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The paper has the following structure. In Section I, I introduce some important methodological preliminaries by asking: How should one reason about global environmental justice in general and global climate change in particular? Section II introduces the key normative argument; it argues that global climate change damages some fundamental human interests and results in a state of affairs in which the rights of many are unprotected: as such it is unjust. Section III addresses the complexities that arise from the fact that some of the ill effects of global climate change will fall on the members of future generations. Section IV shows that some prevailing approaches are unable to deal satisfactorily with the challenges posed by global climate change. If the argument of this paper is correct, it follows that those who contribute to global climate change through high emissions are guilty of human rights violations and they should be condemned as such.

Philosophical discussions of global justice often operate at an abstract level and rarely ask what specific policies should be adopted to bring about a fairer world. This essay aims to explore and investigate this kind of practical issue. It assumes a very minimal conception of global justice and then focuses on the question of which measures should be adopted to realize this minimal ideal. To do so it explores twelve separate measures, including debt cancellation, trade liberalization, global taxation, increased migration, and the implementation of international labour standards.

It is widely recognized that changes are occurring to the earth's climate and, further, that these changes threaten important human interests. This raises the question of who should bear the burdens of addressing global climate change. This paper aims to provide an answer to this question. To do so it focuses on the principle that those who cause the problem are morally responsible for solving it (the ‘polluter pays’ principle). It argues that while this has considerable appeal it cannot provide a complete account of who should bear the burdens of global climate change. It proposes three ways in which this principle needs to be supplemented, and compares the resulting moral theory with the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibility’.

Charles Beitz's Political Theory and International Relations has had an enormous impact on analyses of the ethical issues raised at the global level. It was the first systematic discussion of such ethical issues in the last 50 years if not more. It remains a landmark for a number of different reasons. First, it stands out for the sophistication of its philosophical argument and the meticulous argumentation throughout. The latter is deployed not simply to provide powerful critiques of other perspectives (such as realism and the morality of states). It also puts forward and defends with considerable ingenuity a cosmopolitan theory of distributive justice. A second striking and impressive feature of the book is that it successfully integrates philosophical argument with a deep grasp of the nature of world politics and the empirical and theoretical literatures on salient aspects of world politics. It remains an exemplar for how to argue in global political theory. To these two virtues we should also add that of a tremendous range. Beitz engages not simply with contemporary political theorists (such as Rawls) and International Relations scholars (such as Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye) but also with important thinkers of the past. His work analyses, among others, Grotius, Hobbes, Wolff, Vattel, Kant, Durkheim, Sidgwick and Mill. For these, and other, reasons Political Theory and International Relations has stood the test of time well. The book is divided into three parts, each of which remains of paramount importance to debates about the ethical character of global politics. Part One remains a key discussion of (the untenability of) realism. Part Two's discussion of the 'morality of states' poses a formidable challenge to those who maintain the unconditional value of state sovereignty. And Part Three provides the first systematic defence of a cosmopolitan conception of distributive justice an analysis which, especially given its emphasis on the moral significance of global interdependence, continues to be of utmost relevance.

In recent years a powerful case has been made in defence of a system of global governance in which supra-state institutions are accountable directly to the citizens of the world. This political vision- calling for what is commonly termed a ‘cosmopolitan democracy‘- has been defended with considerable imagination by thinkers such as Daniele Archibugi, Richard Falk, David Held, and Tony McGrew. At the same time, a number of powerful arguments have been developed in favour of cosmopolitan principles of distributive justice. Philosophers such as Brian Barry, Charles Beitz, Onora O'Neill, Thomas Pogge, Henry Shue, and Peter Singer have developed formidable arguments against wholly local theories of distributive justice and have argued for cosmopolitan conceptions of distributive justice.

Social diversity has become a major preoccupation of political philosophy. That concern is far from new. Its roots in the West are usually traced to the Reformation. Yet there has probably been no ...

