Search

Highway concessions are becoming quite popular all around the world as a means to promote private participation in the management and financing of public infrastructure. The congestion problems caused by the limited capacity of the road infrastructure networks in many metropolitan areas are prompting public authorities to adopt the concession approach to improve highway capacity, while at the same time implementing a congestion pricing approach. This paper describes and assesses the case study of a toll highway concession program, recently implemented in the city of Madrid, to build four radial toll highways intended to reduce congestion and at the same time to raise revenues to fund the new infrastructure. The concessions, which started their operations in 2003 and 2004, have not worked as well as expected. There are several reasons for this. The most important one is that they managed to capture only a small share of the traffic in the corridor. This has caused serious financial problems to the concessionaires, who are now on the verge of bankruptcy. This paper analyses both the reasons behind the government's adoption of the concession approach, and the reasons why this approach ultimately proved unsuccessful. On the basis of the results of this case study, we offer a set of recommendations for policy makers when considering the use of toll highway concession contracts in metropolitan areas. Key words: transportation and urban planning, highways. Les concessions autoroutieres deviennent mondialement de plus en plus populaires pour promouvoir la participation du secteur prive dans la gestion et le financement des infrastructures publiques. Les problemes de congestion engendres par la capacite limitee des reseaux autoroutiers dans plusieurs zones metropolitaines invite les autorites publiques a adopter des concessions afin d'ameliorer les capacites autoroutieres, tout en mettant en oeuvre une approche de tarification de la congestion. Le present article decrit et evalue une etude de cas pour un programme de concession d'autoroute a peage implante recemment dans la Ville de Madrid afin de construire quatre autoroutes a peage radiales visant a reduire la congestion, tout en augmentant les revenus pour financer la nouvelle infrastructure. Les concessions, qui ont debute en 2003 et en 2004, n'ont pas eu les succes escomptes. Cela est du a plusieurs raisons, la plus importante etant que leur gestion n'a permis d'aiguiller qu'une petite partie de la circulation passant dans le corridor. Cela a engendre de graves problemes financiers aux concessionnaires, qui sont maintenant pres de la faillite. Cet article analyse les raisons pour lesquelles le gouvernement a adopte l'approche des concessions et pour lesquelles cette approche a ultimement echoue. En se basant sur les resultats de cette etude de cas, nous offrons un ensemble de recommandations aux responsables des orientations politiques lorsqu'ils examinent l'utilisation de contrats de concessions d'autoroutes a peage dans les zones metropolitaines. Mots-cles : transport et l'urbanisme, autoroutes. [Traduit par la Redaction], Introduction Many countries around the world are seeking new ways of involving the private sector in the management and financing of infrastructure through public-private partnerships (PPPs) (OECD 2008). One of [...]

In the beginning of 2006, the regional government of Madrid decided to expand the subway network to the new Terminal T- 4 in Madrid-Barajas International Airport using a public-private partnership (PPP) approach. Owing to the peculiar characteristics of this new access as the enlargement of an existing subway line, the PPP approach was based on separating infrastructure management from transportation service operation. The PPP contractor was entrusted with the infrastructure construction and maintenance while Madrid's public subway company remained in charge of operating the trains. This paper examines the theoretical foundation that justifies the implementation of different PPP approaches to deal with urban rail projects. The paper then explains the reasons why a nonintegrated PPP approach was ultimately adopted for the expansion of Madrid's subway network to the airport. From the outcome of the tender and the present operation performance, we find that nonintegrated PPP contracts have important advantages for urban rail PPPs, particularly for conventional subway networks. These advantages are notable in terms of encouraging economies of scale and density, boosting competition, and reducing the financial costs. DOI: 10.1061/(ASCE)0742-597X(2009)25:1(21) CE Database subject headings: Urban areas; Public transportation; Subways; Infrastructure; Transportation management; Private sector; Financial management.

Abstract: In recent years, several public authorities have been making advances in developing bidding terms for contracts regulating the management of infrastructure. Up to now these bidding terms have focused on granting the contract to the bidder who, having agreed to comply with the requirement of a specified level of quality, as stipulated in the contract, submits the lowest tender in terms of price. As a result, the experience of implementing quality-related incentives for the management of infrastructure has been scarce. This paper demonstrates that, if infrastructure quality is verifiable and the social benefit derived from it is measurable, there is a better way both to tender and to regulate those contracts, based on a combination of price and quality standards. In addition, the paper proposes a new procurement procedure to encourage bidders to provide better quality levels. The last part of the paper provides a practical example of how to calculate a quality index for contracts regulating the management of infrastructure. The paper ends with a set of conclusions related to the advantages of the new tendering mechanism and its possible application. DOI: 10.1061/(ASCE)0733-9364(2007) 133:8(553) CE Database subject headings: Bids; Construction industry; Contract administration; Infrastructure; Regulations.

A great deal of research has been carried out over the past few decades into developing models for estimating road transport costs derived from maintenance investment policies. These existing models attempt to estimate the best investment strategy for fixed budgetary resources. However, they do not take into account the effects derived from work productivity increments arising from new contracting formulas. This paper describes a simulation model for estimating the overall benefit derived from the use of different systems for financing road maintenance as well as the productivity achieved in the management of the work. In order to validate the model, the paper ends with an application on a secondary road in Spain. The results of the simulation show that work productivity is extremely important to the optimal level of investment. Moreover, the simulation provides some relevant conclusions in respect to the financing mechanisms tested. DOI: 10.1061/(ASCE)9733-947X(2002)128:6(559) CE Database keywords: Spain; Maintenance costs; Roads; Financing; Models.