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When and why might a rising China challenge the power and security of a relatively declining United States? Conventional wisdom argues that China – like other rising states – is apt to adopt an increasingly ambitious strategy that imperils US interests as its relative power grows. Drawing on balance of power theory, I instead argue that the threat of Chinese predation is overstated. Rising in a crowded geopolitical neighbourhood, China faces incentives to avoid preying on the United States, and may even have reason to cooperate with the United States over the long term. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why did the United States fail to stop Israeli acquisition of nuclear weapons? Existing research argues that patrons such as the U.S. should have an easy time halting proliferation by militarily and economically vulnerable clients. Nevertheless, Israel acquired nuclear weapons with relatively little American opposition. Utilizing extensive primary source research, we argue that problematic intelligence-policy relations hindered U.S. efforts to arrest Israeli proliferation as (1) policymakers often gave mixed guidance to the intelligence community, resulting in (2) limited information on Israeli efforts that reinforced policy ambiguity. The results carry implications for understanding the dynamics of nuclear proliferation and intelligence-policy relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A letter to the editor and a reply are presented in response to the article "Deal or No Deal" that was published in the previous issue.

Did the United States promise the Soviet Union during the 1990 negotiations on German reunification that NATO would not expand into Eastern Europe? Since the end of the Cold War, an array of Soviet/Russian policymakers have charged that NATO expansion violates a U.S. pledge advanced in 1990; in contrast, Western scholars and political leaders dispute that the United States made any such commitment. Recently declassified U.S. government documents provide evidence supporting the Soviet/Russian position. Although no non-expansion pledge was ever codified, U.S. policymakers presented their Soviet counterparts with implicit and informal assurances in 1990 strongly suggesting that NATO would not expand in post-Cold War Europe if the Soviet Union consented to German reunification. The documents also show, however, that the United States used the reunification negotiations to exploit Soviet weaknesses by depicting a mutually acceptable post-Cold War security environment, while actually seeking a system dominated by the United States and opening the door to NATO's eastward expansion. The results of this analysis carry implications for international relations theory, diplomatic history, and current U.S.-Russian relations [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A letter to the editor is presented in response to the article "China's Century? Why America's Edge Will Endure," by Michael Beckley in the Winter 2011 issue.

The article examines the limits of Iran's ballistic missile arsenal. The analysis focuses on the country's capacity to retaliate with these missiles by launching them at crude oil installations in the Persian Gulf region if its nuclear program is attacked. A worst-case scenario is presented in which Iran attacks Saudi Arabia's crude oil facilities to stop Saudi Arabian petroleum production and create havoc in the world energy markets. The conclusion is that Iran's missile defenses would be ineffective unless the country develops missiles that have a longer range and use Global Positioning System (GPS) technology more effectively. Saudi Arabia's defense capability and potential countermeasures are mentioned.