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Historical data are valuable resources for providing insights into general sociological patterns in the past. How-ever, these data often inform us at the macro-level of analysis but not about the role of individuals’ behaviours in the emergence of long-term patterns. Therefore, it is difficult to infer ‘how’ and ‘why’ certain patterns emerged in the past. Historians use various methods to draw hypotheses about the underlying reasons for emerging patterns and trends, but since the patterns are the results of hundreds if not thousands of years of human behaviour, these hypotheses can never be tested in reality. Our proposition is that simulation models and specifically, agent-based models (ABMs) can be used as complementary tools in historical studies to support hypothesis building. The approach that we propose and test in this paper is to design and configure models in such a way as to generate historical patterns, consequently aiming to find individual-level explanations for the emerging pattern. In this work, we use an existing, empirically validated, agent-based model of common pool resource management to test hypotheses formulated based on a historical dataset. We first investigate whether the model can replicate various patterns observed in the dataset, and second, whether it can contribute to a better understanding of the underlying mechanism that led to the observed empirical trends. We showcase how ABM can be used as a complementary tool to support theory development in historical studies. Finally, we provide some guidelines for using ABM as a tool to test historical hypotheses., Energy & Industry

Green Open Access added to TU Delft Institutional Repository ‘You share, we take care!’ – Taverne project https://www.openaccess.nl/en/you-share-we-take-care Otherwise as indicated in the copyright section: the publisher is the copyright holder of this work and the author uses the Dutch legislation to make this work public., Energy & Industry, Applied Sciences

Human societies and natural ecosystems are under threat by growing populations, overexploitation of natural resources and climate change. This calls for more sustainable utilization of resources based on past experiences and insights from many different disciplines. Interdisciplinary approaches to studies of historical commons have potential to identify drivers of change and keys to success in the past, and offer advice about the management and use of shared resources in contemporary and future systems. We address these issues by applying an ecological perspective to historical data on social-ecological systems. We perform comparisons and time series analyses for nine successful Dutch commons for which highresolution data on the regulatory activities and use of shared resources is available for on average 380 years (range 236 to 568) during the period 1300 to 1972. Within commons, institutional developments were oscillating, with periods of intense regulatory activity being separated by periods of low activity, and with the dynamics of regulations being largely independent across commons. Ecological theory posits that species that occupy similar niches should show correlated responses to environmental challenges; however, commons using more similar resources did not have more parallel or similar institutional developments. One notable exception was that sanctioning was more frequent in commons that directed more regulatory activities towards non-renewable subsoil resources, whereas there was no association between sanctioning and the use of renewable resources. This might indicate that commoners were aware of potential resource depletion and attempted to influence freeriding by actively trying to solve the underlying social dilemmas. Sanctioning regulations were more frequent during the first than during the second part of a common's life, indicating that while sanctioning might have been important for the establishment of commons it was not key to the long-term per, Energy & Industry

In their studies of collective exploitation of common-pool resources, Ostrom and other scholars have stressed the importance of sanctioning as an essential method for preventing overuse and, eventually, the collapse of commons. However, most of the available evidence is based on data covering a relatively small period in history, and thus does not inform us about the evolution of rules, including sanctions, over time. In this article, we demonstrate, based on historical sources covering several centuries, that sanctioning was not always the preferred way of preventing or dealing with free-riding in institutions for collective action, but that the legal context is decisive to understand why commoners in some countries were using more sanctions than those in others to regulate commoners' behavior. Commoners that could self-govern their resources used fewer sanctions, and when they did, it was mainly to avoid overuse of their most vulnerable resources. Moreover, graduated sanctioning seems to be less important than suggested in Ostrom's famous Design Principles, and was reserved primarily for immediate threats to the commons' resources. We also show the importance of other types of rules, such as differentiated rules, which have hardly been taken into account in literature to date., Energy & Industry

