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The Catholic Church claims that its ethical teaching, especially on sex, is based upon natural law. I first show that natural law theories prior to the Middle Ages provide no authority for the Church's teaching on sex. I then examine Aquinas's teaching on natural functions and natural law in the two Summae. I suggest that he partly anticipates Enlightenment thinking about law and morals. I compare his theory of natural law with that of Germain Grisez and John Finnis. Finally, I examine the notion of a principle of practical reasoning and indicate how such principles could be formulated to correspond to elements in human nature.

OBJECTIVE Parental diabetes history is a well-known risk factor for type 2 diabetes and considered strong evidence for a genetic basis of type 2 diabetes. Whether this relationship is affected by other known risk factors, specifically obesity, remains unclear, possibly due to a relative paucity of lean diabetic patients. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS This issue was investigated using data from a high-risk population from Mexico (National Health Survey 2000, n = 27,349), with observations replicated using U.S. citizens of Mexican descent from the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey 2001–2002 and 2003–2004 (n = 1,568). RESULTS As expected, positive parental diabetes was a significant risk factor for type 2 diabetes, regardless of age, sex, or adiposity level. However, positive parental diabetes conferred greater risk in leaner individuals than in their overweight peers (P = 0.001). In other words, the effect of BMI on type 2 diabetes risk was smaller in the presence of parental diabetes history. CONCLUSIONS These findings suggest that parental diabetes is a stronger risk factor for type 2 diabetes in the absence of obesity. Thus, studies in lean diabetic patients could help identify type 2 diabetes susceptibility genes. This study reinforces the concept that parental diabetes and BMI are independent type 2 diabetes risk factors and suggests that glycemic screening may be helpful in assessing type 2 diabetes risk in individuals with parental diabetes history, regardless of their overweight status.

I (1) outline two accounts the Catholic Church gives of the human soul, calling them the Lateran and the Vienne doctrines, and (2) argue they are inconsistent. (3) I run over several difficulties in the more popular Lateran doctrine. (4) I look at three uses to which Catholics might want to put a theory of the soul, and question whether either of the theories on offer can meet their needs. (5) I distinguish the Biblical idea of resurrection from the Greek idea of immortality. Finally (6) I commend the Vienne doctrine as philosophy but advise supplementing it with a view of creation, salvation and sanctification as forming a continuum rather than a discontinuous series of episodes.

I first summarise Martha Nussbaum's theory of emotion and place it against its historical background. Borrowing distinctions from Plato I then argue that the emotions discussed in Hiding From Humanity affect us primarily as social beings, not as individuals, and suggest modifying and educating them by social means.

What sort of right is the right to life? Does it make sense to speak of a right to die, or to be allowed to die, or to be helped to die, or to die with dignity? Are life and death straightforward alternatives? Are they possible objects of desire or aversion? Can they be given as gifts? If life is a gift, have recipients of it a duty to be grateful? Answers to these questions are obtained by philosophical analysis, chiefly of the concepts of life and death.

Synopsis: We are often told that the doctrine of creation has not been refuted by modern science, but we cannot judge whether that is true unless we know exactly what the doctrine is, and that is seldom explained. I first offer an interpretation of the doctrine, then defend this as an interpretation, and finally argue that we should use not scientific but forensic methods to decide whether the doctrine, so interpreted, is true.

The paper presents goodness and truth as analogous formal concepts. I first argue that saying something is true of something and saying it is false of it are basic ways of speaking truly or falsely. I then consider thinking a property a good one for something to acquire and thinking it a bad, equate this with having something as a positive or negative objective, an object of desire or aversion, and argue that these are basic ways of thinking rightly or wrongly. Finally I discuss the notions of a way of speaking or thinking, making special reference to Frege’s ‘Negation’ and ‘The Thought.’

