Search

The purpose of the article is to study fictions as a legal category, their place in the system of non-typical legal regulations, to conduct a scientific and theoretical analysis of the procedure for applying legal fictions in practical activities, as well as to determine their place in the system of modern means of legal technique. Research methods: the study is based on general scientific methods as well as specific legal methods, with the help of which various scientific positions and doctrinal approaches to the development of ideas regarding understanding the concept and essence of legal fictions, as well as their significance in legal sphere, have been analyzed. One of the main methods used is the dialectical method, which made it possible to establish and distinguish the qualitative characteristics of the phenomenon under study. The use of the historical method made it possible to investigate the prerequisites for the emergence and spread of legal fictions in legal practice as well as the formation of views on the essence, content and purpose of this legal category. Results: the result of the scientific work is the development of theoretical provisions, on the basis of which legal fiction is defined as a practice of legal technique, with the help of which an apparently non-existent fact is recognized as the one that exists or, on the contrary, an existing fact is recognized as the one that does not exist. By imitating reality, this practice is used to create a rule of law, which, in case of insufficiency or ineffectiveness of existing legal means, regulates social relations arising in objective reality. Also, by emphasizing special characteristics, the authors proved the importance of this universal practice of legal technique, which is not only a carrier of legislative policy, but also a tool that ensures the improvement of the effectiveness of the legal mechanism, the achievement of a higher level of law and order, and strengthening of state discipline. Discussion: legal fiction directs the process of cognition of factual circumstances to the establishment of a fact presumed in accordance with the law in case of presence of related circumstances. Fiction contributes to the justification of knowledge about a fact. This is the procedural purpose of legal assumption, that is, fiction. In the process of proving the factual circumstances of the case, legal assumption (fiction) acts as a means of their legal qualification. The use of fictions in judicial proceedings contributes to the administration of justice, exercise of right to legal protection, etc. Therefore, the spread of legal fictions and the recent growth of their role are completely natural processes, which are connected with the reformation of legal regulation, the emergence of fundamentally new branches of scientific and theoretical knowledge. Мета статті полягає у вивченні фікцій як правової категорії, їх місця в системі нетипових нормативно-правових приписів, проведенні науково-теоретичного аналізу порядку застосування юридичних фікцій в практичній діяльності, а також визначенні місця в сучасній системі засобів юридичної техніки. Методологічну основу дослідження склали загальнонаукові та спеціально юридичні методи пізнання, за допомогою яких проаналізовано різні наукові позиції та доктринальні підходи до вироблення уявлень щодо розуміння поняття та сутності юридичних фікцій, а також їх значення в правовій сфері. Одним із основних використаних методів є діалектичний метод пізнання, який дозволив встановити та виокремити якісні характеристики досліджуваного феномену. Завдяки історичному методу досліджено передумови появи та поширення юридичних фікції в юридичній практиці, а також формування поглядів щодо сутності, змісту та призначення даної правової категорії. Результати: розробка теоретичних положень, на основі яких юридичну фікцію визначено як прийом юридичної техніки, за допомогою якого здійснюється визнання явно неіснуючого факту таким, що існує або навпаки – існуючого таким, що не існує. Даний прийом шляхом імітації реальності використовується для створення норми права, яка за умови недостатності чи малоефективності існуючих правових засобів регулює суспільні відносини, що виникають в об’єктивній дійсності. Також авторами на основі виділення особливих характеристик доведено значення даного універсального прийому юридичної техніки, який є не лише носієм законодавчої політики, а й інструментом, що забезпечує підвищення ефективності механізму дії права, досягнення вищого рівня правопорядку та зміцнення державної дисципліни. Обговорення: юридична фікція спрямовує процес пізнання фактичних обставин на встановлення передбачуваного відповідно до закону факту в разі наявності пов’язаних із ним обставин. Фікція сприяє обгрунтуванню знання про факт. А це і є процесуальне призначення юридичного припущення, тобто фікції. У процесі доведення фактичних обставин справи юридичне припущення (фікція) відіграє роль засобу їх юридичної кваліфікації. Застосування фікцій в судочинстві сприяє здійсненню правосуддя, реалізації права на судовий захист тощо. Тож поширення юридичних фікцій і зростання їх ролі останнім часом є цілком закономірним процесом, що пов’язане з реформацією правового регулювання, появою в ньому принципово нових галузей науково-теоретичного знання.

