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Norway has a stable economy, a vibrant private sector, the highest living standards in the world, a robust labour market, moderate inflation, and low public debt. Its economy relies much on oil, apparently contradicting the ambitious pro-green policies Norway adopts to face the environmental challenges of this century. Norway administers its huge oil revenues through its Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) and invests them in its citizens' welfare. The State is a crucial actor in Norway's dynamic economy, but private companies play a role as well. The country remains a crucial actor within the European sphere and, together with the EU, it shares the European Green Deal's (EGD) ecological standards, which might work as both an inspiration and an opportunity for Norway. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sovereign wealth funds indicate savings of governments other than national reserves. Sovereign wealth funds can be defined as companies which are established in order to achieve macro-economic goals of the government. National reserves are foreign currency assets and gold of goverments in central banks. However, sovereign wealth funds aim to make profits by using national reserves which are redundant and current account surplus. These funds first emerged in 1950's especially in the Gulf countries, which had an extraordinary revenue stream due to oil revenue, were accepted over time by European countries such as Norway whose exports were much higher than imports with a high current surplus, as well as Asian countries such as China, Hong Kong, Singapore, Russia. A sovereign wealth fund had been established in the name of Türkiye Wealth Fund in our country in 2016. The purpose of the establishment of the fund had been settled as a long-term development perspective with sustainable growth and stability. In this study, a conceptual information had been tried to be presented about the sovereign wealth fund. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We reconsider the role of a sovereign wealth fund in commodity‐exporting economies facing recent volatile fluctuations of commodity prices due to the COVID‐19 shock. We examine the welfare‐improving effect of a sovereign wealth fund from the new perspective of the link between commodity prices and interest rate spreads, which is unique to emerging economies. We show that a sovereign wealth fund becomes more effective in improving welfare for commodity‐exporting economies with a stronger link between their commodity prices and interest rate spreads. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article begins by setting out the rationale for the symposium on alternative finance and governance. New organizational forms of alternative finance provision have grown in importance in recent years, creating opportunities to challenge and extend existing models of corporate governance, which have been focused mainly on large, publicly traded corporations. The article then summarizes the papers in the symposium that relate to crowdfunding, business angel co-investing with other forms of finance, minority private equity investments in family firms, and the performance of private equity funds, before setting out an agenda for further research that relates to other new organizational forms of finance providers—notably, accelerators and sovereign wealth funds. This paper emphasizes the need to take account of the variety of goals of the new organizational forms providing alternative finance and the enterprises they fund, such as social enterprises and student entrepreneurship ventures. It points to the need for studies on the real economic impact of the new forms of alternative finance provision. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Australia's Trade Minister, Senator Don Farrell, has been working to improve trade relations with China, reducing trade impediments from $20 billion to less than a billion dollars. The government aims to diversify trade by focusing on ASEAN and other markets, while also negotiating trade agreements with India and the United Arab Emirates. The government emphasizes the importance of trade for economic growth and encourages businesses to explore new markets with the support of Austrade representatives. [Extracted from the article]

The Journal of Alternative Investments, Volume 26 Number 3 Winter 2024, features an article on sovereign development funds (SDFs) and their investment strategies. SDFs, unlike sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), focus on promoting economic development within a country by financing domestic projects. They have a lower risk tolerance and invest more strategically to achieve socio-economic returns. Another article explores the role of gold in a diversified portfolio, finding that while it reduces downside risk, it also comes at the cost of return. The issue also includes articles on celebrity endorsements in special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs), an algorithm for ranking technologies, and the timing skills of crypto hedge funds in the Bitcoin market. The last piece is a book review on the rise of institutional investment in timberland. [Extracted from the article]

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Cet article détaille l'évolution du fonds de régulations des recettes algérienne sur la période 2000-2020, créé en 2000 pour faire face spécialement au choc pétrolier. Le fonds a contribué pendant de longues années depuis sa création soit à la compensation des moins-values de la fiscalité pétrolière, soit pour la réduction de la dette publique, soit, enfin, pour financer le déficit budgétaire de l’État, ce qui prouve son rôle grandissant d’un côté, mais d’un autre coté le choc pétrolier de 2014 a conduit à l’assèchement total de ses actifs début 2017. This article is about the evolution of the Algerian revenue regulations funds over the period 2000-2020, which was created in 2000 to deal with the oil chock, the funds has contributed for many years since its creation to the compensation of the lower values of the oil taxation, either for the reduction of the public debt, or, finally, to finance the budget deficit of the State, which proves its growing role on the one hand, but on the other hand the 2014 oil shock led to the total drying up of its assets in early 2017.