Cosmopolitanism, world citizenship and global civil society, Chris Brown human rights and diverse cultures - continuity or discontinuity?, Peter Jones human rights, compatibility and diverse cultures, Dimon Caney the pendulum theory of individual, communal and minority rights, Tom Hadden the question of self-determination and its implications for normative international theory, Kimberly Hutchings Derrida and the Heidegger controversy - global friendship against racism, Mark Bevir humanitarian vigilantes or legal entrepreneurs - enforcing human rights in international society, Nicholas J. Wheeler.

The literature on global justice contains a number of distinct approaches. This article identifies and reviews recent work in four commonly found in the literature. First there is an examination of the cosmopolitan contention that distributive principles apply globally. This is followed by three responses to the cosmopolitanism, – the nationalist emphasis on special duties to co-nationals, the society of states claim that principles of global distributive justice violate the independence of states and the realist claim that global justice is utopian and that states should advance national interest.

This paper defends a global principle of equality of opportunity, which states that it is unfair if some have worse opportunities because of their national or civic identity. It begins by outlining the reasoning underpinning this principle. It then considers three objections to global equality of opportunity. The first argues that global equality of opportunity is an inappropriate ideal given the great cultural diversity that exists in the world. The second maintains that equality of opportunity applies only to people who are interconnected in some way and infers from this that it should not be implemented at the global level. The third, inspired by Rawls's The Law of Peoples, maintains that it is inappropriate to thrust liberal ideals (like global equality of opportunity) on nonliberal peoples. Each of these challenges, I argue, is unpersuasive.

(2000). Cosmopolitan Justice and Cultural Diversity. Global Society: Vol. 14, No. 4, pp. 525-551.

To whom do we owe obligations of distributive justice? In the last decade a number of distinguished political theorists - such as David Miller and Yael Tamir - have defended a nationalist account of our distributive obligations. This paper examines their account of distributive justice. In particular, it analyses their contention (a) that individuals owe special obligations to fellow-nationals, (b) that these obligations are obligations of distributive justice and (c) that these obligations are enforceable. Miller and Tamir's justifications, I argue, do not support these claims. Moreover, I argue, (a) and (c) should only be accepted in a greatly qualified form and (b) should be rejected altogether. The paper thus concludes that the nationalists' preferred account of distributive justice is untenable.

In this chapter I examine the responsibilities of major political actors with respect to addressing the challenges raised by dangerous climate change. There is widespread agreement among climate scientists that human activities are bringing about dangerous changes in the earth’s atmosphere. The Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports that temperatures and sea levels have been rising and will continue to rise even more dramatically if humanity continues to emit greenhouse gases at the rate it has been.

It is uncontroversial to observe that in contemporary liberal democracies there is much dissensus about the nature of the good life. Catholics, Protestants, Muslims, atheists and many others hold profoundly different and conflicting views about which personal ideals are fulfilling. Given this we need to know how the State should respond to such a lack of consensus. Various positions have been proposed and one can discern (at least) three possible responses. Some defend what might be termed the democratic solution: this affirms that when people are divided over an issue they should resolve the matter politically and decide the issue by voting on the matter. A second position sometimes affirmed is what might be termed the perfectionist solution: this states that when citizens disagree about which personal ideals are valuable the State should promote the most worthwhile ideals. In cases of conflict between conceptions of the good the State should decide in favour of the most valuable and fulfilling conceptions of the good. A third position might be termed the liberal solution: this maintains that the appropriate way for the State to respond to disagreement is for it to allow people equal freedom to make up their own minds. Now one can, of course, combine these three positions. One could, for example, embrace (b) and (c) and claim that the State should encourage worthwhile conceptions of the good but do so in a way that respects people's most important freedoms.' In this paper I shall consider and appraise Hillel Steiner's defence of what I have termed the liberal solution. In his important work An Essay on Rights he argues that given the existence of unresolvable disagreement there should be a right to equal freedom.2 Furthermore, he argues, this right is lexically prior to all other values.3 This claim that people have a right to equal freedom plays an important role in his theory. From it he derives an account of distributive justice that stipulates that people are entitled to (i) ownership of their bodies (231-2), and