Black loyalists in the American Revolution were early crafters of modern international asylum. Using testimony and document-gathering, enslaved people within British lines transformed themselves fr...

Legal certainty is one of the crucial law characteristics. However, legal uncertainty has both downsides and upsides thus they must be considered to be its common quality, its particular feature. Despite quite an advanced procedural legal relations regulation level due to form of action requirements, the presence of uncertain generally evaluative notions and categories in provisions of branches of procedure law is determined by the multiplicity of such legal relations. The subject of the study carried out by the author deals with specific ways of legal uncertainty manifestation in procedural legal relations regulation while justice in civil(commercial, administrative) cases is administered; the author also pays attention to identifying characteristics of specific legal instruments application in order to overcome(eliminate) such uncertainties within legal relations regulation mechanism. An application of provisions and principles, unconventional(non-traditional, innovative) sources of procedural law(law doctrine, judicial precedent), interpretations and concrete definitions, structures of presumption and legal fiction, statutory analogy and legal analogy has been suggested to be attributed to legal instruments aiming at elimination of uncertainties within legal relations regulation mechanism. The author argues that turning legal uncertainty into certainty in the area of procedural law should be carried out at the discretion of a law-enforcer when it comes to application of specific provisions, categories and structures within actual reality, social development dynamics and improvements in rights and responsibilities of participants in legal relations.

The paper highlights the main stages of the formation of such a philological and legal phenomenon as a metaphor. From ancient times to the present time, the "metaphorical imperative" has determined the most important aspects of the emerging legal reality. The transfer of meanings in jurisprudence took the form of analogy and the objective influence of symbolization and virtual legal structures.Metaphors were also considered as factors of the formation of legal theories acting as some kind of "preforms". Metaphors did not perceive existing similarities, but they themselves created them. This was their significance as "demiurg tools". Therefore, metaphorical expression produced effects rather than meanings, but meanings leading to change. The birth of a new legal meaning was largely spontaneous and unpredictable: it is known that law enforcement sometimes differs from the original intention of the lawmaker and legislator. For the precise establishment of the content of the law, legal knowledge of its original meaning is also necessary. The hermeneutic problem is to bridge the gap between the law and the incident. A change in the social or political situation should not determine the current law to obsolescence: the inherent irrational elasticity of a legal idea provides a field of action.There are also "resonating" metaphors that induce a large number of implications, stimulating new interpretations that reveal hidden implications. Thus, a certain loss of meaning inevitably takes place.The paper clarifies: in the history of law, the metaphor has gone from mythological and traditional ideas to modern legal fiction and "simulacrum".

Les générations futures n’existent pas encore, mais leurs conditions de vie sont déjà affectées. L’origine de ce péril réside dans la fracture originelle du lien entre les générations actuelle et future. La responsabilité délictuelle constitue un levier puissant de protection des générations futures. Le sort des générations futures relève de l’intérêt général. Partant, leur protection se situe au sommet de la hiérarchie des intérêts. Forte de cette primauté, la Fraternité va restaurer le lien transgénérationnel en justifiant des obligations à la charge des générations actuelles et la responsabilité va renforcer ce lien. Enfin, cette primauté va justifier la régulation des comportements actuels, contraires aux intérêts des générations futures, régulation qui repose sur la neutralisation des atteintes et sur la force dissuasive de la créance transgénérationnelle publiée dans les comptes des sociétés. Future generations do not exist yet, but their living conditions are already affected. The origin of this danger lies in the original fracture of the link between current and future generations.Tort liability constitutes a powerful lever for the protection of future generations. The fate of future generations is in the general interest. Therefore, their protection is at the top of the hierarchy of interests. Strengthened by this primacy, fraternity will restore the transgenerational link by justifying the obligations incumbent on current generations and responsibility will strengthen this link. Finally, this primacy will justify the regulation of current behaviors, contrary to the interests of future generations, regulation which is based on the neutralization of the attacks and on the deterrent force of the transgenerational debt published in the accounts of the companies.

