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News briefs on clashes between United Nations armed forces and Seleka in Bria, freeing of Youth & Sports Minister Armel Mingatoloum Sayo by his kidnappers and increasing of United Nations peacekeepers, all in the Central African Republic, are presented.

The UN peacekeeping operations in the Central African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Mali were in 2013 given peace enforcement mandates, ordering them to use all necessary measures to ‘neutralise’ and ‘disarm’ identified groups in the eastern DRC and to ‘stabilise’ CAR and northern Mali. It is not new that UN missions have mandates authorising the use of force, but these have normally not specified enemies and have been of short duration. This article investigates these missions to better understand the short- and long-term consequences, in terms of the willingness of traditional as well as Western troop contributors to provide troops, and of the perception of the missions by host states, neighbouring states, rebel groups, and humanitarian and human rights actors. The paper explores normative, security and legitimacy implications of the expanded will of the UN to use force in peacekeeping operations. It argues that the urge to equip UN peacekeeping operations with enforcement mandates that target particular groups has significant long-term implications for the UN and its role as an impartial arbitrator in post-conflict countries. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article examines how the existence of the unrecognized state, "Republika Srpska Krajina" (RSK), influenced a Danish infantry battalion during its deployment in Croatia between March 1992 and August 1995. Being a part of United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), and later United Nations Confidence Restoration Force in Croatia (UNCRO), the battalion was to protect the Serb-controlled parts of Croatia from further hostilities by demilitarization of these areas. However, the RSK-authorities' stubbornness in maintaining their unofficial borders, their wish for de facto recognition of their self-proclaimed state, and their general lack of trust in the international peacekeepers immediately collided with the initial intention behind the mission. Soon after its deployment, the battalion realized that the RSK authorities hampered its implementation of the peace plan, the so-called Vance-Plan. Through an analysis of a wide range of primary sources this article considers how the battalion responded to these changed circumstances in its distinct local conflict environment. Instead of just considering the Serbs as locals with whom the battalion had the most contact, the article considers the Serb "rebels" as representatives of an unrecognized state. This makes it possible to understand the reason for their hostile attitude, actions and allegations towards the Danish battalion. The article concludes that the RSK-authorities' intention of consolidating their state borders and basic state structures (most importantly their armed forces) played a major role for the Danish battalion. This not only materialized in the battalion's changed perception of the peacekeeping mission as such, but also led to a change in the way of doing things. Thus, it can be argued that the battalion followed a local strategy instead of placing its trust in the international political discussions, which neither the battalion nor the local Serb authorities found specifically valid in their everyday practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The applicability of international humanitarian law (IHL) to United Nations (UN) forces has long generated discussion. When peacekeepers have become engaged in hostilities of such a nature as to trigger the application of IHL (either via acts in self-defence, or in the course of carrying out a mandate as authorised by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations), questions have arisen as to whether they should be equally subject to the rules of IHL. Such questions arise as UN peacekeeping forces act on behalf of the international community and thus have a ‘just cause’, so to speak, to use force. Despite these questions, however, it now appears well settled that the distinction between jus ad bellum (the right to use force under public international law) and jus in bello (the law governing the conduct of hostilities) should be maintained, and that IHL applies in respect of UN peacekeeping operations whenever the conditions for its application are met. That said, questions regarding the conditions for the application of IHL, as well as its scope of application, continue to be relevant, particularly at a time when the Security Council is tasking UN operations with increasingly robust mandates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The spectrum of peacekeeping operations has grown increasingly broad and has come to include various – and sometimes simultaneous – dimensions, such as conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace enforcement and peacebuilding. With the ascendancy of more robust peacekeeping mandates, such as the one assigned by United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 2098 to the UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), there is a need to analyse thoroughly the complexity of the contexts in which peacekeepers are deployed today, the rules applicable to their engagement, and the modalities they can introduce to adapt to new realities. In this interview, the Review sought the opinion of a distinguished military commander and strategist on the future evolution of peacekeeping missions.Lieutenant General Babacar Gaye has been the serving UN Military Adviser for Peacekeeping Operations and Head of the Office of Military Affairs for the past three years. He has exercised command responsibilities at all levels of the military hierarchy and has been among the privileged officers to lead the Senegalese military. Besides his participation in Operation Fode Kaba II in Gambia and the conduct of several campaigns in Casamance, Senegal, General Gaye has taken part in UN operations in Sinai, Lebanon, and Kuwait, where he commanded the Senegalese battalion during Operation Desert Storm. His experience also includes a tour of duty of more than five years in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as MONUC/MONUSCO Force Commander. Prior to that, he served as Ambassador of the Republic of Senegal to Germany, Austria, and the organs of the UN in Vienna. General Officer of the Armoured Cavalry branch, General Gaye is a graduate of the prestigious Saint-Cyr military academy and the Ecole Supérieure de Guerre of France. