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The article reports that scientific journals "Science" and "Nature" may publish controversial research about a new version of bird flu virus which could be transmitted between humans, despite the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity's warning that the research could be misused.

The US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity has explained in detail its rationale in requesting two papers dealing with highly pathogenic H5N1. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on a live chat on the benefits and risks of the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) recommendation on the H5N1 report, an avian flu paper which may trigger a pandemic, including the possibility of being utilized by bioterrorists.

The article focuses on the need for the U.S. government to regulate the biotechnology industry. It states that gene-synthesis companies can provide terrorists with deadly bioweapons. According to the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), it is easy to produce synthetic genomes with pathogenic properties equivalent to disease agents that are federally regulated. It discusses how businesses can give terrorists the ability to produce superlethal, vaccine-proof, drug-resistant diseases.

The article reports on the decision of the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity to drop the variola amendment, a law that bans the synthesis of the smallpox virus in the U.S. The amendment was enacted by the U.S. Congress on December 17, 2004. The definition of smallpox virus according to the amendment is revealed. Complaints of researchers on the definition of the virus in the law are also raised.

Reports on the move made by the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity to develop safeguards against the wrongful application of life sciences research. Standard for identifying research that might have potential for misuse; Effort of the board to create implementing guidelines; Factors required to implement the guidelines.

The article reports that U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) issued a policy on monitoring of dual-use life sciences research on March 29, 2012. The dual-use policy states that life sciences studies must be revised to prevent biosecurity worries, where it was made as a response to findings on bird flu mutations and transmissions. The policy and its linked NSABB documents were added on the National Institutes of Health Office of Biotechnology Activities webpage.

The article reports on the publication by the members of the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity in the U.S. of a defense of its recommendation that details regarding the methodology behind the engineered virulent form of the H5N 1 influenza virus not be made public.

The article discusses research on experiments on the H5N1 avian flu virus. It references a study by the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) published in an issue of "Science." The NSABB cites the need for censoring results from research papers describing controversial experiments on the virus. The two papers covers work on H5N1 where experiments on direct mutations on the virus were done.

The article focuses on the recommendation of the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) to rescind an amendment that was enacted by the U.S. Congress in 2004. The said amendment imposed a ban on the synthesis of Variola, a smallpox virus. The aim of NSABB is to help the government devise precautionary measures against the unlawful application of life sciences research. NSABB also reasoned that the imposition of penalty on scientists who reproduce the virus may hinder research.

Reports on the creation of the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) as part of the government's effort to deal with security-related issues in federally funded life sciences research that will be managed by the U.S. National Institutes of Health. Formation of a global, nonprofit center to foster a culture of responsibility in the private sector by the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute and the International Institute for Strategic Studies; Functions of the NSABB; Scope and coverage of the responsibilities of the NSABB.