The paper questions the extraterritorial nature of foreign private law applied by the national law enforcement body in the regulation of cross-border private law relations. In view of the use of common terms “exterritorial” and “extraterritorial” in the framework of international public and private law regulation, it seems necessary to study the extraterritorial effect of foreign private law provisions through the prism of the substantive characteristics of extraterritoriality, formulated in the context of public international law. To this end, the author refers to the definition of extraterritorial jurisdiction as an international legal category and raises the question of how appropriate it is to admit, within the framework of a single definition, “extraterritorial” both the presence and absence of the manifestation of the sovereign will of the state on the territory of which any of the types of jurisdiction of a foreign state is exercised. Taking into account that the manifestation of the extraterritorial jurisdiction of one state in relation to another is realized in the absence of the latter’s sanction for its implementation, the author debates the admissibility of designation as extraterritorial foreign private law, the admissibility and limits of application of which are sanctioned by the national state.

Without extending the historical analysis, this article analyzes the relationship between the legal concept of person with regard to the notion of living independently. The concept is normatively established in Article 19 of the CRPD and is presented as a legal fiction. The legal technique of fictio iuris is the premise for analyzing contemporary problems, for example, the attribution of responsibilities to non-human personalities, such as robots. The article, however, develops the problem of attributing rights to persons with disabilities. The contraposition of robots and disabled people, understood as opposing visions of anthropological and human models, is part of the philosophical dispute between humanism and post- or transhumanism. The conception of man appears different if created in the image and likeness of God, or as the fruit of evolution from primates, or as a transhumanist entity that can be replaced by the robot. The latter vision is rooted in the mechanization of the mind triggered by cybernetics and cognitive sciences and referable to problems of justice theory and political philosophy concerning the inclusion in society of disabled people. In this article I will limit myself to analyzing, against the background of this complex problem, the link between person, legal fiction and the right to disability starting from the criticism addressed by Nussbaum to Rawls based on the convention and following the methodology developed by Marchisio and Curto in order to clarify the legal connection between thirdness, disability, and person.However, I go one step further by including the issue of disability as justice within the evolution of the notion of the legal person, through the inclusion of fictio iuris and rhetorical methodology in positive law, as a criterion for the interpretation of art. 19 CRPD.

The emergence of the concept of cancellation of employment contract in the Labor Code of the Russian Federation followed the development of this concept in the science of labor law in the Soviet period of our history. It was at that time when essential differences were identified between termination of employment contract after the start date and cancellation of employment contract before its practical implementation. The legislator twice adjusted the regulations on cancellation: legal and technical shortcomings were eliminated; the real will of the legislator was clarified. However, even now there is an urgent need to develop Art. 61 of the Labor Code of the Russian Federation. In addition, based on the study of the work of personnel services, judicial practice, scientific literature, teleological interpretation of the studied norms of law, this work provides an answer to a number of previously unconsidered issues, the resolution of which is the subject of discussion. In particular, the following issues were investigated: (1) the issues of the validity of the extension of the rules on cancellation to all cases of concluding employment contracts; (2) problems of normative regulation of provision for compulsory social insurance in the event of an insured event; (3) the documentary registration and procedure for the employer in the process of canceling the employment contract; (4) the consequences of the cancellation of the employment contract in the event of a lawful and unlawful denial of an employee to work; (5) the consequences of the employer’s refusal to cancel the employment contract with the employee. Based on the results of the study and systematization of approaches to understanding the procedure for canceling an employment contract, the author presents his own version of the interpretation of controversial provisions. The author proposes a way to overcome the contradictions between the norms of the analyzed article of the Labor Code of the Russian Federation and the norms of the Federal Law of December 29, 2006 No. 255-FZ "On Compulsory Social Insurance ... " by adjusting the provisions of the Labor Code of the Russian Federation, which regulate the procedure for canceling an employment contract.