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Bulletin of the 'Carol I' National Defence University / Buletinul Universitatii Nationale de Aparare 'Carol I' is the property of Carol I National Defence University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Estudos de Sociologia is the property of Universidade Estadual Paulista and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article discusses the safe redeployment, or evacuation, of the United Nations' military, the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. Navy's forces during the Korean War at Hungnam, North Korea in 1950. An overview of the role played by the U.S. commander of the Far East Command General Douglas MacArthur and the U.S. commander of Amphibious Force of the Far East Rear Admiral James H. Doyle in the amphibious operations at Hungnam is provided. The role that the U.S. Navy played in the redeploying of troops, military vehicles, fuel and ammunition stores is discussed.

Copyright of Criminologie is the property of Presses de l'Universite de Montreal and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Vereinte Nationen is the property of Berliner Wissenschaftsverlag GmbH and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Historical Journal / Historijski Zbornik is the property of Drustvo za Hrvatsku Povjesnicu and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

International police have been deployed on a number of peacekeeping missions, but providing capacity development and assisting in reform of local police in war-torn nations are only a relatively recent undertaking. The process of police reform is complicated because of the inherent difficulty in evaluating the impact of a development programme on police service delivery performance. This study reports on the results of a pilot survey of international police managers assessment of the level of competency of the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force following the introduction of a capacity development programme 3 years earlier. The results indicate that although the local police had improved operationally, and in some cases to an international standard, the Force had lower capability in strategic administration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As of 2009, over 11,000 international police officers from more than 100 countries were deployed in 18 United Nations peace operations. Crisis management missions of the European Union also rely heavily on international police components. Over the years, the mandates of international police missions have widened from traditional monitoring responsibilities to a broad array of police development and security sector reform tasks. Yet the structures, resources and skill sets of international police missions do not match their mandates. Only fundamental structural changes will enable international support to post-conflict police reform and development to deliver on the promises it has not met so far. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents an evaluation of private military and security agents and companies as civilian protection forces. It asserts that private military and security personnel are better able to protect civilians than the United Nations (UN) forces that are primarily tasked with the responsibility as per purview of UN protection. However, the claims of recruiting private security contractors for civilian protection would not introduce downsides including the prohibitive financial costs nor the significant risks of misconduct which could offset the contractors' utility. Moreover, the aspects of the UN's effort will be identified on which of the two security forces could mostly inhibit a successful civilian protection.

Are peace operations effective in managing violence against civilians in civil wars? I examine the short-term effects of peace operations on the intensity of violence against the civilian population in internal conflicts. Missions are often sent to ongoing conflicts, where the warring parties have not yet managed to settle their dispute through the use of military means. I propose three mechanisms through which the presence of a third party may increase the parties' incentives to target civilians. A quantitative assessment of all intrastate armed conflicts, 1989-2006, shows that while the presence of a peace operation does not have a clear effect on government violence, it is associated with higher levels of violence by rebel groups. Only UN peace operations with an explicit mandate to protect civilians significantly reduce violence against civilians by rebels. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the slums of Haiti, where pistol and machete wielding gangs dominated the populace through murder, intimidation, extortion, and terror, a UN peacekeeping mission managed to established law, order, and government control. The United Nations Mission for the Stabilization of Haiti (MINUSTAH) succeeded by 'taking on' the gangs in a series of military and police 'search and arrest' operations in 2006-07. The achievement was made possible by thorough 'intelligence preparation of the environment'. This paper tells the story of the 'intelligence-led' military-police-civil operations and how they transformed the Haitian slum of Cite Soleil from a foreboding place inaccessible to police for years to one in which the UN workers could safely walk its streets. The functions, structures, problems and challenges of the mission's intelligence capability are described, especially the work of the Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC). Human intelligence proved to be key, while technologies helped considerably. Within the United Nations, intelligence remains a controversial and sensitive matter but the Haiti mission provides a valuable model of how to gather and use actionable intelligence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the military posture of the sub-Saharan African Nations. Topics include recent and ongoing conflicts, the evolving U.S. strategy towards Africa, United Nations deployments in Africa, defense economics for the region, and a survey of each nation’s defense spending and military capabilities.

