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Bell's theorem is based on the assumptions of local causality and measurement independence. The last assumption is identified by many authors as linked to the freedom of choice hypothesis. In this sense the human free will ultimately can ensure the measurement independence assumption. The incomplete experimental conditions for supporting this assumption are known in the literature as "freedom-of-choice loophole" (FOCL). Although there is no consensus among the scientists that the measurement independence is linked to human choices, in a recent paper, published in a prestigious journal, signed by more than a hundred authors, this assumption was seriously taken for the first time in an experiment known as Big Bell Test (Abellán et al. 2018). Using photons, single atoms, atomic ensembles and superconducting devices, this experiment was performed in five continents, and involved twelve laboratories, adopting human choices to close the FOCL. Nevertheless, the possibility of human freedom of choice has been a matter of philosophical debate for more than 2000 years, and there is no consensus among philosophers on this topic. If human choice is not free, this solution would not be sufficient to close FOCL. Therefore, in order to support the basic assumption of this experiment, it is necessary to argue that human choice is indeed free. In this paper, we present a Kantian position on this topic and defend the view that this philosophical position is the best way to ensure that Big Bell Test can in fact close the loophole. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the history of philosophy, the concept of the self has long been a subject of intense debate and scrutiny. Within Kant's critical philosophy, the self holds a significant position and is deemed essential for the very notion of experience. This article aims to clarify Kant's viewpoint on the concept of self. Kant posits the existence of an inner sense faculty, through which he introduces the empirical or phenomenal self, a concept that aligns with Hume's stance on the self. Furthermore, Kant introduces the idea of a noumenal self through the faculty of understanding and apperception, suggesting that this noumenal self is the foundation upon which all our experiences are made possible. Our primary objective is to clarify the distinctions between the two forms of self, which will be succeeded by an assessment of each. Although numerous scholars tend to view Kant's perspective on the self as a negative concept, an alternative viewpoint emerges, proposing a potential positive interpretation of Kant's concept of the self. Subsequently, we present Gallagher's Pattern theory of the self and conduct a comparative analysis between the Kantian self and the components that constitute the self. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I argue in the essay that the conceptualist understanding of the mind-world relation ultimately leads to the kind of view that Panayot Butchvarov calls conceptual or linguistic creationism. According to this view, "there is nothing we have not conceptualized". In addition to being an antithesis of metaphysical realism, which maintains that there is a reality independent of us, the term refers to the kind of thinking that sees human cognitive experience (and reality itself) as thoroughly constituted according to our concepts. While it might be easy to attribute this kind of position to Kant as well, especially when read through a conceptualist lens, I argue that such a position is not in accord with Kant's philosophical intentions. Using the Deduction and Schematism chapters of the Critique of Pure Reason as examples, I also argue that on the conceptualist understanding of the mindworld relation too much is read into Kant's idea that sensibility and understanding must be cognitively compatible with one another. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I consider the principle of sufficient reason (henceforth, PSR) as it functions in both Leibniz and Kant. The issue separating these thinkers is a modal status of absolute contingency, which is exempt from PSR insofar as it is neither logically necessary, nor does it necessarily follow from the given causal series. Leibniz's ambitious metaphysics applies PSR even to God's choices, which, since they must rest on a reason that makes sense of them, necessarily tend to the creation of the best of all possible worlds. Through PSR, the exercise of human freedom represents the unfolding of a concept God already has chosen, with an eye to the best possible world aligned with the universal intelligibility enjoined by PSR. PSR, in Kant's critical period, is not a principle of being, but one of mere experience, since any extension of thought beyond possible experience can yield no knowledge. Human agency, for Kant, has an intelligible aspect that is beyond possible experience. Since PSR is only a principle of experience for Kant, the agent in its intelligible aspect is not subject to it. Human free will introduces a special modal category of absolute contingency. Kant provides impetus for a humanism that makes the absolute freedom of the human will a competitor with the sovereignty of God, and also liberates the human will from contemporary ideologies that would subordinate it to natural determinism or