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PR, IFPRI4; 4 Transforming Agricultural and Rural Economies; CRP2, Foresight and Policy Modeling (FPM); Development Strategies and Governance (DSG); Natural Resources and Resilience (NRR); Transformation Strategies; PIM, CGIAR Research Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM), The number of people living in rural areas of low and middle-income countries is projected to increase in the coming decades. It is in the rural areas of these countries where a large majority of the world’s extreme poor reside. The livelihoods of two to three billion rural people depend on small farms. These small farms are responsible for the production and supply of a large portion of the calories feeding low- and middle-income countries. Small farms are also preservers of crops and associated biodiversity and with the right incentives can contribute to land stewardship. Small farms are diverse, and, hence, so are their associated challenges. We categorize small farms as commercial farms, small farms in transition and subsistence-oriented farms and highlight evidence-based innovations for the sustainable transformation of each type of small farm. Broadly, small farms face high transaction costs, lack collective action, and experience coordination failure in production and marketing. Lack of market access is also a major challenge. Investments in infrastructure, including those that support access to digital technologies, can improve farmers’ access to markets and incentives as well as foster growth in the midstream segments of the value chain that provide inputs, storage, processing, and logistics to small farms. Rural Non-Farm Employment (RNFE) is increasingly the main source of income for most small farmers and provides them with a risk diversification strategy and cash, both to purchase food and for farm investments to raise productivity, expand commercial activities, and produce higher-value products. Public investments and policies that facilitate growth of the agrifood system must pay more attention to creating enabling environments for the development of RNFE and strengthening the synergy between agriculture and RNFE in rural areas.

Non-PR, 3 Building Inclusive and Efficient Markets, Trade Systems, and Food Industry; IFPRI2, DSGD, This policy note presents results from an economy-wide model to assess the expected impacts of implementing the Bottom-Up Economic Plan in Kenya. The economywide modeling results suggest that the design of the Bottom-Up Economic Plan is consistent with its goals of achieving broad-based growth and benefiting the poor, particularly the poorest of the poor at the bottom of the pyramid. We estimate that 5 million jobs will be created, 5.5 million people will move out of poverty, and 2.9 million people will be lifted out of hunger by 2027 under the implementation of the Plan scenario, as compared to today. The structural transformation envisaged in the Plan is key for achieving higher middle-income status. Growth driven by productivity-enhancing private investments (especially in domestic manufacturing) and exports will lead to the acceleration of structural change. Growth led by the agricultural sector is far more effective at reducing poverty than a similar level of growth coming from nonagricultural sectors.

Non-PR, IFPRI1; Capacity Strengthening; 2 Promoting Healthy Diets and Nutrition for all; 4 Transforming Agricultural and Rural Economies; Rwanda SSP, DSGD, This paper assesses the structure of Rwanda’s current and evolving agrifood system and its contribu-tion to national development. The paper reiterates the point that Rwanda’s agrifood system stretches well beyond primary agriculture and creates jobs and income opportunities throughout the economy. While off-farm components of Rwanda’s agrifood system have generally grown more rapidly than pri-mary agriculture in recent years, growth varies across value chains of the agrifood system in the stud-ied period. The growth diagnostic in this paper reveals that it is domestic markets that have driven the recent growth in Rwanda’s AFS other than exports. The paper’s forward-looking analysis assesses potentially differential impacts of value-chain develop-ment efforts on broad development outcomes. The analysis measures the synergies and trade-offs of value-chain development in the context of an inclusive agricultural transformation. Such analysis is conducted using the Rwanda Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model – an adaption of IFPRI’s Rural Investment and Policy Analysis (RIAPA) model to the Rwandan context. The modeling results indicate that value chains differ considerably in their effectiveness in achieving development goals and there are significant trade-offs among different development goals from pro-moting a specific value chain. The value chains that make a larger contribution to growth or job crea-tion are not necessarily effective in reducing poverty or improving dietary quality – for example, value chains for coffee and tea – while value chains that play an important role in improving dietary quality may contribute less to job creation – such as vegetables or fruits. While there is no single value chain that can achieve all development goals effectively, it is possible to select a diversified set of value chains that complement each other in achieving different development goals. This latter strategy is a more realistic approach to growth and development.

Non-PR, IFPRI1; 4 Transforming Agricultural and Rural Economies; RIAPA, MTID; PIM, Global food, fuel, and fertilizer prices have risen rapidly in recent months, driven in large part by the fallout from the ongoing war in Ukraine and the sanctions imposed on Russia. Other factors, such as export bans in response to concerns about commodity shortages, have also contributed to rising prices. Figure 1 examines price changes in key food and nonfood commodities between June 2021 and June 2022. The period of interest for this study is June 2021 to April 2022. Over this period, palm oil and wheat prices increased by 68 and 113 percent in nominal terms, respectively. When deflated by the US Consumer Price Index, these price changes equate to 56 and 100 percent in real terms. Wide variation exists across food products, with nominal maize prices increasing by 19 per-cent (or 11 percent in real terms), and rice prices declining by 13 percent (or 7 percent in real terms) over the same period. Prices of nonfood commodities also rose substantially. Whereas crude oil prices rose 44 percent (or 34 percent in real terms), natural gas and fertilizer prices both doubled (or 88 and 101 percent in real terms, respectively). As shown in the breakdown in the bar chart, most of the price growth occurred after the start of the war in Ukraine, except for fertilizer.