This article examines Terry Nardin's account of the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention. Nardin argues that states ought to adopt a presumption against intervention in the affairs of another state but he claims that, under certain circumstances, this presumption may be overridden to further human rights. This article calls into question both his defence of the norm of nonintervention and his account of when humanitarian intervention is legitimate. It argues that his proposals do not go far enough and that a cosmopolitan theory of intervention is more plausible. Are states entitled to intervene in the affairs of other states? Do they have an obligation to do so? If they do, in what circumstances are they entitled or obligated

It is a commonplace that in many societies people adhere to profoundly different conceptions of the good. Given this we need to know what political principles are appropriate. How can we treat people who are committed to different accounts of the good with fairness? One recent answer to this pressing question is given by Brian Barry in his important workJustice as Impartiality. This book, of course, contains much more than this. It includes a powerful and incisive discussion of several accounts of distributive justice (‘justice as mutual advantage’ and ‘justice as reciprocity’), a critique of other attempts to defend liberal neutrality and a rebuttal of those who are critical of the ideal of impartiality. In this paper I wish, however, to focus on Barry's defence of liberal neutrality. The paper falls into three parts. Section I outlines the thesis that Barry wants to defend and gives a brief sketch of the argument he employs to defend it. Barry's argument makes two claims – what I have termed the Sceptical Thesis and the Agreement Thesis. Section II therefore critically assesses Barry's defence of the sceptical thesis and Section III examines the agreement thesis.

This article examines the justifications of anti-perfectionism given by John Rawls in his recent work Political Liberalism. Rawls, I argue, gives one major argument in defence of anti-perfectionism (what I shall call the ‘reasonableness among free and equal persons' argument) and two subsidiary arguments (what I shall call the ‘social unity’ argument and the ‘stability’ argument). None of these arguments, I claim, are persuasive. Rawls's most recent justification of anti-perfectionism is therefore unsuccessful.

In ‘Liberalism and communitarianism: a misconceived debate’ I argued that communitarians advance plausible descriptive and normative claims but that these are compatible with liberalism.1 I also argued that some communitarians affirm an implausible meta-ethical thesis which liberals disavow. Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift make seven criticisms of my analysis.2 Their first three criticisms focus on my treatment of the descriptive communitarian thesis that individuals ‘conceive their identity … as defined to some extent by the community of which they are a part’.3

. . It’s exciting to have a real crisis on your hands when you have spent half your political life dealing with humdrum things like the environment. . . . The world’s climate is undergoing dramatic and rapid changes. Most notably, the earth has been becoming markedly warmer, and its weather has, in addition to this, become increasingly unpredictable. These changes have had, and continue to have, important consequences for human life. In this chapter, I wish to examine what is the fairest way of dealing with the burdens created by global climate change. Who should bear the burdens? Should it be those who caused the problem? Should it be those best able to deal with the problem? Or should it be someone else? I defend a distinctive cosmopolitan theory of justice, criticize a key principle of international environmental law, and, moreover, challenge the “common but differentiated responsibility” approach that is affirmed in current international environmental law. Before considering different answers to the question of who should pay for the costs of global climate change, it is essential to be aware of both the distinct kind of theoretical challenge that global climate change raises and also the effects that climate change is having on people’s lives. Section 1 thus introduces some preliminary methodological observations on normative theorizing about global climate change. In addition, it outlines some basic background scientific claims about the impacts of climate change. Section 2 examines one common way of thinking about the duty to bear the burdens caused by climate change, namely the doctrine that those who have caused the problem are responsible for bearing the burden. It argues that this doctrine, while in many ways appealing, is more problematic than might first appear and is also incomplete in a number of different ways (sections 3 through 8). In particular, it needs to be grounded in a more general theory of justice and rights.

Climate change poses grave threats to many people, including the most vulnerable. This prompts the question of who should bear the burden of combating 'dangerous' climate change. Many appeal to the Polluter Pays Principle. I argue that it should play an important role in any adequate analysis of the responsibility to combat climate change, but suggests that it suffers from three limitations and that it needs to be revised. I then consider the Ability to Pay Principle and consider four objections to this principle. I suggest that, when suitably modified, it can supplement the Polluter Pays Principle.