group dynamics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The future of philosophy and the future of humankind-in-the-world are intimately related, not only (i) in the obvious sense that all philosophers are "human, all-too-human" animals--i.e., members of the biological species Homo sapiens, and also finite, fallible, and thoroughly normative imperfect in every other way too--hence the natural fate of all human animals is also the natural fate of all philosophers, but also (ii) in the more profound and subtle sense of what I'll call philosophical futurism. Philosophical futurism is a critical, synoptic, and speculative reflection on the fate of humankind-in-the-world, with special attention paid not only to what humankind-in-the-world (including philosophy itself) will most likely be, if things continue to go along in more or less the same way as they have been and are now going, or could conceivably be, as in science fiction or other forms of imaginative projection, but also to what what humankind-in-the-world (including philosophy itself) ought to be, and therefore (assuming that "ought" entails "can") can be, as the direct result of our individual and collective free agency, for the purpose of rationally guiding humankind in the near future. In this essay, I very briefly present, defend, and strongly recommend a version of philosophical futurism that I call Kantian futurism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article undertakes a crucial examination of Kant's depiction of the interconnectedness between human reason and the divine. The argument posits that Kant conceptualizes reason as inherently founded on a divine basis. The primary objective of this article is not to delve into whether Kant endorses or dismisses specific Christian doctrines, or if his portrayal of reason aligns with a particular strand of Christian thought. Instead, the aim is to chart an interpretive middle path – one that embraces the profound philosophical underpinnings embedded in Kant's rationalist legacy while recognizing the inherent limitations he imposes on human reason. The conclusion drawn is that Kant's account of reason tends towards the divine, though the precise nature of this interconnectedness remains shrouded in mystery. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By probing into how desire is involved in fashion phenomena, this article illuminates Willkür in tandem with desire. It first analyzes how the higher and lower faculties of desire, spelled out by Immanuel Kant, play a role in fashion, unveiling how fashion as a form of social relations exists in concert with the higher faculty of desire, which has a close connection with Willkür. This article maintains that the arbitrary choice manifested in and through fashion is illustrative of Willkür, on the grounds that it results from a self-conscious deliberation, demonstrating the 'reflective distance' from our incentives. Christine M. Korsgaard's elucidation of the relationship between 'reflective distance' and self-consciousness helps formulate this argument. However, this article also discusses the foibles of Korsgaard's reading of Kant, in particular in the area of theory of action. By doing so, this article argues that reason is not the only factor with which we make choices and take actions within the bounds of which freedom is secured, and that fashion allows us to comprehend not only how the power of choice, independent from necessitation by sensible impulses, exercises its freedom, but also how personal autonomy is related to Kant's negative concept of freedom. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite signifying a negative self-appraisal, shame has traditionally been thought by philosophers to entail the presence of self-respect in the individual. On this account, shame is occasioned by one's failure to live up to certain self-standards—in displaying less worth than one thought one had—and this moves one to hide or otherwise inhibit oneself in an effort to protect one's self-worth. In this paper, I argue against the notion that only self-respecting individuals can experience shame. Contrary to the idea that shame presupposes the presence of self-worth, I contend that shame merely requires that one have the desire, rather than the expectation, that one is worthy. Furthermore, I suggest that the desire for concealment fueled by shame is not an inherently self-protective mechanism but can alternatively be understood as an effort to safeguard one's connection with others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates conceptions of explanation, teleology, and analogy in the works of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) and Georges Cuvier (1769–1832). Richards (2000, 2002) and Zammito (2006, 2012, 2018) have argued that Kant's philosophy provided an obstacle for the project of establishing biology as a proper science around 1800. By contrast, Russell (1916), Outram (1986), and Huneman (2006, 2008) have argued, similar to suggestions from Lenoir (1989), that Kant's philosophy influenced the influential naturalist Georges Cuvier. In this article, I wish to expand on and further the work of Russell, Outram, and Huneman by adopting a novel perspective on Cuvier and considering (a) the similar conceptions of proper science and explanation of Kant and Cuvier, and (b) the similar