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This article attempts to discuss the views of Banjarese ‘ulama and the legal method used in responding to the issue of polygamy. The Banjarese ulama interviewed are nine. This study reveals the existence of different opinions among the Banjarese ulama. There are many ulama who accept polygamy, the minority being not too rigid in terms of conditions for polygamy, while the majority emphasize rigid conditions. However, there are ulama who reject polygamy due to various considerations and recent conditions. The desire to polygamy can be tolerated, but the conditions are required. The difference of opinions between the Banjarese ulama cannot be separated from the method of Islamic law used in understanding this phenomenon. If related to uṣūl al-fiqh, most views of the Banjarese ulama with regard to polygamy can be concludedas using the method of istiḥsān and dharī‘ah.

While pluralism and minimum harmonisation may have advantages concerning substantive requirements for IP protection there is an argument to be made in favour of establishing further harmonisation concerning rules and principles for legal interpretation of international or regional IP treaties, conventions and other legal instruments. Increasing autonomy of IP Law as a legal discipline and the development of specialisation whiting different IP areas have resulted in different layers of sources of law, comprising specific scopes, validity and enforceability mechanisms. Specialised international, regional and national institutions are creating a body of ‘case-law’ following a specific set of interpretative logic, rules, principles or praxis.This paper reflects on policy options between pluralism and harmonization in two separate levels: (1) the desirability of establishing, or not further harmonization of interpretative rules, criteria and praxis in IP law; (2) whether internal harmonization or systemic coherence between different areas of law and regulation affecting the same object or legal fact is a desirable interpretative objective. The point of departure for the analysis will be emerging technologies, such as for example synthetic biology applications, 3D printing, and gene editing. These are technologies which present a multitude of horizontal challenges crossing different legal disciplines and areas of IP law. These are also technologies which raise interesting social and ethical questions and promise an overlapping wider impact in intellectual property rights. This confluence of circumstances and characteristics strengthen the possibility of actual emergence of a pluralism of legal responses, while making it crucial to debate arguments for using either ‘functional pluralism’ or ‘systemic coherence’ as a policy approach.

Данная работа исследует труды Ф. В. Тарановского, посвященные развитию западноевропейского права. Методы, использованные ученым, можно использовать и в современных реалиях. Как сторонник социологического позитивизма, Тарановский уделял внимание развитию правовых институтов с нескольких сторон: со стороны деятельности государства, со стороны жизни общества; пытался не только проанализировать правовые источники, но и объяснить, почему они появились. Социологический позитивизм не теряет востребованности и в наше время, ведь такое многообразие подходов в сочетании со сравнительно-историческим методом позволяет прогнозировать будущий правовой климат., This paper examines the works of F.V. Taranovskiy dedicated to the development of the Western European law. The methods used by the scientist can also be used in modern realities. As a supporter of sociological positivism, Taranovskiy paid attention to the development of legal institutions from several points of view: from the side of the state, from the side of society; he tried not only to analyze legal sources but also to explain why they appeared. Such a variety of approaches combined with a comparative historical method makes it possible to predict the future legal climate., №2(43) (2018)

The article discusses the role of precedents in the German judicial practice. In the European continental tradition, law enactment is within the legislature, whereas the role of the judiciary is to enforce law. In the continental system, precedent does not constitute a source of law sensu stricto , that is, a formal source of law. In order to guarantee the law utility and, ultimately, the legal certainty, courts interpret legal provisions in a unified manner. It is noteworthy that during the recent years the coherent interpretation of legal provisions and, by the same token, the commitment to law development, have increased. That means that a unified interpretation of law performed by courts may be considered a precedent. In this context, precedents and stare decisis have been replacing the logical interpretation of law in German courts.

En este trabajo se constata un desajuste entre una demanda real y acuciante de un análisis filosófico que permita dar cuenta de la irrupción de nuevos fenómenos en el panorama del derecho y la limitada oferta de herramientas teóricas con que satisfacer esta demanda que aporta el modelo tradicional de ciencia positivista del derecho. Tras el diagnóstico inicial de desajuste entre la oferta y la demanda, se destaca como un problema medular del modelo tradicional de ciencia positivista del derecho su resistencia a asumir una racionalidad de tipo práctico y se defiende la viabilidad de esta forma de pensamiento. El trabajo concluye con una propuesta para la reinvención de la filosofía del derecho del siglo XXI, redefiniendo sus objetivos y replanteando su método. This paper shows a mismatch between a real and pressing demand for a philosophical analysis that allows us to explain the emergence of new phenomena in law, and the limited supply of theoretical tools to satisfy this demand by the traditional model of positivistic science of law. After an initial diagnosis of a mismatch between supply and demand, the resistance of legal positivism to accept practical rationality stands out as a core problem of the traditional model of positivistic science of law and the viability of this way of rationality is defended. The paper concludes with a proposal for the reinvention of the philosophy of law of the 21st century that incorporates new objectives and rethinks its method.