In the first of my reports on financial geography, I focus on a growing body of work that engages with the state as a vital and strategic actor in financial markets and in the global economy. After the 2008 global financial crisis, austerity measures and impacts on public finance have reshaped local-central government relationships with increasing use of financial instruments and market solutions. The growing prominence of sovereign wealth funds, shifting roles of national development banks and central banks, and impacts of currency internationalisation are raising questions about new forms of financial statecraft and opportunities for changing configurations of global hegemony. Taken together, a renewed engagement with a political economic lens and focus on state-finance relations illuminate the changing positionalities of economies and financial actors in the spatial organisation of international financial and monetary relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Al Bashaer Economic Journal is the property of Al Bashaer Economic Journal and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Zeitschrift fur Wirtschaftspolitik is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Sovereign wealth funds ("SWFs") have emerged in the last three decades to be players in the global economy as funding sources. Moreover, OECD economies with low savings rates would benefit from the additional funds provided by SWFs. Disadvantages of SWFs Despite the advantages, SWFs are not without their drawbacks. [Extracted from the article]

Over the years, policymakers have explored various combinations of varying degrees of monetary policy independence, exchange rate stability, and financial openness while recognizing that not all three policies can be achieved to the fullest extent – the "monetary trilemma" hypothesis. In recent years, holding international reserves (IR) has become an important policy instrument as a buffer or insurance against liquidity shortages. Significant and fundamental economic events such as currency crises have often changed the policy mix. In this paper, we find that countries' policy mixes have been diverse and varied over time from the perspective of the trilemma and also IR holding. We then illustrate how the combination of the three trilemma policies and IR holding drastically changed before and after the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC). However, the Global Financial Crisis did not lead to a drastic change in the policy arrangements. We find that countries that faced large terms of trade shocks or negative economic growth during the crisis increase IR holding in the post-AFC. Countries that had negative growth during the crisis also tend to pursue more exchange rate flexibility and more open financial markets. This characteristic is true for commodity exporters, but not for manufacturing exporters. Countries with large current account deficit (i.e., "large capital borrowers") tend to be more sensitive to economic growth at the time of the AFC. Countries that are under IMF stabilization programs or those with sovereign wealth funds tend to hold more IR. These characteristics were not found in the aftermath of the GFC. In general, countries increased their IR holdings after the GFC, but did not respond to the during-crisis economic and institutional conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Administration & Economics is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Abant Social Sciences / Abant Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi is the property of Journal of Abant Social Sciences and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The recent proliferation of Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) in authoritarian regimes is puzzling. While SWFs can generate political, financial, and geopolitical benefits in the long-term, their creation also sharply impedes an autocrat's ability to fund current patronage and other regime-stabilizing public and private goods. What explains the creation of autocratic SWFs? We argue that sovereign wealth funds are more likely to emerge when autocratic leaders possess a high degree of policy-making autonomy. Policy-making autonomy allows leaders to override any opposition from regime insiders who might prefer to keep capital at home and available for patronage. At the same time, such leaders are more politically secure, and thus are more confident that they will remain in power to reap the medium to long-term financial rewards of these funds. We operationalize this concept with indicators that measure whether an autocrat has consolidated their authority over the regime's party infrastructure and employ survival analysis on a global sample of autocratic regimes from 1960–2010. We find robust support for our argument and describe how our findings provide new insights on the political determinants of sovereign wealth funds and the consequences of authoritarian power-sharing institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) are making significant incursions into global financial markets, various countries are increasingly establishing funds geared towards national development. Saudi Arabia's Public Investment Fund (PIF) is the fastest-growing SWF, with most of its assets deployed domestically. Beyond restructuring the economy, deploying the PIF intrinsically implies balancing political and business interests. Yet, there has been little reflection