Non-PR, IFPRI1; MyanmarSSP; CRP2; 3 Building Inclusive and Efficient Markets, Trade Systems, and Food Industry; 4 Transforming Agricultural and Rural Economies; MAPSA; 5 Strengthening Institutions and Governance, DSGD; PIM, CGIAR Research Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM)

Non-PR, IFPRI1; 4 Transforming Agricultural and Rural Economies; RIAPA, DSGD, Global food, fuel, and fertilizer prices have risen rapidly in recent months, driven in large part by the fallout from the ongoing war in Ukraine and the sanctions imposed on Russia. Other factors, such as export bans, have also contributed to rising prices. Palm oil and wheat prices increased by 56 and 100 percent in real terms, respectively, between June 2021 and April 2022, with most of the in-crease occurring since February (Figure 1).

Non-PR, IFPRI1; 4 Transforming Agricultural and Rural Economies; RIAPA, DSGD, Global food, fuel, and fertilizer prices have risen rapidly in recent months, driven in large part by the fallout from the ongoing war in Ukraine and the sanctions imposed on Russia. Other factors, such as export bans, have also contributed to rising prices. Palm oil and wheat prices increased by 56 and 100 percent in real terms, respectively, between June 2021 and April 2022, with most of the in-crease occurring since February (Figure 1).

Non-PR, IFPRI1; 4 Transforming Agricultural and Rural Economies; GSSP; RIAPA, DSGD, Global food, fuel, and fertilizer prices have risen rapidly in recent months, driven in large part by the fallout from the ongoing war in Ukraine and the sanctions imposed on Russia. Other factors, such as export bans, have also contributed to rising prices. Palm oil and wheat prices increased by 56 and 100 percent in real terms, respectively, between June 2021 and April 2022, with most of the in-crease occurring since February (Figure 1). Wide variation exists across products, with real maize prices increasing by only 11 percent, and rice prices declining by 13 percent. The price of crude oil and natural gas has also risen substantially, while the weighted average price of fertilizer has doubled. With these changes in global prices, many developing countries and their development partners are concerned about the implications for economic stability, food security, and poverty.

Non-PR, IFPRI1; 4 Transforming Agricultural and Rural Economies; RIAPA, DSGD, Global food, fuel, and fertilizer prices have risen rapidly in recent months, driven in large part by the fallout from the ongoing war in Ukraine and the sanctions imposed on Russia. Other factors, such as export bans, have also contributed to rising prices. Palm oil and wheat prices increased by 56 and 100 percent in real terms, respectively, between June 2021 and April 2022, with most of the in-crease occurring since February (Figure 1).

Non-PR, IFPRI1; 4 Transforming Agricultural and Rural Economies; MaSSP; RIAPA, DSGD, Global food, fuel, and fertilizer prices have risen rapidly in recent months, driven in large part by the fallout from the ongoing war in Ukraine and the sanctions imposed on Russia. Other factors, such as export bans, have also contributed to rising prices. Palm oil and wheat prices increased by 56 and 100 percent in real terms, respectively, between June 2021 and April 2022, with most of the in-crease occurring since February (Figure 1).

Non-PR, IFPRI1; 4 Transforming Agricultural and Rural Economies; MAPSA; MyanmarSSP; RIAPA, DSGD, Global food, fuel, and fertilizer prices have risen rapidly in recent months, driven in large part by the fallout from the ongoing war in Ukraine and the sanctions imposed on Russia. Other factors, such as export bans, have also contributed to rising prices. Palm oil and wheat prices increased by 56 and 100 percent in real terms, respectively, between June 2021 and April 2022, with most of the in-crease occurring since February (Figure 1).

Non-PR, IFPRI1; 4 Transforming Agricultural and Rural Economies; Rwanda SSP; RIAPA, DSGD, Global food, fuel, and fertilizer prices have risen rapidly in recent months, driven in large part by the fallout from the ongoing war in Ukraine and the sanctions imposed on Russia. Other factors have contributed to the crisis, such as export bans and continued supply chain disruptions from the COVID-19 pandemic. For example, between June 2021 and April 2022, the global prices of palm oil and wheat increased by 56 and 100 percent in real terms, respectively. At the same time, the price of fertilizer doubled, while crude oil and natural gas prices have also risen substantially. However, wide variation also exists across commodities, with real maize prices increasing by only 11 percent, and rice prices declining by 13 percent (Figure 1).

Non-PR, IFPRI1; 4 Transforming Agricultural and Rural Economies; RIAPA, DSGD; AFR, Global food, fuel, and fertilizer prices have risen rapidly in recent months, driven in large part by the fallout from the ongoing war in Ukraine and the sanctions imposed on Russia. Other factors, such as export bans, have also contributed to rising prices. Palm oil and wheat prices increased by 56 and 100 percent in real terms, respectively, between June 2021 and April 2022, with most of the in-crease occurring since February (Figure 1).

Non-PR, IFPRI1; 4 Transforming Agricultural and Rural Economies; Evaluating Impact and Building Capacity (EIBC); EgyptSSP; DCA; RIAPA, DSGD, Global food, fuel, and fertilizer prices have witnessed rapid and significant increase in recent months, driven largely by the fallout from the ongoing war in Ukraine and associated sanctions im-posed on Russia. Other factors, including governments’ responses and export bans, have also con-tributed to rising prices (Laborde and Mamun 2022). Palm oil and wheat prices increased by 56 and 100 percent in real terms, respectively, between June 2021 and April 2022, with most of the in-crease occurring since February 2022.

