Search

The celebrated Bayesian persuasion model considers strategic communication between an informed agent (the sender) and uninformed decision makers (the receivers). The current rapidly-growing literature mostly assumes a dichotomy: either the sender is powerful enough to communicate separately with each receiver (a.k.a. private persuasion), or she cannot communicate separately at all (a.k.a. public persuasion). We study a model that smoothly interpolates between the two, by considering a natural multi-channel communication structure in which each receiver observes a subset of the sender's communication channels. This captures, e.g., receivers on a network, where information spillover is almost inevitable. We completely characterize when one communication structure is better for the sender than another, in the sense of yielding higher optimal expected utility universally over all prior distributions and utility functions. The characterization is based on a simple pairwise relation among receivers - one receiver information-dominates another if he observes at least the same channels. We prove that a communication structure $M_1$ is (weakly) better than $M_2$ if and only if every information-dominating pair of receivers in $M_1$ is also such in $M_2$. We also provide an additive FPTAS for the optimal sender's signaling scheme when the number of states is constant and the graph of information-dominating pairs is a directed forest. Finally, we prove that finding an optimal signaling scheme under multi-channel persuasion is, generally, computationally harder than under both public and private persuasion.

Under the uncoupled learning setup, the last-iterate convergence guarantee towards Nash equilibrium is shown to be impossible in many games. This work studies the last-iterate convergence guarantee in general games toward rationalizability, a key solution concept in epistemic game theory that relaxes the stringent belief assumptions in both Nash and correlated equilibrium. This learning task naturally generalizes best arm identification problems, due to the intrinsic connections between rationalizable action profiles and the elimination of iteratively dominated actions. Despite a seemingly simple task, our first main result is a surprisingly negative one; that is, a large and natural class of no regret algorithms, including the entire family of Dual Averaging algorithms, provably take exponentially many rounds to reach rationalizability. Moreover, algorithms with the stronger no swap regret also suffer similar exponential inefficiency. To overcome these barriers, we develop a new algorithm that adjusts Exp3 with Diminishing Historical rewards (termed Exp3-DH); Exp3-DH gradually forgets history at carefully tailored rates. We prove that when all agents run Exp3-DH (a.k.a., self-play in multi-agent learning), all iteratively dominated actions can be eliminated within polynomially many rounds. Our experimental results further demonstrate the efficiency of Exp3-DH, and that state-of-the-art bandit algorithms, even those developed specifically for learning in games, fail to reach rationalizability efficiently.

Incentivized exploration in multi-armed bandits (MAB) has witnessed increasing interests and many progresses in recent years, where a principal offers bonuses to agents to do explorations on her behalf. However, almost all existing studies are confined to temporary myopic agents. In this work, we break this barrier and study incentivized exploration with multiple and long-term strategic agents, who have more complicated behaviors that often appear in real-world applications. An important observation of this work is that strategic agents' intrinsic needs of learning benefit (instead of harming) the principal's explorations by providing "free pulls". Moreover, it turns out that increasing the population of agents significantly lowers the principal's burden of incentivizing. The key and somewhat surprising insight revealed from our results is that when there are sufficiently many learning agents involved, the exploration process of the principal can be (almost) free. Our main results are built upon three novel components which may be of independent interest: (1) a simple yet provably effective incentive-provision strategy; (2) a carefully crafted best arm identification algorithm for rewards aggregated under unequal confidences; (3) a high-probability finite-time lower bound of UCB algorithms. Experimental results are provided to complement the theoretical analysis., Comment: Accepted to NeurIPS 2021, camera-ready version

Peer review systems such as conference paper review often suffer from the issue of miscalibration. Previous works on peer review calibration usually only use the ordinal information or assume simplistic reviewer scoring functions such as linear functions. In practice, applications like academic conferences often rely on manual methods, such as open discussions, to mitigate miscalibration. It remains an important question to develop algorithms that can handle different types of miscalibrations based on available prior knowledge. In this paper, we propose a flexible framework, namely least square calibration (LSC), for selecting top candidates from peer ratings. Our framework provably performs perfect calibration from noiseless linear scoring functions under mild assumptions, yet also provides competitive calibration results when the scoring function is from broader classes beyond linear functions and with arbitrary noise. On our synthetic dataset, we empirically demonstrate that our algorithm consistently outperforms the baseline which select top papers based on the highest average ratings.