conceptions of the role of teleology and analogy in the works of Kant and Cuvier. The similarities between Kant and Cuvier show, contrary to the interpretation of Richards and Zammito, that some of Kant's philosophical ideas, whether they derived from him or not, were fruitfully applied by some life scientists who wished to transform life sciences into proper sciences around 1800. However, I also show that Cuvier, in contrast to Kant, had a workable strategy for transforming the life sciences into proper sciences, and that he departed from Kant's philosophy of science in crucial respects. • Explains the relevance of Kant's philosophy for the emergence of biology. • Explains Cuvier's conception of proper science and explanation. • Explains Cuvier's regulative conception of teleology and analogy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Immortality of soul is the eternal non–temporal survival of every individual in ontological realm, not their eternal existence within time. Such an idea of the soul becomes a prerequisite for the highest good in the sense of individual. Universal history is an idea of the systematic connection of all empirical human actions, but the history has no end if explored only from the point of view of time, while from the point of view of the intelligible world, especially from the perspective of God, it has a beginning and an end. The end of the history means the realization of the highest good in the sense of all mankind, which occurs in all time and requires the participation of each individual. Every individual would be woven into the universal history by the actions throughout his whole life and even by the eternal existence of his soul, and at the same time realizes the highest good in the whole of humanity and the universal history. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The academic and cultural events surrounding the 2024 tercentenary of Immanuel Kant's birth promise to be both extensive and diverse. Kant's enduring significance transcends mere philosophy, permeating the cultural fabric of the Western world. Thus, this milestone year presents a fitting occasion to delve into his manifold contributions across various domains of knowledge, notably within the realm of religious philosophy, and the themes and developments of greatest actuality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Con-textos Kantianos: International Journal of Philosophy is the property of Con-Textos Kantianos (CTK) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Con-textos Kantianos: International Journal of Philosophy is the property of Con-Textos Kantianos (CTK) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Con-textos Kantianos: International Journal of Philosophy is the property of Con-Textos Kantianos (CTK) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Con-textos Kantianos: International Journal of Philosophy is the property of Con-Textos Kantianos (CTK) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Con-textos Kantianos: International Journal of Philosophy is the property of Con-Textos Kantianos (CTK) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Con-textos Kantianos: International Journal of Philosophy is the property of Con-Textos Kantianos (CTK) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Con-textos Kantianos: International Journal of Philosophy is the property of Con-Textos Kantianos (CTK) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Con-textos Kantianos: International Journal of Philosophy is the property of Con-Textos Kantianos (CTK) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Con-textos Kantianos: International Journal of Philosophy is the property of Con-Textos Kantianos (CTK) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Con-textos Kantianos: International Journal of Philosophy is the property of Con-Textos Kantianos (CTK) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Con-textos Kantianos: International Journal of Philosophy is the property of Con-Textos Kantianos (CTK) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Con-textos Kantianos: International Journal of Philosophy is the property of Con-Textos Kantianos (CTK) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Taiwan Law Review is the property of Angle Publishing Co., Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Has the renewal of interest in the ostensible agency of living beings signaled an advance from a merely heuristic Kantian sense of purposiveness to an unequivocally, empirically grounded research program or are there as yet hidden tensions or contradictions in, for example, the organizational autonomy approach to natural agency? Can normativity be found to be immanent in nature but only beginning with the living cell or must a thoroughgoing naturalism find the seeds of normativity immanent throughout abiotic as well as biotic nature? Beginning with a brief exposition of Kant´s influential treatment and recommendation for how to methodologically combine what he took to be the inevitable epistemological limit to explaining the origins of ostensible biotic purposefulness with the legitimate intentions of scientific research and explanation, this essay will critically engage with three recent essays that attempt to grapple with the preceding questions. Having putatively raised questions about the consistency