In the positivistic conception of law, sources of law (statute, precedent) are strictly distinguished from other legal materials such as doctrine. Courts as well as academia are, however, beginning to recognise the legal relevance of doctrine and case law of lower courts. This acceptance of such epistemic sources is justified within the rule of law if we recognise that courts and legislators do not create law in a vacuum, but rather build on a prior body of legal knowledge. This is relevant to legal argumentation and legal methodology, as it explicates that we have to take epistemic sources into account. This approach is supported by the recent epistemological recognition of testimony as source of knowledge. The epistemological approach to law offers an explanation to the recognition of precedents as source of law, and the authority of non-binding texts, thereby being suitable to a multi-level legal order where authority is more fluid than in traditional positivism.

In the positivistic conception of law, sources of law (statute, precedent) are strictly distinguished from other legal materials such as doctrine. Courts as well as academia are, however, beginning to recognise the legal relevance of doctrine and case law of lower courts. This acceptance of such epistemic sources is justified within the rule of law if we recognise that courts and legislators do not create law in a vacuum, but rather build on a prior body of legal knowledge. This is relevant to legal argumentation and legal methodology, as it explicates that we have to take epistemic sources into account. This approach is supported by the recent epistemological recognition of testimony as source of knowledge. The epistemological approach to law offers an explanation to the recognition of precedents as source of law, and the authority of non-binding texts, thereby being suitable to a multi-level legal order where authority is more fluid than in traditional positivism.

In the positivistic conception of law, sources of law (statute, precedent) are strictly distinguished from other legal materials such as doctrine. Courts as well as academia are, however, beginning to recognise the legal relevance of doctrine and case law of lower courts. This acceptance of such epistemic sources is justified within the rule of law if we recognise that courts and legislators do not create law in a vacuum, but rather build on a prior body of legal knowledge. This is relevant to legal argumentation and legal methodology, as it explicates that we have to take epistemic sources into account. This approach is supported by the recent epistemological recognition of testimony as source of knowledge. The epistemological approach to law offers an explanation to the recognition of precedents as source of law, and the authority of non-binding texts, thereby being suitable to a multi-level legal order where authority is more fluid than in traditional positivism.

This article aims to analyze the Modern Rationality and Legal Method in the light of Plato's Myth of the Cave. The structure of the Myth of the Cave presents the awakening of common sense to science. The journey made by the prisoner symbolizes the changing historical context: the Christian Middle Ages to modernity. The modern rationality emerges with new philosophical and scientific perspective. In this context, thinkers such as Francis Bacon, René Descartes, Gaston Bachelard and Karl Popper, thinking that contributed to the scientific method arise. His ideas allow us to think the legal method. In this perspective, the jurist must abandon the dogmatic right shadows and meet new dynamic to think openly and legal dialectic method in the light of reason, a critical dynamic., O presente artigo tem por objetivo analisar a Racionalidade Moderna e Método Jurídico à luz do Mito da Caverna de Platão. A estrutura do Mito da Caverna apresenta o despertar do senso comum à ciência. O caminho realizado pelo prisioneiro simboliza a mudança de contexto histórico: da Idade Média cristã à modernidade. A racionalidade moderna surge com nova perspectiva filosófica e científica. Neste contexto, surgem pensadores como Francis Bacon, René Descartes, Gaston Bachelard e Karl Popper, que contribuíram para pensar o método científico. Suas ideias possibilitam pensar o método jurídico. Nesta perspectiva, o jurista deve abandonar sombras do direito dogmático e conhecer novas dinâmicas para se pensar o método jurídico à luz da razão, numa dinâmica crítica, aberta e dialética.

A partir de esta idea: el método jurídico se ha de adaptar a la conformación de las fuentes pragmáticas del derecho, el autor delimita y distingue la teoría del derecho de la filosofía del derecho; para ello, primero, describe las materias que preocupan a la teoría del derecho; y, en seguida, a partir de esa delimitación distingue esa disciplina respecto de las demás fronterizas preocupadas del derecho; en especial, con la filosofía del derecho. Based on the idea that the legal method must adapt to the structure of the pragmatic sources of law, the author delimits and distinguishes the theory of law from the philosophy of law. To do this, he first describes the matters concerning the theory of law and then, based on this delimitation, he distinguishes this discipline from other related disciplines dealing with law, especially the philosophy of law.