We study adversarial attacks on linear stochastic bandits: by manipulating the rewards, an adversary aims to control the behaviour of the bandit algorithm. Perhaps surprisingly, we first show that some attack goals can never be achieved. This is in sharp contrast to context-free stochastic bandits, and is intrinsically due to the correlation among arms in linear stochastic bandits. Motivated by this finding, this paper studies the attackability of a $k$-armed linear bandit environment. We first provide a complete necessity and sufficiency characterization of attackability based on the geometry of the arms' context vectors. We then propose a two-stage attack method against LinUCB and Robust Phase Elimination. The method first asserts whether the given environment is attackable; and if yes, it poisons the rewards to force the algorithm to pull a target arm linear times using only a sublinear cost. Numerical experiments further validate the effectiveness and cost-efficiency of the proposed attack method., Comment: 27 pages, 3 figures, ICML 2022

We propose a new problem setting to study the sequential interactions between a recommender system and a user. Instead of assuming the user is omniscient, static, and explicit, as the classical practice does, we sketch a more realistic user behavior model, under which the user: 1) rejects recommendations if they are clearly worse than others; 2) updates her utility estimation based on rewards from her accepted recommendations; 3) withholds realized rewards from the system. We formulate the interactions between the system and such an explorative user in a $K$-armed bandit framework and study the problem of learning the optimal recommendation on the system side. We show that efficient system learning is still possible but is more difficult. In particular, the system can identify the best arm with probability at least $1-\delta$ within $O(1/\delta)$ interactions, and we prove this is tight. Our finding contrasts the result for the problem of best arm identification with fixed confidence, in which the best arm can be identified with probability $1-\delta$ within $O(\log(1/\delta))$ interactions. This gap illustrates the inevitable cost the system has to pay when it learns from an explorative user's revealed preferences on its recommendations rather than from the realized rewards.

A ubiquitous learning problem in today's digital market is, during repeated interactions between a seller and a buyer, how a seller can gradually learn optimal pricing decisions based on the buyer's past purchase responses. A fundamental challenge of learning in such a strategic setup is that the buyer will naturally have incentives to manipulate his responses in order to induce more favorable learning outcomes for him. To understand the limits of the seller's learning when facing such a strategic and possibly manipulative buyer, we study a natural yet powerful buyer manipulation strategy. That is, before the pricing game starts, the buyer simply commits to "imitate" a different value function by pretending to always react optimally according to this imitative value function. We fully characterize the optimal imitative value function that the buyer should imitate as well as the resultant seller revenue and buyer surplus under this optimal buyer manipulation. Our characterizations reveal many useful insights about what happens at equilibrium. For example, a seller with concave production cost will obtain essentially 0 revenue at equilibrium whereas the revenue for a seller with convex production cost is the Bregman divergence of her cost function between no production and certain production. Finally, and importantly, we show that a more powerful class of pricing schemes does not necessarily increase, in fact, may be harmful to, the seller's revenue. Our results not only lead to an effective prescriptive way for buyers to manipulate learning algorithms but also shed lights on the limits of what a seller can really achieve when pricing in the dark., Comment: Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS 2021)

Most algorithmic studies on multi-agent information design so far have focused on the restricted situation with no inter-agent externalities; a few exceptions investigated truly strategic games such as zero-sum games and second-price auctions but have all focused only on optimal public signaling. This paper initiates the algorithmic information design of both \emph{public} and \emph{private} signaling in a fundamental class of games with negative externalities, i.e., singleton congestion games, with wide application in today's digital economy, machine scheduling, routing, etc. For both public and private signaling, we show that the optimal information design can be efficiently computed when the number of resources is a constant. To our knowledge, this is the first set of efficient \emph{exact} algorithms for information design in succinctly representable many-player games. Our results hinge on novel techniques such as developing certain "reduced forms" to compactly characterize equilibria in public signaling or to represent players' marginal beliefs in private signaling. When there are many resources, we show computational intractability results. To overcome the issue of multiple equilibria, here we introduce a new notion of equilibrium-\emph{oblivious} hardness, which rules out any possibility of computing a good signaling scheme, irrespective of the equilibrium selection rule., Comment: Accepted to EC'22