on how socio-political relations with socioeconomic actors shape sovereign wealth allocation. Who gets access to SWF resources, and how? What kind of power relations are maintained or established in the process of SWF development? This article unpacks PIF activities to argue for a microfoundation of how domestic politics influence SWF decision-making. To do so, I introduce a sociology of SWFs using the tools of social network analysis. I find that the PIF mainly targets companies linked to family-owned conglomerates connected to merchant elites with long-standing personal connections to the Saudi state. This article contributes to rentier state debates and broader political economy scholarship by showing how beyond decision-making and asset allocation models, state investment funds also hinge on ancillary networks of social institutions, often generated from ingrained formal and informal interactions between states and society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We respond to the special issue's call for a multiscalar, historicised approach to state capitalism through an exploration of Sovereign Wealth Fund investment into London real estate. We point to how the UK's ostensibly market-led recovery since the 2008 financial crisis has relied in part on attracting 'patient' state capitalist investments. In this, we contextualise the relational regulation of real estate markets as the outcome of intersecting state projects by considering the investment motivations of the single largest owner of London real estate, the Qatari Investment Authority, and the utilisation of their investment by UK governance actors. Focusing on Qatari Investment Authority's involvement in London's Olympic Village, we highlight how this strategic coupling in the real estate market realised domestic and geopolitical aims for the Qataris while facilitating the UK government's strategy to ameliorate London's housing shortage by fostering a 'build to rent' asset class. In doing so, we contribute to readings of state capitalism as an 'uneven and combined' process beyond the traditional state/market binary by placing sovereign wealth fund investment into the context of city governance, the geopolitics of real estate and resultant relational forms of regulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Alami and Dixon instead treat state capitalism not as a well-defined analytical category but rather a "flexible means of problematising...trajectories of state intervention and the role that it plays in the (geo) political re-organisation of global capitalism" ([1]: xx). One way this query might be posed is where in the world the phenomena described under the rubric of state capitalism are most pronounced or perhaps newly apparent; in which countries or in what parts of the world do we see a more muscular or interventionist state? Keywords: State capitalism; hegemonic cycles; macrohistorical sociology EN State capitalism hegemonic cycles macrohistorical sociology 770 773 4 05/16/23 20230501 NES 230501 The term "state capitalism" dates from the late nineteenth century, when it was coined by Marxists seeking to understand the growing role of the state as an owner of capital and orchestrator of production in European countries. [Extracted from the article]

This paper explores the intersections and overlaps between state capitalism and global production networks. A key feature of the so-called new state capitalism is the combination of state ownership and corporatisation, which creates a system that can be characterised as a hybrid of public–private governance in both corporate and network terms. Moreover, the internationalisation of state hybrids adds an extraterritorial dimension to the state, which can influence the configuration and governance of global production networks. This paper develops a conceptual framework (H–E–N) that foregrounds the relationships between hybrid governance (H), extraterritoriality (E) and global production network configurations (N), thereby promoting an integrated analysis of the implications of the new state capitalism for global production networks. This framework is mobilised to explain how state capitalism in Singapore has influenced the development of the city-state's position in upstream, midstream and downstream oil global production networks over the 1959–2019 period. The study demonstrates that hybrid governance, as part of a wider strategy of state capitalism, has been critical in the development of Singapore's position in oil global production networks. The hybrid nature of the institutional forms associated with state ownership – for instance state-owned enterprises and sovereign wealth funds – goes beyond market facilitation to encompass active state participation in markets. Hybrid governance not only allows the state to influence domestic outcomes but – through the extraterritorial strategies of hybrid entities – can also influence global production network configurations beyond its borders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The prominence of state-controlled entities (SCEs) in foreign direct investment (FDI) flows has created multilayer regulatory challenges. The nature of SCEs and geo-economic considerations related to their investments have exacerbated investment-related concerns and, since the global financial crisis and during the global pandemic, triggered legal reforms. Concurrently, SCEs have increasingly relied on international