Non-PR, IFPRI1; 2 Promoting Healthy Diets and Nutrition for all; 4 Transforming Agricultural and Rural Economies; 5 Strengthening Institutions and Governance; DCA; RIAPA, DSGD, Global food, fuel, and fertilizer prices have risen rapidly in recent months, driven in large part by the fallout from the ongoing war in Ukraine and the sanctions imposed on Russia. Other factors, such as export bans, have also contributed to rising prices. Palm oil and wheat prices increased by 56 and 100 percent in real terms, respectively, between June 2021 and April 2022, with most of the increase occurring since February. There is wide variation across products, with real maize prices increasing by only 11 percent, and rice prices declining by 13 percent. The price of crude oil and natural gas has also risen substantially, and the weighted average price of fertilizer has doubled. With these changes in global prices, many developing countries and their development partners are concerned about the implications for economic stability, food security, and poverty.

Non-PR, IFPRI1; 4 Transforming Agricultural and Rural Economies; RIAPA, DSGD, Global food, fuel, and fertilizer prices have risen rapidly in recent months, driven in large part by the fallout from the ongoing war in Ukraine and the sanctions imposed on Russia. Other factors, such as export bans, have also contributed to rising prices. Palm oil and wheat prices increased by 56 and 100 percent in real terms, respectively, between June 2021 and April 2022, with most of the in-crease occurring since February (Figure 1).

Non-PR, IFPRI1; 4 Transforming Agricultural and Rural Economies; RIAPA, DSGD; SAR, Global food, fuel, and fertilizer prices have risen rapidly in recent months, driven in large part by the fallout from the ongoing war in Ukraine and the sanctions imposed on Russia. Other factors, such as export bans, have also contributed to rising prices. Palm oil and wheat prices increased by 56 and 100 percent in real terms, respectively, between June 2021 and April 2022, with most of the in-crease occurring since February (Figure 1). Wide variation exists across products, with real maize prices increasing by only 11 percent and rice prices declining by 13 percent. The price of crude oil and natural gas has also risen substantially, while the weighted average price of fertilizer has dou-bled. With these changes in global prices, many developing countries and their development part-ners are concerned about the implications for economic stability, food security, and poverty.

Non-PR, IFPRI1; 4 Transforming Agricultural and Rural Economies; RIAPA, DSGD, Global food, fuel, and fertilizer prices have risen rapidly in recent months, driven in large part by the fallout from the ongoing war in Ukraine and the sanctions imposed on Russia. Other factors, such as export bans, have also contributed to rising prices. Palm oil and wheat prices increased by 56 and 100 percent in real terms, respectively, between June 2021 and April 2022, with most of the in-crease occurring since February (Figure 1). Wide variation exists across products, with real maize prices increasing by only 11 percent and rice prices declining by 13 percent. The price of crude oil and natural gas has also risen substantially, while the weighted average price of fertilizer has dou-bled. With these changes in global prices, many developing countries and their development part-ners are concerned about the implications for economic stability, food security, and poverty.

Non-PR, IFPRI1; 4 Transforming Agricultural and Rural Economies; RIAPA, DSGD, Global food, fuel, and fertilizer prices have risen rapidly in recent months, driven in large part by the fallout from the ongoing war in Ukraine and the sanctions imposed on Russia. Other factors, such as export bans, have also contributed to rising prices. Palm oil and wheat prices increased by 56 and 100 percent in real terms, respectively, between June 2021 and April 2022, with most of the in-crease occurring since February (Figure 1).

Non-PR, IFPRI1; 4 Transforming Agricultural and Rural Economies; RIAPA, DSGD; SAR, Global food, fuel, and fertilizer prices have risen rapidly in recent months, driven in large part by the fallout from the ongoing war in Ukraine and the sanctions imposed on Russia. Other factors, such as export bans, have also contributed to rising prices. Palm oil and wheat prices increased by 56 and 100 percent in real terms, respectively, between June 2021 and April 2022, with most of the in-crease occurring since February (Figure 1).

Non-PR, IFPRI1; 4 Transforming Agricultural and Rural Economies; RIAPA, DSGD, Global food, fuel, and fertilizer prices have risen rapidly in recent months, driven in large part by the fallout from the ongoing war in Ukraine and the sanctions imposed on Russia. Other factors, such as export bans, have also contributed to rising prices. Palm oil and wheat prices increased by 56 and 100 percent in real terms, respectively, between June 2021 and April 2022, with most of the increase occurring since February (Figure 1). Wide variation exists across products, with real maize prices increasing by only 11 percent and rice prices declining by 13 percent. The price of crude oil and natural gas has also risen substantially, while the weighted average price of fertilizer has dou-bled. With these changes in global prices, many developing countries and their development part-ners are concerned about the implications for economic stability, food security, and poverty.

Non-PR, IFPRI1; 4 Transforming Agricultural and Rural Economies; NSSP; RIAPA, DSGD, Global food, fuel, and fertilizer prices have risen rapidly in recent months, driven in large part by the fallout from the ongoing war in Ukraine and the sanctions imposed on Russia. Other factors, such as export bans, have also contributed to rising prices. Palm oil and wheat prices increased by 56 and 100 percent in real terms, respectively, between June 2021 and April 2022, with most of the in-crease occurring since February (Figure 1). Wide variation exists across products, with real maize prices increasing by only 11 percent and rice prices declining by 13 percent. The price of crude oil and natural gas has also risen substantially, while the weighted average price of fertilizer has dou-bled. With these changes in global prices, many developing countries and their development part-ners are concerned about the implications for economic stability, food security, and poverty.