and adequacy of each of the individual positions, the essay will attempt to move synthetically, drawing upon aspects of all three contributions, in the direction of a "cooperativity theoretic" approach to incipient natural normativity and agency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Educational Studies (1673-1298) is the property of Journal of Educational Studies Editorial Office and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Educational Studies (1673-1298) is the property of Journal of Educational Studies Editorial Office and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Educational Studies (1673-1298) is the property of Journal of Educational Studies Editorial Office and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Educational Studies (1673-1298) is the property of Journal of Educational Studies Editorial Office and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Beytulhikme: An International Journal of Philosophy is the property of Beytulhikme: An International Journal of Philosophy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

For the realist metaphysician, certain notions in metaphysics are objectively theory-guiding. But what makes them so? Echoing others, Dasgupta (2018) suggests that the realist metaphysician faces trenchant difficulties here—resulting in the problem of missing value. I first propose that Kant's project of a critique of pure reason faces this problem: he supposes that the notion of ground is objectively theory-guiding in metaphysics. This investigation reconstructs his response. I argue that, for Kant, a notion is objectively theory-guiding in metaphysics if (and because) it is required for the successful exercise of reason. By analysing the requirements on undertaking a critique of pure reason, we will see why his notion of ground would be objectively theory-guiding in this sense. I conclude that his response generalizes to yield a potentially promising response to the problem of missing value. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper engages with Slavoj Žižek's notion of the 'vanishing mediator,' by taking a closer look at his study of the Hegelian 'night of the world.' It specifically probes into the notion of the divine madness that becomes the 'Ground' for the sane, subjective God of The Bible to Word the universe into being. Following this, it proceeds to bring the aforementioned into discourse with Bloodborne, which, in one of its endings, presents the curious case of the next stage of human evolution, i.e., a transcendence into Godhood, which occurs during a similar night. The paper, in essence, presents a dramatic stage for this madness to play out in its reading of Bloodborne, while tracing its vestiges using a postsecular-psychoanalytical lens. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Adab Al-Kufa is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In this article, I focus on the reading of Heidegger's Kant that Derrida offers in his recently published 1978-9 seminar Donner le temps II (§§12–3). Here Derrida tracks across Heidegger's text the auto-affective or auto-dative structure (namely, the originary synthesis of spontaneity and receptivity) in which the Kantian conceptions of the experience of time and of transcendental imagination converge, and which is seen as scandalously underpinning the conception of respect. In particular, I draw attention to the moment in which Derrida originally accounts for the structure of the Kantian respect as the movement of abandonment or delivery over to the event which he also ascribes to other figures of freedom (or unconditionality without sovereignty) explored in his later writings. My hypothesis is that, in doing so, Derrida may be building a bridge between two thoughts of imagination: on the one hand, imagination as a figure of his early differance, and, on the other hand, imagination as the non-sovereign freedom that undergirds his late work on sovereignty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article is dedicated to the 300th anniversary of the birth of the great German thinker and philosopher Immanuel Kant and analyzes his conceptions of the moral category of freedom. Based on a review and analysis of the philosopher's ideas in the three "critiques" and his other writings, an attempt is made to determine the specificity of Kant's under- standing of moral freedom, as well as to find the connections it makes to some modern dimensions of the problem. Comments of Bulgarian and foreign philosophers on the relevant topic, which enrich the existing knowledge on the problem, are also examined. Conclusions concern the enduring importance of Kantian ideas for modern notions of freedom, publicity, independence, and the significance of truth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to describe F. H. Jacobi's critique of transcendental philosophy concerning the problem of affection and the thing in itself. This critique attributes to Kant's thought an idealism incompatible with any notion of realism. Jacobi's interpretation, however, rests on an ignorance of the methodological-transcendental nature not only of the terminology involved in the problem of affection, but of the whole Kantian reflection about knowledge. The exegetical model of the two aspects view has provided instruments that allowed for a hermeneutical reconstruction of the problem of affection and put in evidence the methodological mistake present in Jacobi's critique. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Against pessimistic trends in social and political theory, this article argues for the indispensability of hope in conceptualizing the future. Such hope, however, does not need to be beholden to a unitary vision of the future, as with traditional metaphysical or Enlightenment notions of progress, but should instead accommodate a multiplicity of possible better worlds. Pluralizing the future links it to diverse nonsynchronous temporalities of past and present and emphasizes the roles of contingency, action and experimentation in concrete aspiration. Immanuel Kant and Ernst Bloch here offer philosophical foundations for this perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is the highest good actually good for in Kant's third Critique? While there are well-worked out answers to this question in the literature that focus on the highest good's practical importance, this paper argues that there is an important function for the highest good that has to do exclusively with contemplation. This important function becomes clear once one notices that coherent [konsequent] thinking, for Kant, was synonymous with 'bündiges' thinking, and that both are connected with the highest good in the third Critique's moral proof for God's existence. I show that the original meaning of 'bündig', which is a forgotten term from the carpentry trade, illuminates the stakes of the highest good in Kant's system. For us, as proverbial carpenters of reason, coherence is essential for the intellectual activity of constructing a philosophical worldview in his transcendental idealism. I motivate the reading further by showing how this function can neatly reconstruct Kant's proof for God's existence in the third Critique. I conclude by sketching Kant's reasons for why the project of creating a coherent worldview grounded in the highest good is worth the labour costs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Kant describes intellectual intuition as a kind of non-sensible intuition that creates its objects and provides knowledge of them as noumena. Although he precludes intellectual intuition from the human mind, Reinhold attributes it to the human mind. Pioneering research has already shown that Reinhold deviates from Kant in this way to explain the possibility of a priori self-cognition. It has also already shown that Fichte follows Reinhold by deviating from Kant in the same way. Yet, other aspects of Reinhold's doctrine of intellectual intuition remain largely overlooked. Among the few Reinhold scholars who study it, the extant view is that intellectual intuition does not yield cognition of an absolute knower, and that only Fichte makes this assertion. However, this view ignores Reinhold's claim that I must attribute all my representations to an absolute knower to explain the unity of experience. In this paper, I argue that we must take this claim seriously, and I show that, for Reinhold, my cognition of myself as an absolute knower in intellectual intuition enables me to attribute all my representations to myself as such a knower, and he does so prior to Fichte. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía is the property of Universidad Complutense de Madrid and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Hay ciertas nociones dentro de la filosofía de Kant que desempeñan un papel clave, tales como “autoconciencia” (Selbstbewusstsein) y “autonomía” (Autonomie). Nuestro objetivo es ofrecer algunas indicaciones sobre cómo comprender estas nociones, en especial en cuanto a cómo ha de entenderse su prefijo ‘auto-’ (Auto-, Selbst-). A pesar de que en algún sentido pueda comprenderse que hay una relación reflexiva en estos actos, aquello no es el punto fundamental, sino el hecho de que tales actos son realizados por el sujeto mismo, es decir, que son actos propios. Con la adición del prefijo ‘auto-’ no se está refiriendo a algo distinto de lo que designa la expresión sin el prefijo, sino al modo o al cómo del acto designado por esta última.

U radu će biti analizirane tri ključne ideje Kantova spisa Odgovor na pitanje: Što je prosvjetiteljstvo? To su: usudi se misliti, javna i privatna upotreba uma, i na koncu, pitanje u kojoj se mjeri, u pragmatičnom društvu može primijeniti Kantov prosvjetiteljski moto sapere aude. Središnja ideja ovoga rada pripada slobodi mišljenja koja nailazi na zakone, moćne pojedince, utjecajne društvene institucije, te na vlastita ograničenja poput kukavičluka u ozbiljenju prosvjetiteljskog mota usudi se misliti kao sredstva oslobađanja čovjeka od nepunoljetnosti. Isticanjem slobode mišljenja kao momenta racionalnog i kritičkog promatranja svijeta a priori je isključena svaka mogućnost koaliranja društvenog instruiranog mišljenja i pojedinčevog moralnog ponašanja u društvu. S druge strane Kant smatra kako je jedino autonomnom pojedincu sposobnom za moralnost, a ne državi ili drugim društvenim institucijama, dozvoljeno određivati granice svoje i tuđe slobode mišljenja i propisivati zakone prema vlastitoj slobodnoj upotrebi uma. Politička i moralna sloboda kao prostor prosvjetiteljske lozinke usudi se misliti predstavljaju i izvor kritike moralno-pravne slobode mišljenja i njezine (ne)primjenjivosti u praksi.