We propose and study a novel mechanism design setup where each bidder holds two kinds of private information: (1) type variable, which can be misreported; (2) information variable, which the bidder may want to conceal or partially reveal, but importantly, not to misreport. We refer to bidders with such behaviors as strategically reticent bidders. Among others, one direct motivation of our model is the ad auction in which many ad platforms today elicit from each bidder not only their private value per conversion but also their private information about Internet users (e.g., user activities on the advertiser's websites) in order to improve the platform's estimation of conversion rates. We show that in this new setup, it is still possible to design mechanisms that are both Incentive and Information Compatible (IIC). We develop two different black-box transformations, which convert any mechanism $\mathcal{M}$ for classic bidders to a mechanism $\bar{\mathcal{M}}$ for strategically reticent bidders, based on either outcome of expectation or expectation of outcome, respectively. We identify properties of the original mechanism $\mathcal{M}$ under which the transformation leads to IIC mechanisms $\bar{\mathcal{M}}$. Interestingly, as corollaries of these results, we show that running VCG with bidders' expected values maximizes welfare, whereas the mechanism using expected outcome of Myerson's auction maximizes revenue. Finally, we study how regulation on the auctioneer's usage of information can lead to more robust mechanisms.

Diffusion source identification on networks is a problem of fundamental importance in a broad class of applications, including rumor controlling and virus identification. Though this problem has received significant recent attention, most studies have focused only on very restrictive settings and lack theoretical guarantees for more realistic networks. We introduce a statistical framework for the study of diffusion source identification and develop a confidence set inference approach inspired by hypothesis testing. Our method efficiently produces a small subset of nodes, which provably covers the source node with any pre-specified confidence level without restrictive assumptions on network structures. Moreover, we propose multiple Monte Carlo strategies for the inference procedure based on network topology and the probabilistic properties that significantly improve the scalability. To our knowledge, this is the first diffusion source identification method with a practically useful theoretical guarantee on general networks. We demonstrate our approach via extensive synthetic experiments on well-known random network models and a mobility network between cities concerning the COVID-19 spreading.

We study a Bayesian persuasion setting with binary actions (adopt and reject) for Receiver. We examine the following question - how well can Sender perform, in terms of persuading Receiver to adopt, when ignorant of Receiver's utility? We take a robust (adversarial) approach to study this problem; that is, our goal is to design signaling schemes for Sender that perform well for all possible Receiver's utilities. We measure performance of signaling schemes via the notion of (additive) regret: the difference between Sender's hypothetically optimal utility had she known Receiver's utility function and her actual utility induced by the given scheme. On the negative side, we show that if Sender has no knowledge at all about Receiver's utility, then Sender has no signaling scheme that performs robustly well. On the positive side, we show that if Sender only knows Receiver's ordinal preferences of the states of nature - i.e., Receiver's utility upon adoption is monotonic as a function of the state - then Sender can guarantee a surprisingly low regret even when the number of states tends to infinity. In fact, we exactly pin down the minimum regret value that Sender can guarantee in this case, which turns out to be at most 1/e. We further show that such positive results are not possible under the alternative performance measure of a multiplicative approximation ratio by proving that no constant ratio can be guaranteed even for monotonic Receiver's utility; this may serve to demonstrate the merits of regret as a robust performance measure that is not too pessimistic. Finally, we analyze an intermediate setting in between the no-knowledge and the ordinal-knowledge settings.

We study the problem of incentivizing exploration for myopic users in linear bandits, where the users tend to exploit arm with the highest predicted reward instead of exploring. In order to maximize the long-term reward, the system offers compensation to incentivize the users to pull the exploratory arms, with the goal of balancing the trade-off among exploitation, exploration and compensation. We consider a new and practically motivated setting where the context features observed by the user are more informative than those used by the system, e.g., features based on users' private information are not accessible by the system. We propose a new method to incentivize exploration under such information gap, and prove that the method achieves both sublinear regret and sublinear compensation. We theoretical and empirically analyze the added compensation due to the information gap, compared with the case that the system has access to the same context features as the user, i.e., without information gap. We also provide a compensation lower bound of our problem.

We study a natural competitive-information-design variant for the Pandora's Box problem (Weitzman 1979), where each box is associated with a strategic information sender who can design what information about the box's prize value to be revealed to the agent when the agent inspects the box. This variant with strategic boxes is motivated by a wide range of real-world economic applications for Pandora's Box. The main contributions of this article are two-fold: (1) we study informational properties of Pandora's Box by showing an intrinsic connection between informativeness of any box's value distribution and the utility order of the search agent; and (2) we fully characterize the pure symmetric equilibrium for the boxes' competitive information revelation, which reveals various insights regarding information competition and the resultant agent utility at equilibrium., Comment: 40 pages, 2 figures. Earlier version appeared in SODA'23

A decision maker is choosing between an active action (e.g., purchase a house, invest certain stock) and a passive action. The payoff of the active action depends on the buyer's private type and also an unknown state of nature. An information seller can design experiments to reveal information about the realized state to the decision maker, and would like to maximize profit from selling such information. We characterize, in closed-form, the revenue-optimal information selling mechanism for the seller. After eliciting the buyer's type, the optimal mechanism charges the buyer an upfront payment and then simply reveals whether the realized state exceeds a certain threshold or not. The optimal mechanism features both price discrimination and information discrimination. The special buyer type who is a-priori indifferent between the active and passive action benefits the most from participating in the mechanism.