The article presents several charts pertaining to defense force levels, economics, and commitments including one describing United Nations deployments during 2008-2009, another showing the leading recipients of arms shipments among developing nations in 2007, and a third listing the top suppliers for global arms shipments for the same year.

Article 5 of the International Law Commission's Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations prescribes the use of the 'effective control' test to determine the attribution of conduct of United Nations peacekeeping forces. A close examination of UN command and control arrangements, however, suggests that art 5, as it is currently understood, may not allow for the comprehensive attribution of conduct as it does not fully take into account the complex arrangements governing the employment of military contingents contributed by UN member states to UN peacekeeping operations. In this regard, the premise upon which art 5 is based may need to be revisited and a new approach considered, to ensure that the conduct of such forces is accurately imputed and that responsibility is correctly attributed to the actors concerned. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Command and control has always been a weak point in UN peace operations. Its inefficiency was clearly demonstrated during the 1990s in both Somalia and the former Yugoslavia. This inefficiency had the effect of pushing traditional Western contributors away from UN peacekeeping. This article examines the impact of the Strategic Military Cell (SMC) established in August 2006 to supervise the UNIFIL II mission in Lebanon on its operational effectiveness, political impacts and influence on traditional contributors. The article argues that the SMC's impacts are rather minimal and that only few of its attributes will be adopted by the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations for other missions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The UN peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) has been derided as one of the world's least effective peacekeeping forces. This article assesses its performance by using two indicators: mandate implementation and the reduction of human suffering. The analysis shows that effective peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been hampered by two major problems. First, MONUC has had a struggle with, and inconsistent approach to, the vague concept of 'robust peacekeeping'. During key moments of the peace process, it tried to wage peace when it should have used force. Second it failed to adapt to a dynamic conflict environment. Both problems were underpinned by flawed assumptions about the peace process, the behaviour of local actors and the presumed benefits of 'post-conflict' elections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines whether non-lethal weapons (NLWs) enhance the capability of the US armed forces to conduct irregular warfare (IW) operations. With expectations that the operational environment will only continue to become more complex in the future, NLWs may reduce the level of violence received, as well as dispensed, by US forces while performing tasks in the IW spectrum. We argue that NLWs increase the ability of US forces to address the long tail of warfare and their deployment should be increased in the near term. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's attitude towards UNPKOs has experienced two shifts since the 1980s. One is about changing from non-financial-support, non-voting, and non-participation concerning peacekeeping to financial-support, voting, and participation in 1981. The other shift concerns China's gradual change in its attitude toward non-traditional peacekeeping over the 1990s. This paper provides a norm perspective on the issue. Specifically the author argues that China's attitude toward UNPKOs changed as a result of the change in international norm from prioritizing sovereignty to prioritizing human rights, and the diffusion of the norm of human rights into China through a variety of agents such as foreign policy elites and two special groups of PLA officers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents several charts including a chart showing individual nations' manpower contributions to 2007 United Nations (UN) deployments, one showing the same information for non-UN deployments, and one listing by supplier arms deliveries to countries in the Middle East and North Africa.

The article highlights various practical issues that must be considered by the United Nations (UN) in developing a military force which would have supranational ownership. It explores some national and international initiatives, academic studies and reports relating to military force during the latter part of the 20th century. Information on the 2006 UN emergency peace service proposal is provided. The article also proposed an approach to developing a UN military force.

The UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) is established in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution No.1244, which brought to an end Serb aggression in Kosovo and stopped the genocide exercised by the Serb authorities who had aimed to ethnically cleanse Kosovo. UNMIK was set up in Kosovo on the second half of 1999 and continues to exercise its entrusted mandate even as this article is being written. Its responsibilities are broadly stretched in many fields and are prescribed in 21 paragraphs (points), tens of subparagraphs (bullets) and two Annexes of the said Resolution. Currently, the responsibilities of UNMIK have been reduced to a large extent. Notwithstanding this, one of its reserved powers continues to be the management of the criminal justice system, which is the topic of this review. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In contrast to the common perception that the United Nations is, or should become, a system of collective security, this paper advances the proposition that the UN Security Council embodies a necessarily selective approach. Analysis of its record since 1945 suggests that the Council cannot address all security threats effectively. The reasons for this include not only the veto power of the five permanent members, but also the selectivity of all UN member states: their unwillingness to provide forces for peacekeeping or other purposes except on a case-by-case basis, and their reluctance to involve the Council in certain conflicts to which they are parties, or which they perceive as distant, complex and resistant to outside involvement. The Council's selectivity is generally seen as a problem, even a threat to its legitimacy. Yet selectivity, which is rooted in prudence and in the UN Charter itself, has some virtues. Acknowledging the necessary limitations within which the Security Council operates, this paper evaluates the Council's achievements in tackling the problem of war since 1945. In doing so, it sheds light on the division of labour among the Council, regional security bodies and states, and offers a pioneering contribution to public and governmental understanding of the UN's past, present and future roles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In contrast to the common perception that the United Nations is, or should become, a system of collective security, this paper advances the proposition that the UN Security Council embodies a necessarily selective approach. Analysis of its record since 1945 suggests that the Council cannot address all security threats effectively. The reasons for this include not only the veto power of the five permanent members, but also the selectivity of all UN member states: their unwillingness to provide forces for peacekeeping or other purposes except on a case-by-case basis, and their reluctance to involve the Council in certain conflicts to which they are parties, or which they perceive as distant, complex and resistant to outside involvement. The Council's selectivity is generally seen as a problem, even a threat to its legitimacy. Yet selectivity, which is rooted in prudence and in the UN Charter itself, has some virtues. Acknowledging the necessary limitations within which the Security Council operates, this paper evaluates the Council's achievements in tackling the problem of war since 1945. In doing so, it sheds light on the division of labour among the Council, regional security bodies and states, and offers a pioneering contribution to public and governmental understanding of the UN's past, present and future roles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In contrast to the common perception that the United Nations is, or should become, a system of collective security, this paper advances the proposition that the UN Security Council embodies a necessarily selective approach. Analysis of its record since 1945 suggests that the Council cannot address all security threats effectively. The reasons for this include not only the veto power of the five permanent members, but also the selectivity of all UN member states: their unwillingness to provide forces for peacekeeping or other purposes except on a case-by-case basis, and their reluctance to involve the Council in certain conflicts to which they are parties, or which they perceive as distant, complex and resistant to outside involvement. The Council's selectivity is generally seen as a problem, even a threat to its legitimacy. Yet selectivity, which is rooted in prudence and in the UN Charter itself, has some virtues. Acknowledging the necessary limitations within which the Security Council operates, this paper evaluates the Council's achievements in tackling the problem of war since 1945. In doing so, it sheds light on the division of labour among the Council, regional security bodies and states, and offers a pioneering contribution to public and governmental understanding of the UN's past, present and future roles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In contrast to the common perception that the United Nations is, or should become, a system of collective security, this paper advances the proposition that the UN Security Council embodies a necessarily selective approach. Analysis of its record since 1945 suggests that the Council cannot address all security threats effectively. The reasons for this include not only the veto power of the five permanent members, but also the selectivity of all UN member states: their unwillingness to provide forces for peacekeeping or other purposes except on a case-by-case basis, and their reluctance to involve the Council in certain conflicts to which they are parties, or which they perceive as distant, complex and resistant to outside involvement. The Council's selectivity is generally seen as a problem, even a threat to its legitimacy. Yet selectivity, which is rooted in prudence and in the UN Charter itself, has some virtues. Acknowledging the necessary limitations within which the Security Council operates, this paper evaluates the Council's achievements in tackling the problem of war since 