The International Atomic Energy Agency has recently drawn attention to the fact that neptunium (Np), a byproduct of the nuclear power industry, can be used to make nuclear weapons. Current monitoring approaches for Np do not rely on material balance accounting as is used for uranium and plutonium. In the future this may change. Although full material balance accounting is not anticipated for Np, it is informative to evaluate the impact and benefit of full material balance accounting when considering other options. Therefore, this paper will apply systems analysis to evaluate ways to convert the current system to full materials balance accounting that will minimize the intrusiveness of the verification system and minimize costs to both the facility operator and the inspection agency. We then compare full material balance accounting to partial material balance accounting and to a ratio-monitoring technique referred to as flow sheet verification. We conclude that sampling approximately 25% of the batches is ...

L'A. tente de corriger les malentendus de sa position exprimee dans Weakness of Will (1991)

This paper describes a stochastic network interdiction model for identifying locations for installing detectors sensitive to nuclear material. A nuclear material smuggler selects a path through a transportation network that maximizes the probability of avoiding detection An interdictor installs sensors to minimize that maximum probability. This problem is formulated as a bi-level stochastic mixed-integer program. The program is stochastic because the evader’s origin and destination are unknown at the time the detectors are installed. The model is reformulated as a two-stage stochastic mixed-integer program with recourse and is shown to be strongly NP-Hard. We describe an application of our model to help strengthen the overall capability of preventing the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials.

Foreword GODFREY VESEY Reason in mystery NORMAN KRETZMANN Logos and Trinity: patterns of Platonist influence on early Christianity JOHN DILLON The philosophy in Christianity: Arius and Athanasius MAURICE WILES Could God become Man? RICHARD SWINBURNE Augustine's philosophy of being CHRISTOPHER STEAD Predestination and freedom in Augustine's ethics GERALD O'DALY God as creator KEITH WARD Foreknowledge and the vulnerability of God I. R. LUCAS On not knowing too much about God A. H. ARMSTRONG Where two are to become one: mysticism and monism GRACE JANTZEN Faith and goodness ELEONORE STUMP Hope STEWART SUTHERLAND Christian averroism, fideism, and the "two-fold truth" STUART BROWN Does philosophy 'leave everything as it is'? Even theology RENFORD BAMBROUGH.

At the beginning of the De A nima, having observed that it is difficult to say even how we should set about enquiring into the soul, Aristotle lists a number of questions: (1) To what logical kind of thing does soul belong? Does 'soul' signify a particular individual and a substance, or does it rather express a quality amount or the like? (402 a 24-5). (2) Is a soul a thing which exists in dunamis or rather a kind of entelecheia words usually translated 'potentiality' and 'actuality'? (402 a 25-6). (3) Is a soul a thing with parts? (402 b 1). (4) Is all soul the same in kind or are there different souls, the soul of a horse, the soul of a dog, the soul of a man, and so on? (402 b 1-8). These questions are not answered in Book I, which consists mainly of an examination of the views of other thinkers. (1) and (2), however, are tackled in De An. II. 1, and (4) in II. 3. Aristotle decides that the notion of a soul is, in a way, the notion of a particular individual and a substance; that it is the notion of an entelecheia; and that there are as many different souls as there are kinds of living thing. This paper will be concerned chiefly with the second point, which is, I think, at once the obscurest and the most important. Aristotle's formal definition of soul, reached through a series of approximations, is translated by D. W. Hamlyn (Aristotle's De Anima, Books II and III, p. 9) as follows

In 1956 Hugh R. King attacked the traditional view that Aristotle postulates what the tradition calls 'prime matter'. He drew replies from Friedrich Solmsen in 1958 and A. R. Lacey in 1965. In an appendix to my translation of Physics I-II in 1970 I offered independent arguments for a position similar to King's. My arguments were criticized by H. M. Robinson in 1974 and R. M. Dancy in 1978. Now C. J. F. Williams, in another appendix, though he thinks that Solmsen and Robinson have 'made out their case', makes it out afresh with special reference to the De Generatione el Corruptione. If Williams is to escape the charge of flogging a dead horse, I must attempt a rejoinder. What exactly is the doctrine which some of us deny, and others assert, that Aristotle held? Williams formulates it as follows (p. 21 1)