Non-PR, IFPRI1; ESSP; 4 Transforming Agricultural and Rural Economies; RIAPA, DSGD, Global food, fuel, and fertilizer prices have risen rapidly in recent months, driven in large part by the fallout from the ongoing war in Ukraine and the sanctions imposed on Russia. Other factors, such as export bans, have also contributed to rising prices. Palm oil and wheat prices increased by 56 and 100 percent in real terms, respectively, between June 2021 and April 2022, with most of the in-crease occurring since February (Figure 1). Wide variation exists across products, with real maize prices increasing by only 11 percent and rice prices declining by 13 percent. The price of crude oil and natural gas has also risen substantially, while the weighted average price of fertilizer has dou-bled. With these changes in global prices, many developing countries and their development part-ners are concerned about the implications for economic stability, food security, and poverty.

Non-PR, IFPRI1; Rwanda SSP; CRP2; 5 Strengthening Institutions and Governance; Capacity Strengthening; RIAPA, DSGD; PIM, CGIAR Research Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM), As Rwanda is expected to return to its rapid growth trajectory following the COVID-19 pandemic, agriculture will continue to play a central role in the structural transformation of the entire economy. To this end, the Government of Rwanda continues to invest in the agricultural sector by building on Strategic Plans for the Transformation of Agriculture (PSTAs) that began in the early 2000s. The challenging question is how to prioritize public expenditures across a broad portfolio of policies and programs. Ambitious plans, whether in the short or long term, require difficult decisions. The prioritization of public investment becomes even more complex as Rwanda’s structural transformation advances and as new investments—beyond the farm—become critically important for the agricultural sector. The structural transformation process itself means that as agriculture becomes more integrated with the rest of the economy, public resource allocations need to address a wider range of issues across the entire food system; these include nutrition-sensitive food production systems, inclusive value chain development, nonfarm rural enterprise development, and climate-resilient sustainable intensification of both crops and livestock. This study provides evidence that is designed to assist the Government of Rwanda in its selection of agricultural policy, investment, and expenditure portfolios that reflect the country’s broad focus on its food system and structural transformation. This process of prioritization will need to incorporate multiple public investments targeting multiple development outcomes and will need to be grounded in the costeffective use of public resources in a largely market-led transformation process. This data-driven and evidence-based approach must critically underpin an informed investment prioritization process that helps achieve ambitious targets in an environment constrained by limited public resources. The study uses the Rural Investment and Policy Analysis

Non-PR, IFPRI1; Rwanda SSP; CRP2; 5 Strengthening Institutions and Governance; Capacity Strengthening; RIAPA, DSGD; PIM, CGIAR Research Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM), Rwanda’s fourth Strategic Plan for the Transformation of Agriculture (PSTA 4), which extends from 2018 to 2024, is currently at its midpoint. This note highlights the contribution of PSTA 4 in its first half (2018–2021) to four key development outcomes: economic growth, job creation, poverty reduction, and diet quality improvement.

Non-PR, IFPRI1; Rwanda SSP; CRP2; 5 Strengthening Institutions and Governance; Capacity Strengthening, DSGD; PIM, CGIAR Research Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM), Although public spending under the fourth Strategic Plan for the Transformation of Agriculture 2018– 2021 (PSTA 4) is generally well structured and cost-effective, funding has been largely stagnant— and even declining, when measured in constant prices—during PSTA’s first four years. This note summarizes the effects of a modest reallocation of public spending under PSTA 4 towards greater cost-effectiveness, as well as a modest increase in PSTA 4 spending. Results draw on an economywide modeling tool designed to prioritize public resources around four key development goals: economic growth, employment creation, poverty reduction, and diet quality improvement.

Non-PR, IFPRI4; CRP4; CRP2; MAPSA; MyanmarSSP, DSGD; PIM; DGO; A4NH, CGIAR Research Program on Agriculture for Nutrition and Health (A4NH), COVID-19-related trade disruptions hit several sectors in Myanmar as early as January 2020, but it was the appearance of the country’s first cases in March 2020 and the subsequent lockdown in April that really hurt the economy. Nonessential businesses shut down, workers and traders could not leave home, and demand for labor dried up. The initial COVID-19 prevention measures worked well — resulting in only a few hundred infections in a country of over 50 million by June — but led to a sharp spike in poverty rates followed by a modest economic recovery in mid-2020. However, by September 2020, the country had faced a second, far worse phase of the crisis, with another wave of infections emerging in Rakhine in August 2020 and quickly spreading out of control to Yangon and other regions. Myanmar went from a few hundred confirmed cases in early August to more than 80,000 by late November (though this was surely a large underestimate, given low testing rates), despite widespread lockdown measures starting in mid-September. Then, just as the economy was showing signs of recovery in early 2021, the military took control of the government on February 1, 2021, sparking wide-scale protests and strikes, withdrawal of major foreign investments, crippling financial instability, and a collapse of economic confidence. To make matters worse, mid-2021 saw the Delta wave sweep through Myanmar, producing even higher rates of infection.