investment arbitration to solve their disputes. This Article examines the role of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) in resolving cases brought by an increasing number of sovereign investors. The Article begins with a linguistic analysis of the ICSID Convention's relevant provisions, which lack a definitive regulatory position, and then reviews historical and drafting documents showing the position of some states that participated in the negotiations. Part III uncovers new cases and further examines understudied ones, and introduces a holistic and systematic analytical study of the case law, drawing lessons from consistencies in the awards. In Part IV, the awards are grouped, focusing on salient issues deriving from the diverse factual and legal elements of the cases. Initially, Part IV focuses on the first ICSID case in which a state-owned enterprise acts as a claimant. The analysis continues with the first application of the Broches test, an examination of awards in which investors were operating for little or no profit, and a review of awards in which sovereign investors were treated as any other privately owned investor. Last, the Part reviews the particularities of Chinese SCEs in FDI flows and ends with an assessment of the role of sovereign wealth funds and related awards. A comprehensive evaluation of the case law reveals that European SCEs have massively relied on the ICSID system, in contrast with Chinese SCEs that have made marginal use of it. Part V explains the relevance of the consistent approaches and argues that ICSID tribunals have established a jurisprudence constante in dealing with SCEs that confirms their access as claimants in investor-state disputes. Conversely, Part VI provides innovative approaches and instruments to assess the owner's role in sovereign investors' transactions and prevent distortions of the Centre's jurisdiction. The last Part summarizes the research findings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The establishment of a sovereign wealth fund to build up "generational capital" is associated with legal imponderables. In principle, the German federal state can set up a foundation under public law to operate the fund with resources allocated to it as loans from the federal budget. However, if the federal state itself takes out loans to finance the foundation, this would be problematic from a constitutional point of view. As far as the protection of fair competition is concerned, it is unlikely that the fund will be systemically relevant and thus benefit from an implicit state guarantee. However, care must be taken to ensure that the fund receives its resources from the federal budget on market terms and that the resources supplied to the fund are also used on market terms. Otherwise, serious problems would arise under EU state aid law. The fact that the fund acts in the interests of the pension insurance scheme would not allow for an exception or justification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In an era of ascendant globalization, sovereign wealth funds were used by governments around the world--and, in particular, by governments with massive natural resource wealth or balance-of-trade surpluses--to invest widely in foreign markets. Sovereign wealth funds were products of the international economic order then in existence, adapted to a political and economic environment in which borders could be easily crossed and foreign assets seemed abundant and easily acquired. After the Financial Crisis, and with the increasing nationalization seen in the 2010s, this environment began to change. Both domestic and international forces spurred the development of new, "strategic" sovereign funds. No longer operating primarily in international markets, nor tightly linked to the international economic order, these sovereign funds are developments of a more desperate age. Rather than focusing on outward investment, these sovereign funds turn inward, focusing instead on domestic concerns and prioritizing domestic political legitimacy. While these strategic funds are designed to thrive in more nationalized economic and political environments, the legal regimes of the sovereign funds' home jurisdictions must also adapt to the domestic turn in sovereign funds. This Article analyzes recent legal adaptations that attempt to manage a more mercantilist and nationalistic orientation from sovereign funds, and it outlines a framework for the legal innovations necessary to regulate and govern the funds within their home jurisdictions and minimize the risk of negative spillovers in other jurisdictions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have been a controversial issue of the international trading system, sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) pose new challenges to existing international economic governance. As active players in the global investment market, SWFs will attract the scrutiny of the General Agreement on Trade in Services and international investment law. By becoming involved in the technology sector in various ways, SWFs may play a role in facilitating technology transfer, which may lead to the examination of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement. This Article offers a thorough examination of the way(s) that international economic governance deals with the status of state enterprises in the investment market and their technology investment and transfer activities. It reveals a series of challenges SWFs may face when they become involved with the technology sector. This Article argues that the World Trade Organization (WTO) serves as a more appropriate forum to regulate SWFs than the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Additionally, in order to properly address state capitalism, it is important to view state capitalism more broadly and objectively, and separately from U.S.