This article considers the criticisms made of liberal political thought by communitarians in the 1980s. It aims to clarify the communitarian critique and evaluate the force of communitarian criticisms of liberalism. It argues that communitarians advance three different types of claim: descriptive claims which stress that people are social beings; normative claims which celebrate the value of community and solidarity, and a meta-ethical claim emphasizing that political principles should mirror ‘shared understandings’. This article argues that the descriptive and normative claims espoused by communitarians are judged to be plausible but are accepted by liberals, and that the meta-ethical thesis is untenable and liberals are right to eschew it.

It is widely recognized that anthropogenic climate change will have harmful effects on many human beings and in particular on the most disadvantaged. In particular, it is projected to result in flooding, heat stress, food insecurity, drought, and increased exposure to waterborne and vector-borne diseases. Various different normative frameworks have been employed to think about climate change. Some, for example, apply cost-benefit analysis to climate change. The Stern Review provides a good example of this approach. It proceeds by comparing the costs (and any benefits) associated with anthropogenic climate change with the costs and any benefits of a program for combating climate change. On this basis, it argues that an aggressive policy of mitigation and adaptation is justified. Whereas the costs of combating climate change, according to Stern, are quite low, the costs of “business of usual” would be considerable. Other analysts adopt a second perspective and conceive of climate change in terms of its impact on security. For example, the High Representative and the European Commission to the European Council issued a statement on Climate Change and International Security, which argues that climate change is “a threat multiplier which exacerbates existing trends, tensions and instability.” It argues that climate change will contribute to the following kinds of insecurities: tensions over scarce resources; land loss and border disputes; conflicts over energy sources; conflict prompted by migration; and tensions between those whose emissions caused climate change and those who will suffer the consequences of climate change. In addition to the “economic” approach and “security-based” approach, some adopt a third different perspective, according to which the natural world has intrinsic value. This ecological approach condemns human-induced climate change because it is an instance of humanity’s domination and destruction of the natural world. For all of their merits, these three perspectives omit an important consideration: the impact of climate change on persons’ fundamental human rights. In this chapter, I argue that it is appropriate to analyze climate change in terms of its impact on human rights.

In recent years, a number of thinkers have argued that members of minority cultures are entitled to special protection. All modern political societies comprise a plurality of different cultures and, in many cases, members of minority cultures have argued that they should receive group rights in order to recognize and protect their cultural identity. Thus, we encounter demands for independence for Quebec, for self-determination for Shia and Kurds in Iraq, for girls to be allowed to wear the hijab in school, for women to wear the niqab at work, for minority languages to receive official support and be taught in schools, and for national minorities to have their own television channels. We have, moreover, encountered arguments for Sikhs to be exempted from wearing crash-helmets, for religious communities to be exempt from rules on animal slaughter, for state funding of faith schools to teach children the religion their parents endorse, for restrictions on freedom of expression when the exercise of that freedom offends others (or incites them to religious hatred), and for indigenous peoples to continue to inhabit their traditional homelands. These kinds of proposals, of course, vary enormously but underlying all of them is a belief that the practices of cultural minorities merit protection.

Liberal theorists have traditionally emphasized the importance of rights and just institutions. Recently liberalism and the liberal emphasis on rights have been criticized on the grounds that they are individualistic and overlook the importance of community and fraternity. In this Note I look at two particular arguments, made by the communitarian Michael Sandel, that have been levelled at the liberal emphasis on rights, namely, what I shall call the ‘circumstances of justice’ argument and the ‘crowding out’ argument.