Historical data are valuable resources for providing insights into general sociological patterns in the past. How-ever, these data often inform us at the macro-level of analysis but not about the role of individuals’ behaviours in the emergence of long-term patterns. Therefore, it is difficult to infer ‘how’ and ‘why’ certain patterns emerged in the past. Historians use various methods to draw hypotheses about the underlying reasons for emerging patterns and trends, but since the patterns are the results of hundreds if not thousands of years of human behaviour, these hypotheses can never be tested in reality. Our proposition is that simulation models and specifically, agent-based models (ABMs) can be used as complementary tools in historical studies to support hypothesis building. The approach that we propose and test in this paper is to design and configure models in such a way as to generate historical patterns, consequently aiming to find individual-level explanations for the emerging pattern. In this work, we use an existing, empirically validated, agent-based model of common pool resource management to test hypotheses formulated based on a historical dataset. We first investigate whether the model can replicate various patterns observed in the dataset, and second, whether it can contribute to a better understanding of the underlying mechanism that led to the observed empirical trends. We showcase how ABM can be used as a complementary tool to support theory development in historical studies. Finally, we provide some guidelines for using ABM as a tool to test historical hypotheses.

In their studies of collective exploitation of common-pool resources, Ostrom and other scholars have stressed the importance of sanctioning as an essential method for preventing overuse and, eventually, the collapse of commons. However, most of the available evidence is based on data covering a relatively small period in history, and thus does not inform us about the evolution of rules, including sanctions, over time. In this article, we demonstrate, based on historical sources covering several centuries, that sanctioning was not always the preferred way of preventing or dealing with free-riding in institutions for collective action, but that the legal context is decisive to understand why commoners in some countries were using more sanctions than those in others to regulate commoners' behavior. Commoners that could self-govern their resources used fewer sanctions, and when they did, it was mainly to avoid overuse of their most vulnerable resources. Moreover, graduated sanctioning seems to be less important than suggested in Ostrom's famous Design Principles, and was reserved primarily for immediate threats to the commons' resources. We also show the importance of other types of rules, such as differentiated rules, which have hardly been taken into account in literature to date.

Historical data are valuable resources for providing insights into general sociological patterns in the past. How-ever, these data often inform us at the macro-level of analysis but not about the role of individuals’ behaviours in the emergence of long-term patterns. Therefore, it is difficult to infer ‘how’ and ‘why’ certain patterns emerged in the past. Historians use various methods to draw hypotheses about the underlying reasons for emerging patterns and trends, but since the patterns are the results of hundreds if not thousands of years of human behaviour, these hypotheses can never be tested in reality. Our proposition is that simulation models and specifically, agent-based models (ABMs) can be used as complementary tools in historical studies to support hypothesis building. The approach that we propose and test in this paper is to design and configure models in such a way as to generate historical patterns, consequently aiming to find individual-level explanations for the emerging pattern. In this work, we use an existing, empirically validated, agent-based model of common pool resource management to test hypotheses formulated based on a historical dataset. We first investigate whether the model can replicate various patterns observed in the dataset, and second, whether it can contribute to a better understanding of the underlying mechanism that led to the observed empirical trends. We showcase how ABM can be used as a complementary tool to support theory development in historical studies. Finally, we provide some guidelines for using ABM as a tool to test historical hypotheses., Energie and Industrie

Green Open Access added to TU Delft Institutional Repository ‘You share, we take care!’ – Taverne project https://www.openaccess.nl/en/you-share-we-take-care Otherwise as indicated in the copyright section: the publisher is the copyright holder of this work and the author uses the Dutch legislation to make this work public., Energy and Industry, Applied Sciences

Marriage is generally regarded as a decisive moment in the life course of individuals. As the social, but also the legal status of women and men changes as soon as they enter marriage and – by extension – their preceding wedding engagement, registers are and were being kept to record this life event in most societies. The difficulty in studying the long-term development of marriage patterns is the need for, among other things, detailed information about the marriage formation process. Most of the research on marriage patterns is based on a limited amount of data. Data either cover only a limited period (at most several consecutive decades), a limited number of variables, a relatively small number of marriages, and/or a relatively small town or region. The Amsterdam marriage banns registers are an exception to the above, in terms of content, focus area, and volume. In this article, we present the dataset results of the Citizen Science project ‘Ja, ik wil!’ [‘Yes, I do!’], involving over 500 participants retrieving a wide range of socio-economic data on over 94,000 couples from the rich source of the historical Amsterdam marriage banns registers, covering every fifth year between 1580 and 1810.