-China geo-economic competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Saudi Arabia's Public Investment Fund (PIF) has grown from marginal player to the most important economic actor in the Kingdom since 2015. Nevertheless, we know surprisingly little about the political economy of the PIF revamp. Against an unfavorable macroeconomic backdrop, I argue that shifts in PIF organization and orientation are fundamentally driven by the centralization of power within the circles of the Saudi ruling family since the rise of Mohammed bin Salman (MBS). The fund's governance framework and network of insiders forming the board of directors mirror the concentration of authority around MBS. In turn, PIF domestic activities shifted from scattered investment patterns associated with the competing influence of senior decision-makers to a highly authoritative and personalized strategy. Moreover, the PIF's response to COVID-19 further exemplifies the turn from a conservative strategy toward a short-term oriented approach to sovereign wealth management. Going beyond macro-level economic and institutional dynamics, the article introduces the role of political agency in SWF choices by stressing how political actors and the distribution of power within ruling elites shape SWFs. The article thus adds to the scholarship on domestic drivers of SWFs and contributes to debates surrounding the interplay between states and markets under processes of financialization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We present a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model in which a resource‐rich government allocates its excess resource rents between a resource stabilization fund and the facilitation of costly domestic fund‐raising activities of sovereign wealth funds (SWF), which holds a portfolio of government‐linked companies (GLCs). Despite being less productive efficient, GLCs' operation benefits from scale economies tied to the resource sector: its profitability is procyclical to commodity shocks. The model is estimated to Malaysia using the Bayesian approach, with the results suggesting a business cycle heavily influenced by resource shocks. Based on this, we solve numerically for a socially optimal combination of excess resource savings allocation. We find the present allocation to be sub‐optimal, regardless of the structural shocks. This suggests that the Malaysian economy might have hit its absorptive capacity constraint (i.e., a domestic economy saturated by GLCs). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies the dynamic asset allocation problem faced by an infinitively lived commodity-based sovereign wealth fund under incomplete markets. Assuming that the fund receives a non-tradable stream of commodity revenues until a predetermined date, the optimal consumption and investment strategies are state and time-dependent. Using data from the Norwegian Petroleum Fund, we find that the optimal demand for equity should decrease gradually from 60% to 40% over the next 60 years. However, the solution is particularly sensitive to the correlation between oil and stock price changes. We also estimate wealth-equivalent welfare losses, relative to the optimal rule, when following alternative suboptimal investment rules. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recent geopolitical uncertainty and the alarming increase in the sovereign credit risk of many countries have motivated us to investigate the potential asymmetric co-movement between geopolitical risk and sovereign credit risk for nineteen countries (China, Russia, USA, Brazil, UK, South Korea, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Sweden, Spain, Norway, Italy, Morocco, France, Bahrain, Abu Dhabi, Japan, and Greece). Using data consisting of Sovereign Credit Default Swap (SCDS), Geopolitical Risk (GPR), and the Quantile-on-Quantile approach (QQA), empirical findings indicate that (i) the effects of GPR on SCDS were heterogeneous, mainly positive, asymmetric, and varied across quantiles and countries; (ii) when the SCDS and GPR are both in upper quantiles, the impacts of GPR are more pronounced; (iii) the countries with the most significant sovereign wealth funds (Norway, China, Saudi Arabia) are less affected by geopolitical uncertainty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper asks whether the policy of benign neglect that the United States (U.S.) government adopted in the 1970s toward foreign purchases of U.S. dollar securities and the price of the U.S. dollar has advanced the ability of the U.S. to achieve its employment, price level, growth, and national security objectives. The dominant objective of some members of the U.S. team at Camp David in August 1971 was to secure an increase in the U.S. trade surplus. One choice for the U.S. government was to increase the U.S. dollar price of gold to $100 or $140 an ounce, much like the increase to $35 an ounce in 1934. The competing choice was to close the gold window. Some members of this team believed that this choice would