Search

The article discusses the generic features of Władysław Stanisław Reymont's short story I Killed! in the context of horror fiction. The work's generic status carries specific interpretative implications. Through the language of horror Reymont emphasizes the possible horror of a revolutionary uprising. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Le récit-cadre des Mille et une nuits est composé d'un prologue et d'un épilogue (texte ZER) et soulève des problèmes lorsqu'il appartient à des versions lacunaires qui ne comportent que le prologue (texte G) ou l'épilogue (texte K). Ces problèmes ont été traités du point de vue philologique, rarement d'un point de vue littéraire. En partant d'une série de manques, au sens narratologique de ce terme, que l'on peut relever dans un discours du roi Šāhriyār dans le prologue de G, on va montrer ici comment ces manques sont comblés grâce à Šahrazād dans l'épilogue de K. Des compétences complémentaires, laïques et islamiques, ont été attribuées à l'héroïne pour réussir dans sa tâche: elle connaît la médecine et peut donc soigner le roi par la thérapie du récit en miroir et le guérir ; elle intervient par délégation divine, en réponse aux prières qu'une population qui souffre adresse à Dieu, et peut donc sermonner le roi à l'aide du ḥadīṯ et du Coran et le remettre sur le droit chemin. The frame tale of the Thousand and One Nights is composed of a prologue and an epilogue (ZER text) and raises problems when it belongs to lacunar versions which have only the prologue (G text) or the epilogue (K text). These problems were treated mainly from a philological point of view in the past, but rarely from a literary one. Starting from a series of gaps, in the narratological sense of this term, that can be found in a speech of king Šāhriyār in the prologue of G, it will be shown here how these gaps are filled by Šahrazād in the epilogue of K. Complementary skills, secular and Islamic, have been attributed to the heroine to succeed in her task: she knows medicine and can therefore treat the king through the therapy of the mirror story and heal him; she intervenes by divine delegation, in response to the prayers that a suffering population addresses to God, and can therefore admonish the king with the help of the ḥadīṯ and the Qurʾān and set him back on the right path. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ludwig Wittgenstein repeatedly called religion and faith "madness", "folly", etc. However, this does not mean that he considered it irrational or meaningless. Rather, he saw in it a way of thinking and speaking, a "language-game", that was not explicitly rational, but nevertheless meaningful, and in which there were "entirely different connections" than normal between individual statements. Nor can the language of faith be regarded as conventional, according to Wittgenstein, even if approached from the point of view of the nature of the statements it contains. If, for example, we think that theological statements are factual statements (as if they refer only to existing things or objects), then this language immediately becomes meaningless. The aim of my study is to analyze the "grammar" of this language (the language of faith or religion), using Wittgenstein's notes from different times, paragraphs of his published works, comments made during university lectures, etc., and to describe the correct use of words in it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Critics often suggest that Socrates' portrait of the philosopher's inspired madness in his second speech in Plato's Phaedrus is incompatible with the other types of divine madness outlined in the same speech, namely poetic, prophetic, and purificatory madness. This incompatibility is frequently taken to show that Socrates' characterisation of philosophers as mad is disingenuous or misleading in some way. While philosophical madness and the other types of divine madness are distinguished by the non-philosophical crowd's different interpretations of them, I aim to show that they are not, in fact, presented as incompatible. Socrates' pair of speeches demonstrates that madness can be divided into harmful and beneficial kinds, and in Socrates' key discussion of philosophical madness (249c4-e4), I argue that the crowd correctly recognises that the philosopher is mad on the basis of his eccentricity, but wrongly assumes that the philosopher's madness is of the harmful type because it fails to realise that the philosopher is enthused. Socrates' second speech provides information about human souls and gods which shows that philosophical madness belongs to the beneficial type and so falls under the heading of divine enthusiasm after all. Importantly, human souls and gods are shown in the speech to be roughly isomorphic. Both philosophical and other kinds of divine madness involve having something divine inside a human body (entheos): in the former a human soul has become godlike; in the latter a human soul has been displaced by a god. Because of this, I propose that philosophy is presented as a genuine form of divine madness alongside the other more conventional examples. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper elaborates key factors in Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida's long polemical argument over the question of madness. The paper focuses on Foucault's consideration of a constitutive exclusion underlying the discourse of reason and unreason, as well as his insistence on that exclusion's singular relationship with madness. This exclusion is then developed in psychoanalytic terms augmenting the constitutive gesture that Sigmund Freud attributed to the plurality of subjective structures elaborated in his metapsychology. The psychoanalytic determination of constitutive exclusion is posed as being situated at a privileged position that enables it to consolidate the polemic debate between Foucault and Derrida about madness. By doing so, the intersection of Foucault's theory of madness with Freud's psychoanalysis is shown to be fruitful territory, epitomizing a hospitality to madness—thus, doing justice to Foucault in light of Derrida's critique. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT: On the literary scene, Algerian novels are increasingly asserting themselves through their value, and their aesthetic renewal. Thus, contemporary Algerian novel production preserves its ancestral heritage while renewing its scriptural forms. Our aim is to interrogate the manifestation of this contemporary aesthetic renewal, through Lynda Chouiten's novel 'Une Valse'. This article takes a critical look at the notion of generic hybridity, linguistic hybridization, and narrative polyphony. It seeks to highlight, through a structural and semiotic approach, the set of processes that have enabled the proliferation of genres, languages, and discourses in our corpus. RÉSUMÉ : Sur l’Olympia littéraire, le roman algérien s’impose de plus en plus de par sa valeur et son renouveau esthétique. Ainsi, la production romanesque algérienne contemporaine préserve son héritage ancestral tout en renouvelant les formes scripturales. Notre dessein est d’interroger la manifestation de ce renouveau esthétique contemporain, à travers le roman Une Valse de Lynda Chouiten. Cet article porte un regard critique envers la notion de l’hybridité générique, le métissage linguistique ainsi que la polyphonie narrative. Il s’agit de mettre en évidence, à travers une approche structurale et sémiotique, l’ensemble des procédés ayant permis la profusion des genres, des langues et des discours dans notre corpus

Bu çalışma, deliliğin kültürel temsilini bir sosyal içerme meselesi olarak sorunsallaştırarak yerli televizyon anlatılarında delilik söylemlerine odaklanmaktadır. Çalışma, üretilen söylemlerin yaşanmış deneyimi olan kişileri ne dereceye kadar failliklerini ve deneyimin kolektif boyutlarını öne çıkaracak şekilde güçlendiren veya kişileri nesneleştirme ve deneyimi bireyselleştirme yoluyla güçsüzleştiren mesajlar ürettiğini incelemektedir. Deliliğe dair popüler anlatılar, deliliği bir hastalık veya anomalite olarak gören tıbbi söylemin hakimiyetindedir. Tıbbi perspektiften çerçevelenen bu temsiller, deneyimi bireyselleştirdiği ve karmaşıklığını görünmez kıldığı gerekçesiyle deliliği sosyokültürel perspektiften incelemeyi öneren disiplinlerce eleştirilmiştir. Literatür, son yıllarda televizyon ve sinema anlatılarında deliliğin tıbbi temsillerinin yanı sıra deneyimin farklı katmanlarını ortaya çıkaran sunumlarının da belirmeye başladığını göstermektedir. Bu çalışma, bu verilere dayanarak yerli televizyon anlatılarında delilik temsillerinin çeşitlenip çeşitlenmediğini incelemek için son yılların en popüler televizyon dizilerinden biri olan “Kırmızı Oda”ya odaklanmaktadır. Çalışma engellilik çalışmalarının sunduğu eleştirel perspektiften yararlanarak Kırmızı Oda dizisini Eleştirel Söylem Analizi yöntemiyle çözümlemektedir. Bulgular, Kırmızı Oda dizisinin klişelerin ötesinde bazı alternatif söylemler sunmasına rağmen deliliği baskın bir şekilde hastalık, anomalite ve kişisel bir trajedi olarak çerçeveleyerek hakim söylemleri yeniden ürettiğini göstermektedir. Çalışma, engellilik çalışmalarının eleştirel perspektifini kullanarak, delilik hakkında üretilen popüler anlamları, ayrımcılık, erişilebilirlik ve savunuculuk temaları ile ilişki içinde incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır.