PR, IFPRI3; ISI; CRP2; 2 Promoting Healthy Diets and Nutrition for all; 4 Transforming Agricultural and Rural Economies; MyanmarSSP; IFPRIOA; UNFSS, DSGD; PHND; PIM, CGIAR Research Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM), The objective of this contribution is to report the initial impacts of measures taken to contain the COVID-19 pandemic on Myanmar's agri-food system. Myanmar is one of several late-transforming low-income countries in Southeast Asia where agriculture still plays a large role in rural livelihoods, and where food prices are a key factor affecting nutrition security for poor urban and rural households. Whereas the economic impacts of COVID-19 disruptions on tourism and manufacturing were obvious to policymakers, the impacts on the agri-food system were less evident and often more indirect. This resulted in the rural sector being allocated only a very small share of the government's initial fiscal response to mitigate the economic impacts of COVID-19. To correct this information gap, a suite of phone surveys covering a wide spectrum of actors in the agri-food system were deployed, including farm input suppliers, mechanization service providers, farmers, commodity traders, millers, food re

Non-PR, IFPRI1; CRP2; 1 Fostering Climate-Resilient and Sustainable Food Supply; 4 Transforming Agricultural and Rural Economies; G Cross-cutting gender theme, DSGD; PIM, CGIAR Research Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM), Gender differences in the engagement of work activities across sectors are important elements of gender inequality in rural livelihoods and welfare in developing countries. The role of production technologies, including agricultural mechanization, in addressing gender inequality, is increasingly explored. Knowledge gaps remain, however, including, how agricultural mechanization differentially affect labor engagements across sectors. This study aims to partly fill these knowledge gaps through micro-evidence from 8 countries (Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania, India, Nepal, Tajikistan and Vietnam), using several nationally representative panel data and supplementary data, and applying Correlated-Random-Effects Double-Hurdle models with Instrumental-Variables. We find that the use of tractors and/or combine harvesters by the household induces greater shift from farm activities to non-farm activities by female members than by male members. While statistical significance varies, these patterns generally hold consistently across all 8 countries studied. These patterns also seem to hold across different farm sizes. While these are short-term relations, agricultural mechanization proxied by tractor and/or combine harvesters is one of the important contributors to gendered rural livelihood. Future studies should more closely investigate underlying mechanisms and implications of these patterns.

Non-PR, IFPRI1; CRP2; 1 Fostering Climate-Resilient and Sustainable Food Supply; 2 Promoting Healthy Diets and Nutrition for all; 4 Transforming Agricultural and Rural Economies; SPEED, DSGD; PIM, CGIAR Research Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM), Public expenditures (PE), their sizes, and allocations across sectors, are some of the important instruments for the public sector to contribute toward sustainable development goals (SDGs). However, knowledge gaps remain as to how PEs have actually contributed to key SDG outcomes in the past, including the eradication of poverty and hunger, and the improvement in food and nutrition security in sustainable manners (SDGs 1 and 2). This study aims to partly fill this knowledge gap using the Statistics on Public Expenditures for Economic Development (SPEED data) and various country-level panel data. We find that PEs in different sectors have been significantly associated with key indicators under SDGs 1 and 2. Specifically, greater PEs for agriculture and health sectors have had relatively positive effects on total factor productivity growth in agriculture, reduced consumer food price indices, reduced poverty, reduced stunting, underweight or overweight among children under 5. A greater PE for agriculture has also been weakly associated with enhanced biodiversity. These relationships are observed for a broad class of countries, but somewhat stronger for countries that had been classified as low- or lower-middle-income in 2000. Greater PEs for education and social protection, which have been generally higher than PEs for agriculture and health, have had more mixed effects on these outcomes. While continued analyses are required to better understand the complex linkages between PE and these outcomes, the current study offers useful preliminary insights.

PR, IFPRI3; ISI; CRP2; DCA, DSGD; PIM; DGO, CGIAR Research Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM), Chinese migrant workers are very exposed to the shocks caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Falling remittances adversely affect their families who rely on remittance incomes. The impacts of COVID-19 on migrants and remittance-receiving households are assessed using a nationally representative household dataset and a microsimulation model. We found about 70 percent of migrant workers lost part of their wage income during the pandemic lockdown period and rural migrants working in small and medium enterprises were affected the most. This led to about 50 percent of remittance-receiving households being affected adversely by falling remittances, and the average decline in such income was more than 45 percent. Nearly 13 percent of pre-pandemic nonpoor remittance-receiving households could fall into poverty, raising the poverty rate among remittance-receiving households by 4 percentage points. Many households that were poor prior to the pandemic became more impoverished. The results indicate that social protection programs targeting vulnerable migrants and their families at home are important.

Non-PR, IFPRI5; UNFSS; CRP2, DSGD; EPTD; PIM, 16 pages, CGIAR Research Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM), By 2050, the United Nations projects that 68 percent of the world population will live in cities (UN DESA 2019). However, with continuous population growth, the number of people living in rural areas of many lowand low-middle-income countries (LMICs) will continue to rise. Two-thirds of the extreme poor live in rural areas (World Bank 2016) and the livelihoods of two to three billion rural people, often the most food insecure and vulnerable, still depend primarily on small farms (Laborde, Parent, and Smaller 2020; Woodhill, Hasnain, and Griffith 2020). There are various estimates of the number of small farms in the world, but they all suggest these farms are numerous. Lowder et al. (2016) used agricultural census data from 167 countries to estimate that, of the total 570 million farms in the world, 475 million farms have less than 2 hectares (ha), dominating agriculture in most LMICs, where farm sizes continue to fall. Africa south of the Sahara has the highest rural population growth rate globally, and thus the number of small farms is expected to increase more than in other regions. Africa’s share of total world rural poverty is also expected to rise from 39.6 percent in 2015 to 58.1 percent in 2050 (Thurlow, Dorosh, and Davies 2019). Transforming Africa’s agriculture sector is thus a priority embodied in the Malabo Declaration on Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Transformation for Shared Prosperity and Improved Livelihoods (AU 2014). But to meet the Malabo goals and to achieve multiple SDGs in all LMICs by 2030, creating an enabling environment where small farms are included in and benefit from rapid growth and transformation of agrifood systems is urgent (Barrett et al. 2020).