facilitate the move to a flexible exchange rate arrangement and that the U.S. trade surplus would increase as the price of the U.S. dollar fell. The price of the U.S. dollar has increased since the late 1970s and the purchase of U.S. dollar securities by foreign central banks, sovereign wealth funds, mutual funds, insurance companies, pension funds, and families have meant that U.S. exports of securities have displaced U.S. exports of goods. The U.S. trade surplus morphed into a U.S. trade deficit in the early 1980s, which has increased secularly, and now is nearly four percent of U.S. GDP. U.S manufacturing employment declined from 20 million in 1980 to 13 million in 2020. The increasingly large U.S. trade deficit led to the loss of three million U.S. manufacturing jobs (ball park estimate). Hundreds of factory towns in the Northeast and Midwest were decimated by the increase in the U.S. trade deficit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This part of the chapter will provide a broader view, where Islamic finance should be guided by financing techniques that can increase economic opportunities and be oriented toward all people, especially non-Muslims who are the majority in certain countries. But unfortunately, a lack of understanding of Islamic finance creates obstacles to its development, leading to unfavorable prejudices against Islamic finance. Contemporary Issues in Islamic Law, Economics and Finance: A Multidisciplinary Approach: edited by Flavia Cortelezzi and Alessandro Ferrari, et al., Routledge (2023). [Extracted from the article]

The article discusses a possible new law in New York that would require vulture funds to grant the same refinancing conditions as lending governments when developing countries restructure their debts. Currently, vulture funds can reject agreements reached by other lenders in order to obtain a better deal, which has caused delays and harm to countries in trouble. The new law aims to streamline sovereign debt restructurings and prevent litigation between vulture funds and sovereign governments. Additionally, the article highlights the concentration of technology companies in the S&P 500 stock index and how this can affect investment diversification. Investors are warned that past performance does not guarantee future performance and that they should consider periods of growth, transition, and market decline. [Extracted from the article]

This article is an introduction to the latest issue of the journal "Critical African Studies." The authors express gratitude to the previous co-chairs of the Editorial Board and introduce the new co-chair. The issue features a range of articles that explore topics such as conversational thinking in philosophy, social and economic transitions, the politics of waiting in Morocco, color-blind racism in South Africa, the links between economic accumulation and colonial violence, anti-porn legislation in Uganda, the creation of the "genocide genre," indigenous voices in tourism projects in Zimbabwe, sovereign wealth funds in Botswana, and power dynamics in co-supervision arrangements for PhDs. The authors highlight the fresh critical analysis offered by these articles and invite readers to enjoy reading them. [Extracted from the article]

Copyright of Journal of International Business Studies is the property of Springer Nature and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article discusses lessons from the enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in the sovereign wealth fund laundering conspiracy and bribery scandal involving investment banking company Goldman Sachs and strategic development company 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) .

Since the 1990s, Latin American countries have been receiving numerous investments in information technologies, a process triggered by the current stage of financial capitalism. In Brazil, the use and expansion of fiber optic cabling are linked to the period of insertion of the country in the context of informational globalization. Structural and financial assets controlled by Sovereign Wealth Funds and Private Funds, such as Singapore's GIC and BTG Pactual, respectively, are agents with the ability to produce and organize the territory. Financial investments in technical telecommunication networks print power relations that integrate, articulate and drain this territory at different scales of action. This process leads to the debate of the logic of financialization of the territory and of the different hegemonic agents that are constituting the new dynamics of infrastructure production. Thinking about the maintenance of socio-spatial inequalities associated with investments in fiber optic infrastructure networks, and what are the territorial implications of these investments in the condition of the use of these communication instruments, brings to light how the different geographical objects subscribed in the territory lead to the selective specialization of certain areas. In view of this, this article seeks to contribute to the understanding of the socio-spatial inequalities promoted by the new installations of telecommunication infrastructure, since they are related to the logics of interest of agents of international financial capital. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of AAU Journal of Business & Law is the property of Association of Arab Universities and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)