Mówiąc o analogii w prawie ma się zazwyczaj na myśli stosowanie prawa na zasadzie analogii, a konkretnie – wnioskowanie per analogiam o obowiązywaniu danej normy prawnej z przepisu prawnego (analogia legis), tudzież z prawa w ogóle (analogia iuris). Jest to przy tym nie tyle co odrębna metoda stosowania prawa, co metoda jego interpretacji. Mówić tu należy o wykładni sensu largo – wnioskowaniu prawniczym opartym na stosunku podobieństwa, zmierzającym do sformułowania w oparciu o aksjologię systemu prawnego przesłanki większej sylogizmu prawniczego na potrzeby danej sprawy. Od wykładni sensu stricto odróżnia ją zatem rezultat w postaci decyzji interpretacyjnej „odrywającej się” od tekstu prawnego – danemu predykatowi przyporządkowywane zostają desygnaty, które nie mieszczą się w jego zakresie znaczeniowym. Z uwagi jednak na ową aksjologię rozstrzygnięcie to często okazać się właściwsze. Mając to na względzie, praca niniejsza zmierzać będzie do omówienia analogii jako odrębnej metody prawniczej, której nadać się przy tym winno status równorzędnej innym zabiegom interpretacyjnym. Discussing analogy in law one usually thinks about using law on the base of analogy, particularly – inferring per analogiam about validity of one legal norm from the specific legal provision (analogia legis) or from the legal system as a whole (analogia iuris). However, this is not so much a separate method of law application but the method of its interpretation. It is interpretation sensu largo - legal inference based on the resemblance relationship, aiming at formulating, basing on the axiology of the legal system, major premise of the legal syllogism for the need of a case. It is distinguished from the interpretation sensu stricto by the result in the form of decision of interpretation, stemming not from the legal text – to one predicate are assigned designates, which are not in its scope of meaning. Because of the axiology, this decision will often turn out to be the right one. Bearing this in mind, this paper discusses the analogy as a separate legal method, which should be considered equal to the other methods of interpretation.

わが国においては歴史的経緯から独自の土地利用が形成されてきた。しかしながらこのことは，水害リスクに関しては減ることのない構造となっている。したがって根源的な変質が迫られている。そこで本稿では減災を目的とするソフト対策についてのレビューを行い，もって土地利用用途の改変を実現させることを目指した。具体的には，法律および行政の対応の点では開発に関する法律と抑制を目指す法律の構造・背景，諸外国での類例，地震分野および学際的な分野からの取り組みおよびそこから得られる示唆について，それぞれ検討した。, Original land-use has created in Japan, historically. And that was constructed one structure which cannotreduce flood risks. So, fundamental change was forced to Japanese society. I aimed land-use change byreviewing soft-typed methods which are able to mitigate flood risks. I showed the aspects such as law andadministrative backgrounds, foreign studies, earthquake studies and transe-bounary studies.

This first part of this paper consists of a personal review of the scientific nature of Criminal Law (which is rejected), of the constant influence of Politics on Law (whichis regrettable) and the deductive or inductive legal method (which is demythologised,because much of it constitutes wishful thinking). As a result of these assertions, it isargued that the system is made for man and not man for the system; what matters is that a legal solution for a social conflict be reasonable, rather than systematic. Applying these conclusions to the traditional problem of the criminal liability of legalentities, it is understood that the reply should not be abstract, but concrete, and should it prove to be advantageous for the ends pursued by Criminal Law, it isadvisable to legally declare this liability, despite its being fictitious, because the Lawis not a product for philosophy but for real life. The author believes that currently this advantage is provided by the belief that this statement reinforces general prevention asthe objective of Criminal Law. In the second part of this paper, the principles that should orient the introduction of this question in the Spanish legal code are indicated, differentiating the legal liability of a physical person who commits a crimeand the liability of a legal entity, which has created the necessary setting for it. Finally, constructive criticism is made of the proposed organic law of 15 January 2007, which reforms that Spanish legal code of 1995, introducing the criminal liability of legalentities. La primera parte del trabajo constituye una revisión personal del carácter científico del Derecho penal (que se rechaza), de la influencia constante de la Política sobre el Derecho (que se lamenta) y del método jurídico deductivo o inductivo (que se desmitifica, porque en él hay mucho de voluntarismo). Como consecuencia de este planteamiento se sostiene que el sistema es para el hombre y no el hombre parael sistema, y que lo que importa de una solución jurídica para un conflicto social esque sea razonable y no sistemática. Aplicando las conclusiones obtenidas al tradicional problema de la responsabilidad penal de las personas jurídicas, se entiende que la respuesta no ha de proceder en abstracto sino en concreto, y, si resulta alguna ventajapara los fines del Derecho penal, es oportuno declarar legalmente esa responsabilidad,aunque se trate de una ficción, porque el Derecho no es un producto filosófico sino para la vida. El autor piensa que en la actualidad la citada ventaja la proporciona la creencia de que con esa declaración se fortifica la prevención general como fin del Derecho penal. En la segunda parte del trabajo, se apuntan los principios que deberían orientar la introducción de esta cuestión en el Código penal español, distinguiendo entre la responsabilidad personal del individuo que comete materialmente el delito y la responsabilidad de la persona colectiva que ha proporcionado el marco adecuado para ello. Finalmente, se critica constructivamente el proyecto de ley orgánica de 15 de enero de 2007, por el que se reforma el Código penal español de 1995 para introducir la responsabilidad penal de las personas jurídicas.