The purpose of the article is to reveal the theory and practice of legal fiction in civil law, to determine their essential features, to reveal their technical and legal specifics. The scientific novelty lies in the actualization of further depth study of legal fiction in civil law and in legal science in general. After all, filling gaps in scientific knowledge about legal fiction will allow to adequately identify and describe real legal phenomena. The necessity of distinguishing between such concepts as legal fictions and fictions in law is argued. It is shown that with the help of legal fiction separate normative provisions are created that regulate specific social relations, institutions of law, in particular the institution of a legal entity, the institution of extraterritoriality, retroactive force of law, etc. Contractual fictions are designed to close some gaps in the conclusion of contracts. Otherwise, if the Civil Code of Ukraine did not contain such fictions for certain agreements, they would be considered unconcluded with the corresponding consequences. Conclusions. The author concludes that there are causal links between legal fiction as a norm and a method. The specificity of legal fiction is that it is an element of legal technique, as well as a way of expressing the will of the legislator. The anomaly of legal fictions is seen in the signs of fictitiousness of the rule of law, as well as in the fictitiousness of the situation itself, which requires logical consolidation. There is a deviation of the law from its inherent goals by interfering in the development of legal relations of the subjective element. The use of fiction does not help the court to establish the objective truth in the case. The expediency of legal fictions in civil law is justified by their features and functions.

The use of the legal fiction, terra nullius, as it was erroneously applied to Terra Australis, Australia, as a legal doctrine, supported the British colonial power’s right to settle that territory. Since then, many unspoken (as well as acknowledged) acts of structural and direct violence have been perpetrated against the First Nations population in Australia via the imposition, and later ‘reception’, of the legal system and laws of England, as well as the dominant socio-political system, that represented the British Crown.

The article examines the essence of legal fiction. Based on an analysis of the current legislation of the Russian Federation, the author has established ways of using legal fiction in civil law. It has been substantiated that legal fiction finds expression in the construction of a legal entity and the institution of fictitious transactions. Legal fiction is used to extend the legal regime of one object to another object, as well as the legal status of one subject to another subject. Legal fiction is used when it is necessary to overcome a situation of legal uncertainty, to recognize as real non-existent circumstances to restore the violated rights of persons who have suffered as a result of the actions of unscrupulous participants in civil-law transactions. Finally, the method of legal fiction is widely used by the legislator the legal economy. As a result of the study, a conclusion was made about the importance of legal fiction for the process of lawmaking.

In his valedictory lecture before the College de France, Alain Supiot reviews his work on the transformation of labour in the twenty‐first century, highlighting the role of law and institutions in addressing the consequences of the digital revolution and environmental crisis. In his view, the moral, social and environmental bankruptcy of neoliberalism calls for us to reconsider the legal fiction of labour as a commodity and to re‐establish the truly “humane labour regime” envisaged by the preamble to the ILO Constitution, recognizing both the meaning and content of work. He uses the case of scientific research to illustrate his argument.

How might the connections between anthropology and international law become more dynamic? I reflect upon this question in this essay using ethnographic insights from the documentary cycles of the UN Human Rights Committee, the treaty body monitoring state compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Building on recent anthropological scholarship on international organizations, bureaucracy, and documents, this essay discusses the knowledge practices and legal technicalities that characterize the international community of human rights lawyers. In particular, I reflect on the legal fiction of difference governing UN treaty bodies’ operations and the empirical sameness of participants in different formal categories in the shared community of practice of human rights lawyers. I conclude by suggesting that anthropological insights could significantly enrich our shared understanding of the diverse and subtle effects of human rights monitoring. Simultaneously such insights may offer rejuvenated inspiration for those international lawyers tackling a sense of losing faith in their discipline, both as an influential tool of world improvement and an invigorating intellectual tradition.