In order to understand the lyric poetry in any language, one should be familiar with the different aspects of its most important concepts. Because despite the common meaning overlap in words such as love and beauty in the world’s lyric poetry, there are still special cultural and linguistic differences without which it’s impossible to properly understand a poetry. One of these concepts is madness and its various images and interpretations in Persian poetry. This article tries to use descriptive – analytical method to examine various aspects to show how a common word finds its way in to Language of lyrical poetry and gradually expands other concepts of the poetry tradition, it becomes permanent, and then due to its parallelism with intellectual currents in the context of history, culture and thought. It is possible not to present it as a discourse in lyrical poetry. The results of this study show how the concept of insanity travels the discours path and undergoes changes from the dictionary meaning with the passage of time and political situation, and it is promoted from the socially unpleasant meaning ti the concept of love and then in the context Mutazila and Ashari philosophical conflicts become a suitable term for anti – rationalism, and with the spreadof Sufi ideas, it becomes a valuale term. And it goes beyond the limit of a mere word and opens its place as a common discourse by expanding the semantic realm and become one of the basic discourses of Persian lyrical poetry

The Marsden Case, Ford’s first published novel after the First World War, has received relatively little critical attention. This paper aims to redress the balance by offering a sustained reading which illustrates how the context of the First World War interacts with a major theme in Ford’s oeuvre, madness. It follows Ford’s maxim that the novel was a place for inquiry and illustrates how Ford’s narrator explores the questions of who succumbs to madness and why. It highlights a debate at work in the novel on the role of talk in creating or curing nervous breakdowns. The novel’s opacity is part of a challenge to the wisdom of directly confronting or revisiting painful experiences, which speaks not only to the effects of the war but to the value of emerging Freudian psychotherapy.

Video games are known for many things, but nuanced portrayals of characters with mental illness might not be one of them. This trend, however, has gradually started to shift with games like Hellblade: Senua’s Sacrifice, which aim to convey a genuine experience of mental illness to the player. Through a close reading of different instances in the game, this paper shows how Hellblade complicates the usual sanist ideas seen in most other games by taking an ambiguous stance, using mental illness as a representational tool. Furthermore, it avoids some of the more sensationalist and problematic tropes often employed in such representations, like the supercrip and the Cartesian divide of the body and mind. In order to show this, we have employed Mitchel and Snyder’s concept of narrative prosthesis to demonstrate how the game does not in fact rely on Senua’s disability as an exotic feature of the narrative to hook players in. By combining insights from disability and mad studies, we show how this game is a step in the right direction when it comes to challenging the perceptions of mental illness prevalent in pop culture.

In Molière's celebrated Le misanthrope, the spectator is witness to an immensely funny, albeit profound staging of the limits of rationality. The comedy exhibits how an idealist idea of the pure sovereignty of reason is ridiculous, self‐contradictory, and mad, since the distinction between ideality and reality, the universal and the particular, the social and the individual, is ignored or even dissolved. The comic art of literature steps forth as a joyous purging and corrective of the highly seductive, but essentially delusional appeals from philosophy and idealism to absolutize reason and thus render oneself sovereign. A totalized reason that nonetheless cancels itself and becomes madness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By interrogating how the original composition and textual reincarnations of Lu Xun's "Diary of a Madman" manifest his idea of an "object in between," this article celebrates an intertextual event in world literature. It traces how Lu Xun's "Diary of a Madman" came into being in conversation with preexisting literary creations and how the intertextual recasting of Lu Xun's story both within and beyond the Sinophone world incorporates postcolonial contexts and recent cyberculture. The intertextuality not only calls for a dynamic negotiation with Lu Xun's "Diary of a Madman" but also involves unexpected engagement with the literary antecedents to Lu Xun's work. By examining the transculturation of cannibalism and insanity in the works of Lu Xun, Liang Wern Fook, Ōe Kenzaburō, and Leonid Andreev, among others, this article reveals how "Diary of a Madman" as an object in between projects a vision of a future that resists the pressures of historical impasse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of the College Of Basic Education is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In this paper, I will argue for two interrelated theses. First, if we take phenomenological psychopathology seriously, and want to understand what it is like to undergo various psychopathological experiences, we cannot treat madpeople’s testimony as mere data for sane clinicians, philosophers, and other scholars to analyze and interpret. Madpeople must be involved with analysis an interpretation too. Second, sane clinicians and scholars must open their minds to the possibility that there may be experiences that other people have, which they nevertheless cannot conceive of. I look at influential texts in which philosophers attempt to analyze and understand depersonalization and thought insertion. They