Historical commons represent self-governed governance regimes that regulate the use and management of natural and man-made shared resources. Despite growing scientific interests, analyses of commons evolution and temporal dynamics are rare and drivers of change (birth, adaptation, dissolution) remain obscure. We apply an interdisciplinary approach and address these issues from an eco-evolutionary perspective. Analyses of > 400 Dutch commons over more than a millennium (between the 9th and the 20th century) uncovered that most commons originated between 1200 and 1700, and that there was a particularly high rate of evolution during 1300-1550, a pattern intermediate to gradualism and punctuated equilibrium in biological evolution. Dissolutions of commons were rare prior to 1800 and peaked around 1850, comparable to a mass extinction in biology. Temporal trends in number, spatial distribution, density, and dispersion of historical commons were distinctive and resembled developments seen at the levels of species and individuals in the growth of biological communities and populations, in that they showed signs of saturation determined by the abundance and distribution of resources. The spatiotemporal dynamics of commons also pointed to important roles of social, economic and political factors, such as new reclamations of resources and pressure on resources due to population growth. Despite internal and external pressures, the self-governing commons studied here were very successful, in the sense that they persisted for on average >350 years. There was a weak positive relationship between the use of multiple resources and the lifespan of commons, resembling associations between diversity and persistence seen in biological systems. It is argued that eco-evolutionary perspectives can further the understanding of the long-term dynamics of commons as institutions for collective action, vitalize future research, improve management of shared goods, and advise about sust, Energy & Industry, Transport and Logistics

Declining welfare states and increasing privatization of the insurance sector are leaving an increasing number of people, particularly in Europe, without insurance. In many countries, new initiatives like Friendsurance (Germany), Broodfonds (the Netherlands), and Lemonade (US) have emerged to fill this gap. These initiatives, sometimes called peer-to-peer insurance, aim to make insurance fair, transparent, and social again. Resembling 19th-century mutuals, they pool premiums in (small) risk-sharing pools. We compare eleven new mutuals with respect to their institutional, resource, and member characteristics and find two broad typologies. The first bears the most resemblance to the 19th-century mutuals: Members are (partly) responsible for governance, there is no risk differentiation, premiums are fixed and low, and insurance payouts cover basic expenses only and are not guaranteed. The second group, while also applying risk-sharing and redistribution of unused premiums, is organized more like the present-day commercial insurers it reacted against, e.g., with refined InsurTech methods for risk differentiation and a top-down organization. We thus pose that, while both groups of new insurers reinvent the meaning of solidarity by using direct risk-sharing groups (as is central to the concept of mutuals), they have different projected development paths—especially considering how, in case of further growth, they deal with problems of moral hazard and adverse selection.

We present an analysis of regulatory activities in historical commons offering a unique picture of their long-term institutional dynamics. The analysis took into account almost 3,800 regulatory activities in eighteen European commons in two countries across seven centuries. Despite differences in time and space, we found a shared pattern where an initial, highly-dynamic institutional-definition phase was followed by a relatively long period of stability and a final burst of activities, possibly in an attempt to respond to new challenges. In addition, most of the initial regulatory activities focused on resource use, while towards the end other activities prevailed. Our approach allows for a better understanding of institutional dynamics and our findings also provide important insights about how to regulate the use of current natural resources., Energy & Industry

Declining welfare states and increasing privatization of the insurance sector are leaving an increasing number of people, particularly in Europe, without insurance. In many countries, new initiatives like Friendsurance (Germany), Broodfonds (the Netherlands), and Lemonade (US) have emerged to fill this gap. These initiatives, sometimes called peer-to-peer insurance, aim to make insurance fair, transparent, and social again. Resembling 19th-century mutuals, they pool premiums in (small) risk-sharing pools. We compare eleven new mutuals with respect to their institutional, resource, and member characteristics and find two broad typologies. The first bears the most resemblance to the 19th-century mutuals: Members are (partly) responsible for governance, there is no risk differentiation, premiums are fixed and low, and insurance payouts cover basic expenses only and are not guaranteed. The second group, while also applying risk-sharing and redistribution of unused premiums, is organized more like the present-day commercial insurers it reacted against, e.g., with refined InsurTech methods for risk differentiation and a top-down organization. We thus pose that, while both groups of new insurers reinvent the meaning of solidarity by using direct risk-sharing groups (as is central to the concept of mutuals), they have different projected development paths - especially considering how, in case of further growth, they deal with problems of moral hazard and adverse selection. Supplementary File, s. https://doi.org/10.17645/si.v8i1.2125