1945. In doing so, it sheds light on the division of labour among the Council, regional security bodies and states, and offers a pioneering contribution to public and governmental understanding of the UN's past, present and future roles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In contrast to the common perception that the United Nations is, or should become, a system of collective security, this paper advances the proposition that the UN Security Council embodies a necessarily selective approach. Analysis of its record since 1945 suggests that the Council cannot address all security threats effectively. The reasons for this include not only the veto power of the five permanent members, but also the selectivity of all UN member states: their unwillingness to provide forces for peacekeeping or other purposes except on a case-by-case basis, and their reluctance to involve the Council in certain conflicts to which they are parties, or which they perceive as distant, complex and resistant to outside involvement. The Council's selectivity is generally seen as a problem, even a threat to its legitimacy. Yet selectivity, which is rooted in prudence and in the UN Charter itself, has some virtues. Acknowledging the necessary limitations within which the Security Council operates, this paper evaluates the Council's achievements in tackling the problem of war since 1945. In doing so, it sheds light on the division of labour among the Council, regional security bodies and states, and offers a pioneering contribution to public and governmental understanding of the UN's past, present and future roles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In contrast to the common perception that the United Nations is, or should become, a system of collective security, this paper advances the proposition that the UN Security Council embodies a necessarily selective approach. Analysis of its record since 1945 suggests that the Council cannot address all security threats effectively. The reasons for this include not only the veto power of the five permanent members, but also the selectivity of all UN member states: their unwillingness to provide forces for peacekeeping or other purposes except on a case-by-case basis, and their reluctance to involve the Council in certain conflicts to which they are parties, or which they perceive as distant, complex and resistant to outside involvement. The Council's selectivity is generally seen as a problem, even a threat to its legitimacy. Yet selectivity, which is rooted in prudence and in the UN Charter itself, has some virtues. Acknowledging the necessary limitations within which the Security Council operates, this paper evaluates the Council's achievements in tackling the problem of war since 1945. In doing so, it sheds light on the division of labour among the Council, regional security bodies and states, and offers a pioneering contribution to public and governmental understanding of the UN's past, present and future roles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In contrast to the common perception that the United Nations is, or should become, a system of collective security, this paper advances the proposition that the UN Security Council embodies a necessarily selective approach. Analysis of its record since 1945 suggests that the Council cannot address all security threats effectively. The reasons for this include not only the veto power of the five permanent members, but also the selectivity of all UN member states: their unwillingness to provide forces for peacekeeping or other purposes except on a case-by-case basis, and their reluctance to involve the Council in certain conflicts to which they are parties, or which they perceive as distant, complex and resistant to outside involvement. The Council's selectivity is generally seen as a problem, even a threat to its legitimacy. Yet selectivity, which is rooted in prudence and in the UN Charter itself, has some virtues. Acknowledging the necessary limitations within which the Security Council operates, this paper evaluates the Council's achievements in tackling the problem of war since 1945. In doing so, it sheds light on the division of labour among the Council, regional security bodies and states, and offers a pioneering contribution to public and governmental understanding of the UN's past, present and future roles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In contrast to the common perception that the United Nations is, or should become, a system of collective security, this paper advances the proposition that the UN Security Council embodies a necessarily selective approach. Analysis of its record since 1945 suggests that the Council cannot address all security threats effectively. The reasons for this include not only the veto power of the five permanent members, but also the selectivity of all UN member states: their unwillingness to provide forces for peacekeeping or other purposes except on a case-by-case basis, and their reluctance to involve the Council in certain conflicts to which they are parties, or which they perceive as distant, complex and resistant to outside involvement. The Council's selectivity is generally seen as a problem, even a threat to its legitimacy. Yet selectivity, which is rooted in prudence and in the UN Charter itself, has some virtues. Acknowledging the necessary limitations within which the Security Council operates, this paper evaluates the Council's achievements in tackling the problem of war since 1945. In doing so, it sheds light on the division of labour among the Council, regional security bodies and states, and offers a pioneering contribution to public and governmental understanding of the UN's past, present and future roles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In contrast to the common perception that the United Nations is, or should become, a system of collective security, this paper advances the proposition that the UN Security Council embodies a necessarily selective approach. Analysis of its record since 1945 suggests that the Council cannot address all security threats