In recent years a large and impressive literature has evolved concerning the principles of distributive justice that should apply at the global level. However, although there is an extensive and sophisticated literature on global distributive justice, there has not been much extended philosophical discussion of the kinds of global principles of justice that should apply to the environment.1 This general neglect is both striking and represents an important omission for there is a great number of pressing environmental issues which have a large impact on people throughout the world. One obvious example of the latter is global climate change. It is now widely recognized that the world’s climate is becoming both warmer and more unpredictable, and that human activity causes these changes. The emission of greenhouse gases and extensive deforestation have contributed to, and continue to contribute to, global climate change. This raises a number of normative questions. As Henry Shue points out, we can identify at least four separate questions: (i) who should shoulder the costs of preventing further global warming?, (ii) who should shoulder the costs of coping with global warming?, (iii) what is a fair background framework within which parties can negotiate?, and (iv) what are fair emissions levels, both in the short term as we move to a fair system and in the long run? (Shue, 1994: 344, 1995: 240).

Having argued, in Ch. 2, that there are universal moral values, the next logical step is to ask what these universal moral values are; this question is pursued in Chs 3 and 4, which consider arguments for two different types of universal value and link together to provide an analysis of what universal principles of justice should apply at the global level. This chapter examines claims that there are universal principles of civil and political justice, that is, those principles that specify what rights people have to what freedoms, and argues for universal human rights to certain civil and political liberties. It is arranged in 13 sections: Section I presents an analysis of human rights, since this term plays a central and important role in a plausible account of civil and political justice; Section II puts forward a general thesis about justifications for civil and political human rights; this is followed, in Sections III–VII, by an analysis of four cosmopolitan arguments for human rights that criticizes three of them but defends the fourth; Section VIII considers an alternative non-cosmopolitan approach to defending civil and political human rights, presented by John Rawls in The Law of Peoples (1999b); the next three sections (IX–XI) of the chapter explore misgivings about civil and political human rights, including the objections that such human rights are a species of imperialism and do not accord sufficient respect to cultural practices (IX), produce homogeneity/uniformity (X), and generate egoism/individualism and destroy community (XI); Section XII considers a further objection—the realist charges that foreign policy to protect civil and political human rights is in practice selective and partial and a cloak for the pursuit of the national interest. Section XIII summarizes the overall case made for civil and political justice.

Focuses on the question of whether it is ever justified to intervene in the affairs of another political regime. To answer this question, the chapter begins, in Section I, with an analysis of what is meant by humanitarian intervention, and then goes on, in Section II, to outline a cosmopolitan argument for the right, and indeed duty, of humanitarian intervention. Sections III–VI then consider four counter-arguments for a norm of non-intervention presented by ‘society of states’ theorists, realists, and nationalists; these are that humanitarian intervention is illegitimate because it fails to respect the right to self-government, is presumptuous and arrogant, destroys international stability, and rarely succeeds. Sections VII–VIII argue that there is a moral case for intervention on humanitarian grounds, and analyse the conditions that must be satisfied before intervention is attempted (VII), as well as the principles that should guide the conduct of an intervention (VIII). Section IX examines whether international law should affirm a right to humanitarian intervention, and Section X summarizes and concludes, suggesting that overall, on cosmopolitan grounds, humanitarian intervention is defensible under certain conditions, but pointing out that it is a reactive policy, and that there is a strong case to be made for tackling and preventing problems rather than responding to them after they have arisen.

Describes the aims, approaches, and structure of the book. The basic issue addressed is the political principles that should govern global politics, and to analyse this the book posits six sets of questions, each of which is addressed in separate chapters that separately examine (moral) universalism, civil and political justice, distributive justice, political structures, just war, and humanitarian intervention. The author makes four points: that his concern is with political philosophy; that he refers to global rather than international political theory; that he examines global political theory rather than global ethics; and that he distinguishes three levels at which global political theory may operate—its relation to domestic political theory, the principles and institutions involved, and the application of these principles to specific issues. He also identifies the aims of the book, which are: to provide a defence of what is commonly termed a cosmopolitan political morality; to explore in depth and evaluate competing philosophical perspectives on these issues; and to emphasize that the topics examined in the book are very closely intertwined and cannot be engaged satisfactorily in isolation from one another. The four competing approaches that may be taken to global political theory (cosmopolitanism, realism, the ‘society of states’, and nationalism) are outlined in turn in order to provide a framework within which the six questions posited in the book are examined, and to stake out and defend the cosmopolitan approach taken.