Non-PR, IFPRI1; ReSAKSS Asia; CRP2; 4 Transforming Agricultural and Rural Economies; COVID-19 Measuring Impacts and Prioritizing Policies for Recovery, DSGD; PIM, CGIAR Research Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM), Understanding how the Papua New Guinea (PNG) agricultural economy and associated household consumption is affected by climate, market and other shocks requires attention to linkages and substitution effects across various products and the markets in which they are traded. In this study, we use a multi-market simulation model of the PNG food economy that explicitly includes production, consumption, external trade and prices of key agricultural commodities to quantify the likely impacts of a set of potential shocks on household welfare and food security in PNG. In this study, we use a multi-market simulation model of the PNG food economy that explicitly includes production, consumption, external trade and prices of key agricultural commodities to quantify the likely impacts of a set of potential shocks on household welfare and food security in PNG. We have built the model to be flexible in order to explore different potential scenarios and then identify where and how households are most affected by an unexpected shock. The model is designed using region and country-level data sources that inform the structure of the PNG food economy, allowing for a data-driven evaluation of potential impacts on agricultural production, food prices, and food consumption. Thus, as PNG confronts different unexpected challenges within its agricultural economy, the model presented in this paper can be adapted to evaluate the potential impact and necessary response by geographic region of an unexpected economic shock on the food economy of the country. We present ten simulations modeling the effects of various shocks on PNG’s economy. The first group of scenarios consider the effects of shocks to production of specific agricultural commodities including: 1) a decrease on maize and sorghum output due to Fall Armyworm; 2) reduction in pig production due to a potential outbreak of African Swine Fever; 3) decline in sweet potato production similar to the 2015/16 El Niño Southern Oscillation (EN

Non-PR, IFPRI1; Rwanda SSP; CRP2; 4 Transforming Agricultural and Rural Economies; COVID-19 Measuring Impacts and Prioritizing Policies for Recovery, DSGD; PIM; DGO, CGIAR Research Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM), Rwanda’s policy response to COVID-19 has been widely praised for its rapid, systematic, and comprehensive approach to containing the pandemic. Although the economic consequences are unavoidable, the country expects to return its economy to its high-growth trajectory as the pandemic subsides. We use economic modeling tools designed to estimate the short-term economywide impacts of the unanticipated, rapid-onset economic shocks of COVID-19 on Rwanda. - Results show that during the six-week lockdown that began in March, Rwanda’s GDP fell 39.1 percent (RWF 435 billion; USD 484 million) when compared to a no-COVID situation in the same period. - Results further show that Rwanda’s GDP in 2020 will be between 12 and 16 percent lower than a predicted no-COVID GDP, depending on the pace of the recovery. The losses in annual GDP are between RWF 1.0 and 1.5 trillion (USD 1.1–1.6 billion). - While GDP for the industrial and services sectors were estimated to have fallen during the lockdown period by 57 and 48 percent, respectively, exemptions of COVID-19 restrictions for the agricultural sector limited the decline in agricultural GDP to 7 percent compared to a noCOVID situation. - During the lockdown period, the national poverty rate is estimated to have increased by 10.9 percentage points as 1.3 million people, mostly in rural areas, fell into temporary poverty. Poverty rates are expected to stabilize by the end of 2020, increasing only by between 0.4 and 1.1 percentage points. While these figures may be encouraging, they mask the impacts on poor households of the sharp poverty spike during the lockdown and the inherent complexity of poverty dynamics post-lockdown. Looking forward, the speed and success of Rwanda’s recovery will depend critically on the expansion of Rwanda’s social protection programs, boosting enterprises of all sizes, support to the agri-food system, and restoration of international trade.

Non-PR, IFPRI1; CRP2; 4 Transforming Agricultural and Rural Economies, DSGD; PIM, CGIAR Research Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM), Recent growth accelerations in Africa are characterized by increasing productivity in agriculture, a declining share of the labor force employed in agriculture and declining productivity in modern sectors such as manufacturing. To shed light on this puzzle, we disaggregate firms in the manufacturing sector by size using two newly created panels of manufacturing firms, one for Tanzania covering 2008-2016 and one for Ethiopia covering 1996-2017. Our analysis reveals a dichotomy between larger firms that exhibit superior productivity performance but do not expand employment much, and small firms that absorb employment but do not experience any productivity growth. We suggest the poor employment performance of large firms is related to use of capital-intensive techniques associated with global trends in technology.

Non-PR, IFPRI5; Capacity Strengthening; Feed the Future Initiative; Food Security PRCI, DSGD, Trade flow among the countries determines the economic benefits countries gain from trade. For many Asian developing countries, agricultural and food trade is an important engine for agricultural growth. The ability to use trade flow data for analyses is important for decision making related to trade policies. The training is going to be organized through a set of virtual workshop sessions. In order to prepare for the training and maximize the benefits from the online training workshop, participants are expected to read the workshop materials and get familiar with the trade datasets shared in advance.