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PR, IFPRI3; ISI; CRP2; CRP5; 5 Strengthening Institutions and Governance; 1 Fostering Climate-Resilient and Sustainable Food Supply, EPTD; PIM, CGIAR Research Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM); CGIAR Research Program on Water, Land and Ecosystems (WLE), “Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.” So argued ecologist Garrett Hardin in “The Tragedy of the Commons” in the 13 December 1968 issue of Science (1). Hardin questioned society’s ability to manage shared resources and avoid an environmentally and socially calamitous free-for-all. In the 50 years since, the essay has influenced discussions ranging from climate change (see page 1217) to evolution, from infectious disease to the internet, and has reached far beyond academic literature—but not without criticism. Considerable work, notably by Nobelist Elinor Ostrom (2) , has challenged Hardin, particularly his emphasis on property rights and government regulatory leviathans as solutions. Instead, research has documented contexts, cases, and principles that reflect the ability of groups to collectively govern common resources. To mark this anniversary and celebrate the richness of research and practice around commons and cooperation, Science invited experts to share some contemporary views on such tragedies and how to avert them.

This thesis tracks the development of common right concerning livestock grazing, from legal codification in England, through the colonization of America and into the creation of the vast grazing commons administered by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) in the western United States. By following landmark legal decisions and legislation, the development from manorial legacy in England, to natural law infused legislation in the early United States, it is demonstrated that the current BLM grazing programs are not only a grazing common, with a distinctly unique form of common right, but also result of the post-colonial evolution of commons in the United States.

Het verband tussen liefdadigheid en de christelijke religie is sterk en onderstaand citaat onderschrijft dat. Het woord liefdadigheid houdt sterk verband met religie omdat het de erkenning is van Gods liefde in andere mensen en via liefdadigheidswerk uitte men de liefde voor God. ‘Feed the poor, friend, and it’s God you feed, / For God lies hidden in those in need.’ Deze studie is gewijd aan de denkbeelden over ouderenzorg en liefdadigheid die door de kerk werden uitgedragen in het vroegmoderne Nederland. Het doel is geweest om een antwoord te formuleren op de vraag hoe de visie van de kerk op ouderenzorg is veranderd door toedoen van de Reformatie. De nadruk van dit onderzoek ligt op de zestiende eeuw, de periode van 1500 – 1650. Deze tijdspanne kan worden aangemerkt als een periode waarin het liefdadigheidsdebat een publieke stem kreeg door humanisten als Erasmus en Juan Luis Vives en hervormers als Luther en Calvijn. De stemmen die vormgeven aan het liefdadigheidsdebat binnen deze studie zijn beperkt tot die van Cornelis Adriaensz. Brouwer van Dordrecht en Heinrich Bullinger. Beide predikanten schreven een overzichtelijk en daarom veelvuldig gelezen werk over hun uitleg van de Tien Geboden, waarin ook hun noties over religie en liefdadigheid worden behandeld.

Despite significant progress in recent years, the evolution of commons over the long run remains an under-explored area within commons studies. During the last years an international team of historians have worked under the umbrella of the Common Rules Project in order to design and test a new methodology aimed at advancing our knowledge on the dynamics of institutions for collective action – in particular commons. This project aims to contribute to the current debate on commons on three different fronts. Theoretically, it explicitly draws our attention to issues of change and adaptation in the commons – contrasting with more static analyses. Empirically, it highlights the value of historical records as a rich source of information for longitudinal analysis of the functioning of commons. Methodologically, it develops a systematic way of analyzing and comparing commons’ regulations across regions and time, setting a number of variables that have been defined on the basis of the “most common denominators” in commons regulation across countries and time periods. In this paper we introduce the project, describe our sources and methodology, and present the preliminary results of our analysis.