The article starts with the observation of A. F. Chalmers, philosopher of science, that there is neither a common concept of science, nor a common concept of scientific method which could be applied for every scientific branch in every stage of its evolution. The uncertainty of the definition of modern science could be indicated as the first problem in the discussion on the scientific character of law. The second problem arises when one tries to define the concepts of legal science and jurisprudence. The author of the article states that these concepts represent different approaches towards legal research: legal science focuses on value- neutral criteria, ideas, characteristics, considers legal norms as objectively existing social facts. Jurisprudence, in its turn, analyzes legal practice ant its methods “from the inside”, emphasizes legal knowledge, reasonableness, just decisions. According to some European legal scholars whose thoughts are discussed in the article, it is reasonable to indicate the specific branches of theoretical legal sciences, such as, for example, general theory of law, philosophy of law, history of law, law sociology, law and economics, law epistemology, law methodology, law and artificial intelligence studies, as well as general jurisprudential discourse. A definition of the object of legal science, as another source of uncertainty, is analyzed in the second part of the article. The question of the object of legal science is identical to the question of the nature of law. It is well known that discussions on this issue have been indeed frequent and no conclusion has yet been reached. Nine definitions of law are discussed in this part: law as a system of legally binding norms, law as a social practice, law as a product of legal doctrine, law as an ideal construction, law as an institutional fact, law divided into the input law and the output law, law as a moral imperative of a particular society, etc. Finally, some remarks on legal methodology are made. The traditional legal attitude which concentrates on the methods of interpretation of law is considered to be too narrow. The importance of argumentation, hermeneutics, coherence theories, together with logic and analysis for jurisprudence is stressed. Besides the abovementioned issues, the diversity of the approaches to legal methodology is regarded as another factor determining the complexity of the scientific character of legal science and jurisprudence. Konferencijos pavadinimu pasėjus tam tikrą abejonę teisės mokslu kaip reiškiniu („Kaip galimas teisės mokslas?“), o šio straipsnio pavadinimu teisės mokslo bei jurisprudencijos moksliškumą įvardijus problema , tikslinga būtų pradėti nuo pačių pirminių sąvokų analizės – ką turime omenyje sakydami teisės mokslas? jurisprudencija? moksliškumas? Ar jurisprudencijos ir teisės teorijos, teisės filosofijos sąvokos laikytinos sinonimais, ar kiekviena iš jų reiškia skirtingą teisės tyrimo būdą, metodologiją, požiūrį į teisę? Ar moksliškumą tapatiname su tiesos nustatymu, ar renkamės pliuralistinę mokslo sampratą, o gal apsiribojame „mokslinių“ metodų, „patikimos“ metodologijos paieška? Straipsnyje atkreipiamas dėmesys į tai, kad egzistuoja mažiausiai dvi skirtingos požiūrių į teisės tyrinėjimus kryptys – sąlyginai jas galime įvardyti moksline ir jurisprudencine kryptimis. Konstatuojamas teisės mokslo objekto sampratos nevienareikšmiškumas, lemiantis ir paties teisės mokslo daugialypiškumą. Pastabomis apie jurisprudencijos metodologiją parodoma, kad metodo klausimas teisėje taip pat problemiškas.

This article presents a legal method that can be used to find solutions to the challenges of regulating Internet technology. The method consists of ten steps and the reader is guided through the application of these steps. To illustrate the use of the method, it is applied to the research task of finding a solution to the conundrum of regulating cross-border data flows on the Internet. Thus, the article has two distinct aims, and it should benefit anyone with an interest in research methodology, as well as those interested in the regulation of privacy in general, and on an international level, in particular.

In this article the author presents Latour’s negative analysis of modernity and his positive ethnographical studies of the modes of existence of our modern world. I will discuss the merits and disadvantages of his specific approach on law – an insti‐ tutional ethnography of the French Conseil d’Etat – within this framework. The analysis will be supplemented with the results of a conflict-based approach to a case study in patent law at a law firm.