go astray because they keep using their own powers of conceivability as a guide to what is or is not humanly possible to experience. Several experiences labeled inconceivable and therefore impossible by these philosophers, are experiences I have had myself. Philosophers and others would be less likely to make this mistake if they would converse and collaborate more with the madpeople concerned. When this is not feasible, they should nevertheless strive to keep an open mind. Fantastical fiction may have a role to play here, by showing how bizarre experiences may nevertheless be prima facie conceivable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the concept of the uncanny in a postcolonial context, specifically focusing on the slums of Mumbai and the partition of India. The author argues that the uncanny aesthetic can reveal hidden aspects of reality and challenge dominant narratives. By examining literature and psychoanalysis, the author suggests that the uncanny can help readers engage with their own emotions and fantasies, bypassing censorship and facilitating social and political change. The article applies this postcolonial uncanny aesthetic to the short story "Toba Tek Singh" by Saadat Hasan Manto, highlighting the absurdity of partition and its impact on mental health. The article raises questions about the usefulness of the uncanny aesthetic in analyzing real-life social and political conditions. [Extracted from the article]

Madness and collective are two terms that have marched in a disjunct way in history. Its most obvious expression was the construction of the psychiatric asylum, located far from the life of the city. The most current incarnation is that of the individual who lives in the street, within the city, but outside of all ties. These individual lives a new exile without asylum in the collective. From my work as a psychologist in a social center in Paris, I ask myself how to integrate the difference of madness, without erasing it in the name of an ideal, inherent to this - and all - collective. I show that collective and madness are structurally disjunct, but for an institution to be alive, the two terms must be inseparable. The collective must be sufficiently docile, so that everyone can appropriate it as a means of life. If the collective is necessary for every speaking being, it is indispensable for those who cannot find a typical solution to the problems posed by their body and the problems it poses to the social body. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much modern philosophy considers whether addicts--people who have normatively atypical relationships to various substances--possess genuine moral responsibility. Are addicts the subjects of apt attributions of blame, particularly in the context of their drug use and the negative consequences thereof? One group, "choice theorists," tend to think so; another, "disease theorists," think not. Rather than take a side or synthesize them somehow, I argue that we should stop arguing about this question entirely. In order for the discussion to be worthwhile, it must satisfy the basic condition of pragmatic bearing: some action, permissible to execute in reaction to addicts' wrongdoing if they are morally responsible, but impermissible if they are not. I describe the set of arguably harmful actions often performed by addicts and enumerate the common penalties (which I collectively term "addict oppression" or, more neutrally, "addict sanctions") imposed upon them by institutions in response. If the basic condition holds, those who view addicts as morally responsible and those who do not must disagree on the permissibility of at least some such sanctions, on responsibility grounds. But dispatches from the discourse demonstrate that choice and disease theorists generally agree on the appropriateness of the sanctions and on the (nonresponsibilist) nature of the justification. When dispute does arise, it doesn't concern responsibility either. Neither the conclusion that addicts are morally responsible nor the conclusion that they aren't licenses a meaningful change in the social treatment of addicts by nonaddicts and institutions. In particular, discussion of addict moral responsibility is irrelevant to the material conditions of addicts. Finally, I turn to an idiosyncratic attitude of indecision about addict responsibility, often detectable in the literature and in public life. I suggest that this indecision reflects the uneasy superimposition of two distinct possible addict futures--recovery and liberation--and hang my hat on liberation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper concerns the common features exhibited by geniuses and the ingredients which forms the recipe for a genius. It analyses the creativity of some of the most remarkable geniuses of mankind who have generated scientific theories and inventions, which brought our civilization further and further, in both, technology and in understanding our Universe. It presents what these geniuses had in common and what differentiated them from the common people, and also how they succeeded to achieve what they created. In its last section, this paper analyses the question whether A.I. could be brilliant or not and gives extensive explanations for the verdict regarding the potential brilliance of A.I. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article locates performance creation as a strategy for enacting mad praxis. We begin by offering an overview of popular notions of madness, paying careful attention to spatial metaphors that position madness as "out there" and, therefore, beyond the realm of politics. In response, drawing on sources in mad studies, disability studies, and disability performance practice, we counter this depoliticization by positioning madness as a meaningful social location from which to perceive and intervene in the politics of space. Taking the question, "Where is madness?" as a point of departure, we then put this framework into action through performative, polyvocal analysis of our collaborative digital performance, The Mad Maps Project. Weaving together theoretical analysis, embodied inquiry, and critical reflection, we argue that, when approached as a form of mad praxis, performance offers powerful tools for conceptualizing and conveying mad experiences and their political effects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper stems from the challenge of translating Pirandello's plays into Swahili and is aimed to open up a polylogue between Italian and Swahili literature. Therefore, in searching for connections between Luigi Pirandello's and Penina Muhando's plays, this paper will explore multiple masks engaged in a reciprocal dialogue among the following six selected plays: Enrico IV ('Henry IV,' Pirandello 1921); Così è, Se vi pare ('It is so, if you think so!' Pirandello 1917); Il Berretto a Sonagli ('Cap and bells,' Pirandello 1916); Pambo ('Decoration,' Muhando 1975); Nguzo mama ('The Mother Pillar,' Muhando 1982); and Lina ubani ('An Antidote to Rot,' Muhando 1984). In conclusion, this study will illustrate how different forms of sociohistorical alienation, which encircle the twentieth century, are stylistically represented in these plays through the characters who wear the masks of madness, or 'sage-madness.' To allow an in-depth analysis of the plays this study will be divided into two parts. Part one will examine Enrico IV ('Henry IV,' Pirandello 1921) and Pambo ('Decoration,' Muhando 1975). Part Two will examine Così è, Se vi pare ('It is so, if you think so!' Pirandello 1917); Nguzo mama ('The Mother Pillar,' Muhando 1982); Il Berretto a Sonagli ('Cap and bells,' Pirandello 1916); and Lina ubani ('An Antidote to Rot,' Muhando 1984). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The several editions of Schumann's diaries refer us to at least two drinking styles in his university years, both of them with a flavour of "wine, women and song" fraternities. He plunged headlong into all this for a start, finding it elevating and then considering it self-medicating. He drank to excess for a while but he stopped short, unable to go further to the bitter end because he could not develop a tolerance and mostly because he was afraid of madness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Matéi Visniec's play Paparazzi ou La Chronique d'un lever de soleil avorté presents a vision of the end of the world, brought about by the implosion of the Sun. The action of the dramatic play focuses on the protagonists' reactions to the impending catastrophe, rather than on the apocalyptic event itself. Visniec uses the metaphor of the apocalypse as a tool to criticize society and its loss of values. He depicts how a consumer society can demoralize individuals, leading to their isolation and inability to engage in interpersonal communication. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Erciyes Communication / Erciyes İletişim Dergisi is the property of Erciyes University, Faculty of Communication / Erciyes Universitesi Iletism Fakultesi and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The institutional organization of psychiatry in Poland when it became independent faced the problem of the integration of three ex-partition territories having different laws, health-care systems and psychiatric cultures. Due to the high incidence of mental health problems, among which psychosis was the most frequent, psychiatric care facilities had to be organized as quickly and efficiently as possible and had to address the issue of psychosis both conceptually and practically. This study investigates the concept of psychosis and methods of its treatment in inter-war Polish psychiatric care facilities in relation to the sociocultural context of the institutional organization of psychiatry in Poland and the influence of major European concepts and treatment practices regarding psychoses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A basic question of philosophy of psychiatry is "what is madness (mental illness, mental disorder...)?" Contemporary thinkers err by framing the problem as one of defining madness in contrast with sanity. For the Late Modern theorist of madness, the problem was not one of defining madness in contrast with sanity, but in contrast with "idiocy"—the apparent diminution or abolition of one's reasoning power. This altered reading of the problem has an important consequence. For what distinguishes madness from idiocy is not the failure, absence, or lack of reason, but its presence—albeit in a perverse and mutated form. For the Late Modern theorist, madness was always, by its very nature, infused with reason. This "infusion" of madness by reason has two consequences for philosophy of psychiatry today: it reframes the project of defining "mental disorder," and it provides intellectual scaffolding for the emerging movement known as Mad Pride, mad resistance, or mad activism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

1. Introduction One of the fundamental concepts of lyrical poetry is the concept of madness and many images and interpretations of it that can be seen in Persian poetry. This article tries to use descriptive – analytical method to examine various aspects to show how a common word finds its way into language of lyrical poetry and gradually expands other concepts of the poetry tradition, it becomes permanent, and then due to its parallelism with intellectual currents in the context of history, culture and thought. It is possible not to present it as a discourse in lyrical poetry. The results of this study show how the concept of insanity travels the discours path and undergoes changes from the dictionary meaning with the passage of time and political situation, and it is promoted from the socially unpleasant meaning ti the concept of love and then in the context Mu’tazila and Ash’ari philosophical conflicts become a suitable term for anti – rationalism, and with the spread of Sufi ideas, it becomes a valuale term. And it goes beyond the limit of a mere word and opens its place as a common discourse by expanding the semantic realm and become one of the basic discourses of Persian lyrical poetry in the scope of the poetry of great poets. 