Non-PR, IFPRI5; Capacity Strengthening; Food Security PRCI, DSGD, Trade flow among the countries determines the economic benefits countries gain from trade. For many Asian developing countries, agricultural and food trade is an important engine for agricultural growth. The ability to use trade flow data for analyses is important for decision making related to trade policies. The training is going to be organized through a set of virtual workshop sessions. In order to prepare for the training and maximize the benefits from the online training workshop, participants are expected to read the workshop materials and get familiar with the trade datasets shared in advance.

Non-PR, IFPRI5; Capacity Strengthening; Feed the Future Initiative; Food Security PRCI, DSGD, Trade flow among the countries determines the economic benefits countries gain from trade. For many Asian developing countries, agricultural and food trade is an important engine for agricultural growth. The ability to use trade flow data for analyses is important for decision making related to trade policies. The training is going to be organized through a set of virtual workshop sessions. In order to prepare for the training and maximize the benefits from the online training workshop, participants are expected to read the workshop materials and get familiar with the trade datasets shared in advance.

Non-PR, IFPRI5; Capacity Strengthening; Feed the Future Initiative; Feed the Future Initiative; Food Security PRCI, DSGD, Trade flow among the countries determines the economic benefits countries gain from trade. For many Asian developing countries, agricultural and food trade is an important engine for agricultural growth. The ability to use trade flow data for analyses is important for decision making related to trade policies. The training is going to be organized through a set of virtual workshop sessions. In order to prepare for the training and maximize the benefits from the online training workshop, participants are expected to read the workshop materials and get familiar with the trade datasets shared in advance.

Non-PR, IFPRI5; Capacity Strengthening; Feed the Future Initiative; Food Security PRCI, DSGD, Trade flow among the countries determines the economic benefits countries gain from trade. For many Asian developing countries, agricultural and food trade is an important engine for agricultural growth. The ability to use trade flow data for analyses is important for decision making related to trade policies. The training is going to be organized through a set of virtual workshop sessions. In order to prepare for the training and maximize the benefits from the online training workshop, participants are expected to read the workshop materials and get familiar with the trade datasets shared in advance.

Non-PR, IFPRI5; Capacity Strengthening; Feed the Future Initiative; Food Security PRCI, DSGD, Trade flow among the countries determines the economic benefits countries gain from trade. For many Asian developing countries, agricultural and food trade is an important engine for agricultural growth. The ability to use trade flow data for analyses is important for decision making related to trade policies. The training is going to be organized through a set of virtual workshop sessions. In order to prepare for the training and maximize the benefits from the online training workshop, participants are expected to read the workshop materials and get familiar with the trade datasets shared in advance.

Non-PR, IFPRI1; CRP2; Rwanda SSP; 4 Transforming Agricultural and Rural Economies; COVID-19 Measuring Impacts and Prioritizing Policies for Recovery, DSGD; PIM, CGIAR Research Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM), In Rwanda, as elsewhere, different types of households experienced the economic effects of COVID-19 differently. We use a microsimulation approach to show the importance of these differences to better understand COVID-19’s impacts on their income and poverty status. Main results: Nationally, during the lockdown period between March and May 2020, the simulation results estimate declines in household income by 33 percent on average. The urban population experienced the largest declines, averaging 40 percent during this period. Unlike patterns seen with other shocks, middle-income households experienced the sharpest declines in income during the lockdown of an estimated 33 to 35 percent. The share of individuals falling into poverty was highest among those in urban, middle income (Ubudehe 2) households (27 percent). However, the greatest absolute number of individuals in poverty remained concentrated in rural areas during the lockdown. Poor individuals in the lowest expenditure quintile remain in the most severe poverty, with average expenditures during the lockdown estimated at 54 percent below the poverty line. Under both the fast and slow post-COVID economic recovery scenarios used in the simulations, household incomes nearly return to pre-COVID levels for all household categories by the end of 2020. However, these results do not capture the potential longterm impacts of the substantial shocks of the pandemic to incomes, assets, and individual wellbeing. These modeling results suggest that targeting should be a central component of the design and implementation of social protection programs and economic recovery policies to support a diverse set of beneficiaries. These beneficiaries include rural farming households and poor households, as well as nonagricultural household, and households in the middle expenditure quintiles.

Non-PR, IFPRI5; 4 Transforming Agricultural and Rural Economies; ReSAKSS Asia; CRP2; COVID-19 Measuring Impacts and Prioritizing Policies for Recovery, DSGD; PIM, CGIAR Research Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM), COVID-19 has impacted urban and rural households throughout Papua New Guinea (PNG). Looking ahead, policymakers and development practitioners must continue to mitigate COVID-19 impacts on PNG households, as well as monitor other potential agricultural production shocks (such as El Niño, African Swine Fever, etc.) that could substantially decrease household income and food consumption.

Non-PR, IFPRI5; CRP2, DSGD; PIM, CGIAR Research Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM)