In the article, the author researches the problematic aspects of silence in law, in particular, the definition of silence is provided, its meaning at various stages of historical development is outlined, the types of silence are described, the legal consequences of silence are discussed, and the place of silence in the sphere of legal conventions (legal presumptions, fictions, substitution). The author provides the following definition of silence: silence is a legitimate or unlawful inaction of the subject of legal relations, from which the conditional content of the subject’s will on a legal issue follows and (or) with which a positive law (transaction) directly connects the occurrence of legal consequences. Since silence can be interpreted as a sign of agreement or disagreement, it can be argued that it creates uncertainty. Given the fact that legal certainty in modern life is a constitutional value, positive law should exclude or mitigate this uncertainty, or the content of the will arising from silence should be predetermined by positive law or transaction. The result arising from the silence falls within the realm of legal conventions and in order to find out whether silence is a legal presumption, legal fiction or substitution, the article compares these categories. The author concludes that the legislator can formulate the same provision regarding silence both with the help of legal fiction (fictitious consent) and with the help of a legal presumption (presumed consent). At the same time, the article provides a justification for the impossibility of considering tacit consent as a legal substitution, in view of the fact that in objective reality there is no conditional silence, which is an essential reason for excluding the basis of legal substitution.

The author of the article has analyzed the current legislation of Ukraine and legal literature on determining the concepts of “literary piracy”, “text recycling”. It has been proved that literary piracy as a legal phenomenon is a type of intellectual property infringement to objects that are protected as objects of intellectual property rights. It has been argued that literary piracy should not be considered as an abuse of the right to creativity by a person who commits literary piracy. Literary piracy is a generic term for academic literary piracy as a type of violation of academic honesty. It has been established that academic literary piracy and text recycling according to the current legislation of Ukraine are forms of fraudulent pretence as a type of academic honesty violation. The author has argued that if one establishes the fact of literary piracy as intellectual property infringement, the offender is subject to sanctions provided by the legislation on protection of intellectual property rights, such as compensation of damage (material damage), including lost profits, or recovery of proceeds received by an offender as a result of copyright infringement and (or) related rights. When the fact of academic literary piracy is established we apply sanctions, which are provided by the legislation on education and science, for example, cancellation of the decision of a one-time specialized scientific council on awarding a person with the PhD degree and issuing an appropriate diploma. It has been proved that text recycling is legal fiction in its essence, i.e. such a non-existent position, which is declared existing and becomes mandatory due to its enshrinement in the legal prescription. It has been substantiated that the legislation on the procedure of considering the issue of establishing academic literary piracy needs to be improved. It is also advisable to define different types of academic literary piracy at the legislative level. The author has offered to consider text recycling not as a legal category, but as a moral and ethical category in the context of ethical approaches to self-citing, academic honesty, etc.

With development and application of computer science research in depth, the invention created by Artificial Intelligence (AI) could fully achieve the standards of granting patents. The paradigm shift brought about by the scientific revolutions cannot be separated from the constraints of social systematic structure. Even if these inventions created by AI will not have an excessive impact to against our patent system, the general public’s concerns about technology out of control have led to the continuous delay of patentability of the inventions created by AI. From the principle of interest balance to deal with these problems, it is only necessary to coordinate and resolve the legal relationship behind the inventions created by AI, and make appropriate adjustments through patent system. To give AI inventors the personality status through legal fiction will not only not destroy the ethics and rules of human society, but will be more conducive to stimulating the research and development of AI research and further promoting its industrialization.

This article aims to deepen the understanding of the Western legal tradition with the instruments of cultural anthropology. Recalling the properties of legal reason, it opens the way for a new relationship between law and anthropology. It also warns against the temptation to extend the domination of this Western reason over other societies and cultures. (author's abstract); Cet article, rejetant les séductions de l’exotisme, se propose d’approfondir la compréhension de la tradition juridique occidentale grâce aux instruments de l’anthropologie culturelle. Rappelant les propriétés de la raison juridique et traçant la voie à une nouvelle articulation entre droit et anthropologie, il met également en garde contre la tentation d’étendre la domination de cette raison occidentale sur les autres sociétés et les autres cultures. (résumé auteur)