2. Methodology Present study applies a descriptive-analytical method with the use of library tools. To this end, first, the related literature regarding the topic was studied and reviewed in three areas of research including 1) divine madness and the rational of madmen, 2) description of madness in "Leili and Majnoon” poems, and 3) the contrast between madness and wisdom in Persian poems. Based on the scope of the research literature, it has been necessary to study and examine the evolution and transformation of the fundamental concepts of "madness and fascination" from the beginning to the peak and evolution of Persian poetry - that is, in the era of Hafez. To do this, a case study of the poems developed by the prominent poets from the 4th to 8th centuries (AH) was conducted. The important poems related to the discussion were selected and classified, and the content of poems with themes of madness, mania, and hypocrisy, etc., were analyzed in the main stage of the study. 3. Discussion As different researchers have perceived, the concept of madness in Persian literature has had different degrees and layers of meaning. In mystical literature, the concept of madness is often conceived of as a contrast to conventional reasoning, and this concept is used to mean spiritual insanity, which is considered as a positive transcendence. As an example, even during the first decades of the 1st century (AH), the madness of the Sufis was constantly referred to as the "madness of the wise" because their behaviors, conducts, and speech were not similar to the customs and traditions of the society. But despite their appearance, people, especially the wise, observed some characteristics in them that indicated knowledge and wisdom, and for this reason, they were described as insightful and sometimes they were referred to as "the insane wise". Madness is also used in lyrical poems to refer to the psychological ramifications of the physical love. "Physical love sometimes leads to madness. Most scholars believe that physical love is in contrast to reasoning and it is not compatible with rational mind, and apparently one of the reasons why love was called insanity was its incompatibility with rational thinking and reasoning" (Medi, 1992). Part of the meaning of the word "madness" which is the primary and literal meaning of the word can be seen in all eras. On the other hand, part of the concept of insanity revolves around the literary traditions and the content and propositions of mystical and lyrical poetry, which will be discussed further in detail. During the Sasanid dynasty, abundance of wealth, favorable economic conditions, and incentives for poets led to an expansion of Persian literature and language and thereby the lyrical poetry. This, in turn, created a new phase of change to the concept of madness. From the sixth century of Hijri onwards, the poems created by most poets are full of the concept of "madness", and madness from this time onwards is given a sublime meaning in the poems of Persian poets. Madness is no longer associated with the inferior meaning that is usually perceived of the word. This concept is presented in the form of a new discourse, in contrast to reasoning, and it has influenced the thinking of poets for the later periods. Another important literary factor that has had an important impact on the development of the concept of madness is undoubtedly the composition of Nezami’s "Leili and Majnoon”. The story of Leili and Majnoon, which is "a kind of borrowing from an excused love in Arabic literature" (Ghanimi Hilal, 2013) was only seen in the form of hints and references in the poetry of previous poets, but it appeared as an independent poem in Persian literature thanks to the efforts made by Nizami Ganjavi. In this collection of poems, romantic madness reaches its peak and finds a sublime meaning. During the following periods, the discourse of madness in the poems of prominent poets (Attar, Rumi and Hafez) has outlined and proved its true nature and existence in a way that poets encourage people to go crazy; With a mystical perspective, Molana Balkhi comes to the conclusion that the essence of the desired cannot be reached with a selfish and expedient mind. In order to fulfill his real objective, which is to discover and intuit the truth and conduct an expedition in the spiritual world, he derives from the power of insanity above reasoning and prefers it to the superficial trivial mind. In Hafez's poems, too, the detail-oriented intellect is condemned in every way. In his poems, "Madness" is sometimes presented openly and sometimes referred to indirectly. In his poems madness is sometimes associated with love and it is sometimes presented in contrast to reasoning. In his poems, madness is the first step on the way to Leili's home (the beloved and the truth) (Hafez, 1399). 4. Conclusion The concept of madness changes during the course of time and based on the social and cultural context, and it goes beyond the limits of a mere lexical field and even becomes a suitable means of opposing wisdom. A heavenly meaning is associated with madness with the proliferation of the Sufi ideas to become a valuable terminology. It begins to be used as a basic discourse in Persian lyrical poetry within the scope of the poetry compiled by great Persian poets. Present study makes it clear that the discourse of madness with its multiple meanings has gradually matured to reach perfection and the early poets who looked at the concept in a more realistic way have also played an important role within this process. With the mystical poetry and the intermediate style of the sixth century, this significant process approaches the realm of Sufism, and social criticism or the mystical wonder and insanity. These experiences and favoring madness and infatuation is substantiated in the seventh and eighth centuries giving it a positive meaning to the point where madness and insanity turns to one of the functions of the mystical poetry. The battle between reasoning and love and the victory of love and heart over wisdom and reasoning has paved the way for more insanity and favoring of this basic theme and concept. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Poligramas is the property of Universidad del Valle and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Written in an interlanguage of English and Chinese, Jong Ah Siug's autobiography "The Case" (1872) is rich in ambiguity; this makes it urgently in need of interpretation. Tried unfairly and detained in a lunatic asylum, Jong wrote "The Case" to narrate the cause, process, and aftermath of a fight to prove his innocence, yet unknowingly he introduced another case with the use of highly individualized language: does his "nonsense" imply that he was of unsound mind? This article will analyze "The Case", first to deduce what Jong's case really is, what it tells us about Australian colonial culture, and how medical knowledge was powerfully channeled in the colony. Secondly it will examine the case of "The Case": how the text is accepted by contemporary critics, translators, and psychiatrists, why they are prone to regard the narrator as mad, and what part language plays in the construction of Jong's insanity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much modern philosophy considers whether addicts—people who have normatively atypical relationships to various substances—possess genuine moral responsibility. Are addicts the subjects of apt attributions of blame, particularly in the context of their drug use and the negative consequences thereof? One group, “choice theorists,” tend to think so; another, “disease theorists,” think not. Rather than take a side or synthesize them somehow, I argue that we should stop arguing about this question entirely. In order for the discussion to be worthwhile, it must satisfy the basic condition of pragmatic bearing: some action, permissible to execute in reaction to addicts’ wrongdoing if they are morally responsible, but impermissible if they are not. I describe the set of arguably harmful actions often performed by addicts and enumerate the common penalties (which I collectively term “addict oppression” or, more neutrally, “addict sanctions”) imposed upon them by institutions in response. If the basic condition holds, those who view addicts as morally responsible and those who do not must disagree on the permissibility of at least some such sanctions, on responsibility grounds. But dispatches from the discourse demonstrate that choice and disease theorists generally agree on the appropriateness of the sanctions and on the (nonresponsibilist) nature of the justification. When dispute does arise, it doesn’t concern responsibility either. Neither the conclusion that addicts are morally responsible nor the conclusion that they aren’t licenses a meaningful change in the social treatment of addicts by nonaddicts and institutions. In particular, discussion of addict moral responsibility is irrelevant to the material conditions of addicts. Finally, I turn to an idiosyncratic attitude of indecision about addict responsibility, often detectable in the literature and in public life. I suggest that this indecision reflects the uneasy superimposition of two distinct possible addict futures—recovery and liberation—and hang my hat on liberation.

This study investigates the connection between madness and critiques of the chivalric romance genre in two late Renaissance works, Ludovico Ariosto’s Orlando Furioso and Miguel de Cervantes’s Don Quijote de la Mancha. The satire of chivalric romance in these works of fiction caution against nascent modes of thinking in imperial societies for the implementation of chivalric ideas to inspire and promote imperial conquests in Latin America through juxtaposition with the Muslim and Moorish conquest in the Maghreb and through metaphorical island governance. In order to make such critiques, these novels implement the madness of their parodic knights to disguise their critiques. This practice establishes a precedent which later literature can employ to make sociocultural critique covertly, to the detriment of disability representations as literary devices or metaphors.

After the spread of rationalism and rationality in the Renaissance, the importance of the concepts of poetry and poeticism in various literary works decreased day by day and any irrationality and "madness" was confined within the sanatoriums. Desperate for the results of western rationalism, modern writers tended to look at the semantic, subjective, and non-figurative aspects of poetry in fiction in order to both confront the prevailing wisdom and represent the outcry of "madness" in the form of modern fiction. From the point of view of modern theorists, "poetry" in its new definition was generally associated with an interest in abstraction and irrationality and the rejection of common standards in literature. In this article, we have tried to show the concept of "poetry" and its relation to "madness" through the stylistic components of modern stories in the novel "Shazdeh-Ehtejab". Findings show that in Golshiri's novel "Shazdeh Ehtejab", "poetry" through components such as anti-narrative, ambiguity, nonlinear timing, and attention to the metaphorical construction of sentences and elements such as "madness" and "death", takes the narrative out of the ordinary and in addition to making the text and atmosphere of the story poetic, it creates a meaningful and protesting relationship with the negation of rationalism and attention to "madness" in the modern era.