Motivated by information sharing in online platforms, we study repeated persuasion between a sender and a stream of receivers where at each time, the sender observes a payoff-relevant state drawn independently and identically from an unknown distribution, and shares state information with the receivers who each choose an action. The sender seeks to persuade the receivers into taking actions aligned with the sender's preference by selectively sharing state information. However, in contrast to the standard models, neither the sender nor the receivers know the distribution, and the sender has to persuade while learning the distribution on the fly. We study the sender's learning problem of making persuasive action recommendations to achieve low regret against the optimal persuasion mechanism with the knowledge of the distribution. To do this, we first propose and motivate a persuasiveness criterion for the unknown distribution setting that centers robustness as a requirement in the face of uncertainty. Our main result is an algorithm that, with high probability, is robustly-persuasive and achieves $O(\sqrt{T\log T})$ regret, where $T$ is the horizon length. Intuitively, at each time our algorithm maintains a set of candidate distributions, and chooses a signaling mechanism that is simultaneously persuasive for all of them. Core to our proof is a tight analysis about the cost of robust persuasion, which may be of independent interest. We further prove that this regret order is optimal (up to logarithmic terms) by showing that no algorithm can achieve regret better than $\Omega(\sqrt{T})$., Comment: Accepted at Operations Research. Preliminary version appeared as an extended abstract in EC 2021

We study bandit algorithms under data poisoning attacks in a bounded reward setting. We consider a strong attacker model in which the attacker can observe both the selected actions and their corresponding rewards and can contaminate the rewards with additive noise. We show that any bandit algorithm with regret $O(\log T)$ can be forced to suffer a regret $\Omega(T)$ with an expected amount of contamination $O(\log T)$. This amount of contamination is also necessary, as we prove that there exists an $O(\log T)$ regret bandit algorithm, specifically the classical UCB, that requires $\Omega(\log T)$ amount of contamination to suffer regret $\Omega(T)$. To combat such attacks, our second main contribution is to propose verification based mechanisms, which use limited verification to access a limited number of uncontaminated rewards. In particular, for the case of unlimited verifications, we show that with $O(\log T)$ expected number of verifications, a simple modified version of the ETC type bandit algorithm can restore the order optimal $O(\log T)$ regret irrespective of the amount of contamination used by the attacker. We also provide a UCB-like verification scheme, called Secure-UCB, that also enjoys full recovery from any attacks, also with $O(\log T)$ expected number of verifications. To derive a matching lower bound on the number of verifications, we prove that for any order-optimal bandit algorithm, this number of verifications $\Omega(\log T)$ is necessary to recover the order-optimal regret. On the other hand, when the number of verifications is bounded above by a budget $B$, we propose a novel algorithm, Secure-BARBAR, which provably achieves $O(\min\{C,T/\sqrt{B} \})$ regret with high probability against weak attackers where $C$ is the total amount of contamination by the attacker, which breaks the known $\Omega(C)$ lower bound of the non-verified setting if $C$ is large., Comment: Accepted to AAAI 2022

The study of strategic or adversarial manipulation of testing data to fool a classifier has attracted much recent attention. Most previous works have focused on two extreme situations where any testing data point either is completely adversarial or always equally prefers the positive label. In this paper, we generalize both of these through a unified framework for strategic classification, and introduce the notion of strategic VC-dimension (SVC) to capture the PAC-learnability in our general strategic setup. SVC provably generalizes the recent concept of adversarial VC-dimension (AVC) introduced by Cullina et al. arXiv:1806.01471. We instantiate our framework for the fundamental strategic linear classification problem. We fully characterize: (1) the statistical learnability of linear classifiers by pinning down its SVC; (2) its computational tractability by pinning down the complexity of the empirical risk minimization problem. Interestingly, the SVC of linear classifiers is always upper bounded by its standard VC-dimension. This characterization also strictly generalizes the AVC bound for linear classifiers in arXiv:1806.01471.