Non-PR, IFPRI1; Rwanda SSP; CRP2; 4 Transforming Agricultural and Rural Economies; COVID-19 Measuring Impacts and Prioritizing Policies for Recovery, DSGD; PIM; DGO, CGIAR Research Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM), Rwanda’s policy response to COVID-19 has been widely praised for its rapid, systematic, and comprehensive approach to containing the pandemic. Although the economic consequences of the actions taken are unavoidable, the country expects to return its economy to its high-growth trajectory as the pandemic subsides. We used economic modeling tools designed to estimate the short-term economywide impacts of the unanticipated, rapid-onset economic shocks of COVID-19 on Rwanda. In this brief, we present a synopsis of the results of this analysis. • During the six-week lockdown that began in March 2020, we estimate Rwanda’s GDP fell 39.1 percent (RWF 435 billion; USD 484 million) when compared to a no-COVID situation. • Rwanda’s GDP in 2020 will be between 12 and 16 percent lower than a predicted no-COVID GDP, depending on the pace of economic recovery. The losses in annual GDP are between RWF 1.0 and 1.5 trillion (USD 1.1 to 1.6 billion). • While GDP for the industrial and services sectors were estimated to have fallen during the lockdown period by 57 and 48 percent, respectively, exemptions of COVID-19 restrictions for the agricultural sector limited the decline in agricultural GDP to 7 percent compared to a no-COVID situation. • During the lockdown period, the national poverty rate is estimated to have increased by 10.9 percentage points as 1.3 million people, mostly in rural areas, fell into temporary poverty. Poverty rates are expected to stabilize by the end of 2020, increasing only by between 0.4 and 1.1 percentage points over the pre-COVID situation. While these figures are encouraging, they mask the impacts on poor households of the sharp poverty spike during the lockdown and the inherent complexity of poverty dynamics post-lockdown. Looking forward, the speed and success of Rwanda’s economic recovery will depend critically on expanding Rwanda’s social protection programs, supporting enterprises of all sizes, providing broad assistance to the agri-food system, and r

Non-PR, IFPRI1; Rwanda SSP; CRP2; 4 Transforming Agricultural and Rural Economies; COVID-19 Measuring Impacts and Prioritizing Policies for Recovery, DSGD; PIM, CGIAR Research Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM), In Rwanda, as in other countries, different types of households will experience the economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic differently. We use a microsimulation approach to highlight the importance of these differences and to draw attention to the diversified livelihood strategies of Rwandan households in order to fully understand COVID-19’s impacts on their income and poverty status. Our approach complements macro-level assessments of COVID-19’s economic impacts, focusing on the contribution of the income sources, asset holdings, and location (urban/rural) of households to understanding these differential effects.

PR, IFPRI4, DSGD, This chapter on Africa documents the region’s unfolding agricultural and broader economic transformations, explores the underlying drivers and implications of these transformations, and considers the new policy priorities dictated by these developments. It starts with an analysis of the shifting role of agriculture in the development of African economies, and the history and status of agricultural transformation and its implications for economic growth, poverty reduction, food systems, and nutrition. The second section reviews changes in agricultural productivity growth over time. The third section discusses patterns of poverty reduction and urbanization and related changes in diets, as well as their effects on agrifood systems and nutrition outcomes. The fourth section summarizes four broad trends that illustrate Africa’s agricultural transformation to date and briefly discusses their possible future evolution.

Non-PR, IFPRI1; CRP2; 4 Transforming Agricultural and Rural Economies; 2 Promoting Healthy Diets and Nutrition for all; ReSAKSS Asia; COVID-19 Measuring Impacts and Prioritizing Policies for Recovery, DSGD; PIM, CGIAR Research Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM), Developments in the agricultural economy of Papua New Guinea have major impacts on household food consumption decisions. A household’s ability to produce and sell food is affected by climate and associated agricultural potential, market opportunities (domestic, import and export) and unexpected shocks. Each of these factors affects the overall food system, thereby influencing production and consumption of all food products and the markets in which they are traded. The COVID-19 pandemic has presented a challenge far more complex than an agricultural production shock, such as those due to El Niño or pests. Rather than directly affecting agricultural output and rural household welfare, the COVID-19 pandemic has affected economies across the globe via trade disruptions (logistic challenges; international trade barriers), social distancing policies (domestic food market and nonessential business closures), and transportation restrictions (road closures; air travel cancellations). The measures aimed to curb the spread of COVID-19 have affected household incomes via urban job losses, reduced market interaction, and dramatic changes in world food prices. While rice prices have increased, luxury food prices, such as for chocolate (i.e. cocoa), have decreased. PNG’s unique and highly varied biophysical landscape has shaped agricultural production patterns, outcomes, and livelihoods for centuries. Understanding how the PNG agrifood economy and resulting household consumption is affected by COVID-19 therefore requires attention to linkages and substitution effects across various products and the markets in which they are traded.

Non-PR, IFPRI1; MyanmarSSP; CRP2; 3 Building Inclusive and Efficient Markets, Trade Systems, and Food Industry; 4 Transforming Agricultural and Rural Economies; MAPSA; 5 Strengthening Institutions and Governance, DSGD; PIM, CGIAR Research Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM), Agri-food exports are important for Myanmar’s economic takeoff, in particular for the transformation of agri-food systems. This paper analyzes the past performance of key agri-food exports and assess their role and future potential to contribute to the transformation of Myanmar’s agri-food system and the overall economy.

PR, IFPRI4; ReSAKSS, AFR; DSGD, The objectives of the 2020 Annual Trends and Outlook Report (ATOR) are twofold. First, the report tracks past and current African agricultural policies, and evaluates their limitations and achievements. Second, it identifies further policy interventions to improve agricultural outcomes and stimulate broader transformation throughout the agrifood system so as to contribute to healthy and nutritious diets, environmental sustainability, and job creation. Collectively, the chapters converge on a number of key lessons: consolidate recent successes without repeating past mistakes, ensure that policies are both holistic and nuanced, and strengthen the broader policy and institutional setting in which sector-specific policy decisions are embedded. This chapter summarizes these findings and concludes that even though COVID-19 has been a significant global shock, it does not need to derail the region’s agrifood system transformation aspirations.