The themes of past sins have occupied our collective imagination since the dawn of humankind. The ways in which characters are faced with their nemesis have changed throughout history, but the structure of the myth permeates our culture even nowadays. In this essay, Shaky from Simon Spurrier’s Crossed: Wish You Were Here is analysed and compared to Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex to determine if this myth still accurately represents some of our oldest fears, if its structure still serves the purpose of identifying anxieties in our culture, and it the Oedipal process can help explain Shaky’s search for identity.

Historically, women do not appear to be escaping the determination to be insane either by adopting prescribed patterns of femininity or by opposing the attributions. No matter how strong or weak a woman is, in the end, there is always a possibility of the loss of the self that turns them into mad women. This paper examines why and how several female protagonists in Game of Thrones are depicted as insane and hysterical as over time their characters grow stronger. The analogous arrangement of madness and femininity blocks their access to the position of normality in this fictional world. Moreover, female abnormality is a clear form of female normality since, weak or strong, women like Daenerys, Sansa, Arya, or Cersei end up being labeled as insane or hysterical by the patriarchal normativity. In the fictional world of Westeros, madness and gender performative discourses form the framework of behavioral traits that lead its female protagonists towards madness. This paper will use gender theories and Butler’s performative acts to explain the attitudes of the writer as well as the creators of Game of Thrones towards female insanity and the reasons behind the depiction.

Wouter Kusters argues that madness has much to offer philosophy, as does philosophy to madness. In this paper, I support both claims by drawing on a mad phenomenon which I label Radical Psychotic Doubt, or RPD. First, although skepticism is a minority position in epistemology, it has been claimed that anti-skeptical arguments remain unsatisfying. I argue that this complaint can be clarified and strengthened by showing that anti-skeptical arguments are irrelevant to RPD sufferers. Second, there's a debate about whether so-called hinge commitments are beliefs or not. I argue that RPD can be used to strengthen the case that they are. Moreover, if hinges are beliefs, some madpeople are more epistemically rational than some sane philosophers. Third, drawing on my own mad experiences, I challenge evidentialism by presenting a better candidate for a truly forced choice about what to believe than William James' traditional religious example. I further show that in certain psychiatric contexts, evidentialism has more radical implications than Jamesian pragmatism, which comes out as more conservative. Finally, I discuss how philosophical theories like pragmatism and Pyrrhonism can provide inspiration for new and much – needed coping strategies for RPD sufferers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I will examine the question why it is so difficult to understand madness. First, I will examine what the third-person approach of psychosis or madness has to offer, and where its limitations lie with respect to its proper understanding. Next I will examine if and how the first-person perspective on madness contributes to our understanding. I will demonstrate that there is a stalemate between third- and first-person perspectives, which on the one hand hinders a free sight on madness, but which is on the other hand exemplary of the problem that is presented by madness. This turns out to be a paradox that haunts both the concept and experience of madness itself, as well as those who try to understand it. In the fourth section, I will unpack some of the operations of the paradox as it is found both in philosophy and madness, both by their producers as by their consumers. In the fifth section, I will tentatively sketch (im)possibilities of escaping paradoxes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Index: Revista de Arte Contemporaneo is the property of Pontificia Universidad Catolica del Ecuador and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In 1844, Poe likely encountered the American Journal of Insanity through his associate, Dr. Pliny Earle, director of the Bloomingdale Asylum for the Insane. A careful look at the evidence suggests that the journal may have influenced Poe's only fictional description of an asylum in "The System of Doctor Tarr and Professor Fether." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay explores the differences in the narrative forms of mental illness, depending on whether the sources consulted come from published medical histories or archival material. Based on the study of dozens of clinical cases contained in, above all, the institutions of Charenton and Bicêtre, from the late eighteenth century to the 1850s, I argue that the distinctive feature of the clinical case was vehemence rather than delirium. My methodological approach is based on the conceptualization of the forms of experience proposed by the philosopher of history Reinhart Koselleck. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revue Historique (0035-3264) is the property of Presses Universitaires de France and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)