishment of a federal administrative court affords, however, an opportunity for reference to them from a point of view which has received very little attention. The cases are important to the proposal, not in furnishing any direct authority one way or the other, but in suggesting an interesting contrast. In one field of administrative law, having to do with delegations of legislative power to executive or administrative agencies, the Supreme Court has, with these decisions, at last made progress toward some sort of a boundary line between two of the three great departments of government under our Constitution. At least, the Court has recognized that there is a boundary line. In the equally important sister field, having to do with reposing judicial power in such agencies, we are still not only without any semblance of a boundary line but are actually faced with a disheartening maze of conflicting notions as to where that line should be drawn and at times even with doubts as to whether any line exists. In its opinions in these two cases last year, the Supreme Court of the United States declared for the first time in positive terms that there are bounds which Congress may not transgress in delegating legislative power to the Executive. Superficially, it seems strange that we have waited so long for judicial repair of this essential but somewhat damaged pillar in our national structure. The doctrine of separation of governmental powers into legislative, executive and judicial is one feature of our Constitution that cannot rightly be blamed on the laissez-faire philosophy of poor old Adam Smith. The doctrine was written into our fundamental law plainly enough

* On January 31, 1971, President Nixon released to the public a booklet entitled A New Regulatory Framework: Report on Selected Independent Regulatory Agencies. The Report represents a year's work by the President's six-member Advisory Council on Executive Organization, popularly known as the Ash Council.' The Council studied several Federal agencies: the Federal Trade Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, the Federal Power Commission, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Civil Aeronautics Board, and the Federal Maritime Commission. The Report notes at the outset that it is "now almost routine practice to condemn the commissions for a lack of resourcefulness, insensitivity, and for a general inability to respond effectively to the pressing problems within the scope of their responsibilities."2 The Council then recommends several major changes in the structure of our regulatory system designed to tackle these failings. The Council's major recommendation, which it would apply to all agencies except the FCC, is to abolish the job of commissioner with a fixed term of office, and to substitute single administrators directly responsible to the President. In replacing "collegial bodies" with single heads, it would hope to increase efficiency and at the same time to strengthen Executive control over, and perhaps support for, agency policies. Moreover, the adjudicatory functions of the agencies would be de-emphasized. Agency chiefs would have only 30 days to review the decisions of hearing examiners; ordinarily, cases would proceed directly to a new Administrative Court, composed of specialized judges appointed for fifteen-year terms. Finally, the Report makes several detailed recommendations concerning individual agencies. It would merge the ICC, CAB, and FMC into a single transportation agency. It would transfer the CAB's promotional, subsidy-granting activities to the Department of Transportation. It would separate the FTC's consumer-protection responsibilities from its antitrust activities, and vest the latter in a new Federal Antitrust Board with a chairman and two economist members.3 It would transfer responsibility for the Public Utility Holding