effectively. The reasons for this include not only the veto power of the five permanent members, but also the selectivity of all UN member states: their unwillingness to provide forces for peacekeeping or other purposes except on a case-by-case basis, and their reluctance to involve the Council in certain conflicts to which they are parties, or which they perceive as distant, complex and resistant to outside involvement. The Council's selectivity is generally seen as a problem, even a threat to its legitimacy. Yet selectivity, which is rooted in prudence and in the UN Charter itself, has some virtues. Acknowledging the necessary limitations within which the Security Council operates, this paper evaluates the Council's achievements in tackling the problem of war since 1945. In doing so, it sheds light on the division of labour among the Council, regional security bodies and states, and offers a pioneering contribution to public and governmental understanding of the UN's past, present and future roles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 1945 the idea of some form of permanent UN peacekeeping force has been considered. There have been many suggestions as to how such a force could improve training, reaction time to crises, coordination efficiency and financial stability. The periods 1944-50 and 1990 to the present have been particularly active but the idea was also discussed during the four decades in-between. This article analyses international support for the idea in the mid-1960s by examining the plans, proceedings and results of a conference of 23 countries in 1964, organized by Canada. It shows that during 1950-90 small and middle powers (particularly Canada) were, like the superpowers, reluctant to sacrifice national sovereignty to the international organization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The role of UN peacekeeping missions has expanded beyond the traditional tasks of peacekeeping to include a wide range of political, economic, and humanitarian activities. While such expansion indicates an improved understanding of the complexities and challenges of post-conflict contexts, it also raises questions about whether UN peacekeeping missions are equipped to handle peacebuilding tasks. Evidence from a study of the peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone suggests they are not. This article argues that peacekeeping missions are a poor choice for peacebuilding given their limited mandates, capacity, leverage, resources and duration. Peacekeepers should focus on peacekeeping, by which they can lay the foundation for peacebuilding. Peacebuilding should be the primary task of national governments and their populations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reviews the lessons from Great Britain's successful military intervention in Sierra Leone in 2000. While their presence was ostensibly to protect their citizens, British armed forces successfully repelled the Revolutionary United Front until the United Nations peacekeeping mission was able to assert itself.

This article excerpts United Nations' documentation to present an update of existing peacekeeping missions around the world. The security situation in Darfur, Sudan, has deteriorated, threatening the fragile peace in the area. The UN peacekeeping force in Lebanon, however, has met with greater success. There has been very few instances of violence since initial hostilities ceased in August of 2006. The 15,000 troops will remain in the border zone between Lebanon and Israel for the foreseeable future.

In dealing with the sexual exploitation of women and girls by UN and other personnel operating in post-conflict situations there is a limited amount the UN can do without the cooperation of troop contributing states. Anyone employed by, or affiliated with the UN must be held accountable and, when the circumstances so warrant, prosecuted. This article is a legal analysis and discussion of these problems against the background of the report by the Secretary-General's adviser on sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers (the Zeid Report), and the UN investigation into allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by MONUC personnel in the Congo. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the security situation in Darfur remaining grim, the international community passed United Nations Security Resolution 1769 that authorised a more robust peacekeeping force. This article addresses the security concerns motivating the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), highlights the mandate and implications of the force, and compares the potential command and control issues to the experiences of the Somalia intervention in the 1990s. It closes by analysing the prospects for success of the intervention and offering some limited recommendations on ways to mitigate the risks associated with the peacekeeping effort. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In March 2003, Iraqi soldiers captured Pfc. Jessica Lynch, and one week later, American soldiers rescued her in a dramatic, filmed operation. From the moment of her capture, both the American government and the media used Lynch's story as a template for narratives that went far beyond the life of an American soldier to engage questions about war, race, gender, and nation. Journalists debated such issues as women in the military and Lynch as a feminist icon and even revisited the Great Society programs of the 1960s to demonstrate the ineffectiveness of government intervention in Appalachia, Lynch's region of origin. The spinning and counter-spinning of Lynch's story moved the traditional captivity narrative into a new form of imperial myth making, obliterating hierarchies of race, gender, and class at home, while setting Lynch in a foreign land where she was threatened by male, Arabic soldiers. This narrative sought to contain political opposition to the war, resolve the systemic blocking of opportunity in Appalachia, and bring Iraq fully into the orbit of American Empire. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]